Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: Tiornu

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And has an unfortunate Dr. Phil fetish, it seems... Most disturbing...

Update: I'm told that the tattoo is not in fact Dr Phil but an ancient Toltec deity best remembered for inventing the Twinkee. Not only that, but it's not actually on the back of MY head, so clearly I have dodged a bullet.
On the subject of "best," it occurs to me that George Moore's Building for Victory offers an excellent account of how the RN decided which ships best fit its needs during WWII. I don't know any other book like it.

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"Accuracy of the Gunfire of Main Batteries of United States Battleships" for the National Defense Research Committee. It dates to 1944 and uses Iowa as a benchmark for its comparisons of the different gunnery processes. The analysis is intense. One table summarizes hit percentages at four target angles (0, 30, 60, and 90 degrees) and projects the number of hits to be expected in each case at ranges listed in 2000-yard increments out to 34,000 yards. At that range and a target angle of 90deg, the radar ship would get 23.53% more hits; for 0deg, it's 10%. The greatest boost for radar appears to be at around 20,000 yards were the advantages are 26.83-32.38%.

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ORIGINAL: Tiornu
On the subject of "best," it occurs to me that George Moore's Building for Victory offers an excellent account of how the RN decided which ships best fit its needs during WWII. I don't know any other book like it.

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ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

Yea despite my better judgment ...

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I'll see if I can find that at the local U.

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ORIGINAL: Nikademus

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ORIGINAL: Tiornu
On the subject of "best," it occurs to me that George Moore's Building for Victory offers an excellent account of how the RN decided which ships best fit its needs during WWII. I don't know any other book like it.

Yikes......$211.00 off amazon. pricey!

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ORIGINAL: Jaroen

@Tiornu: Thank you for the commendation and later reference on the George Moore book.
I will stick to the DK Brown book for starters. Seems like a good follow-up on the book I just finished: "Churchill's Navy: the ships, men and organisation 1939-1945; by Brian Lavery". A nice introduction which covers a wide range of related subjects putting it all in perspective. One anecdote I found surprising: "A normal salvo in a ship with twin turrets was to fire one gun in each turret, while the other reloaded. The nine-gun Rodney normally fired her nine main guns in salvoes of five and four, but when she took part in the sinking of the Bismarck in 1941 she also fired one eight-gun salvo and there were seven-gun ones. According to an American observer on board: Damage sustained from contusion of broadsides very considerable, causing undue discomfort to personnel and much work to make compartments habitable. Tile decking in washrooms, water closets and heads were ruptured throughout the ship. Urinals were blown off bulkheads, water pipes broken, and heads flooded. Longitudinal beams were broken and cracked in many parts of the ship having to be shored. ... The overhead decking ruptured and many bad leaks were caused by bolts and rivets coming loose. All compartments on the main deck had water flodding the decks."

What surprised me was both the non-use of full broadsides (nine-gun salvoes) and the damage involved with firing it's own main guns. I presume both were common on all big gun ships and perhaps even on the smaller gunned ones. How much does "good design" help on this?

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I think one of the factors is that if you lack the ability to deal with a BB, which often means having your own BB

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ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

Just want to understand this point: you guys are saying that this ship HMS Rodney, damaged herself by firing her guns?

I realize that she was a compromise reduced version of herself because of the Washington Treaty, but still, isn't that absurd?

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ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

I have a faint inkling that the whole big gun infatuation/arms race period of the early decades of the century was in part irrational or at best 'speculative.' Until bigger and 'better' was actually tested in war who could have easily dismissed the fact that a rival nation was building these things as being 'inconsequential?"

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ORIGINAL: Anthropoid

I have a faint inkling that the whole big gun infatuation/arms race period of the early decades of the century was in part irrational or at best 'speculative.' Until bigger and 'better' was actually tested in war who could have easily dismissed the fact that a rival nation was building these things as being 'inconsequential?"

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This is what I'd like to know: was it really just a waste of time? Were DDs and torpedo boats, aircraft, mines, etc., just as good for 'countering' enemy BBs as building your own BBs would have been?

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ORIGINAL: Terminus

Not in the 30's, certainly... Later, 'twas a different story.

I'd advance the opinion, however, that the last war-winning performance by the battleship was at Tsushima. After that, they didn't do much to justify their price-tags.

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ORIGINAL: Tiornu
The HSF was also built on the premise of a new Trafalgar. The difference is that the Grand Fleet was actually capable of winning it. It therefore never had to. The Grand Fleet was a monumental success, even if that success wasn't all that gratifying. The HSF, on the other hand, represents one of the greatest policy blunders of the century. The lesson: don't waste your money on a weapon that cannot win.

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ORIGINAL: JWE

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ORIGINAL: Tiornu
The HSF was also built on the premise of a new Trafalgar. The difference is that the Grand Fleet was actually capable of winning it. It therefore never had to. The Grand Fleet was a monumental success, even if that success wasn't all that gratifying. The HSF, on the other hand, represents one of the greatest policy blunders of the century. The lesson: don't waste your money on a weapon that cannot win.

I think Tiornu makes a good point. The larger the superiority, the fewer the opportunities to show that superiority. The fleet in being thing only works if you are able to pin or fixate an opposing (hopefully much larger) force onto your own, thereby opening up opportunities elsewhere.

But if you ain’t got no elsewhere, or the opponent is so superior they can confront the fleet in being as well as maintain superiority elsewhere, you be in a world of hurt, and just wasted a few billion dollars, pounds, marks, lire, francs, zlotys, whatever. So why poke your head out and die? Doesn’t leave much opportunity for the big boys to rack up a kill. HSF got marginalized rather quickly. But all that means is that the Grand Fleet BBs did their jobs, as an extension of policy.

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ORIGINAL: Tiornu

The Grand Fleet was a monumental success, even if that success wasn't all that gratifying.

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ORIGINAL: Tiornu

The HSF was also built on the premise of a new Trafalgar. The difference is that the Grand Fleet was actually capable of winning it. It therefore never had to. The Grand Fleet was a monumental success, even if that success wasn't all that gratifying. The HSF, on the other hand, represents one of the greatest policy blunders of the century. The lesson: don't waste your money on a weapon that cannot win.