Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: eskuche

This prevents the sit-in-the-ocean-indefinitely-and-wait-for-a-spot-to-open-up scenario.

quote:

ORIGINAL: ncc1701e

Perhaps a possible solution is to limit the number of transports and the number of landing ships available to Japan at the beginning of the scenario.
We can even put some transports and some landing ships being built in the deployment queue of the Japanese player at the start of the scenario.

This way, Japan will have to carefully selected what to invade.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Platoonist

quote:

ORIGINAL: ncc1701e

Perhaps a possible solution is to limit the number of transports and the number of landing ships available to Japan at the beginning of the scenario.
We can even put some transports and some landing ships being built in the deployment queue of the Japanese player at the start of the scenario.

This way, Japan will have to carefully selected what to invade.

Resources for the historical Japanese opening offensive were spread dangerously thin, with just the equivalent of 11 divisions assigned to the entire Pacific and southeast Asia. The Japanese were largely able to pull this off at the time because of Japanese supremacy in the air and superiority at sea. Each advance proceeded by leaps, with each leap directed against a strategic point having an airfield that could be rapidly converted to Japanese use. Each leap was short enough to be easily covered by land-based aircraft. Air units would then move forward to the newly captured airfield to cover the next leap. The Japanese carefully planned the offensive on a strict timetable to keep the Allies off-balance and unable to redeploy in time to meet each new threat.

That's the major historical reason anyway why Japan didn't make a leap at the Netherlands East Indies on the first go. Malaya, Sarawak and Borneo had to be taken first for the desired air cover.

It also helped that most of these amphibious landings were unopposed, which was possible because the Allies did not have nearly enough troops to cover all the possible landing sites. Wake Island being the glaring exception where the Japanese direct assault attempt got a bloody nose on the first try.

quote:

ORIGINAL: incbob

1) Until the game makes historical decisions desirable to the player, players will not do them.
2) I posted a video on YouTube Pacific Carrier Guy that shows the Japanese player can easily invade India on the February 15th turn. Take their historical gains, defend everything, and I think I could have invaded Australia, but not in strength.

The issue with supply and logistics. (Not the "Logistics" in the game, but Logistics in the general military sense).

The 1941 scenario gives the Allies no logistics. Since they have no logistics they are no threat to the Japanese and the player knows it. The Japanese player knows he does not have to defend ANYTHING until February. Move, Attack, Then in February and March move units to defend.
The Japanese player knows that the Allies cannot do anything till April at the earliest. (The UK player cannot even place a single division in India or Australia until April)!!!!!

The Allies complete lack of logistics is then compounded by giving the Japanese logistics that even their wildest Generals and Admirals wold not have dreamed of. They knew where the oil was, but they did not invade Java until February because they did not have the logistics.

I have actually had a Japanese player invade the Marquesas Islands (far southeastern corner of map). That would have been impossible because it would have taken every tanker Japan had and then whatever force landed there would never have gotten supply.