EwaldvonKleist
Posts: 2038
Joined: 4/14/2016 From: Berlin, Germany Status: offline
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quote:
My reasoning, based on old games of my own, was that committing an army for a month or two is actually less than committing a corps there for a couple of years. If you do not take Sevastopol then you will need forces there for the rest of the game to keep them penned in anyway. So you are investing more for forces in a short period of time to free up forces for a very long period of time - it is a net plus. If there is nothing else on the map to do, or if you expect to be on the defending side soon, I see the points. Otherwise I would enjoy seeing a sizeable Soviet army parked in a location with very low activity, while my forces overrun manpower centres and pocket units on the open fields. In this case the Southern pincer of operation typhoon Nr. 2 would be a very good place for the forces from Sevastopol, it looks to be short of infantry support. Assuming lvl two forts and your def CV=Soviet offensive CV in the Sevastopol hex as the requirement for successful blocking, you need 9 of your offensive CV for every 20 offensive CV the Soviets commit. A very good deal given the force ratios in 1942, especially because you can deploy Rumanians here which are of limited offensive use. (1 off CV in wood hex with lvl 2 fort=4 def CV and 1 off CV in rough hex with lvl 2 fort=5 def CV), it is even better once lvl 3 is reached (11 of your offensive CV for every 30 offensive CV the Soviets commit). You also have the advantage of inner lines, withdrawing from Sevastopol and redeploying to the main front takes the Sovs far longer than for the Axis side, which has a direct rail connection while the reds need to ship first and then travel a very long arc by rail. Same for reinforcing Sevastopol for a coup de main or to counter a build up of the other side. quote:
Additionally Sevastopol starts to become a pain when the tide turns and the soviet side is on the offensive. This is especially true if amphibious landings are allowed as you then have to cover the coast west of Sevastopol. By contrast if you take the whole of Crimea it can be quite easy to hold on to it with a division or two at kerch and similarly at the entrances to the peninsula. So it can be some valuable real estate you can hold onto with minimum commitment for quite a long time. Once the Sovs are more restricted by available front line then by their forces, I agree. If sea landings are a threat again depends on the force ratio and available reserves, they also can result in the Soviets losing units for little in return.
< Message edited by EwaldvonKleist -- 7/7/2019 3:37:48 PM >
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