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RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/1/2010 6:18:38 PM   
Curtis Lemay


Posts: 12969
Joined: 9/17/2004
From: Houston, TX
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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

This really is like arguing with my fifteen year old. It's just like it.

Look: your arguments never hold up to examination -- for the excellent example that they rarely have any foundation in reality.


Here come the insults. Right on schedule. He's incapable of anything else.

quote:

Take it another way. Go to ten random locations in your day. Look around and see over what percentage of the horizon you could see a low flying aircraft eight miles away. Even if you could see it, could you identify it as hostile?

It's random, but I looked around my place. I have visibility along ground level eight miles out over about 10% of the 360 degree circle around my house. Even in that case, I doubt if I could distinguish a small aircraft eight miles out. I certainly couldn't tell whose it was or what its intentions were.


Again, they aren't cruise missiles. They have to find their targets from altitude. You can see them from enormous distances if they start out at 20,000 feet. And there's optics in use as well. Precautions can be taken even if it's unknown if the planes are hostile. And, there were the two issues of multiple passes and multiple planes in sequence. The actual attack could last quite a while. If the attack could be limited to just one plane and one pass, that would be worth doing.

quote:

Offhand, and on average -- and going by what accounts I can recall, I'd guess fifteen seconds warning of an incoming strafing attack is average. Certainly not two minutes.


You can guess whatever you want, but that's what it will be. And I forgot the fact that the bombers don't magically disappear as soon as they pass the target. They have to fly out of range - being fired at as they go. The longer range heavy Flak would be better able to exploit that.

Look, there isn't a magic solution to getting strafed. If there were, Germans wouldn't have had trouble moving around late in the war. It's a problem for towed light AAA as well (and that's primarily what infantry divisions would have had - the SPAAG was for armored divisions). But that isn't the only AAA function Flak guns perform. When in defense or attack, 88's would already be unlimbered.

Your own post #1092 actually describes the use of heavy flak during moves:

...Protection against high-level attack by heavy Flak is required only at assembly, entrucking and detrucking areas, halts and especially dangerous points the route such as bridges, defiles or intersections.

That means that moving units needed heavy Flak to cover their moves.

This whole issue is getting absurd. If the 88mm Flak was only used for AT in the field, then why continue to provide a Flak gun to the field units? Why not just make a dedicated AT gun? The Germans made 57 versions of just about everything. What prevented them from making a dedicated 88mm Flak gun using the Flak-37 tube?

The only plausible answer is that it was performing a dual purpose in the field at the time. Later, as the Allies got more coordinated, that ceased to be the case, and they finally did have to make the dedicated AT gun, and 86ed the Flak-41.

QED.

(in reply to ColinWright)
Post #: 1111
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/1/2010 7:56:07 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay




Again, they aren't cruise missiles. They have to find their targets from altitude. You can see them from enormous distances if they start out at 20,000 feet.


This is fairly typical. First, fighters on a strafing mission don't need to climb to 20,000 feet. In fact, coming down to the deck and zipping along a road until something turns up would be a fine idea.

Second, go ahead and look outside. Pick out a point eight miles away and tell me what detail you can distinguish. Your average fighter bomber would have a wingspan of thirty feet. Can you see such an object? Make out its nationality and its heading?

Third, go look at the horizon around where you live. Something at an altitude of say five thousand feet (not twenty thousand) is going to be out of sight at a range of eight miles in a good many cases. Hills and things, you know. Hard to look through trees.

Finally, and most important, look at the flak that was actually attached to mobile units. 88's aren't there -- not with the mobile elements.

Happily, as it happens, I have my Seelowe Scenario. All nicely researched, too. There was a lot of flak attached. But 88's to the mobile units? No. All light flak.

You don't let anything -- historical practice, technical feasibility, or even common sense -- get in the way of what you're bent on asserting. It's all a matter of you sticking to whatever silly-ass assertion you made in the first place, come hell or high water.

Even that wouldn't be so bad -- except that we're stuck with you being in a position where you can influence the development of TOAW. It's like having an advocate of 'wooden ships and iron men' in charge of warship development in 1890.


< Message edited by ColinWright -- 7/1/2010 7:57:43 PM >


_____________________________

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Post #: 1112
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/1/2010 8:02:09 PM   
ColinWright

 

Posts: 2604
Joined: 10/13/2005
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

This really is like arguing with my fifteen year old. It's just like it.

Look: your arguments never hold up to examination -- for the excellent example that they rarely have any foundation in reality.


Here come the insults. Right on schedule. He's incapable of anything else.


I knew that post was around here somewhere. I actually went back to look for it last night to strip this stuff out -- in the interests of keeping some focus to the argument if nothing else.

Couldn't find it, though. But seriously, it happens to be true. Your arguments usually don't have any foundation in reality. They display an almost incredible refusal to take any cognizance of it at all.


_____________________________

I am not Charlie Hebdo

(in reply to Curtis Lemay)
Post #: 1113
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/1/2010 11:15:22 PM   
madner

 

Posts: 48
Joined: 6/21/2010
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


Your own post #1092 actually describes the use of heavy flak during moves:

...Protection against high-level attack by heavy Flak is required only at assembly, entrucking and detrucking areas, halts and especially dangerous points the route such as bridges, defiles or intersections.

That means that moving units needed heavy Flak to cover their moves.

This whole issue is getting absurd. If the 88mm Flak was only used for AT in the field, then why continue to provide a Flak gun to the field units? Why not just make a dedicated AT gun? The Germans made 57 versions of just about everything. What prevented them from making a dedicated 88mm Flak gun using the Flak-37 tube?

The only plausible answer is that it was performing a dual purpose in the field at the time. Later, as the Allies got more coordinated, that ceased to be the case, and they finally did have to make the dedicated AT gun, and 86ed the Flak-41.

QED.


You are trying to bend facts to fit with your opinion. The opinion being that the increased tactical proficiency of the allies spelled doom on the regular 8.8. Which ignores that the same units which used the 8.8 to support the Heer units did it right to the end, with the same gun. The Flak 41 wasn't used, but the Luftwaffe units still were used in field and still were called upon to assist with ground targets.

What changed was that other Heer units now had a dedicated AT gun of the same caliber.
If your opinion would be correct, those Flak units couldn't and wouldn't be used.

What fits the facts is that the Heer didn't consider the AA capability of the dual gun useful, or at least not useful enough.

(in reply to Curtis Lemay)
Post #: 1114
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/7/2010 4:48:31 PM   
Curtis Lemay


Posts: 12969
Joined: 9/17/2004
From: Houston, TX
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

This is fairly typical. First, fighters on a strafing mission don't need to climb to 20,000 feet. In fact, coming down to the deck and zipping along a road until something turns up would be a fine idea.


They have to climb to considerable altitude to find their targets. They can be spotted then. Especially if they're an entire squadron or group. They only come down to the deck for the attack run. And even then they don't have ground hugging ability - that's a modern technology. Most attacks that I've seen film of were made at about 30-degree dives.

quote:

Second, go ahead and look outside. Pick out a point eight miles away and tell me what detail you can distinguish. Your average fighter bomber would have a wingspan of thirty feet. Can you see such an object? Make out its nationality and its heading?


Ever been to an air show? You can see them a long way off. And that's without optics. You can take precautions even if you don't know they're hostile (although I would think friendlies could be identified via radio).

quote:

Third, go look at the horizon around where you live. Something at an altitude of say five thousand feet (not twenty thousand) is going to be out of sight at a range of eight miles in a good many cases. Hills and things, you know. Hard to look through trees.


They're aircraft. They won't be on the horizon. They will be at considerable altitude.

Regardless, you're ignoring all my other points:

1. The straffing plane has to fly away after the strike. That takes minutes.
2. Passes by multiple planes take minutes.
3. Multiple passes by one plane takes minutes.
4. Light AAA is often towed as well. That takes time to unlimber too.
4. Even if it can't be deployed for an interdiction attack, it would be already deployed for a unit that wasn't moving - say it was attacking or defending.

There is no question that the fact that the 88's weren't in SPAAG does not mean that they were worthless for air defense for ground units.

quote:

Finally, and most important, look at the flak that was actually attached to mobile units. 88's aren't there -- not with the mobile elements.

Happily, as it happens, I have my Seelowe Scenario. All nicely researched, too. There was a lot of flak attached. But 88's to the mobile units? No. All light flak.


I don't know about Seelowe, but they were there in the Desert. Again, whether they were organic or independent is irrelevant.

Furthermore, by 1944 they were organically part of the mobile units. And, by then, they were primarily used for air defence, not AT.

quote:

You don't let anything -- historical practice, technical feasibility, or even common sense -- get in the way of what you're bent on asserting. It's all a matter of you sticking to whatever silly-ass assertion you made in the first place, come hell or high water.

Even that wouldn't be so bad -- except that we're stuck with you being in a position where you can influence the development of TOAW. It's like having an advocate of 'wooden ships and iron men' in charge of warship development in 1890.


Right. You're the final arbiter of "historical practice, technical feasibility, or even common sense". That's hilarious.

(in reply to ColinWright)
Post #: 1115
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/7/2010 4:50:53 PM   
Curtis Lemay


Posts: 12969
Joined: 9/17/2004
From: Houston, TX
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright


quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Here come the insults. Right on schedule. He's incapable of anything else.


I knew that post was around here somewhere. I actually went back to look for it last night to strip this stuff out -- in the interests of keeping some focus to the argument if nothing else.

Couldn't find it, though. But seriously, it happens to be true. Your arguments usually don't have any foundation in reality. They display an almost incredible refusal to take any cognizance of it at all.


It's just a fact that till you arrived the only thing being slung was evidence.

(in reply to ColinWright)
Post #: 1116
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/7/2010 4:58:31 PM   
Curtis Lemay


Posts: 12969
Joined: 9/17/2004
From: Houston, TX
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: madner


quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


Your own post #1092 actually describes the use of heavy flak during moves:

...Protection against high-level attack by heavy Flak is required only at assembly, entrucking and detrucking areas, halts and especially dangerous points the route such as bridges, defiles or intersections.

That means that moving units needed heavy Flak to cover their moves.

This whole issue is getting absurd. If the 88mm Flak was only used for AT in the field, then why continue to provide a Flak gun to the field units? Why not just make a dedicated AT gun? The Germans made 57 versions of just about everything. What prevented them from making a dedicated 88mm Flak gun using the Flak-37 tube?

The only plausible answer is that it was performing a dual purpose in the field at the time. Later, as the Allies got more coordinated, that ceased to be the case, and they finally did have to make the dedicated AT gun, and 86ed the Flak-41.

QED.


You are trying to bend facts to fit with your opinion. The opinion being that the increased tactical proficiency of the allies spelled doom on the regular 8.8. Which ignores that the same units which used the 8.8 to support the Heer units did it right to the end, with the same gun. The Flak 41 wasn't used, but the Luftwaffe units still were used in field and still were called upon to assist with ground targets.

What changed was that other Heer units now had a dedicated AT gun of the same caliber.
If your opinion would be correct, those Flak units couldn't and wouldn't be used.

What fits the facts is that the Heer didn't consider the AA capability of the dual gun useful, or at least not useful enough.


Again, I'm not bending facts to fit my opinion. I'm actually listing facts. Let's list them again:

1. Early in the war the Germans used a Flak gun in an AT role. They never made a dedicated AT gun with that tube.
2. Late in the war the Germans finally made a dedicated 88mm AT gun and the Flak 88's were phased out of use in the AT role.

There's only one explaination for those two facts that doesn't require the Germans to be militarily incompetent: At first the gun provided a dual use, later it didn't.

Now I want to go back to the "proximity fuse" issue:

Only the USA and the British had Proximity fuses. They were first used by naval units from 1943 on, and were finally released to ground units in late autumn, 1944. So neither the Soviets nor any of the Axis had them at all, while the Western Allied ground forces only had them for less than 10% of the war. Considering that the Western Allies accounted for less than 10% of the ground combat in the ETO, that totals to less than 1% of ground combat having proximity fuses in the war. It is therefore absurd to claim that German heavy flak was somehow inferior due to lack of proximity fuses.

Note that naval units used heavy flak as their main defense against air attack. US BBs had the 5” DP guns. British Nelsons had 4.7” AA guns. German BBs had 105mm Flak. Italian BBs had 90mm AA. Japanese BBs had 127mm AA guns. While the US and British did have proximity fuses late in the war, those BBs were designed with heavy AA long before such existed. US BBs designed after 1943 wouldn’t have been launched before the end of the war. And the other nations never had it at all.

Now, naval vessels at sea only need defend against low-altitude air attack. High-altitude air bombardment would be near useless against a ship at sea – avoided by mere maneuver. At port the ship would depend upon port air defenses. The use of tonnage on a vessel is critical and no naval architect would waste tons of it on armament that was worthless at sea.

Conclusion: Heavy AA is effective vs. low-altitude air attack, even without proximity fuses. That it would be more effective with them doesn’t mean that it wasn’t effective without them.

QED.

(in reply to madner)
Post #: 1117
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/7/2010 9:57:16 PM   
Jo van der Pluym


Posts: 834
Joined: 10/28/2000
From: Valkenburg Lb, Netherlands
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Note that naval units used heavy flak as their main defense against air attack. US BBs had the 5” DP guns. British Nelsons had 4.7” AA guns. German BBs had 105mm Flak. Italian BBs had 90mm AA. Japanese BBs had 127mm AA guns. While the US and British did have proximity fuses late in the war, those BBs were designed with heavy AA long before such existed. US BBs designed after 1943 wouldn’t have been launched before the end of the war. And the other nations never had it at all.

Now, naval vessels at sea only need defend against low-altitude air attack. High-altitude air bombardment would be near useless against a ship at sea – avoided by mere maneuver. At port the ship would depend upon port air defenses. The use of tonnage on a vessel is critical and no naval architect would waste tons of it on armament that was worthless at sea.

Conclusion: Heavy AA is effective vs. low-altitude air attack, even without proximity fuses. That it would be more effective with them doesn’t mean that it wasn’t effective without them.

QED.


If I good remember was there a allied tactic that made heavy AA very effective agains attacking torpedoplanes. Namely: A heavy volume of shells where fired in the sea near and in the path of the attacking planes. These shells made a sort of wave so hard as a concrete wall. Mostley the attacking planes can't escape and crashed in the wave because the height, speed and short distance between the wave and plane.

This same tactic where also used bij the other shipguns who where no DP or AA.






_____________________________

Greetings from the Netherlands

Jo van der Pluym
CrazyDutch

(in reply to Curtis Lemay)
Post #: 1118
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/8/2010 7:05:43 PM   
madner

 

Posts: 48
Joined: 6/21/2010
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
Again, I'm not bending facts to fit my opinion. I'm actually listing facts. Let's list them again:

1. Early in the war the Germans used a Flak gun in an AT role. They never made a dedicated AT gun with that tube.
2. Late in the war the Germans finally made a dedicated 88mm AT gun and the Flak 88's were phased out of use in the AT role.

There's only one explaination for those two facts that doesn't require the Germans to be militarily incompetent: At first the gun provided a dual use, later it didn't.


1. Correct.
2. Not correct. The Flak 88's were still used in the AT role up until the end of the war. The mobile flak units still supported the ground forces when called upon, and it wasn't less.
What happened was that the AT battalions now had that gun, instead of the 3.7 or 5cm.

(in reply to Curtis Lemay)
Post #: 1119
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/10/2010 6:40:24 PM   
Curtis Lemay


Posts: 12969
Joined: 9/17/2004
From: Houston, TX
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The following link is to one of Dr. Niklas Zetterling’s research files for his “Normandy 1944” book:

http://home.swipnet.se/normandy/gerob/othghq/3flak.html

(I used his site extensively in the design of my “France 1944” scenario.)

It gives great detail about that unit’s experience in Normandy. He also uses those details to reach conclusions about the 88mm Flak gun that echo what I’ve been saying all along.

He starts with an examination of the unit’s primary role in Normandy:

“It is common to emphasize the anti-tank role of the 8,8 cm Flak gun. However, this seems not to be consistent with the employement of the III. Flak-Korps.2 The major reason for this is that the 8,8 cm Flak gun was not very suitable for anti-tank missions.”

He then goes on to list the disadvantages that the gun had for the AT role, most of which we have already heard (hard to hide, hard to move, etc.). He then lists the true role of the unit:

“First and foremost, the corps was employed in the air defence role7. This was the main mission and initially it extended from the front to a line from Falaise to Le Beny Bocage8. The second important mission of the corps was to provide indirect fire to support the ground combat units.9 The chief reason for this was the shortage of GHQ artillery. Due to the range of the 8,8 cm guns, this could often be provided from the positions they were to protect from air attack.”

So, not only was it there primarily to provide air defense, but it generally wasn’t even in the frontlines, but directly behind them – close enough, though, to serve as artillery support.

And, on those rare occasions when enemy tanks penetrated far enough to engage the guns, their performance was poor:

“The Flakkampfgruppen were not very successful in combat. The results were not in proportion to the casualties.11 They lost about 35 8,8 cm guns and 70 light Flak guns, while the number of tanks they knocked out were assessed to be twenty.12 ”

Later he surmises why the 88mm had such a reputation as a tank-killer:

“Finally it is worth discussing why the 8,8 cm Flak gun has received such a repution in the history of operation Overlord. In 1940 and 1941, when the German antitank defences mainly consisted of the 3,7 cm AT gun, the 8,8 cm Flak 36 was significantly superior in terms of armour pentration and range. With the introduction of the 7,5 cm Pak 40, the superiority of the 8,8 cm Flak 36 was relatively marginal. However, it seems that the image of the all-pervasive 8,8 cm Flak guns was created in the early years of the war, largely in North Africa. During much of the fighting in North Africa British tank units were equipped with tanks armed with guns that had no HE ammunition. Also the cooperation between British tanks and artillery was often abysmal. In Normandy the behaviour of British forces was quite different however. Hence, the drawbacks of the 8,8 cm Flak gun, described above, were much more pronounced. But still the image of the "88 mm Flak" seem to have been vivid.”

In other words, it was British incompetence in the Desert War – which had been rectified by 1944. He also lists misidentification as another source of its reputation.

In contrast, the air defense role of the unit was much more successful. He lists 462 aircraft shot down. He even accounts how it was subject to much air attack during its move to Normandy. It took quite a bit of damage, yet:

“The march to Normandy did not only result in losses for the corps. It also shot down about 35 air craft during the movement to Normandy.27”

This was despite the fact that the unit did not have SPAAG.

So, to summarize, by 1944, not only were frontline units being augmented with organic 88mm Flak in their TO&E, but entire Corps-sized units were being provided for further augmentation of the front lines as well. This unit contained over 100 88mm Flak guns and received 53 more over the Normandy campaign.

And, by that time, their role was primarily air defense. This was not just because of the severe air threat the Germans were under, but because the guns were just no longer effective in the AT role. The period when they could be used effectively in that role had been due to enemy incompetence, and that was no longer the case.

A note here about Dr. Zetterling: He is renown for exhaustive research of primary documents and uses it to flog lesser historians like Ambrose, Bever, et al. who rely primarily on secondary Allied sources. His (heavily referenced) positions are based upon the official report of the unit on its Normandy experience, the memoirs of the unit’s commander, and the actual combat statistics of the unit in Normandy.

The link is both definitive and conclusive. It supports everything I’ve been saying all along. It should be the end of this discussion.

(in reply to madner)
Post #: 1120
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/10/2010 7:43:19 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:


The link is both definitive and conclusive. It supports everything I’ve been saying all along. It should be the end of this discussion.


Lol.

Without wasting more time on this than it merits, let me point out the most obvious problem with your assertion. You have adopted the singularly improbable position that the 88 could be used to provide mobile flak protection, and you apparently feel that the fact that this unit claimed 35 aircraft shot down during its approach march to Normandy is 'both definitive and conclusive proof' for this assertion. Yet the only relevant fact you cite suggests that the unit contained more light AA than 88's ('They lost about 35 8,8 cm guns and 70 light Flak guns'). How is it that you know that it was the 88's that shot down these aircraft rather than the light AA? I might as well argue that since Fliegerkorps VIII contained Stukas, and since it shot down 387 Russian fighters during the battle of _______, that the Stuka was a formidable opponent in dog fights.

As I say, I could go on, but why bother? You'd never concede even the most carefully proven proposition.

However, regardless of how stubbornly you attempt to defend them, at the end of the day you not only haven't found proof for your assertions, but you won't find it, because the assertions themselves are ill-considered and arbitrary, and have no foundation in reality. It doesn't matter how much energy I invest in attempting to prove that Australia lies north of the equator. It doesn't, and I won't get anywhere.

< Message edited by ColinWright -- 7/10/2010 8:08:02 PM >


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Post #: 1121
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/10/2010 8:28:56 PM   
ColinWright

 

Posts: 2604
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quote:

This was despite the fact that the unit did not have SPAAG.


I really should quit -- but Curtis is such a gold mine!

I read the above sentence and wondered in passing: does that have any basis in fact, or did he just say it because it would be helpful to his argument if such was the case?

After all, this is Curtis we're talking about.

So I should be working on that retaining wall out back, but...

I read the one page article he cites. No discussion of the matter either way. I went to 'Lexicon der Wehrmacht.' Looked up the composition of the 'Flak Sturm Regimenter' that made up the 'Flak Korps III' under discussion. The light flak batteries are listed as (sf).

Uh huh. Off to Niehorster. 'Sf' = 'self-propelled.'

< Message edited by ColinWright -- 7/10/2010 8:32:39 PM >


_____________________________

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Post #: 1122
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/10/2010 8:40:58 PM   
madner

 

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That is indeed a very good link, but there seems to be a slight discrepancy between the claims. The 462 claim for aircraft is matched with 92 tanks and 14 armored cars. Now Normandy isn't the desert or the Ukraine, so the long range advantage is less.

However, notice that the Flak unit was still used in the ground support role, not primarily, but it wasn't withdrawn from that role. That link is evidence that despite much better pak guns, the 8.8 still saw ground combat, despite the far less favorable terrain.

(in reply to ColinWright)
Post #: 1123
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/10/2010 9:00:59 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: madner

That is indeed a very good link, but there seems to be a slight discrepancy between the claims. The 462 claim for aircraft is matched with 92 tanks and 14 armored cars. Now Normandy isn't the desert or the Ukraine, so the long range advantage is less.

However, notice that the Flak unit was still used in the ground support role, not primarily, but it wasn't withdrawn from that role. That link is evidence that despite much better pak guns, the 8.8 still saw ground combat, despite the far less favorable terrain.



Yeah. The points made in the original article aren't without merit -- the author can't be held to blame for the uses Curtis attempts to make of them.

At the same time, the merits of the 88 -- long range and excellent optics -- were of considerably more value in the desert or in the East than in Normandy. In Normandy, you probably weren't going to see your target until it was a few hundred yards away anyway. Under such circumstances, the ability to hit it at a range of several thousand meters was of decidedly limited value.


_____________________________

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Post #: 1124
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/11/2010 8:11:30 PM   
Curtis Lemay


Posts: 12969
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From: Houston, TX
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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

quote:


The link is both definitive and conclusive. It supports everything I’ve been saying all along. It should be the end of this discussion.


Lol.

Without wasting more time on this than it merits, let me point out the most obvious problem with your assertion. You have adopted the singularly improbable position that the 88 could be used to provide mobile flak protection, and you apparently feel that the fact that this unit claimed 35 aircraft shot down during its approach march to Normandy is 'both definitive and conclusive proof' for this assertion. Yet the only relevant fact you cite suggests that the unit contained more light AA than 88's ('They lost about 35 8,8 cm guns and 70 light Flak guns'). How is it that you know that it was the 88's that shot down these aircraft rather than the light AA? I might as well argue that since Fliegerkorps VIII contained Stukas, and since it shot down 387 Russian fighters during the battle of _______, that the Stuka was a formidable opponent in dog fights.


The article is definitive and conclusive about the role that the 88mm Flak gun was used for by field units in 1944. It was used for air defense, with a secondary use of artillery support (there's something TOAW lacks). It could still be used for AT, but was employed at that rarely, and was abysmal at it when it was.

The fact that the unit shot down 35 interdicting aircraft is definitely a data point that supports my position. There is nothing in the article that contradicts that position.

quote:

As I say, I could go on, but why bother? You'd never concede even the most carefully proven proposition.


That's hilarious, considering I've just posted an article that destroys your claim that the 88's were only used by field units in the AT role and only defended fixed targets against air attack. Yet here you are sticking to your, now indefensible, claims.

< Message edited by Curtis Lemay -- 7/11/2010 8:37:07 PM >

(in reply to ColinWright)
Post #: 1125
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/11/2010 8:14:42 PM   
Curtis Lemay


Posts: 12969
Joined: 9/17/2004
From: Houston, TX
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quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

quote:

This was despite the fact that the unit did not have SPAAG.


I really should quit -- but Curtis is such a gold mine!

I read the above sentence and wondered in passing: does that have any basis in fact, or did he just say it because it would be helpful to his argument if such was the case?

After all, this is Curtis we're talking about.

So I should be working on that retaining wall out back, but...

I read the one page article he cites. No discussion of the matter either way. I went to 'Lexicon der Wehrmacht.' Looked up the composition of the 'Flak Sturm Regimenter' that made up the 'Flak Korps III' under discussion. The light flak batteries are listed as (sf).

Uh huh. Off to Niehorster. 'Sf' = 'self-propelled.'


"Handbook on German Military Forces", pg 167, figure 151: "Antiaircraft Regiment (motorized)". No SPAAG.

And, of course, the article notably fails to list any of the guns as SPAAG.

(in reply to ColinWright)
Post #: 1126
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/11/2010 8:29:11 PM   
Curtis Lemay


Posts: 12969
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From: Houston, TX
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quote:

ORIGINAL: madner

That is indeed a very good link, but there seems to be a slight discrepancy between the claims. The 462 claim for aircraft is matched with 92 tanks and 14 armored cars.


"Of the tanks destroyed about twelve fell victims to the man-held Panzerfaust close range antitank weapon.32"

"The number of tanks claimed is quite small. Given the fact that Army and Waffen-SS units claimed to have destroyed 3 663 enemy tanks from 6 June to 21 August35, the III. Flak-Korps can not be regarded as a very important part of German anti-tank defences."

And:

"If enemy tanks had broken through, the flak units were expected to engage them if they reached the positions of the flak."

quote:

Now Normandy isn't the desert or the Ukraine, so the long range advantage is less.


"The longer range of the 8,8 cm Flak gun compared to the 7,5 cm AT gun was of course an advantage, but at longer range, accuracy declines for all guns, even the 8,8 cm gun. Thus, the chances of hitting with the first shot was lower. Since the 8,8 cm AA gun was difficult to conceal and easy to spot when it had fired, this made it likely that the enemy tanks could respond with HE fire, or call for indirect artillery on the positions of the Flak guns before they were destroyed at long range."

quote:

However, notice that the Flak unit was still used in the ground support role, not primarily, but it wasn't withdrawn from that role. That link is evidence that despite much better pak guns, the 8.8 still saw ground combat, despite the far less favorable terrain.


"The fact that the 8,8 cm Flak was not suitable for anti-tank misisons was also clearly recognized by the commanders and men serving in the III. Flak-Korps. Both in the post-war manuscript produced by the corps commander, Wolfgang Pickert5, and in a report, dated 20 September 1944, discussing the experiences from the actions of the corps during the battles in Normandy6, this is clear."

(in reply to madner)
Post #: 1127
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/11/2010 10:01:53 PM   
ColinWright

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

quote:

This was despite the fact that the unit did not have SPAAG.


I really should quit -- but Curtis is such a gold mine!

I read the above sentence and wondered in passing: does that have any basis in fact, or did he just say it because it would be helpful to his argument if such was the case?

After all, this is Curtis we're talking about.

So I should be working on that retaining wall out back, but...

I read the one page article he cites. No discussion of the matter either way. I went to 'Lexicon der Wehrmacht.' Looked up the composition of the 'Flak Sturm Regimenter' that made up the 'Flak Korps III' under discussion. The light flak batteries are listed as (sf).

Uh huh. Off to Niehorster. 'Sf' = 'self-propelled.'


"Handbook on German Military Forces", pg 167, figure 151: "Antiaircraft Regiment (motorized)". No SPAAG.

And, of course, the article notably fails to list any of the guns as SPAAG.


There's really no point in bothering. I cite evidence that those specific regiments contained self-propelled AA guns -- you steam roller right over it. Never mind you've still shown no reason at all to think the 88's served as mobile flak.

< Message edited by ColinWright -- 7/11/2010 10:13:51 PM >


_____________________________

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(in reply to Curtis Lemay)
Post #: 1128
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/11/2010 10:16:45 PM   
ColinWright

 

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Joined: 10/13/2005
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...

< Message edited by ColinWright -- 7/11/2010 10:42:44 PM >


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(in reply to Curtis Lemay)
Post #: 1129
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/11/2010 10:43:17 PM   
ColinWright

 

Posts: 2604
Joined: 10/13/2005
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay



That's hilarious, considering I've just posted an article that destroys your claim that the 88's were only used by field units in the AT role and only defended fixed targets against air attack. Yet here you are sticking to your, now indefensible, claims.


Nothing in the article supports your assertion that 88's were used as mobile AA. I have never asserted that 88's were only used by field units in the AT role.

I'd be curious to know what claims you think I've made that are indefensible. The fact of the matter is that with you, one wastes a great deal of time proving the obvious, and invariably, the obvious turns out to be true. Australia does indeed lie south of the equator. The current month of July will shortly be succeeded by the month of August.

Etc. It gets really tedious. Worse, it interferes with potentially useful and constructive debates. Here comes Curtis. He will now say something ridiculous, and we will then play semantic games about who said what and whether what he produces as evidence actually supports his contentions.




_____________________________

I am not Charlie Hebdo

(in reply to ColinWright)
Post #: 1130
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/11/2010 10:51:55 PM   
ColinWright

 

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The worst of it all is that it's all majestically beside the point.

A game at the level of TOAW can't meaningfully discriminate between flak that's useful for forces on the move and flak that is best used from a fixed position. 88's should indeed reduce the effectiveness of close support and interdicting aircraft. Flak in general should do that. That's definitely a needed change.

Otherwise, it would be nice if flak could either provide AA protection or be used for direct ground support. As noted here, 88's did not do both at once. They did apparently serve simultaneously as both AA and artillery, which is interesting, and yet another aspect of their role that could be simulated -- but isn't something we're arguing about.

No -- we've gotten onto something that appears to involve Curtis simultaneously contending that 88's could serve usefully as flak while on the move and that they were no longer useful in an AT role -- neither contention being remotely defensible or supported by anything Curtis cites.

_____________________________

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(in reply to ColinWright)
Post #: 1131
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/12/2010 12:34:22 PM   
madner

 

Posts: 48
Joined: 6/21/2010
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: madner

That is indeed a very good link, but there seems to be a slight discrepancy between the claims. The 462 claim for aircraft is matched with 92 tanks and 14 armored cars.


"Of the tanks destroyed about twelve fell victims to the man-held Panzerfaust close range antitank weapon.32"

"The number of tanks claimed is quite small. Given the fact that Army and Waffen-SS units claimed to have destroyed 3 663 enemy tanks from 6 June to 21 August35, the III. Flak-Korps can not be regarded as a very important part of German anti-tank defences."


"The longer range of the 8,8 cm Flak gun compared to the 7,5 cm AT gun was of course an advantage, but at longer range, accuracy declines for all guns, even the 8,8 cm gun. Thus, the chances of hitting with the first shot was lower. Since the 8,8 cm AA gun was difficult to conceal and easy to spot when it had fired, this made it likely that the enemy tanks could respond with HE fire, or call for indirect artillery on the positions of the Flak guns before they were destroyed at long range."

quote:

However, notice that the Flak unit was still used in the ground support role, not primarily, but it wasn't withdrawn from that role. That link is evidence that despite much better pak guns, the 8.8 still saw ground combat, despite the far less favorable terrain.


"The fact that the 8,8 cm Flak was not suitable for anti-tank misisons was also clearly recognized by the commanders and men serving in the III. Flak-Korps. Both in the post-war manuscript produced by the corps commander, Wolfgang Pickert5, and in a report, dated 20 September 1944, discussing the experiences from the actions of the corps during the battles in Normandy6, this is clear."


Now that is a good argument if someone would argue that, but your argument was that due to superior allied tactics the flak units were no longer used to support ground operations. Clearly the III. Flak-Korps was used in that fashion, and clearly it did destroy around 80 tanks.

Now, 92 or 80 out of 3663 may be a low percentage, but consider this, on his heyday:

Causes of T-34 losses from June 1941 to September 1942 (expressed as % of total).
Weapon Calibre 88mm 3.4%.

So the 2.5% don't look out of ordinary.



< Message edited by madner -- 7/12/2010 12:35:04 PM >

(in reply to Curtis Lemay)
Post #: 1132
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/12/2010 3:05:18 PM   
Curtis Lemay


Posts: 12969
Joined: 9/17/2004
From: Houston, TX
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

quote:

This was despite the fact that the unit did not have SPAAG.


I really should quit -- but Curtis is such a gold mine!

I read the above sentence and wondered in passing: does that have any basis in fact, or did he just say it because it would be helpful to his argument if such was the case?

After all, this is Curtis we're talking about.

So I should be working on that retaining wall out back, but...

I read the one page article he cites. No discussion of the matter either way. I went to 'Lexicon der Wehrmacht.' Looked up the composition of the 'Flak Sturm Regimenter' that made up the 'Flak Korps III' under discussion. The light flak batteries are listed as (sf).

Uh huh. Off to Niehorster. 'Sf' = 'self-propelled.'


"Handbook on German Military Forces", pg 167, figure 151: "Antiaircraft Regiment (motorized)". No SPAAG.

And, of course, the article notably fails to list any of the guns as SPAAG.


There's really no point in bothering. I cite evidence that those specific regiments contained self-propelled AA guns -- you steam roller right over it. Never mind you've still shown no reason at all to think the 88's served as mobile flak.


And I cite evidence that they didn't. And the article supports it at every turn:

"The III. Flak-Korps was made up of motorized units only1, even though there were shortages of vehicles."

No shortage of guns is listed. By definition, SPAAG doesn't require a vehicle to tow it. The need for vehicles strongly suggests that they were towed. And:

"According to the 20 September 1944 experience report, losses during the march included 20 guns, 110 trucks and towing vehicles, 100 motorcycles, passenger cars and trailers.26 "

No SPAAG is ever listed in any loss reports. Towing vehicles are, however.

Finally, it's improbable that a purely defensive unit, intended for rear area deployment would have been given SPAAG. That was reserved for units whose mobility was critical - Panzer Divisions, for example.

(in reply to ColinWright)
Post #: 1133
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/12/2010 3:16:30 PM   
Curtis Lemay


Posts: 12969
Joined: 9/17/2004
From: Houston, TX
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Nothing in the article supports your assertion that 88's were used as mobile AA. I have never asserted that 88's were only used by field units in the AT role.


Direct quote from your post #1072:

quote:

Very few of them were there with the field units. And they were up front to serve as AT, not as AA. In their AA role, they would be used to defend fixed targets vulnerable to high-level bombing, not for defense against tactical aircraft.


In contrast, I have never explicitly stated that 88's were used as mobile AA. I've simply challenged you basis for your explicit statement that they weren't. Same post:

quote:

A limbered up 88 moving along with a column would be useless if some Tomahawks showed up.


None of your claims about this have stood up to scrutiny. And you're now reduced to claiming that all the kills of the unit while it moved were by light AA. You have no evidence for this, and you're starting to look like the British at Isandhlwana.

All I've ever claimed is that the 88mm Flak was providing a dual use to ground units early in the war - air defense and AT. That they were used for air defense of ground units is now an established fact.

< Message edited by Curtis Lemay -- 7/12/2010 3:30:53 PM >

(in reply to ColinWright)
Post #: 1134
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/12/2010 3:28:05 PM   
Curtis Lemay


Posts: 12969
Joined: 9/17/2004
From: Houston, TX
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: madner

Now that is a good argument if someone would argue that, but your argument was that due to superior allied tactics the flak units were no longer used to support ground operations. Clearly the III. Flak-Korps was used in that fashion, and clearly it did destroy around 80 tanks.


I've never claimed that their use as AT completely ended. I've said that they were phased out of that role. And that's just what happened. The unit kept its guns behind the lines for air defense purposes, rarely engaging tanks. But the Germans were on the defensive in Normandy, so tanks couldn't be avoided altogether.

quote:

Now, 92 or 80 out of 3663 may be a low percentage, but consider this, on his heyday:

Causes of T-34 losses from June 1941 to September 1942 (expressed as % of total).
Weapon Calibre 88mm 3.4%.

So the 2.5% don't look out of ordinary.


Those T-34's were primarily on the defensive for those periods, in contrast to Allied tanks in Normandy. Regardless, I'm sure those figures pale in comparison to the 88's performance in the Desert.

The important point is that longer ranges don't realy benefit an unarmored gun. That's because it is subject to HE fire, and HE ranges far exceed AT ranges. Only in those cases where the enemy has poor coordination of artilery with armor, and tanks that lack HE will that range matter. Late in the war even the Soviets were probably competent enough to discount that advantage, and they had huge artillery support.

Since we now know for certain that the 88mm Flak was used for air defense of ground units, that makes my point about the Pak 43 telling: Why build a dedicated AT gun if a Flak gun can give you dual use? The only answer is that the Flak gun was no longer effective in the AT role. And that's just what the article emphasizes.

(in reply to madner)
Post #: 1135
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/12/2010 3:35:46 PM   
Curtis Lemay


Posts: 12969
Joined: 9/17/2004
From: Houston, TX
Status: offline

quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Otherwise, it would be nice if flak could either provide AA protection or be used for direct ground support. As noted here, 88's did not do both at once. They did apparently serve simultaneously as both AA and artillery, which is interesting, and yet another aspect of their role that could be simulated -- but isn't something we're arguing about.


Actually, the figures do show that they did both at once. 462 AC and 92 Tanks destroyed.

(in reply to ColinWright)
Post #: 1136
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/12/2010 5:38:33 PM   
ColinWright

 

Posts: 2604
Joined: 10/13/2005
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Otherwise, it would be nice if flak could either provide AA protection or be used for direct ground support. As noted here, 88's did not do both at once. They did apparently serve simultaneously as both AA and artillery, which is interesting, and yet another aspect of their role that could be simulated -- but isn't something we're arguing about.


Actually, the figures do show that they did both at once. 462 AC and 92 Tanks destroyed.


Similarly, the Short Stirling was used as a strategic bomber and as a target tug, thus showing it was able to do both at once.


_____________________________

I am not Charlie Hebdo

(in reply to Curtis Lemay)
Post #: 1137
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/12/2010 7:27:16 PM   
madner

 

Posts: 48
Joined: 6/21/2010
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: madner

Now that is a good argument if someone would argue that, but your argument was that due to superior allied tactics the flak units were no longer used to support ground operations. Clearly the III. Flak-Korps was used in that fashion, and clearly it did destroy around 80 tanks.


I've never claimed that their use as AT completely ended. I've said that they were phased out of that role. And that's just what happened. The unit kept its guns behind the lines for air defense purposes, rarely engaging tanks. But the Germans were on the defensive in Normandy, so tanks couldn't be avoided altogether.


Now if that would be true, why would the above mentioned report complain about the usage versus ground forces? It only makes sense if they were deliberately used (like latter in Wacht am Rhein) to support ground forces.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

quote:

Now, 92 or 80 out of 3663 may be a low percentage, but consider this, on his heyday:

Causes of T-34 losses from June 1941 to September 1942 (expressed as % of total).
Weapon Calibre 88mm 3.4%.

So the 2.5% don't look out of ordinary.


Those T-34's were primarily on the defensive for those periods, in contrast to Allied tanks in Normandy. Regardless, I'm sure those figures pale in comparison to the 88's performance in the Desert.

The important point is that longer ranges don't realy benefit an unarmored gun. That's because it is subject to HE fire, and HE ranges far exceed AT ranges. Only in those cases where the enemy has poor coordination of artilery with armor, and tanks that lack HE will that range matter. Late in the war even the Soviets were probably competent enough to discount that advantage, and they had huge artillery support.

Since we now know for certain that the 88mm Flak was used for air defense of ground units, that makes my point about the Pak 43 telling: Why build a dedicated AT gun if a Flak gun can give you dual use? The only answer is that the Flak gun was no longer effective in the AT role. And that's just what the article emphasizes.


Not comparable as in the desert the flak units represented a significant percentage of German units capable of destroying tanks. If you posses one third of the anti tank assets you should at least destroy as many tanks.

The Red army artillery coordination was always poor, that said they 7.62 was by design meant to be both field and AT gun, and engage targets mostly by direct fire. But I digress, wasn't it you that claimed that the 8.8 was able to be dismounted fast enough to engage strafing aircraft without prior warning? Certainly after destroying targets it would be possible to shift the firing positions?


(in reply to Curtis Lemay)
Post #: 1138
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/12/2010 8:05:55 PM   
ColinWright

 

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Sigh. The whole thing always gets pulled out of all connection with reality when Curtis comes trooping in. While there's the usual conventional praise for the 88/revisionist modification, the essential facts aren't particularly debatable.

There is light flak and heavy flak. Light flak is mobile, effective against low-level aircraft, and quickly deployed. It is, in particular, suitable to accompany moving columns of troops, because it is able to come into action very quickly. Heavy flak is intended more to be used against aircraft at elevation, and takes some time to deploy. Aside from the sheer size of the piece, you're gonna be going through a ton of shells, and presumably, there's some sort of observation, fuse-setting, and gun-laying rigamarole connected with taking full advantage of the potential of the piece. The 88 was heavy flak -- or medium flak, or whatever you want to call it. That's what it was made for, and that's what it was best at. No doubt it could do something about that P-47 that just came zipping over the tree-line, but a limbered 88 wasn't really what was called for in that situation.

I don't really see anything too hard to swallow in the foregoing. I don't see how anyone could. Now for the second part of my exposition on the obvious.

The Germans always were noticeably ready to employ their flak in a ground support role, and the 88 was no exception. Early on, its value for bunker-busting and as a long-range AT gun were noticed and exploited. 88's did not accompany front-line troops because they were especially suitable for the role of mobile AA. When they appeared in a direct-fire role in mobile warfare, it was because they were useful in ground combat roles. I'm interested to hear it was apparently also used to provide indirect artillery support, but that's really kind of beside any point anyone seems interested in disputing.

Now...what seems to be driving Curtis is the usual 'all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds.' The fact of the matter -- again as usual -- is that it isn't. 88's, employed as AA guns, would tend to be in the rear with the gear, protecting fixed and vulnerable points, which yes, were plentiful, even in the desert. As such, they would usually not be in a position to support assaults and provide AT protection. When they were deployed in such roles, they were usually not in a position to fulfill the AA mission they were best at. The 88's can be protecting Tank Repair Workshop 8, or they can be smashing up Matildas. They can't be doing both. Not at once.

Now, we could be having a useful conversation -- or at any rate, an illuminating debate -- aimed at defining this and similar defects and deciding how best to remedy them. But no -- we're hung up with Curtis and his attempts to prove that two and two make five, or that someone else said two and two make five, or something else connected with whatever the needs of his inner world are.




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(in reply to madner)
Post #: 1139
RE: Comprehensive Wishlist - 7/12/2010 9:11:47 PM   
madner

 

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Well prior to the war there was quite a debate about the proper caliber for light divisional artillery, with the US army and Wehrmacht going for the 105mm, UK for 87mm and Red Army for 7.62mm guns (which were to be replaced by 107mm artillery, starting in 1941). And the Germans had the long range 105mm as well, so clearly they felt there was a niche for a longer range light artillery piece. Mainly useful for counter battery fire I suppose.  

(in reply to ColinWright)
Post #: 1140
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