ChuckBerger
Posts: 278
Joined: 8/10/2006 Status: offline
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Kurita at Samar faced a conundrum... On the one hand, there would never be a better opportunity (or indeed, any opportunity at all) for the IJN to inflict damage in surface action on the American fleet. This he must have known. So if the goal was to inflict damage, no matter what the cost, he made the wrong call. Yet he also must have known that his opportunity to inflict serious damage was limited. He had just witnessed the extreme difficulty his force had prosecuting a naval battle while under constant air attack, and undoubtedly he knew that the air attacks would continue and probably intensify. Plus the likely presence of US battleships. So even though this was the best remaining opportunity for the IJN battle fleet to inflict damage on the Americans, still it was not a very good opportunity. At best, he was looking at trading his ships for another couple of US CVEs, or maybe at the outside some of Oldendorf's old battleships. And then he must also have known, in his heart of hearts, that this was not a "decisive" battle, in the sense of a battle that could change the outcome of the war. It wasn't 1942 anymore. There was no longer any real opportunity for Japan to win the war, or even to fight to a stalemate. Even if he managed to repel the Philippines invasion completely, all that does is buy a few months. I think all Japanese leaders must have known this by 1944, even if they didn't admit it to anyone or to themselves. In the face of all that, what's a reasonable "goal" for Kurita? If it's to inflict damage at any price, he made the wrong decision. If it's not to waste his men's lives for little return, and no real strategic impact, then he made the right decision. I think on balance his choice was the right one. But then again, I think Japan should have surrendered in 1944, if not earlier...
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