GoodGuy
Posts: 1506
Joined: 5/17/2006 From: Cologne, Germany Status: offline
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Prince of Eckmühl The ships logs conveniently went down with the carriers, btw. The material has been available for twenty-thirty years but went unnoticed for want of translation and interpretation. The authors offer copious source referencing. PoE (aka ivanmoe) Hi POE, you suggested that I should read Shatt.Sword a while ago, and I've read a lot of reviews and reader comments, and now I think ppl should read this interesting book, especially since the US Navy put it on their list of "must-read" works for their academy and their research facilities. I have not read the book yet (delivery to Germany takes several weeks ) but I've ordered it. I do think, despite all the numbers and facts the authors collected, that this work has a few weak spots, though. Correct me if I'm wrong (since I've not read the book yet), but I got the following impressions after I did quite some research about the book: Since the authors communicated with so many ppl around the globe (via email, hey this is the electronic age :p) many quotes/footnotes refer to emails only. Japanese experts/historians forwarded numbers/figures, blueprints etc., but original sources/works (given, most likely in japanese anyways) remain unknown/unmentioned, with some of these "evidences" coming across as hearsay, although these experts might be spot-on. In quite some cases, the authors never got their hands on original sources/material. Don't get me wrong, with their thorough research/communication, they collected a massive amount of facts, no doubt. Still, all the details about hangar setups, loading processes, operating mode and construction design of AA's, fire control, doctrines, do not tell what the USN did right (besides having a good amount of luck), so I still tend to think that dedication and a few quick bold moves on the US side, and - in turn - some bad coordination and delayed decisions on the jap side were important factors at Midway, maybe a tick more important than the authors would accept. They paint a picture where the IJN's assets and doctrines were ill-fated right from the start, with doctrines, procedures and even vessels/aircrafts having quite some weaknesses. I for one do think that, in addition to these weaknesses, some officers within the KB were "just" incapable and/or they proposed/conducted half-assed operations. Misconceptions during the planning phase (for Midway), poor planning (or bad luck, depending on your POV) regarding the collection of intel (i.e. operations of the seaplane base, which was supposed to track the movement of US carriers, were delayed), bad a/c coordination and double minded officers ... all of these factors have to be added to the facts stated in the book. The US in turn did have one or another incapable high-ranking officer, even with subordinates demanding the removal, but dedication and finesse presented by some of the TG commanders partially made up for some dumb moves. Also, I don't know if the authors factor in the sheer US advantage when it comes to industry/weaponry production. Even if IJN doctrines / procedures / weaponry would have been superior all along the way, the amount of weaponry the US could field after Midway was impressive and a tough nut to crack. Until Midway, US air assets for example, were not as successful/capable as one might think after reading Shattered Sword. I think I'll stick to my theory (for now) that the IJN would have had a chance at Midway, if the operation would have been planned differently. Spreading the forces (by ordering the simultaneous attack on the Aleutians, which wasn't even conducted simultaneously ) was one of the worst moves around. Last but not least, it seems to be like KB here KB there in the book, although the term for the "combined fleet" (superior unit, I can't recall the japanese term atm) was the more important part within the japanese doctrine. Gigantic surface ships played a vital role in that fleet and in their doctrine in general, since the IJN believed that these monstrous BBs were needed, although we know today that they bet on the wrong horse, so I would like to know how the authors treat that part of history. (High numbers of) Carriers turned out to be one of the decisive factors during the war in the Pacific, with the USN's submarines accounting for 55% of all Japanese tonnage sunk in the war, maybe the most important branch if you look at what quickened Japans fall. Unlike the fight for resources in Europe, namely the Allied doctrine to cut supply lines/resources of the Axis, which was only partially successful (because the Axis powers managed to rebuild/repair plants often), the raids on Japanese supply lines, conducted by a/c's, TGs and submarines, with the latter being the most succesful branch, were impressively successful. I think reading a good book covering the US POV, along with reading Shattered Sword, would be the way to go, since Sh.-Sword delivers valuable insights, but it does not draw the whole picture. My 2 cents.
< Message edited by GoodGuy -- 8/23/2007 4:05:31 AM >
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"Aw Nuts" General Anthony McAuliffe December 22nd, 1944 Bastogne --- "I've always felt that the AA (Alied Assault engine) had the potential to be [....] big." Tim Stone 8th of August, 2006
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