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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 6:31:46 PM   
golden delicious


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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Squads, but light rifle squads. These have half the firepower of regular fire squads.


2/3s.

quote:

The differences are that (1) 5% of a tank's load might be three hundred pounds -- 5% of a rifleman's load of ammo is about one pound. (2) The rifleman -- almost regardless of his 'fuel' situation -- can be redeployed to face any threat or even moved to another sector entirely. A tank without fuel simply can't move.


True. And in an operational game, defending a hex implies that the equipment in the unit can move around within that hex- especially as one moves up the scales.

< Message edited by golden delicious -- 2/15/2010 6:32:17 PM >


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 6:34:04 PM   
Meyer1

 

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quote:

:
ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Assuming we're talking about one twelve tube artillery battalion and one eight hundred man infantry battalion, in your case we're getting maybe one shell for each artillery tube and about ten rounds per rifleman.

That'll get you one salvo in the morning and enough rifle fire to fend off a light probe.

Alternatively, give all 1000 kg to the riflemen. Now you've got forty rounds per rifleman. They can be overrun -- but it'll take an earnest assault with at least equivalent numbers.


This case assumes that the units had no supply at all before receiving those 1000kg. As I said before, units were pulled out of the line before they find themselves in such position. And in the case that are sourrounded, well, I guess it depends on the particular situation. Sometimes one artillery salvo in the morning could be better than ten rounds per rifle.

< Message edited by Meyer1 -- 2/15/2010 6:35:10 PM >

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 6:48:39 PM   
Meyer1

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright


But that's just it. In TOAW-land, you don't pull them out of the line. You keep banging away with them. It's the land of the perpetual offensive.


Well, perhaps the problem is that 1% supply units have too great combat potential, but I don't se that armor and artillery should be more affected by this than the infantry.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 6:49:55 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Meyer1

quote:

:
ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Assuming we're talking about one twelve tube artillery battalion and one eight hundred man infantry battalion, in your case we're getting maybe one shell for each artillery tube and about ten rounds per rifleman.

That'll get you one salvo in the morning and enough rifle fire to fend off a light probe.

Alternatively, give all 1000 kg to the riflemen. Now you've got forty rounds per rifleman. They can be overrun -- but it'll take an earnest assault with at least equivalent numbers.


This case assumes that the units had no supply at all before receiving those 1000kg. As I said before, units were pulled out of the line before they find themselves in such position.


Not in TOAW, they won't be. That's largely the problem.
quote:




And in the case that are sourrounded, well, I guess it depends on the particular situation. Sometimes one artillery salvo in the morning could be better than ten rounds per rifle.


Sometimes. Like, you want to keep a load for that special moment. However, this is TOAW, and we have to work with the general run of cases, and abstract the hell out of everything.

Infantry retains some combat value with an almost absurdly small tonnage. Therefore, in circumstances where only an absurdly small tonnage is available, it will be the infantry that will retain combat value.

The first thing I keep seeing is that artillery and mechanized forces come to a hard stop. That last fifty pound shell is fired, or that last gallon of fuel is burnt, and that's it. You can't make a stirring speech to the truck engine and get it to give you another five miles. It'll be utterly irresponsive. Infantry is to some extent self-adjusting. As the 'fuel' runs down it will only respond to increasingly imperative demands -- but it will respond.

The second thing I keep seeing is that the fuel and ammo requirements for artillery et al are truly massive. Any impediment to the flow of supply directly and immediately cuts into their utility.

An artillery tube that can fire only one shell in a day has almost neglible value compared to one that can fire a thousand shells. Curtail the ammo supply of a rifle platoon and it can no longer blaze away at everything that goes bump in the night -- but with a few cases of rifle ammunition, it can continue to be a formidable obstacle to an attacker.


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 6:58:27 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Meyer1


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright


But that's just it. In TOAW-land, you don't pull them out of the line. You keep banging away with them. It's the land of the perpetual offensive.


Well, perhaps the problem is that 1% supply units have too great combat potential, but I don't se that armor and artillery should be more affected by this than the infantry.


Think of it this way: to keep an artillery or armor unit at the values it will have at 1% requires something like one hundred times the tonnage that would be required to keep an infantry unit at the value it will have at 1%. It is true that infantry often retains some combat value in circumstances where the guns have simply run out of shells and the tanks have simply run out of fuel.

< Message edited by ColinWright -- 2/15/2010 6:59:23 PM >


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 7:11:45 PM   
Meyer1

 

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quote:

However, until we know to what extent they skimped on rifle ammunition, we have no way of knowing if they were choosing to supply the tanks over the riflemen, or simply able to supply the riflemen completely and then having to ration the supply for the tanks.


Colin: that's true, but going through my books, I find this in Nash's "Hells gate":

quote:

Amount of supplies airdropped to spearheads of III.Pz.Korps from 12-20 February 1944:
Ammunition: 316 tons
Fuel: 57,024 gallons
Food: 24.1 tons
Containers of medical supplies (VAB): 4


We still don't have the tonnage of rifle ammo delivered, but some interesting calculations could be made:

79,6 tons of Tiger ammunition
68,6 tons of Panther ammunition
4 tons of Pz IV (I guess this cover the Stugs' as well)

So this covers the 50% of the weight of the ammo delivered. The rest should include all kinds of artillery ammo, including feld, antitank, flak, plus the mortars and maybe mines, and I'm sure I forget something here. It does not seem to me that the infantry ammunition represented more than 10% of the total delivered, and if we put the rifle ammo in the contexto of all the supplies (not only amunition), that ammount would be much lower. I know, it's a wild speculation, but based in some facts.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 7:23:00 PM   
Panama


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It is entirely possible for the entire supply question to become so messy it would take an entire team of researchers and programmers to sort it out properly and even then it would only work under specific circumstances. It doesn't work well now if compared to real life. I don't see it ever working well. Instead make a game called The Operation Art of Logistics and forget the combat part. How many potatoes does it take to supply a Soviet Rifle battalion in a half week turn? I don't know, how many will they use to make the vodka?

I understand that it's not perfect the way it is now. What needs to be done is decide on a level of detail MOST people will be satisfied with and go from there. Like Lemay said, do it in steps. The few that are not happy with it can go on and develop TOAL. One thing that should be understood about game design. You will NEVER make everyone happy.

What I've seen so far in this current discussion is alot of tail chasing.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 8:01:26 PM   
Meyer1

 

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Ok, time for some more wild speculations:

This was delivered to the pocket:

Ammunition: 867.7 tons
Fuel: 82,948.8 gallons
Medical Supplies: 4 tons


The forces that were sourrounded included four infantry divisions, one panzergrenadier division and one motorizer brigade (plus some elements from other divisions) total strength was about 54,000-56,000 men
AFV's in the pocket: SS-Wiking division had by january 1, 1944 nineteen Pz III, thirteen Pz IV, and four Stugs on hand, of which thirty were operational. It did not recieve any replacements before being encircled twenty days later.
The other units with armor were the two Stug battalions, with seventeen assault guns each, and the Wallonien brigade wich had ten Stugs as authorized strength (don't know how much actually had)

So, more speculations could be made about how many AFV were operational in those units, as an average while in the kessesl, 30-40? maybe less.
Comparing the ratio: gallons of fuel/tonnage of ammo delivered, with the III.PzKorps, we see a higher number for the latter, which is hardly surprising since consisted of a much more "armored/motorized" heavy force (four Pz divisions and a Tiger battalion), but is very interesting to see that ammount of fuel delivered to an encircled, almost entire, leg infantry force.
That tells me that even in those circunstances, the value of armor units were still highly regarded, and that reflected in the type of supplies that were delivered.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 8:15:27 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Panama

It is entirely possible for the entire supply question to become so messy it would take an entire team of researchers and programmers to sort it out properly and even then it would only work under specific circumstances. It doesn't work well now if compared to real life. I don't see it ever working well. Instead make a game called The Operation Art of Logistics and forget the combat part. How many potatoes does it take to supply a Soviet Rifle battalion in a half week turn? I don't know, how many will they use to make the vodka?

I understand that it's not perfect the way it is now. What needs to be done is decide on a level of detail MOST people will be satisfied with and go from there. Like Lemay said, do it in steps. The few that are not happy with it can go on and develop TOAL. One thing that should be understood about game design. You will NEVER make everyone happy.

What I've seen so far in this current discussion is alot of tail chasing.


I agree. As much as possible of the logistic calculations should be 'under the hood,' so to speak. About all I would want the player to be saddled with is noticing how much supply his units are actually receiving, and setting a priority to indicate which ones he wants to get the most.

Happily, the current supply model profoundly diverges from reality -- so we've nowhere to go but up. The situation as it stands is completely unsatisfactory.

Most of the 'tail-chasing' derives from Curtis, who digs in on some inane position and then belligerently defends it regardless of what arguments are advanced. That's precisely what I find so frustrating about talking to him. It's like trying to convince a dog to give up a bone.

Going around with others is constructive. People are at least forced to refine their views and modify them, even if they rarely abandon them completely. For example, I have had to concede that any attempt to reflect my ideas about infantry's continued fighting power would have to be weapon- rather than icon-based.

< Message edited by ColinWright -- 2/15/2010 8:57:47 PM >


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 8:22:39 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Meyer1


That tells me that even in those circunstances, the value of armor units were still highly regarded, and that reflected in the type of supplies that were delivered.



We can't judge this unless we know to what extent the infantry forces were being deprived. If they already had adequate stocks of ammunition, it would have made little sense to deliver more.

One can turn how you are reading the numbers on their head. Apparently, armored forces required major resupply efforts to remain functional.


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 9:08:58 PM   
Meyer1

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright


If they already had adequate stocks of ammunition, it would have made little sense to deliver more.


That was not the case.

quote:

One can turn how you are reading the numbers on their head. Apparently, armored forces required major resupply efforts to remain functional.


Yes, but since they were very important, the efforts were made.

OK, to summarize you position: 1)as a rule of thumb, in conditions of lower than normal supply, the small arms ammunition represented a higher percentage of the total ammunition delivered to the units, compared with normally would represent.
And because of that 2)infantry units would be relatively more effective than armor/artilery units as supply level drops

Regarding the first point, until I see some actual numbers, I won't believe it. I think that the quantities the ammunition that the units recieve varies with their consumption, and this dependes on the type of battle/situation the unit is facing. So there would be cases when, even in the imposibility to deliver a satisfactory level of supply, the artillery or the armor will recive a higher than normal percentage of ammunition.
About the second point, see my response to the first


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 9:36:19 PM   
golden delicious


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Meyer1

The forces that were sourrounded included four infantry divisions, one panzergrenadier division and one motorizer brigade (plus some elements from other divisions) total strength was about 54,000-56,000 men
AFV's in the pocket: SS-Wiking division had by january 1, 1944 nineteen Pz III, thirteen Pz IV, and four Stugs on hand, of which thirty were operational. It did not recieve any replacements before being encircled twenty days later.
The other units with armor were the two Stug battalions, with seventeen assault guns each, and the Wallonien brigade wich had ten Stugs as authorized strength (don't know how much actually had)

So, more speculations could be made about how many AFV were operational in those units, as an average while in the kessesl, 30-40? maybe less.
Comparing the ratio: gallons of fuel/tonnage of ammo delivered, with the III.PzKorps, we see a higher number for the latter, which is hardly surprising since consisted of a much more "armored/motorized" heavy force (four Pz divisions and a Tiger battalion), but is very interesting to see that ammount of fuel delivered to an encircled, almost entire, leg infantry force.
That tells me that even in those circunstances, the value of armor units were still highly regarded, and that reflected in the type of supplies that were delivered.


Slight flaw in your reasoning- presumably the motorised units had other vehicles too.

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Post #: 882
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 9:48:04 PM   
Meyer1

 

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Of course they did. I know that, and the infantry units had also some vehicles (and artillery), but we have to think here in the icon the unit would have in TOAW. Because, as I said before, in 99% of the scenarios, infantry icon units have artillery in their equipment (and sometimes armor), but that did not stop Colin to say that they should be in better shape than the infantry units in the event of low supply
But since the III.Pzkorps units have an very very higher ratio of vehicles/men, compared with the forces inside the pocket, my point still stands.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 11:43:18 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Meyer1


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright


If they already had adequate stocks of ammunition, it would have made little sense to deliver more.


That was not the case.

quote:

One can turn how you are reading the numbers on their head. Apparently, armored forces required major resupply efforts to remain functional.


Yes, but since they were very important, the efforts were made.

OK, to summarize you position: 1)as a rule of thumb, in conditions of lower than normal supply, the small arms ammunition represented a higher percentage of the total ammunition delivered to the units, compared with normally would represent.
And because of that 2)infantry units would be relatively more effective than armor/artilery units as supply level drops

Regarding the first point, until I see some actual numbers, I won't believe it. I think that the quantities the ammunition that the units recieve varies with their consumption, and this dependes on the type of battle/situation the unit is facing. So there would be cases when, even in the imposibility to deliver a satisfactory level of supply, the artillery or the armor will recive a higher than normal percentage of ammunition.
About the second point, see my response to the first




Your summary omits the key point that small arms ammo weighs a whole lot less. One Ju-52 can deliver enough ammo to give every rifleman in a battalion close to a hundred rounds. It can deliver enough shells to give every tube in a battalion of 105's five shells. What this boils down to is that a staffel of Ju-52's can keep the infantry of a whole division fighting for a day -- or they can deliver enough shells to permit one short bombardment by one artillery battalion.

You are right that situations do vary -- and there might be situations where you want to get the artillery one good load of shells. However, I have suggested that one component of a revised supply system would be a priority setting for each unit. If you really want your rifle battalions to starve so that you can get some fuel to the tank company, set the tank company's priority on 'very high' and all the rifle battalions on 'very low.'

As to evidence of infantry's continuing ability to fight, there can't be any precise numbers. It's not really in the nature of the beast. However, if you read about armies in distress, you will persistently find them still able to field some combat-worthy infantry even though the guns and tanks had long since been abandoned for lack of fuel and shells.


< Message edited by ColinWright -- 2/16/2010 12:12:24 AM >


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 11:44:49 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Meyer1

Of course they did. I know that, and the infantry units had also some vehicles (and artillery), but we have to think here in the icon the unit would have in TOAW. Because, as I said before, in 99% of the scenarios, infantry icon units have artillery in their equipment (and sometimes armor), but that did not stop Colin to say that they should be in better shape than the infantry units in the event of low supply
But since the III.Pzkorps units have an very very higher ratio of vehicles/men, compared with the forces inside the pocket, my point still stands.


I long ago modified my position to say that the calculation should be based on actual equipment, not the icon.


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/15/2010 11:48:52 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Meyer1


But since the III.Pzkorps units have an very very higher ratio of vehicles/men, compared with the forces inside the pocket, my point still stands.


You also seem to be overlooking the point that the Germans apparently felt the imperative was to keep III Panzer Korps combat-worthy. The units inside the pocket merely had to be able to hold on and flee when the moment came.

And actually, that's a point. Notice how all those infantrymen were able to move even without 'fuel.' That's the neat thing about infantry -- trucks don't have much of a survival instinct.

I really don't see how this situation demonstrates much of anything. I'm playing OPART 5 with the new improved supply system. I want III Panzer Korps to keep functioning -- so I set its units' supply priority to 'very high' so they will get the lions share of what little supply is available. The trapped infantry continues to retain some combat value even though its getting little or no supply.

So? Compare and contrast to the current system. III Pz Korps gets what everyone else gets. Those units in the pocket -- their artillery keeps manfully slamming out shells. No need to supply them. Hell, they'll even be able to drive out of the pocket when the time comes.

The bar we have to get over here is pretty low. It'd be hard not to improve on the current system.


< Message edited by ColinWright -- 2/16/2010 12:14:14 AM >


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/16/2010 8:00:20 AM   
ColinWright

 

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Some ideas for improvements to the available terrain options.

1. A tile -- it can be anything -- that blocks supply but doesn't block motorized movement. Particularly relevant in desert scenarios. You can swing out into the desert -- you'll just have a problem if supply isn't quickly reestablished.

In an ideal world, some unit icon would be exempt from the effects of this. This would allow for units such as the LRDG and Sonderverband 288.

2. Just the opposite. A tile -- it can be anything -- that blocks motorized movement but doesn't block supply. At the moment I'm mapping the Caucasus. There were several passes that German mountain troops penetrated but that obviously couldn't be used by motorized units. At the same time, the Germans were able to bring supply over.

Again, an ideal world option would severely restrict the supply that could be brought over. The German mountain troops weren't able to bring over much supply.

3. This one's a bit more ambitious. A setting for each hex that allows the movement effect of the tile to be applied only, the combat effect only, or both, as is currently the case. I'm thinking of areas such as the Intermountain US West, which typically consist of dead flat, coverless expanses a mile or two wide -- but overlooked by tree-covered mountain ridges. This stuff goes on forever. Except at the largest scales, most hexes would incorporate both. Movement is quite fast: a well-sprung truck could do 20 mph across those flats. However, for combat purposes, it's almost ideal for the defender. All those flats are completely exposed to fire.

4. As I've advocated before, we need a 'super-open' terrain type, where non-armored defenders are at a severe disadvantage if they are not dug in. Unentrenched infantry was dead meat if it ran into armor in the the more open areas of the North African Desert and the Don Steppe.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/16/2010 1:48:39 PM   
Panama


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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Some ideas for improvements to the available terrain options.

1. A tile -- it can be anything -- that blocks supply but doesn't block motorized movement. Particularly relevant in desert scenarios. You can swing out into the desert -- you'll just have a problem if supply isn't quickly reestablished.

In an ideal world, some unit icon would be exempt from the effects of this. This would allow for units such as the LRDG and Sonderverband 288.

2. Just the opposite. A tile -- it can be anything -- that blocks motorized movement but doesn't block supply. At the moment I'm mapping the Caucasus. There were several passes that German mountain troops penetrated but that obviously couldn't be used by motorized units. At the same time, the Germans were able to bring supply over.

Again, an ideal world option would severely restrict the supply that could be brought over. The German mountain troops weren't able to bring over much supply.

3. This one's a bit more ambitious. A setting for each hex that allows the movement effect of the tile to be applied only, the combat effect only, or both, as is currently the case. I'm thinking of areas such as the Intermountain US West, which typically consist of dead flat, coverless expanses a mile or two wide -- but overlooked by tree-covered mountain ridges. This stuff goes on forever. Except at the largest scales, most hexes would incorporate both. Movement is quite fast: a well-sprung truck could do 20 mph across those flats. However, for combat purposes, it's almost ideal for the defender. All those flats are completely exposed to fire.

4. As I've advocated before, we need a 'super-open' terrain type, where non-armored defenders are at a severe disadvantage if they are not dug in. Unentrenched infantry was dead meat if it ran into armor in the the more open areas of the North African Desert and the Don Steppe.


I have a little problem understanding 1. Alot of supply is motorized movement. How can a hex allow motorized movement but block supply?

Some of what has been suggested in the ideas in this thread concerning supply seem to relate more to a tactical scale than an operational scale.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/16/2010 5:02:22 PM   
Curtis Lemay


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I thought it would be useful to post the entire “Logistics” part of the Nofi article, since it’s so relevant to the discussion. Part of it is only applicable to the Desert War, but much of it has universal application.

”To operate a combat unit needs three primary items of supply: ammunition, fuel and food. A unit would normally carry with it enough of the supplies to last five days (plus a few days extra emergency food in cans). To give a detailed example: a typical German Infantry Division had 12,000 men. It’s “basic load” (five-day supply) weighed 1902 tons. This consisted of fuel (207 tons or 10.4%) for 600 trucks; food (108 tons or 5.2%); fodder (248 tons or 14.9%) for the 4600 horses; and ammunition (1339 tons or 69.5%) for the unit’s 11,300-odd weapons. The main problem is the rate at which the above material is used up. Some elements are quite consistent. Food is consumed at the rate of about three pounds per day per man. That’s 18 tons a day. Fuel for the trucks is a different matter. The five “loads” of fuel carried by each is enough to carry the division’s vehicles 100 kilometers. If the division is just sitting around in reserve one load of fuel would last a week (about 6 tons a day). When moving, the division would consume about one load a day (41 tons). Many of the trucks are used for moving forward supplies, which accounts for such a large gas consumption in a unit that moves at the rate of 30-40 kilometers a day.

If the unit is out of action, it naturally requires no ammunition. But it does require 64 tons of other supplies, plus a few tons of “housekeeping” items (paper, mail, spare parts, etc.). Roughly 70 tons. When in action the situation was, of course, quite different. Ammunition had to come from Europe, a lot of it. And it weighed quite a lot compared to food and fodder.

Ammunition expenditures were also, to a certain extent, quite consistent. But there were considerable variations according to the intensity of action and type of unit (infantry or mobile). For infantry units (non-mobile) ammunition expenditures varied from about 60 tons a day for mopping up, or similar low-level actions, or up to 200-300 tons a day for major offensive or defensive operations. Mobile (motorized) units, in addition to having more men also had more weapons per man and, being mobile, usually had greater opportunity to use them. An armored division might expend up to 400 tons a day. Some 80% of this ammunition was expended by the 105mm and 150mm howitzers of the divisional artillery, even though only about one-third of the division’s basic load of ammunition was artillery ammo. Primarily, this was due to the relative ease with which howitzers (which were behind the fighting line) could be resupplied. Front line units, many of which were under fire and very difficult to supply with anything, carried a larger amount of ammunition. Most of this was for self-defense, for artillery caused most of the enemy casualties (usually around 50-60%). Infantry heavy weapons (mortars and heavy guns) caused another 10-25%, while all other weapons caused the remainder. Rifles and machineguns were not great casualty-producing weapons (although they were very instrumental in pinning down enemy infantry). Most of the ammunition in the army level ammo dumps was for the artillery. These dumps usually contained half the total amount of ammunition carried by the divisions in the army. This ammo was distributed according to the intensity of operations within the army and was an army commander’s chief means of controlling the situation. It was his “ultimate reserve”. The use of artillery required enormous amounts of ammunition in order to be effective. For example, a three-minute barrage (a line of shells forming a barrier) by a 105mm battalion (12 guns) would consume eleven tons of ammunition. The barrage covered 360 meters of front. A three-minute, 600 meter barrage by a 150mm battalion would consume 9.4 tons.

On a higher level, the artillery of an infantry division (36 105mm howitzers and 12 150mm howitzers) would expend, per hour, 45 tons of munitions while covering a deployment. A preparation fire against enemy positions would consume 131 tons per hour. Support the first two hours of an attack would consume 92 tons per hour. Spoiling fire against enemy offensive preparations would consume 104 tons and defensive fires against enemy attacks would take up to 92 tons an hour. These figures are “planning” figures (averages) and vary somewhat according to circumstances. The point of it all is that your chief logistic headache is going to be artillery ammunition.

The most obvious problem encountered in desert fighting was, of course, the heat and absence of water. Casualties in North Africa from heat stroke were far greater than in other theaters of war. Lack of water was always a considerable problem, particularly in as much as many of the wells in the Western Desert supplied unstorable water. Surprisingly, water represents numerous storage problems. It may not just be bottled up and used at a later date. Certain types of wells will supply water which can last indefinitely. Others will be undrinkable in three days. A great many places named on any map of North Africa are not actual places, but merely wells. Water, of course, is useful in combating heat stroke. Water also helps keep a mechanized army moving, but that’s a problem which ties in with fuel supply. Besides, you can use non-potable water in your radiator.

The desert also presents difficult problems for the mechanic. Sand manages to work its way into everything. This increases the wear and tear on equipment necessitating the more frequent replacement of critical parts. Items which have been heavily greased suffer particularly in this fashion. So the supply of spare parts was always a major problem, and a tank had some 8,000 parts made of 30,000 pieces. Needless to say the Axis suffered far more from this than the British, who benefited from seemingly inexhaustible supplies of equipment.

The key problem for the logistician was in the land transshipment of the replacements and material. Rommel needed 60,000 tons of supply per month in 1942. In the last six months of 1942 an average of 56,209 tons of supplies were being unloaded in North Africa per month. But they had to be unloaded in places like Tobruk, over 300 miles behind the Alamein position; or Benghazi, nearly 600 miles in the rear; or even Tripoli, about 1500 miles off. From these ports literally every ounce of material had to be trucked across the length of Africa up to the front. Motor gasoline weighs 6.11 pounds to the gallon, in drums up to 7.41 pounds per gallon. A 2.5 ton tank truck, consumes, in moving 160 kilometers, 20 gallons of gasoline, and 1.6 gallons of petroleum products, without considering additional consumption to wear of the vehicle, desert climate, and combat conditions. Thus, to get 1000 gallons of gasoline from Tobruk to the Alamein position costs 120 gallons of gasoline and 9.6 gallons of other POLs. Then we must figure in an average of 10% for wastage and spillage. Our 1000 gallons now reads 768 and we have yet to send the trucks back, which will cost another 132 gallons! We have still to bring forward a single ounce of ammunition, spare parts, foodstuffs or other POLs, and only 636 gallons have reached the front! And we are operating from Tobruk, not Tripoli! Nor have we calculated in loss due to enemy action!

How did the British solve this problem? They took advantage of a railroad which extended from Alexandria to the vicinity of Alamein and extended it across the Libyan frontier. That Rommel did not activate this line when he captured nearly 300 miles of it in mid-1942 is indicative of his lack of ability as a logistician. Rail transport is more efficient than road; a standard gauge steam locomotive (2-8-0) consumes 55 pounds of coal per kilometer of train being pulled, or about 700 pounds per hour. It can transport, in that kilometer, almost half a million gallons – on paper. Even off paper the record is impressive. Furthermore, railroads are very difficult targets to knock out from the air and usually can be repaired overnight.”


I’d like to highlight a couple of points from this:

1. Note how the supply system was expressly set up to keep the artillery in action. As I’ve been saying all along, the quartermasters are not idiots. They know what the needs are going to be and they plan accordingly. If artillery causes 50-60% of the enemy casualties, it had better be priority #1.

2. In contrast, note that there wasn’t even a whiff of a hint of any priority whatsoever for small arms ammo. If anything, units were expected to almost fend for themselves in that regard while under fire. Their part of the basic ammo load was very disproportionate to their expected expenditures, relative to the artillery. This probably would allow them to get by without much resupply at all, till there was a lull in the action.

So, no wonder artillery can keep firing at 1% in TOAW while within the full supply net. Once you free yourself from the notion that unit supply levels are equivalent to their stockpile levels you can start to recognize that TOAW models reality pretty well. Norm was one smart fellow. There are just some special cases at the extremes where it breaks down. We do need to address them. But, as I said, with a scalpel, not a sledgehammer.

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Post #: 889
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/16/2010 5:19:30 PM   
Curtis Lemay


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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Some ideas for improvements to the available terrain options.

1. A tile -- it can be anything -- that blocks supply but doesn't block motorized movement. Particularly relevant in desert scenarios. You can swing out into the desert -- you'll just have a problem if supply isn't quickly reestablished.


A better way to handle this would be with "Tracked" movement. If the unit was rated as "tracked" it could move into dunes and badlands. Trucks and other wheeled vehicles could not. Also, for motorized infantry, it would be useful to be able to "disembark" - leave the trucks behind in the pools and proceed on as a foot unit.

quote:

In an ideal world, some unit icon would be exempt from the effects of this. This would allow for units such as the LRDG and Sonderverband 288.


Or equip them with tracked-rated vehicles (use the equipment editor if necessary).

quote:

2. Just the opposite. A tile -- it can be anything -- that blocks motorized movement but doesn't block supply. At the moment I'm mapping the Caucasus. There were several passes that German mountain troops penetrated but that obviously couldn't be used by motorized units. At the same time, the Germans were able to bring supply over.

Again, an ideal world option would severely restrict the supply that could be brought over. The German mountain troops weren't able to bring over much supply.


Units are in supply now in locations that are adjacent to supplied locations. So, a unit in a dune/badland hex is actually in supply if that hex is adjacent to a non-dune/badland hex that is in supply. So you can project supply into blocking terrain - for a short distance (one hex).

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Post #: 890
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/16/2010 6:05:27 PM   
Meyer1

 

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quote:

That Rommel did not activate this line when he captured nearly 300 miles of it in mid-1942 is indicative of his lack of ability as a logistician.


Interesting reading, except for this part , which is dead wrong. They did activate that rail line, starting in august 1942.

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Post #: 891
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/16/2010 6:29:34 PM   
Panama


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Some ideas for improvements to the available terrain options.

1. A tile -- it can be anything -- that blocks supply but doesn't block motorized movement. Particularly relevant in desert scenarios. You can swing out into the desert -- you'll just have a problem if supply isn't quickly reestablished.


A better way to handle this would be with "Tracked" movement. If the unit was rated as "tracked" it could move into dunes and badlands. Trucks and other wheeled vehicles could not. Also, for motorized infantry, it would be useful to be able to "disembark" - leave the trucks behind in the pools and proceed on as a foot unit.

quote:

In an ideal world, some unit icon would be exempt from the effects of this. This would allow for units such as the LRDG and Sonderverband 288.


I'm not sure if there are very many pure tracked units at battalion level or higher. Even in todays armys. How would you account for all the wheeled vehicles in this 'tracked' unit? They are there so the unit will be able to function properly. Unless you were to eliminate all the wheeled vehicles in a unit. But that wouldn't be at all realistic and isn't that what the idea behind all this is?

Disembarked? Most of the scenarios are ten or more kilometers/miles per hex. How far would you have a motorized unit walk? Wouldn't an Army commander love it when his corp commander makes his motorized highly mobile unit dismount to do something an infantry unit could have done? How about we keep the game operational instead of tactical/grand tactical?

< Message edited by Panama -- 2/16/2010 6:32:45 PM >


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/16/2010 7:39:06 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Panama


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Some ideas for improvements to the available terrain options.

1. A tile -- it can be anything -- that blocks supply but doesn't block motorized movement. Particularly relevant in desert scenarios. You can swing out into the desert -- you'll just have a problem if supply isn't quickly reestablished.

In an ideal world, some unit icon would be exempt from the effects of this. This would allow for units such as the LRDG and Sonderverband 288.

2. Just the opposite. A tile -- it can be anything -- that blocks motorized movement but doesn't block supply. At the moment I'm mapping the Caucasus. There were several passes that German mountain troops penetrated but that obviously couldn't be used by motorized units. At the same time, the Germans were able to bring supply over.

Again, an ideal world option would severely restrict the supply that could be brought over. The German mountain troops weren't able to bring over much supply.

3. This one's a bit more ambitious. A setting for each hex that allows the movement effect of the tile to be applied only, the combat effect only, or both, as is currently the case. I'm thinking of areas such as the Intermountain US West, which typically consist of dead flat, coverless expanses a mile or two wide -- but overlooked by tree-covered mountain ridges. This stuff goes on forever. Except at the largest scales, most hexes would incorporate both. Movement is quite fast: a well-sprung truck could do 20 mph across those flats. However, for combat purposes, it's almost ideal for the defender. All those flats are completely exposed to fire.

4. As I've advocated before, we need a 'super-open' terrain type, where non-armored defenders are at a severe disadvantage if they are not dug in. Unentrenched infantry was dead meat if it ran into armor in the the more open areas of the North African Desert and the Don Steppe.


I have a little problem understanding 1. Alot of supply is motorized movement. How can a hex allow motorized movement but block supply?

Some of what has been suggested in the ideas in this thread concerning supply seem to relate more to a tactical scale than an operational scale.


No...on the contrary, it's more of an operational problem than a tactical one.

In North Africa, nothing much ever happened in the deep desert -- but it was always a possibility. The British were holding Siwa Oasis with a full brigade at one point, for example. Rommel considered threading the Qattara Depression rather than butting his head against El Alamein.

More mundanely, when Rommel did his end run around the Gazala positions, he was betting he could batter open a direct supply route tout sweet. His logistical capacity simply wasn't sufficient to run supplies for the entire Afrika Korps all the way around Bir Hakeim.

The difficulty, of course, was supply. You could send substantial forces that deep into the desert -- but how to supply them? If we had a tile that could block supply, then the problem with such maneuvers could be simulated, and at the same time, one could choose to take the chance that one would be able to improve matters shortly -- ala Rommel at Gazala.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/16/2010 7:55:34 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Panama


I'm not sure if there are very many pure tracked units at battalion level or higher. Even in todays armys. How would you account for all the wheeled vehicles in this 'tracked' unit? They are there so the unit will be able to function properly. Unless you were to eliminate all the wheeled vehicles in a unit. But that wouldn't be at all realistic and isn't that what the idea behind all this is?




There's also the minor detail that the actual tracked vehicles available aren't necessarily better at desert movement in the first place. The Long Range Desert Group used trucks with special tires. When the British cut off the the Italians at Beda Fomm, they sent the wheeled vehicles ahead of the slower tracked ones.

Now, if we're talking about a Star Wars Sand Crawler, maybe treads are the way to go. But when it's a choice between sending the Matildas waddling off into the great beyond and sticking with Ford trucks -- stick with the Ford trucks. They'll be able to go far further with far less fuel and water, they'll be far less likely to break down -- and when it comes to getting stuck, weight is a consideration. A common desert pitfall is a Sebka -- a flat expanse of dried salt and/or crusted sand lying over saline goo. I'd rather not try crossing it at all -- but if I had to, I'll take the three-ton truck and you can have the Pz III. There's a fine picture in Playfair of a Matilda that had sunk into such a place and been abandoned.


< Message edited by ColinWright -- 2/16/2010 8:04:42 PM >


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/16/2010 8:04:51 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Panama



Disembarked? Most of the scenarios are ten or more kilometers/miles per hex. How far would you have a motorized unit walk? Wouldn't an Army commander love it when his corp commander makes his motorized highly mobile unit dismount to do something an infantry unit could have done? How about we keep the game operational instead of tactical/grand tactical?


This is actually a problem. It's very common for infantry to be moved by truck -- but they are nevertheless not motorized infantry. Once the infantry's delivered to the battlefield, the trucks go back to resume hauling cases of ketchup, all the infantry's subsequent movements are by foot, and they have no ability to instantly remount to exploit any openings. Another common syndrome is that a division might have enough vehicles to lift any one of its brigades at once. This was actually the theoretical British Army TO&E for at least a while -- and how to simulate it in TOAW? All three brigades aren't motorized. At any given time, only one is. The idea, of course, was that the brigades would be 'lifted' forward in turn to the battleground -- but they would fight on foot.

I have a scenario where the 'rail lines' are the roads, the railroad engine sound tile has been replaced by a truck noise, and there's a 0% rail destruction setting. Each player can use his 'rail capacity' to haul around his infantry -- but only as means of repositioning them. Any opposed advance necessarily happens on foot.

It works quite well -- but having such a mechanism built into the system would work even better.


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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/16/2010 8:05:01 PM   
golden delicious


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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

More mundanely, when Rommel did his end run around the Gazala positions, he was betting he could batter open a direct supply route tout sweet. His logistical capacity simply wasn't sufficient to run supplies for the entire Afrika Korps all the way around Bir Hakeim.


But could he have supplied them if all that desert was grassland instead- or was it simply the distance from good roads which was the problem?

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Post #: 896
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/16/2010 8:11:50 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: golden delicious


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

More mundanely, when Rommel did his end run around the Gazala positions, he was betting he could batter open a direct supply route tout sweet. His logistical capacity simply wasn't sufficient to run supplies for the entire Afrika Korps all the way around Bir Hakeim.


But could he have supplied them if all that desert was grassland instead- or was it simply the distance from good roads which was the problem?


I'm not sure the desert is any less navigable than your average expanse of grassland.

In any case, when Rommel punched his hole through the minefields and took Bir Hacheim, he still didn't have a good road -- just a shorter expanse of desert over which to haul his supplies.

The point, really, is that the further out into the desert a unit goes, the more of a logistical drain it becomes. x trucks can supply one regiment lying three miles from the depot, it'll take 10x trucks to supply it if it's thirty miles from the depot, and you'd better not even think about sending that infantry regiment three hundred miles deep into the desert.

Now, an ideal supply system would reflect that -- but pending getting such a system, it would be nice if one could impose an absolute limit to supplies, but not to movement. That way, you can go wherever you want to -- but have a plan for getting back into supply sometime soon. As it was, large units could go down to Siwa and such -- but once there, they just sat. There wasn't anything like the logistical resources needed to support active operations on such a scale at such a distance from the roadhead.

Right now, I handle this sort of problem with a suite of house rules. Not ideal.

Ideally, of course, we'd have a good supply mechanism that would more or less reflect the problem.

However, we aren't going to get that anytime soon. So pending that, what I propose would allow oases to be set up as minimal supply points where a unit wouldn't actually expire and the rest of the deep desert to be rendered as an area where it wasn't really going to work just to hang out. The oases themselves, of course, would be ringed with these supply-barring hexes.


< Message edited by ColinWright -- 2/16/2010 8:17:20 PM >


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Post #: 897
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/16/2010 8:20:48 PM   
golden delicious


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ORIGINAL: ColinWright

In any case, when Rommel punched his hole through the minefields and took Bir Hacheim, he still didn't have a good road -- just a shorter expanse of desert over which to haul his supplies.


OK that's fine. I believe the next patch would reflect this particular case.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/16/2010 11:52:58 PM   
Panama


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Have any of you seen the SPI North African Campaign game where the logistics is very very detailed? Almost down to the jerry can. I have a friend that has it. We messed around with it for a bit once. It didn't take long to realize the main item of supply isn't fuel or ammo. It's water. And those jerry cans lose alot until they get improved. So now, whenever someone speaks of the Italians in North Africa I have to chuckle. Their main food ration was...pasta.

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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 2/17/2010 12:26:02 AM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Panama

Have any of you seen the SPI North African Campaign game where the logistics is very very detailed? Almost down to the jerry can. I have a friend that has it. We messed around with it for a bit once. It didn't take long to realize the main item of supply isn't fuel or ammo. It's water. And those jerry cans lose alot until they get improved. So now, whenever someone speaks of the Italians in North Africa I have to chuckle. Their main food ration was...pasta.


One wonders how valid that is is. First, I don't recall the exact figures, but the water ration for Western Desert Force in Operation Compass was fairly modest.

Lessee...here it is. Half a gallon per man and one gallon per radiator per day. That's four pounds and eight pounds respectively. Now, obviously the men continue to 'burn' water even when they're not firing off bullets and shells, and all men 'burn' it, not just combatants, but four pounds just isn't that much, and the water requirements for the vehicles would be dwarfed by their fuel requirements.

...Add that if one looks at a detailed map of the Western Desert, the coastal area has lots of wells. It's more deep inland that one really has the waterless desert thing.

However, we'll forget about the wells. An eight hundred man battalion might have a hundred vehicles. That gives us a total water demand of a ton and a half per day while idle and more like two tons if in motion. That compares to (really pulling numbers out of the air here), a fuel demand of (100 vehicles x 7 lbs per gallon x 20 gallons per vehicle/2000) seven tons of fuel for a battalion vigorously scurrying about and none if its still. Ammo? Obviously depends on the arm in question, but let's figure 20 pounds per man if vigorous combat is going on. 16000 pounds equals eight tons.

I can see water being the biggest item on the agenda if it's all quiet on the Western Front. Under other circumstances, though, it would seem that fuel and ammo demands would be the major items. Take wells into account, and water drops even lower -- certainly the water doesn't need to be brought all the way from Tunis/Alexandria (unlike the fuel and ammo). Water was important, but SPI may have gotten carried away. I'd be curious to see what they base their figures on.

< Message edited by ColinWright -- 2/17/2010 12:30:18 AM >


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