Slitherine

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ORIGINAL: jtoatoktoe

LCS 1 is getting the Naval Strike Missile, so that's a start.

"To meaningless French Idealism, Liberty, Fraternity and Equality...we answer with German Realism, Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery" -Prince von Bülov, 1870-

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ORIGINAL: Mikewritesfic face legitimate 21st Century blue water threats,

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ORIGINAL: Sabresandy
If we really wanted the jack-of-all-trades not-really-a-warship, the Danish approach with the Absalon-class support ship or a larger number of Sea Fighter types would work relatively well. (Come to think of it, the Danish Absalons are almost everything that the LCS is supposed to be, discounting the anti-small boat mission.)

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That requires the ability to counter growing “asymmetric” threats like coastal mines, quiet diesel submarines, global piracy, and terrorists on small fast attack boats. It also requires intelligence gathering and scouting, some ground combat support capabilities, and the ability to act as a local command node, sharing tactical information with other Navy aircraft, ships, submarines, and joint units.

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ORIGINAL: ExNusquam
I've yet to see any evidence that the original LCS plan would have failed to complete these missions.

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ORIGINAL: mikmyk

My only issue with them is there isn't really a completed module yet. We can't even evaluate how good they are at x until these are completed. Other than tour around we have yet to see these ships do something other than travel. This could totally be how the Navy is communicating though.

Mike

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ORIGINAL: jimcarravallah

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ORIGINAL: mikmyk

My only issue with them is there isn't really a completed module yet. We can't even evaluate how good they are at x until these are completed. Other than tour around we have yet to see these ships do something other than travel. This could totally be how the Navy is communicating though.

Mike

You're right about the modules.

One has to look at LCS first in terms of its design effort to control long term sustainment costs for operations.

I worked Army acquisition, and post production sustainment costs (including manpower, training, and hard sustainment items such as ammunition, fuel, and spares) drove anywhere from 65 to 90 percent of the life cycle costs for deploying a combat system after engineering development, production, and initial deployment costs were factored in. The largest single cost impact over the lifecycle of a system was manpower and training for operations, maintenance, and its share of supply support.

LCS is one of the first deployed systems whose design criteria placed life cycle cost containment on a par with combat capability.

Launching the platform allows the Navy to begin testing its concept for reducing operational costs by minimizing the crew complement necessary to sail the ship, and rotating crews on the platform to keep it operationally available up to 50-percent of the time during its life (current systems average approximately 25-percent operational availability due in part to crew fatigue / workload constraints to maintain combat readiness).

When LCS combat role was first defined, the Navy was focusing on the emerging DoD role to support combat against asymmetrical threats and insurgent operations. Today, it appears that DoD is building a consensus that conflicts with major powers such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are potential threats.

The late 90s doctrine developers were wise to recognize that the threat environment could change while the LCS platform was still in production, and defined the modular weapons hosting concept you mention in the design criteria so the platform remained viable as the threat focus changed.

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ORIGINAL: mikmyk

Thanks Jim

Do you think the problem is though is that the module designs are also fluid? Not that this is wrong but it does lead people to the conclusion that they're not ready/completed.

Ex. Surface module was first built to deal with swarms in the littoral (guns and small missiles with high rates of fire). Now there is an added requirement of being able to duke it out with a contemporary or Chinese/Russian vessel with defensive systems?

I'm really a fan of these ships!

Mike

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ORIGINAL: mikmyk

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ORIGINAL: jimcarravallah

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ORIGINAL: mikmyk

My only issue with them is there isn't really a completed module yet. We can't even evaluate how good they are at x until these are completed. Other than tour around we have yet to see these ships do something other than travel. This could totally be how the Navy is communicating though.

Mike

You're right about the modules.

One has to look at LCS first in terms of its design effort to control long term sustainment costs for operations.

I worked Army acquisition, and post production sustainment costs (including manpower, training, and hard sustainment items such as ammunition, fuel, and spares) drove anywhere from 65 to 90 percent of the life cycle costs for deploying a combat system after engineering development, production, and initial deployment costs were factored in. The largest single cost impact over the lifecycle of a system was manpower and training for operations, maintenance, and its share of supply support.

LCS is one of the first deployed systems whose design criteria placed life cycle cost containment on a par with combat capability.

Launching the platform allows the Navy to begin testing its concept for reducing operational costs by minimizing the crew complement necessary to sail the ship, and rotating crews on the platform to keep it operationally available up to 50-percent of the time during its life (current systems average approximately 25-percent operational availability due in part to crew fatigue / workload constraints to maintain combat readiness).

When LCS combat role was first defined, the Navy was focusing on the emerging DoD role to support combat against asymmetrical threats and insurgent operations. Today, it appears that DoD is building a consensus that conflicts with major powers such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are potential threats.

The late 90s doctrine developers were wise to recognize that the threat environment could change while the LCS platform was still in production, and defined the modular weapons hosting concept you mention in the design criteria so the platform remained viable as the threat focus changed.

Thanks Jim

Do you think the problem is though is that the module designs are also fluid? Not that this is wrong but it does lead people to the conclusion that they're not ready/completed.

Ex. Surface module was first built to deal with swarms in the littoral (guns and small missiles with high rates of fire). Now there is an added requirement of being able to duke it out with a contemporary or Chinese/Russian vessel with defensive systems?

I'm really a fan of these ships!

Mike

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ORIGINAL: Primarchx

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ORIGINAL: mikmyk

Thanks Jim

Do you think the problem is though is that the module designs are also fluid? Not that this is wrong but it does lead people to the conclusion that they're not ready/completed.

Ex. Surface module was first built to deal with swarms in the littoral (guns and small missiles with high rates of fire). Now there is an added requirement of being able to duke it out with a contemporary or Chinese/Russian vessel with defensive systems?

I'm really a fan of these ships!

Mike

Both good points above about cost savings and expectations. But from what I've seen only the LCS ASuW module has actually been effectively deployed to date. The others seem to be chasing a moving target and failing in basic performance benchmarks followed by lengthy 'back to the drawing board' periods. I'm all for finding good TCO economies but what we see more and more of (not just with LCS) are promises of fiscal improvement turning into programs of spiraling cost that struggle to meet even fundamental performance goals.

I have no expectation of LCS competing 1:1 with a well-defended warship. However it should be an offensive/defensive match for a FAC-M, a frequent resident of the littoral region the LCS was designed to operate in. While helos/UAVs help even the scales, organic, all-weather offensive OTH weapons are IMHO necessary to make that happen.

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ORIGINAL: Primarchx

Some (recent) interesting reading on the subject. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33741.pdf

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March 2016 GAO Report
A March 2016 GAO report assessing DOD weapon acquisition programs stated:

Mine Countermeasures (MCM)
The Navy has accepted six MCM packages without demonstrating that they meet interim or threshold requirements. The package has four increments: the first is designed to remove sailors from the minefield and improve mine detection, classification, and neutralization over legacy vessels. Operational testing for the first increment was scheduled to begin in fiscal 2015. This testing has been suspended following a series of performance and reliability shortfalls during developmental tests. The Navy stated that, when the package was available, it significantly exceeded performance requirements during tests. The Department of Operational Test and Evaluation stated that the Navy did not take into account that the systems were unavailable for 85 of 132 days of testing. Test officials determined that the current MCM system would not be found operationally effective and critical MCM systems and the Independence-variant seaframe are not reliable. Test officials support the Navy's September 2015 decision to suspend further testing and evaluate alternatives to key systems and assess technical and programmatic
risks. The findings of this evaluation have not yet been finalized.

Surface Warfare (SUW)
The Navy has accepted seven SUW packages and plans to accept one more in fiscal 2017. Each increment one package currently consists of two 30 millimeter guns, an armed helicopter, and two rigid hull inflatable boats. In August 2014, the Navy found that the package met interim performance requirements on the Freedom variant and is currently testing the package on the Independence variant. To meet threshold requirements for SUW a surface-to-surface missile is required. The Navy plans to use the Army's Longbow HELLFIRE missile for this capability, as it canceled two previous efforts. According to program officials, initial demonstrations with Longbow HELLFIRE
have been successful and operational testing is planned for fiscal year 2017.

Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)
According to the Navy, the systems that comprise the ASW mission package are mature, as they have been fielded by United States and foreign navies. In September 2014, the Navy completed development testing aboard the Freedom variant, but the mission package is currently 5 tons over its weight parameters. Navy program officials stated that they recently awarded contracts to reduce package weight by at least 15 percent. The Navy is now planning to meet the threshold requirement for ASW in 2017, a one year delay from last year's estimate, as the Navy redirected funding for ASW to make up for funding shortfalls in the MCM and SUW packages.

Other Program Issues
The Navy continues to procure LCS seaframes, even though the sub-systems necessary to meet threshold mission package requirements have not yet been fully developed and integrated with both seaframe designs. The Navy will not achieve the capability to meet threshold requirements for all three of the mission packages until 2019, by which time it plans to take delivery of 22 ships. The Navy plans to begin procurement of a modified LCS in 2019.

...

GAO Response
The systems that comprise the Navy's mission packages have yet to work together to achieve stated minimum requirements. The failures of the MCM package during testing this year and the subsequent indefinite delay of MCM initial capability are emblematic of the Navy's challenges. In the absence of a defined increment-based approach to sequentially gain knowledge and meet requirements, the Navy's acquisition approach is not in accordance with best practices.

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ORIGINAL: Primarchx

This part is pretty telling as well...

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March 2016 GAO Report
A March 2016 GAO report assessing DOD weapon acquisition programs stated:

Mine Countermeasures (MCM)
The Navy has accepted six MCM packages without demonstrating that they meet interim or threshold requirements. The package has four increments: the first is designed to remove sailors from the minefield and improve mine detection, classification, and neutralization over legacy vessels. Operational testing for the first increment was scheduled to begin in fiscal 2015. This testing has been suspended following a series of performance and reliability shortfalls during developmental tests. The Navy stated that, when the package was available, it significantly exceeded performance requirements during tests. The Department of Operational Test and Evaluation stated that the Navy did not take into account that the systems were unavailable for 85 of 132 days of testing. Test officials determined that the current MCM system would not be found operationally effective and critical MCM systems and the Independence-variant seaframe are not reliable. Test officials support the Navy's September 2015 decision to suspend further testing and evaluate alternatives to key systems and assess technical and programmatic
risks. The findings of this evaluation have not yet been finalized.

Surface Warfare (SUW)
The Navy has accepted seven SUW packages and plans to accept one more in fiscal 2017. Each increment one package currently consists of two 30 millimeter guns, an armed helicopter, and two rigid hull inflatable boats. In August 2014, the Navy found that the package met interim performance requirements on the Freedom variant and is currently testing the package on the Independence variant. To meet threshold requirements for SUW a surface-to-surface missile is required. The Navy plans to use the Army's Longbow HELLFIRE missile for this capability, as it canceled two previous efforts. According to program officials, initial demonstrations with Longbow HELLFIRE
have been successful and operational testing is planned for fiscal year 2017.

Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)
According to the Navy, the systems that comprise the ASW mission package are mature, as they have been fielded by United States and foreign navies. In September 2014, the Navy completed development testing aboard the Freedom variant, but the mission package is currently 5 tons over its weight parameters. Navy program officials stated that they recently awarded contracts to reduce package weight by at least 15 percent. The Navy is now planning to meet the threshold requirement for ASW in 2017, a one year delay from last year's estimate, as the Navy redirected funding for ASW to make up for funding shortfalls in the MCM and SUW packages.

Other Program Issues
The Navy continues to procure LCS seaframes, even though the sub-systems necessary to meet threshold mission package requirements have not yet been fully developed and integrated with both seaframe designs. The Navy will not achieve the capability to meet threshold requirements for all three of the mission packages until 2019, by which time it plans to take delivery of 22 ships. The Navy plans to begin procurement of a modified LCS in 2019.

...

GAO Response
The systems that comprise the Navy's mission packages have yet to work together to achieve stated minimum requirements. The failures of the MCM package during testing this year and the subsequent indefinite delay of MCM initial capability are emblematic of the Navy's challenges. In the absence of a defined increment-based approach to sequentially gain knowledge and meet requirements, the Navy's acquisition approach is not in accordance with best practices.

This doesn't just have issues of 'mission creep' with regard to ASuW modules, but both the ASW and particularly the MCM modules, which to my knowledge have not strayed much from their initial project specifications, won't even be to threshold capability, if they pass at all, before 22 vessels have been delivered.

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ORIGINAL: Primarchx

We're seeing more of this as acquisition programs do their 'parallel development' of platforms and testing. If testing is done at all, falling to the wayside of vendor 'assurances'. Which then lead to costly overruns when, surprise, surprise, the vendors were blowing smoke and the system doesn't perform as promised after the barn door is closed and units have been delivered.