Slitherine

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Now if at Midway part of the IJN CAP was kept or sent back up after the TBs attacked, again we might have had an alternate ending.

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ORIGINAL: treespider

You think Allied CV's early war are weak...bite me! I knew exactly where they were...one of my subs even had the temerity to scratch Yorktown's paint with a torpedo the day before the big exchange on the 15th.

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ORIGINAL: treespider

You think Allied CV's early war are weak...bite me! I knew exactly where they were...one of my subs even had the temerity to scratch Yorktown's paint with a torpedo the day before the big exchange on the 15th.

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ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf

i do agree that a better design than the betty was needed, something fast and heavily armed+armored

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ORIGINAL: spence
The IJN spent nearly 4 years wishing that all this was true. In the real world the Bettys (and Nells) had one really good day against ships (Prince of Wales and Repulse). That same torpedo corps went after the Lexington in February and then Adm Crace's TF at Coral Sea without any effect. After that they spent the rest of their existence completely justifying their reputation (amongst their own crews) as RONSONs (a type of cigarette lighter). The occasional torpedo hit they scored hardly justifies the expenditure of aircrew that went along with it.

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Okay, let's count successes of Betties after PoW and Repulse:

CV:1 damaged
BB:1 damaged (disputed, might be B6N)
CA:1 sunk, 3 damaged
CL:3 damaged (or 4, if USS Birmingham was also torpedoed by G4M on 10/08/43, can't find definite information about the attacker's type anywhere)
A bunch of lesser ships (AV Langley, both APAs lost by USN during the war, a couple of destroyers), I'm far too lazy to count exactly.

That's... a very good tally for a plane of which only 2435 (I hope you realise that this is a quite small number for a plane that also was the main ground attacker and one of the main searchplanes of IJNAF) were produced and which was on the losing side. In fact, I don't think any other purely land-based plane on both sides can boast a comparable list. Add here important operational results achieved by repulsing Allied cruisers at Makassar Strait, and by numerous airfield and port attacks during the Japanese offensive in Philippines, Malaya and DEI, as well as far less triumphant, but still vital for holding the line as long as Japs did, action over Darwin, Port Moresby and Solomons, and I fail to see how G4M career can be considered anything other than illustrious. Impossibility of the odds placed against IJNAF land-based bomber force is a weak reason to condemn a plane's design.

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Okay, let's count successes of Betties after PoW and Repulse:

CV:1 damaged
BB:1 damaged (disputed, might be B6N)
CA:1 sunk, 3 damaged
CL:3 damaged (or 4, if USS Birmingham was also torpedoed by G4M on 10/08/43, can't find definite information about the attacker's type anywhere)
A bunch of lesser ships (AV Langley, both APAs lost by USN during the war, a couple of destroyers), I'm far too lazy to count exactly.

That's... a very good tally for a plane of which only 2435 (I hope you realise that this is a quite small number for a plane that also was the main ground attacker and one of the main searchplanes of IJNAF) were produced and which was on the losing side. In fact, I don't think any other purely land-based plane on both sides can boast a comparable list. Add here important operational results achieved by repulsing Allied cruisers at Makassar Strait, and by numerous airfield and port attacks during the Japanese offensive in Philippines, Malaya and DEI, as well as far less triumphant, but still vital for holding the line as long as Japs did, action over Darwin, Port Moresby and Solomons, and I fail to see how G4M career can be considered anything other than illustrious. Impossibility of the odds placed against IJNAF land-based bomber force is a weak reason to condemn a plane's design.



That's roughly the same number of a/c as the Fairey Swordfish with the same record of combat success (approximately). Not too many threads from the IJN fanboys complaining about how the game portrays such an invidious British invention though.

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ORIGINAL: crsutton

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ORIGINAL: treespider

You think Allied CV's early war are weak...bite me! I knew exactly where they were...one of my subs even had the temerity to scratch Yorktown's paint with a torpedo the day before the big exchange on the 15th.

I think the general consensus has always been. Never take on KB-"unless" Treespider is your opponent. Then you can safely figure that you have about a 80% chance of sinking at least six of his carriers.

We call it Treespider's Law.

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ORIGINAL: crsutton

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ORIGINAL: treespider

You think Allied CV's early war are weak...bite me! I knew exactly where they were...one of my subs even had the temerity to scratch Yorktown's paint with a torpedo the day before the big exchange on the 15th.

I think the general consensus has always been. Never take on KB-"unless" Treespider is your opponent. Then you can safely figure that you have about a 80% chance of sinking at least six of his carriers.

We call it Treespider's Law.

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ORIGINAL: spence
Even the 1000 lbers delivered by US carrier air most probably will not seriously harm IJN BBs. Such historical certainty allows for very unhistorical play.

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ORIGINAL: spence
Seems the Swordfish had a better record than the RIKKO.

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ORIGINAL: jeffk3510

How come the Allies never had a long-legged land based torpedo bomber? No need with their carrier striking power?

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ORIGINAL: Chickenboy
Meh. The Swordfish had a different record than the Rikko because it was used in a very different naval war than the Pacific. In spite of its limitations, and the absence of a good follow-on design in the early to mid-war, it did well enough to justify its existence. It was a useful tool for the Allied naval war effort.

The G3/4 series was useful in its mission-to an extent. Then Japanese conceptual failures in design (armor, self-sealing fuel tanks, etc.), pilot training issues and usage (poor escort coordination at times) made its deployment a case of diminishing returns. On the whole, I can't be so dismissive of the successes of this airframe (it ONLY sank how many ships?) as to say that it wasn't at least modestly successful.

Furthermore, I would say that the capabilities of the G3/4 were respected enough to cause the Allies to alter their strategic goals in the Pacific IRL. If they were concerned about the IJ Guadalcanal buildup cutting off supply routes from CONUS-Australia, they weren't concerned about the range and naval interdiction capabilities of the Dave float planes or even the occasional Emily torpedo attack. They were concerned enough about the capabilities of the G3/4 series (and its range) at naval interdiction that they felt compelled to hold an invasion on a shoestring.

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ORIGINAL: jeffk3510

How come the Allies never had a long-legged land based torpedo bomber? No need with their carrier striking power?

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ORIGINAL: Nikademus

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ORIGINAL: jeffk3510

How come the Allies never had a long-legged land based torpedo bomber? No need with their carrier striking power?

Couple reasons. First off, the USN pre-war was still largely gun-based. War plan Orange/Rainbow envisioned a fleet action to relieve the PI. The Japanese envisioned a defensive action to attrit this fleet. Yamamoto was an air enthusiaist and the Japanese in general saw the torpedo as an ideal means to acompish this attrition. Second....for 'defensive' the US envisioned high alt precision bombing as a possible solution to naval shore defense......hence the B-17.

The Japanese ended up under-estimating the problem of widely seperated bases lacking mutual protection and the US grossly overestimated the ability of high alt bombers hitting moving ships. It can also be noted (and has been by some authors) that the Japanese were so enthralled with long range that they failed to appreciate that being unescorted could produce problems and that crew fatigue would have an impact as well.

Live and Learn.

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ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo

Can't it be argued instead that the Allies in general never saw the torpedo as a viable weapon (vis "the USN was gun crazy")? The British, or for that matter the French, never put much effort into developing a long range, land-based TB despite the likelihood of it being very effective in N.Atlantic conditions?

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ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf

Have to say it again,

japanese didn't understand that because 90% of their atoll bases were water,
best thing to do was use that space for flying boats with torpedoes (and they had the fastest flying boat in the world, the emily)

so instead of 50 zeroes and 50 betties, you could fit 150 zeroes and 150 emilies on a size 3 or size 4 atoll

, a few of these atolls put together (like the marshall islands), and a USN counter-offensive would be quite difficult


taking out some of the fuel from the emily (don't need 30 hex range, 15 will do fine) and putting lots of armor or more ordnance
would have made it a truly devastating weapon - the only problem would be the high cost in materials, H8K1 was about 16 tons, and H8K2 was 18 tons


the concept of the long range torpedo plane, with escort and high performance oxygen torpedoes was a brilliant one

just implemented with a few flaws

(and using their few precious betties to attack allied airfield didn't help either)

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ORIGINAL: Nikademus

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ORIGINAL: Onime No Kyo

Can't it be argued instead that the Allies in general never saw the torpedo as a viable weapon (vis "the USN was gun crazy")? The British, or for that matter the French, never put much effort into developing a long range, land-based TB despite the likelihood of it being very effective in N.Atlantic conditions?

I think it would be more accurate to say the US saw the torpedo as too expensive and preferred bombs being targeted into pickle barrels with the amazing Norden bombsite and advertised to Congress as the ultimate in Cheap defense....more so given that at high alt the precious (and expensive) bombers would be more immune to counter-attack :)

The FAA was the black sheep stepchild of the RAF and was also starved of funds. Funds for big bombers were focused on continental bombing primarily pre-war

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ORIGINAL: Nikademus

your right. Coastal Command was responsible for patrol/ASW duties, however it too tended to only get 2nd hand equipment. Once the war began and stepped up, Harris begrudged every large modern bomber to anything other than his Bomber Command.

The Japanese viewpoint was different keep in mind because they were focused on the Decisive Battle so an attack on an invading fleet was paramount in their thoughts. the UK faced no similar threat and had the still had quantitively the most powerful navy in the world at the time (but along with an extremely tight budget).

As such there wasn't alot of fiscal room to develop a 2nd naval line of defense nor was there seen a pressing need.....hence the FAA remained stuck with torpedo biplanes and went down the dead end corridor of the multi-purpose aircraft such as the Skua and Roc.