Subchaser
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ORIGINAL: Charles_22
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ORIGINAL: Subchaser
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ORIGINAL: Charles_22
I think I saw several internet sources that claimed IJ plane production was some 76,000.
Japan produced 53734 aircraft in 1942-1945, most of them in 1944 – 28180, for Japan in ’44 this was not bad at all, USSR for comparison produced 40300 planes the same year (with industry safe and well supplied). Japanese a/c production experienced 70% increase between 1942 and 1944. 28180 is impressive figure in such circumstances, but one should not forget that more than 20% of those were trainers, totally out of scope in witp, so monthly rate was about 1600-1800 of combat aircraft.
So the war total would be roughly 1,174 per month including trainers. I think you're counting only 3 years. I'm counting about 45 months instead of 36, which must be how you're getting the higher figure. Still, even with 1,174, even at a 30% trainer rate, which you say is incorrect for IJ, 600 fighters of one type monthly is quite easy. IJ didn't do that needless to say, but the IJ player emporer can and at least has historical gross production figures to back it up.
1600-1800 (combat a/c) is an average rate for 1944 only, the year when Japanese a/c output raised to its peak. But it’s a bit pointless task trying to figure out an average monthly production rate, there are so many different factors here that make any statistical result misleading and out of the context. While the use of number of aircraft rather than airframe weight tends to underemphasize increase of output somewhat in the USA and overemphasize it in Germany, in Japan the relationship between airframe weight and number of planes produced remained almost constant during the war years. In US, the shift to 4-engined bombers towards the end of the war tended to result in a decline in the monthly output of planes by number, whereas total weight produced increased. In Germany, the shift away from bombers to fighters resulted in an increase in number in 1944 while weight remained steady. In Japan, though there was a shift from bombers to fighters, the early bombers were very light while the trend in fighters was toward heavier, better protected types, so one balanced the other.
Japanese a/c output was actually adequate to meet their war needs. The real problem was their a/c industry management and IJA/IJN strategic planning. The irony for Japanese was that when in 1943 the good pilots were still available they had to use inferior planes and were killed, while, by the end of 1944 when the better planes were becoming available, pilot training had to be severely cut because of insufficient number of trainers and the fuel shortage, and then poor pilots were slaughtered in a lot better planes. When in 1942-early 43 they still had a luxury to produce more trainers and less fighters of obsolete types they opted for more such fighters, in 1944 they’ve finally got some good fighter designs and were ready to produce them in numbers, they found out that they had no adequate pilots to operate these new aircraft, so the losses became even higher and thus hard-earned increase in a/c production was simply nullified. Number of ground personnel and supporting units also did not increase properly by 1944, given the troublesome nature of most Japanese engines, it was a real handicap.
If you have enough capacities to produce 600 Tony airframes and 600 kawasaki engines per month (IIRC Kawasaki produced more than 400 Ki-61 airframes somewhere in 1944) this doesn’t necessarily mean that you’ll get 600 new Ki-61s boost next month. The key here and that should really be used as historic reference for such matters is a number of fully operational a/c in first-line combat units. The following chart indicates the total first-line combat strength of all US airpower pitted against first-line combat strength of the Japanese units in PTO, on four successive dates.
------------USA------Japan
Jan. 1943 - 3537 / 3200 = 1,1 : 1
Jan. 1944 - 11442 / 4050 = 2,8 : 1
Jan. 1945 - 17976 / 4600 = 3,9 : 1
July 1945 - 21908 / 4100 = 5,3 : 1
As you can see the dramatic 70% increase in a/c production in 1944 did not change much for the first line japanese units. If your air force and air industry do not act as a single mechanism, all efforts will be futile.
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