Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I’m not sure I would agree with that. With hindsight there are things that should have been done differently – but abandoning Cyrenaica was not one of them. The plan was to knock Italy out of the war. Clearing the Italians from Cyrenaica was a necessary part of that – and of course, with hindsight, completing the job by removing them from Tripolitania should have been the priority. What doesn’t seem sensible in the circumstances would have been to simply walk back to the Egyptian border. The Desert War was a battle for airfields, and airbases in Cyrenaica would a) help limit the danger to Alexandria and the Royal Navy, b) help with the interdiction of Italian supply to Tripoli, c) assist in the supply and protection of Malta, not to mention d) help protect the flank of any misguided attempts to help Greece . Simply giving back the Italians their forward airfields as well as the ports of Benghazi and Tobruk defies military logic (not that much of British and French thinking in the early war didn't defy military logic ).

But sadly the decision was taken to assist the Greeks*, leaving behind to defend Cyrenaica…..er not very much actually. The 2nd Armoured and 7th Armoured were divisions in name only, nowhere near full strength and in at least one case, they relied on captured Italian tanks. But in addition to the loss of British armour it also meant the Aussie and Kiwi infantry and a large part of the small desert air force were taken away too. The introduction of the Luftwaffe was a game changer and effectively closed the Med – something the Italians had not been able to properly achieve – making reinforcement much longer (the air via Takoradi, the army via the Cape).

*It should be remembered that Greece was one of the British few allies at the time. I think abandoning Greece would have been the militarily sensible thing to do, but politically? Interestingly I’ve read recently, contrary to the 'usual' versions of events, that it was the British military that said an expedition to Greece should be mounted. Allegedly Churchill warned Eden (who was sent on the fact finding mission to Greece) that he did not want to risk another Norwegian fiasco and that he should not feel pressured into making a decision to go if that was likely. But supposedly Wavell, Cunningham and Longmore were for it.

Right or wrong, and who's ever fault it was, the decision to assist Greece was taken even though the small British army was still rebuilding from the defeat in France, the threat of invasion had not disappeared and the Italians had not been kicked out of Africa. But, help to Greece was going to be given, was denuding the holding forces in Cyrenaica a poor decision based on known events at the time? Maybe. The Italians botched the ‘invasion’ of Egypt, even with 10th Army intact. Now it had been destroyed there was no reason to believe 5th Army was going to be able to offer something different. I don’t know what consideration had been given to German assistance being provided at that time – but the fact the Luftwaffe had moved in to the theatre at the start of the year should have been a warning – but even then, with the Italians seemingly in disarray, the feeling was probably that the RN could restrict reinforcement / resupply by the Germans.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Zorch

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I’m not sure I would agree with that. With hindsight there are things that should have been done differently – but abandoning Cyrenaica was not one of them. The plan was to knock Italy out of the war. Clearing the Italians from Cyrenaica was a necessary part of that – and of course, with hindsight, completing the job by removing them from Tripolitania should have been the priority. What doesn’t seem sensible in the circumstances would have been to simply walk back to the Egyptian border. The Desert War was a battle for airfields, and airbases in Cyrenaica would a) help limit the danger to Alexandria and the Royal Navy, b) help with the interdiction of Italian supply to Tripoli, c) assist in the supply and protection of Malta, not to mention d) help protect the flank of any misguided attempts to help Greece . Simply giving back the Italians their forward airfields as well as the ports of Benghazi and Tobruk defies military logic (not that much of British and French thinking in the early war didn't defy military logic ).

But sadly the decision was taken to assist the Greeks*, leaving behind to defend Cyrenaica…..er not very much actually. The 2nd Armoured and 7th Armoured were divisions in name only, nowhere near full strength and in at least one case, they relied on captured Italian tanks. But in addition to the loss of British armour it also meant the Aussie and Kiwi infantry and a large part of the small desert air force were taken away too. The introduction of the Luftwaffe was a game changer and effectively closed the Med – something the Italians had not been able to properly achieve – making reinforcement much longer (the air via Takoradi, the army via the Cape).

*It should be remembered that Greece was one of the British few allies at the time. I think abandoning Greece would have been the militarily sensible thing to do, but politically? Interestingly I’ve read recently, contrary to the 'usual' versions of events, that it was the British military that said an expedition to Greece should be mounted. Allegedly Churchill warned Eden (who was sent on the fact finding mission to Greece) that he did not want to risk another Norwegian fiasco and that he should not feel pressured into making a decision to go if that was likely. But supposedly Wavell, Cunningham and Longmore were for it.

Right or wrong, and who's ever fault it was, the decision to assist Greece was taken even though the small British army was still rebuilding from the defeat in France, the threat of invasion had not disappeared and the Italians had not been kicked out of Africa. But, help to Greece was going to be given, was denuding the holding forces in Cyrenaica a poor decision based on known events at the time? Maybe. The Italians botched the ‘invasion’ of Egypt, even with 10th Army intact. Now it had been destroyed there was no reason to believe 5th Army was going to be able to offer something different. I don’t know what consideration had been given to German assistance being provided at that time – but the fact the Luftwaffe had moved in to the theatre at the start of the year should have been a warning – but even then, with the Italians seemingly in disarray, the feeling was probably that the RN could restrict reinforcement / resupply by the Germans.

I was referring to your game, not to real life.
I agree the Greek adventure was a mistake, in real life.

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Zorch

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I’m not sure I would agree with that. With hindsight there are things that should have been done differently – but abandoning Cyrenaica was not one of them. The plan was to knock Italy out of the war. Clearing the Italians from Cyrenaica was a necessary part of that – and of course, with hindsight, completing the job by removing them from Tripolitania should have been the priority. What doesn’t seem sensible in the circumstances would have been to simply walk back to the Egyptian border. The Desert War was a battle for airfields, and airbases in Cyrenaica would a) help limit the danger to Alexandria and the Royal Navy, b) help with the interdiction of Italian supply to Tripoli, c) assist in the supply and protection of Malta, not to mention d) help protect the flank of any misguided attempts to help Greece . Simply giving back the Italians their forward airfields as well as the ports of Benghazi and Tobruk defies military logic (not that much of British and French thinking in the early war didn't defy military logic ).

But sadly the decision was taken to assist the Greeks*, leaving behind to defend Cyrenaica…..er not very much actually. The 2nd Armoured and 7th Armoured were divisions in name only, nowhere near full strength and in at least one case, they relied on captured Italian tanks. But in addition to the loss of British armour it also meant the Aussie and Kiwi infantry and a large part of the small desert air force were taken away too. The introduction of the Luftwaffe was a game changer and effectively closed the Med – something the Italians had not been able to properly achieve – making reinforcement much longer (the air via Takoradi, the army via the Cape).

*It should be remembered that Greece was one of the British few allies at the time. I think abandoning Greece would have been the militarily sensible thing to do, but politically? Interestingly I’ve read recently, contrary to the 'usual' versions of events, that it was the British military that said an expedition to Greece should be mounted. Allegedly Churchill warned Eden (who was sent on the fact finding mission to Greece) that he did not want to risk another Norwegian fiasco and that he should not feel pressured into making a decision to go if that was likely. But supposedly Wavell, Cunningham and Longmore were for it.

Right or wrong, and who's ever fault it was, the decision to assist Greece was taken even though the small British army was still rebuilding from the defeat in France, the threat of invasion had not disappeared and the Italians had not been kicked out of Africa. But, help to Greece was going to be given, was denuding the holding forces in Cyrenaica a poor decision based on known events at the time? Maybe. The Italians botched the ‘invasion’ of Egypt, even with 10th Army intact. Now it had been destroyed there was no reason to believe 5th Army was going to be able to offer something different. I don’t know what consideration had been given to German assistance being provided at that time – but the fact the Luftwaffe had moved in to the theatre at the start of the year should have been a warning – but even then, with the Italians seemingly in disarray, the feeling was probably that the RN could restrict reinforcement / resupply by the Germans.

I was referring to your game, not to real life.
I agree the Greek adventure was a mistake, in real life.

warspite1

Soz old fruit, you were replying to the previous poster, who as far as I could tell was talking about real life.

However, I still disagree with you

Although I don't know how this game plays out, I know that the Germans get a victory bonus for taking Tobruk. Moreover in real life Rommel couldn't move on Egypt without taking Tobruk. I assume the supply rules adequately reflect this (and I base my answer on that assumption).

quote:

ORIGINAL: Olorin

The British should have sent 20 divisions to Greece or none at all.

Since they lacked that force, the meager force that was sent was not an assistance at all, it simply hastened the deutsch decision to invade, because the reason for the invasion was the British presence in Greece.

Terrible decision for both nations.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Olorin

The British should have sent 20 divisions to Greece or none at all.

Since they lacked that force, the meager force that was sent was not an assistance at all, it simply hastened the deutsch decision to invade, because the reason for the invasion was the British presence in Greece.

Terrible decision for both nations.

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

quote:

ORIGINAL: Zorch

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Zorch

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I’m not sure I would agree with that. With hindsight there are things that should have been done differently – but abandoning Cyrenaica was not one of them. The plan was to knock Italy out of the war. Clearing the Italians from Cyrenaica was a necessary part of that – and of course, with hindsight, completing the job by removing them from Tripolitania should have been the priority. What doesn’t seem sensible in the circumstances would have been to simply walk back to the Egyptian border. The Desert War was a battle for airfields, and airbases in Cyrenaica would a) help limit the danger to Alexandria and the Royal Navy, b) help with the interdiction of Italian supply to Tripoli, c) assist in the supply and protection of Malta, not to mention d) help protect the flank of any misguided attempts to help Greece . Simply giving back the Italians their forward airfields as well as the ports of Benghazi and Tobruk defies military logic (not that much of British and French thinking in the early war didn't defy military logic ).

But sadly the decision was taken to assist the Greeks*, leaving behind to defend Cyrenaica…..er not very much actually. The 2nd Armoured and 7th Armoured were divisions in name only, nowhere near full strength and in at least one case, they relied on captured Italian tanks. But in addition to the loss of British armour it also meant the Aussie and Kiwi infantry and a large part of the small desert air force were taken away too. The introduction of the Luftwaffe was a game changer and effectively closed the Med – something the Italians had not been able to properly achieve – making reinforcement much longer (the air via Takoradi, the army via the Cape).

*It should be remembered that Greece was one of the British few allies at the time. I think abandoning Greece would have been the militarily sensible thing to do, but politically? Interestingly I’ve read recently, contrary to the 'usual' versions of events, that it was the British military that said an expedition to Greece should be mounted. Allegedly Churchill warned Eden (who was sent on the fact finding mission to Greece) that he did not want to risk another Norwegian fiasco and that he should not feel pressured into making a decision to go if that was likely. But supposedly Wavell, Cunningham and Longmore were for it.

Right or wrong, and who's ever fault it was, the decision to assist Greece was taken even though the small British army was still rebuilding from the defeat in France, the threat of invasion had not disappeared and the Italians had not been kicked out of Africa. But, help to Greece was going to be given, was denuding the holding forces in Cyrenaica a poor decision based on known events at the time? Maybe. The Italians botched the ‘invasion’ of Egypt, even with 10th Army intact. Now it had been destroyed there was no reason to believe 5th Army was going to be able to offer something different. I don’t know what consideration had been given to German assistance being provided at that time – but the fact the Luftwaffe had moved in to the theatre at the start of the year should have been a warning – but even then, with the Italians seemingly in disarray, the feeling was probably that the RN could restrict reinforcement / resupply by the Germans.

I was referring to your game, not to real life.
I agree the Greek adventure was a mistake, in real life.

warspite1

Soz old fruit, you were replying to the previous poster, who as far as I could tell was talking about real life.

However, I still disagree with you

Although I don't know how this game plays out, I know that the Germans get a victory bonus for taking Tobruk. Moreover in real life Rommel couldn't move on Egypt without taking Tobruk. I assume the supply rules adequately reflect this (and I base my answer on that assumption).

I'm not saying abandon Tobruk - just don't go past Gazala with major forces.

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Olorin

The British should have sent 20 divisions to Greece or none at all.

Since they lacked that force, the meager force that was sent was not an assistance at all, it simply hastened the deutsch decision to invade, because the reason for the invasion was the British presence in Greece.

Terrible decision for both nations.

warspite1

Agreed the decision was bad, but I can't believe it hastened the German intervention. Hitler simply could not afford a threat to Ploesti.

So let's say the military geniuses (that seemed to totally forget what happened in Norway and France) decide to concentrate on kicking Italy out of Tripolitania and forget Greece. Was there a good chance that the British would have succeeded? I think so - or at least forced the Italians to rush reinforcements to Libya, rather than Albania.

Thus the day of decision on the Eastern Front draws near and the Greeks are well on their way to taking Albania. With Crete in Greek hands, the threat to Ploesti was real from an RAF deployment there - regardless of British troop involvement on the Greek mainland or not.

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I think this ignores the relationship between the two twats. After Mussolini gave Hitler a free pass over Austria, Hitler said he would never forget it - and he didn't.

I can't see how Hitler could humiliate the Italians like that and still expect Mussolini's regime to survive. Anything that wouldn't humiliate Il Duce would not be acceptable to Greece who, after all were well inside Albania, having cleared Italians off their soil.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Zorch

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

I think this ignores the relationship between the two twats. After Mussolini gave Hitler a free pass over Austria, Hitler said he would never forget it - and he didn't.

I can't see how Hitler could humiliate the Italians like that and still expect Mussolini's regime to survive. Anything that wouldn't humiliate Il Duce would not be acceptable to Greece who, after all were well inside Albania, having cleared Italians off their soil.

The Greeks could be intimidated.
Mussolini was a pain to Hitler, who would relish a chance to show him who's boss. Their relationship was way past the Brenner Pass days. I doubt Mussolini would have fallen. Remember how much it took before the King & Badaglio deposed him in September 1943. But Hitler didn't even try this approach...a sign of his declining mental abilities, or overconfidence?

England expects that every man will do his duty. Horatio Nelson October 1805

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Turn 40 - 2. Gabr Saleh
26th April 1941

The stunning defeat of the 3rd Motor Brigade means that Neame has little choice but to throw in all available reserves from Bardia and the surrounding area almost regardless of their supply and readiness situation.

The call goes out - "if its got a barrel and there is a spare shell lying around, fire the bloody thing". The Australian artillery concentrates on the two surrounded units - which includes the Ariete Divisional HQ, while the British artillery to the west, concentrate on the Bersaglieri battalion.