Slitherine

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom



What? No apology for accussing me of fabricating that Ike quote?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Anyway, after reading and answering some of the non-stop nonsense over the past few days, I will no longer be participating in this thread.

Nothing is going to be gained.

I just wanted to post that last reply to Kevinugly, and now I am outta here.

I am leaving, not because anyone has "won"; rather, it has now become a complete waste of my time.

It is summertime, the weather here is beautiful, and I'm going to enjoy myself. . .

I would urge anyone who is interested to learn more about Patton to go to your library and read some good books about him. Don't take anyone's word for it in this thread, which has been dominated by a few individuals who are determined to destroy Patton's Great memory.

I now leave this thread to those few who remain, so that they can squabble among themselves over "how many angels it really does take to sit on the head of a pin".

quote:

My apologies if this post is a bit long, however, I think it is vitally important to read it and understand the situation of Patton and Third Army by September, 1944, before the Battle for Metz started.

quote:

When Patton's troops received enough gasoline to resume their advance towards the Moselle on 5 September, after a delay of nearly a week, the troops quickly discovered that the great pursuit was over. Instead of running down the fleeing fragments of shattered German units, soldiers all along Third Army's front encountered enemy soldiers who contested every foot of ground and who counterattacked viciously to recover lost positions.

quote:

Why did Patton bother with Lorraine at all?

The REASON is that Patton WAS ORDERED to take Lorraine.

Did you catch that?

That's right, Patton and Third Army were ORDERED to attack Metz:

"Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, made up his mind to destroy as many German forces as possible west of the Rhine. Omar Bradley, Patton's immediate superior as commander of 12th Army Group, concurred. All Allied armies were ordered to press ahead on a broad front.."

quote:

Patton and Third Army were ORDERED to attack Metz - the MOST HEAVILY FORTIFIED PLACE IN EUROPE.

quote:

It seems in the Lorraine Campaign that the Germans had an unwitting ally - the Allied High Command. What the German armies were incapable of doing - stopping Patton - the Allied High Command did it for them.

quote:

Read on:


SITUATION OF THIRD ARMY AT METZ


************************

Shortage of Fuel

Although gasoline was plentiful in Normandy, by August 31, Third Army received NO gasoline at all. With fuel tanks running dry, Patton's spearheads captured Verdun and crossed the Meuse River.

For the next 5 days, Third Army was virtually immobilized.

Why?

Eisenhower granted logistical priority to the British and American armies farther north, leaving Third Army with about one-quarter of its required daily gasoline allotments.

quote:

Patton's troops captured some gasoline from the Germans, hijacked some from First Army depots, and received some gasoline by air, but when gasoline receipts finally increased to the point that the advance could be resumed, the opportunity of sweeping through Lorraine unopposed had passed.

quote:

Eisenhower granted logistical priority to the British and American armies farther north, leaving Third Army with about one-quarter of its required daily gasoline allotments.

quote:

************************

Shortage of Supplies


The gasoline shortage was followed by a shortage of ammunition, particularly in the larger artillery calibers that had not been in great demand during the fluid pursuit. By 10 September, Third Army's artillery batteries received only one-third of a unit of fire per day. Other shortages would crop up as the campaign progressed. At one time or another, rations, clothing, mattress covers, coffee, tires, tobacco, antifreeze, winter clothing, and overshoes would all be in critically short supply.

quote:

At the same time that the Germans received reinforcements, Patton's Third Army was being trimmed down. In the pursuit across France, Third Army had controlled four far-flung corps, but during September two of those corps were REMOVED from Patton's command.

Just before the Battle of Metz, Patton's Third Army was cut in half.

"For most of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army would consist of two corps, the XX and the XII. Four to six infantry divisions and two or three armored divisions would carry the bulk of the burden for the next 3 months."

quote:

************************

Shortage of Air Power

Patton's arsenal for the Lorraine campaign was the XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC), which had cooperated with Third Army throughout the pursuit across France. Fighter-bombers from the XIX TAC flew 12,000 sorties in support of Third Army during August, but in September, TACs efforts would be divided between the Lorraine front and the battles being waged to reduce the German fortresses still holding out along the French coast. As the autumn wore on, XIX TAC would be increasingly frustrated by poor weather.

Therefore, before the Battle for Metz began, Patton lost HALF of his airforce!

quote:

************************

Conclusion


Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, which Patton WAS ORDERED to pursue, Third Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and denied the full use of its air assets.

quote:

On 10 September, 12th Army Group (Bradley) ORDERED Third Army to advance on a BROAD FRONT and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz.

quote:

With all these handicaps, Patton and Third Army were ORDERED to attack Metz - the MOST HEAVILY FORTIFIED PLACE IN EUROPE.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Anyway, after reading and answering some of the non-stop nonsense over the past few days, I will no longer be participating in this thread.

quote:

Nothing is going to be gained.

I just wanted to post that last reply to Kevinugly, and now I am outta here.

I am leaving, not because anyone has "won"; rather, it has now become a complete waste of my time.

quote:

It is summertime, the weather here is beautiful, and I'm going to enjoy myself. . .

quote:

I would urge anyone who is interested to learn more about Patton to go to your library and read some good books about him. Don't take anyone's word for it in this thread, which has been dominated by a few individuals who are determined (against much of the evidence) to destroy Patton's Great memory.

quote:

Instead I opted to post a few articles in the hopes that people would be able to read about Patton for themselves.

quote:

ORIGINAL: freeboy

kev,
My biggest askiii was simply, why could not these divisions of Pattons encircled all the active wermatct west of say Brussels? supported by follow on units .. monty etc.. remember those germans who stood and fought had a terrible supply line into France, daily bomber raids before the late fall weather slowed this... I see lots of statements of the nature of "this couldn't be done" I have no problem wiht opinions.. I simply ask why?

Why Why Why...???

Matthew the freeboy

quote:

ORIGINAL: freeboy

don't you mean retreating East?.. and thee goal would be to pocket the majority of the okw forces in France.. ?? And politics is the relations between men, all mankind not meaning to exclude females, and so of course I agree some politics is inevatable, but are you saying that war is politics? not in my book, war is putting the forces of your enemies under your heal... but I ramble thanks for including me.. id where are u?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Kevinugly

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Anyway, after reading and answering some of the non-stop nonsense over the past few days, I will no longer be participating in this thread.

Nothing is going to be gained.

I just wanted to post that last reply to Kevinugly, and now I am outta here.

I am leaving, not because anyone has "won"; rather, it has now become a complete waste of my time.

It is summertime, the weather here is beautiful, and I'm going to enjoy myself. . .

I would urge anyone who is interested to learn more about Patton to go to your library and read some good books about him. Don't take anyone's word for it in this thread, which has been dominated by a few individuals who are determined to destroy Patton's Great memory.

I now leave this thread to those few who remain, so that they can squabble among themselves over "how many angels it really does take to sit on the head of a pin".

This is not the first time you've printed this message. I'm sure you won't stay away!

I printed an article which concludes that Patton made some serious errors of judgement attempting to capture the fortified city of Metz. You attacked those conclusions so I asked you to offer your own analysis of why. All you produced were the same old excuses of 'it was the weather' or 'it was the lack of supplies' without offering up anything on Patton's chosen tactics - the main point of the article I posted. I would suspect that this is because you have nothing and so are flouncing off to worship at the shrine to Patton you have sited in some dark recess.

By 'good' books, I presume you mean those that don't portray Patton in anything but the most favourable light

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Golf33

Do you seriously believe this? I am astonished. I should have thought it obvious that diaries can be falsified in any number of ways, both at the time of writing and subsequently.

This is my last try at getting a direct answer to this direct question.

Regards
33

33,
The section on Hammelburg in D'Este's (excellent work) provides some evidence for you. He makes it clear that a personal letter written home was at odds with other things Patton was writing and saying at this time about the incident. Two letters home, one three days before the incident and the other after the raiwas launched make it clear Patton knew who was there. In War as I knew it Patton tells us that he launched the raid to free 900 prisoners (no mention that he knew who was there) and to keep the enemy off balance as to his true intentions. Even more revealing is D'Este's description of the press conference at which Patton was asked to explain this action.

He recounts how Patton waved his Diaries and personal letters in the air insisting he had known nothing of the presence of his son in law. D'Este pretty conclusively shows that he did, using pesonal correspondence to his wife as the evidence. The correspondence pre-dated the raid, and specifically mentions the son in law as being at the camp.

These daries clearly omitted any mention of the true reason for the raid, which suggests they are not as reliable as has been claimed. Many military figures used their diaries whilst writing memoirs after the war, and I believe Patton (as War as I knew it demonstrates) would have written at length after the war about his role, as the other senior commanders did. Diaries are also published, I've seen AlanBrookes for example. Knowing this, he would have to have been careful when writing anything that it fit what he was publicly pronouncing at the time.

Still, this just means we have to treat Patton's diaries with the same caution as we treat any first peron account, not that they are useless. I think there is much in there that is useful.

regards,
IronDuke

I now know why I'm bored.

The level of debate here has entered the realm of Mush. . .

Why does it feel like I'm reading a page of gossip from the National Enquirer or watching an episode of Jerry Springer?

I guess when Great Men like Patton, MacArthur, Ike, Kennedy, Caesar and Napoleon dare to do Great Things, they can also make mistakes.

But never fear, there is always an Oswald or a Booth standing nearby to take a shot at them. . .

I have read the accounts of the Hammelburg Incident in D'Este and Blumenson as well as a few other places, and the general consensus is this:

D'Este says that the evidence that Patton knew that Waters was in Hammelburg is circumstantial. In other words, Patton might have known Waters was in the POW camp, but then again, he might not have know.

Blumenson adds that when Waters saw Patton he asked him if he knew he was in the camp, and Patton replied: "I didn't know for sure."

What is known for sure is that a POW camp containing American POWs was in Hammelburg and that Waters might be there. Apparently the POWs in a camp in Poland were moved to Hammelburg. The belief was that Waters might have been in that Polish camp as well. But no one knew if he was even alive.

In Patton's two letters to his wife, he mentions that "he" (Waters) is in the camp. But this may have been Patton being overly optimistic to his wife about rescuing their Son-In-Law. Many men will tend to put on a brave, optimistic face for their wives, if something bad might happen. Also, Patton suffered from Dyslexia, so he may not have written it the way he had intended to.

Even after the incident was over, the only thing Patton regretted was not in sending a larger rescue force as he had originally intended.

As it stood, the rescue force freed 700 Russian POWs, and liberated the POW camp in Hammelburg that was holding 5,000 POWs, including Waters. However, this rescue attempt ultimately failed.

A short time later another rescue party liberated the camp.

The verdict?

Patton maintains he did not know for sure if Waters was in the camp. No one really did. He felt since there were 5,000 POWs there anyway, it was worth liberating. He also felt that it would cause a diversion and draw German forces away from his main thrust of attack.

Personally, I feel it has been made into a big deal for two reasons:

1) Patton's critics can feel all warm and fuzzy inside because they have found a chink in the armour of the Great Patton; and

2) The fact that the original operation failed. If Patton had sent a larger force as he had originally intended, and had it been successful, the whole operation would just be a footnote in history.

Therefore, those who dislike Patton will continue to ring the Bell of Hammelburg, while fair-minded people, when considering Patton's Great Accomplishments, will place this incident in the proper perspective as it should be. . .

Incidently (and it comes as no surprise to me) that Charles Whiting has written a book about this incident called "48 Hours to Hammelburg: Patton's Secret Ghost". No doubt he will be fair and objective about Patton.

quote:

Von Rom
I now know why I'm bored.

The level of debate here has entered the realm of Mush. . .

Why does it feel like I'm reading a page of gossip from the National Enquirer or watching an episode of Jerry Springer?

A debating trick. Line it up next to the Straw man Golf identified for us, and the dodging the question we've all witnessed.

quote:

Von Rom
I guess when Great Men like Patton, MacArthur, Ike, Kennedy, Caesar and Napoleon dare to do Great Things, they can also make mistakes.

But never fear, there is always an Oswald or a Booth standing nearby to take a shot at them. . .

The sad thing is you will never know how the truly great men in your list would feel being lined up for a purpose like this, and being put in some of the company you choose. You list of great men has some notables, but also some figures it is difficult to talk of in the same breath. I see a pattern. Your fervour for Patton is becoming unsettling.

quote:

Von Rom
I have read the accounts of the Hammelburg Incident in D'Este and Blumenson as well as a few other places, and the general consensus is this:

We both know your description of the consensus isn't the case. You continue to believe you own the only copy of D'Este in the world, and feel free to selectively quote him. I have a copy. For the critical forum reader, I shall relate what D'Este actually says so they can decide for themselves.

quote:

Von Rom
D'Este says that the evidence that Patton knew that Waters was in Hammelburg is circumstantial.

This is strictly true, but the evidence he provides is compelling, which I note you strangely omit. Perhaps Forum readers should be allowed to view this evidence themselves (as presented in D'Este) to decide the matter for themselves.

The raid was launched by Hoge's 4th Armoured. The mission was given to Hoge and Patton's bodyguard, Al Stiller, turned up to join the raid. D'Este notes (AND I QUOTE)

quote:

D'Este: Pg 714.
However, General's aides do not just go along on combat missions. Clearly, Stiller seemed to be there for another purpose.

Hoge, together with his Corp Commander raised concerns with Patton about it. Neither could see the point of this raid. Patton inisisted saying:

quote:

Patton:
I promise I'll replace every man and every vehicle you lose.

Bearing in mind what D'Este thinks the raid was for, this quote does not sit well with Von Rom's continued insistence that Patton put his men first.

Hoge was embarrassed by the pleading tone in Patton's voice (D'Este's adjective not mine). Hoge turned to Stiller (Patton's bodyguard) and D'est says.

quote:

D'Este:
As historian John Toland reveals:"...Stiller explained in a low voice that the 'Old Man' was absolutely determined to free the prisoners at Hammelburg-and revealed that John Waters, Patton's son in law, was one of the prisoners.

So, CCB are ordered to do the mission. The request to use the entire Combat command was Hoge and the task force leader's (Baum's) request. D'Este says nothing at this juncture about Patton specifying the size of the force. The request was turned down by Eddy, the Corp Commander. Patton was Eddy's superior Officer, so quite why Patton wanted to send the entire Combat Command yet wouldn't overrule his Subordinate who was against it escapes me, but never mind.

Task Force Baum is created. 16 tanks, 3 SP 105s, 27 Halftracks, 294 Men.

The main evidence presented by D'Este for Patton knowing about Waters being at the camp is this:

Letter to Beatrice his wife, dated 23/03/1945. Three days before the task force was despatched.

quote:

Patton
We are headed right for John's place and may get there before he is moved if he is moved he had better escape or he will end up in Bavaria.

Second letter to Beatrice dated 27/03/1944. The raid had been despatched, but was reported as missing so Patton had no idea at this stage what they had found at the camp.

quote:

Patton
Last night I sent an armoured column to a place 40 miles east of Frankfurt where John and some 900 POWs are said to be...everyone but me thought it was too great a risk.

This rather places Patton's later plea (that he wanted to send a Combat Command) into perspective. He didn't feel the raid was a risk despite being only of TF size having just despatched it, but all his senior officers did think it was a risk. This is interesting, since the raid was caught by elements of three German divisions on it's way back from Hammelburg, and chopped to pieces. 293 men were listed as MIA. Many were liberated several weeks later, including the Commander. D'Este does not provide a figure for the number killed attempting to rescue Patton's son in law. He however describes "scores of wounded" suggesting there were many deaths. This suggests Patton was not being completely honest after the raid turned into a fiasco.

quote:

Von Rom
In other words, Patton might have known Waters was in the POW camp, but then again, he might not have know.

Forum readers can now decide for themselves.

quote:

Blumenson adds that when Waters saw Patton he asked him if he knew he was in the camp, and Patton replied: "I didn't know for sure."

The clear implication of which is that Patton suspected (at the very least) that Waters was there. Although in his private correspondence he seemed much surer, and in public, denied it.

As D'Este says

quote:

D'Este
Those involved in the raid, Hoge, Baum, Stiller and Creighton Abrams, were convinced that Patton had mounted Hammelburg to save his son in law. All, however, chose to remain silent in deference to Patton.
Not until 1967, when he was himself a four star General did Abrams write that Stiller had admitted he made the trip "only because General Patton's son in law, Colonel Waters, was in the prison camp."

The Leader of the Task Force, the Commander of the Combat Command it belonged to, The Commander of the Division the Combat Command belonged to and Patton's Bodyguard knew who was there. You say Patton might not have done.

quote:


Von Rom
In Patton's two letters to his wife, he mentions that "he" (Waters) is in the camp. But this may have been Patton being overly optimistic to his wife about rescuing their Son-In-Law. Many men will tend to put on a brave, optimistic face for their wives, if something bad might happen. Also, Patton suffered from Dyslexia, so he may not have written it the way he had intended to.

I have been accused of twisting facts to suit my argument. Here, you suggest (D'Este doesn't enter the realm of fantasy about why Patton was telling his wife this) that Patton was somehow being overly optimistic. Why raise his wife's hopes unless he knew John Waters was these? Of all the POW camps in Germany, he tells his wife (you say without knowing) that Waters is in the camp. You're suggesting he deliberately raised her hopes by mentioning John despite the fact that

quote:

Von Rom
But no one knew if he was even alive

Your remarks about his dyslexia defy belief. I believe Patton's condition is something else we can add to the list of things you know little about. D'Este (who would have read every word Patton wrote) writes:

quote:

D'Este
Patton's dyslexia generated a lifelong writing problem manifested by mis-spelled words, and the frequent omission of punctuation and capitalisation.

In an attempt to rubbish this evidence, you're suggesting you know better and it could actually manifest itself by making him write things so as to give the wrong meaning. I felt:

quote:

Patton
We are headed right for John's place

looks fairly easy to understand. Trying to use his dyslexia in this manner does you no credit.

quote:

Von Rom
Even after the incident was over, the only thing Patton regretted was not in sending a larger rescue force as he had originally intended.

As his letters illustrate, he wasn't too concerned about the size of the force when it was despatched. He was the only one who felt it had a chance.

As for whose fault it was, D'Este makes several comments (not quotes from others, these are his own words.)

quote:

D'Este
The only certainty in the entire tragic affair is that Bradley would have forbidden Patton to undertake the Hammelburg raid if he had known of it in advance.

He goes on:

quote:

D'Este
Patton attempted to put a brave face on an unjiustifiable act.

Further

quote:

D'Este
Patton perpetuated the fiction of Hammelburg at a press conference, in which he baldly deceived the correspondents by waiving his personal and official diairies in the air and claiming he had known nothing of Water's presence in Hammelburg until 9 days after the raid.

These are the diaries you maintain are invaluable because they are unaltered, reveal Patton's true thoughts and come down to us as evidence not designed to be read by others, so not likely to be doctored.

Regarding Patton's claim he had not been allowed to send enough men, D'Este says:

quote:

D'Este
Patton later blamed Bradley. He also blaimed Eddy and Hoge. In fact he blaimed everyone but himself.

Later he comments on Patton's version of events in War as I knew it.

quote:

D'Este
This version is as self serving as his earlier complaint that Bradley had denied him the necessary force to mount the raid.

The last words are again Colonel D'Este's.

quote:

D'Este
His denials notwithstanding, the raid not only branded Patton a liar but tarnished the very fabric on which his fame lasted-that his troops came first, and everything possible must be done to insure their survival. Instead, he had sent 307 men on a mission whose implicit purpose was the rescue of his own son-in-law.

All bar one of these men were (at best) captured, or at worst, injured or killed. These men belonged to the US Army, not to Patton. He commanded them, but they were not his property. I can not think of another event during WWII quite like this (anyone any suggestions?)

Critical readers of this thread can now decide for themselves why Hammlelburg was launched, whose fault it was, and whether being upset about it (as his critics are) is fair and "putting it into perspective."

Regards,
IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: warhead2

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

quote:

ORIGINAL: Frank
For Western - Allied leaders, he is a good one. For German leaders he was average IMHO.

I was never that impressed with the average German General when it came to leadership ability.

Interesting. I always have. The situations within the respective armies were different, but I always thought the superior training of the pre-war German Officer Corp, allied with greater attrition rates which meant more officers got the chance to command, meant generally they were a more competent bunch than anything the Allies possessed.

Would Any German commander have kept his post if roles had been reversed at Messina etc, or they had taken three months with naval and air supremacy to breakout from Normandy? Ultimately, since only success guaranteed continuing employment, better officers gravitated to the surface in the Wehrmacht.

Regards,
IronDuke

Here again, is another one your lop-sided opinions.

Patton can do no right no matter what he does.

However, everything German officers did is brilliant no matter the circumstances.

Let's take a look at the so-called "brilliant" BlitzKrieg of the early German years, shall we?

The Germans surprise-attacked the unprepared Poles, bombing poor defenceless Warsaw. The Poles attacked German tanks with cavalry. Quite the achievement

Next, came poor little neutral Belgium. A surprise attack forced its surrender - another brilliant military move.

Next on the agenda was poor, defenceless Denmark - yes quite the military victory.

Then there was Holland - the technique of bombing defenceless Rotterdam is still studied today. . .

Then of course, there was the surprise attack through the Ardennes at Sedan, when German tanks basically raced for the channel, hardly encountering any opposition. The Germans faced divided, inexperienced, and poorly led Allied forces.

And at Dunkirk, the Germans couldn't even capture all the defenceless Allied soldiers trapped on the beaches

Yes, yes, all brilliant.

Then of course, the Germans attacked Russia in a surprise attack, surrounding and defeating a poorly led rabble. All those encirclements meant that those German officers encountered very little opposition. And the opposition they did encounter, was carried out by troops with low morale, poor clothing and weapons, and with very poor leadership.

Yes, what stunning successes. . .

My God,I have yet to get to the end of this "debate",but I must chime in here and say you sure do have a simpleton's view of the "blitzkrieg". Reading thus far has been like an instruction on how to lose a debate..you're getting your *ss handed to you,and you don't even realize it.

Cheers!

Ohhhh, yes it's quite shocking, isn't it. . .

When people can fault Patton for victories against supposedly inferior forces, then I can compare and find fault of early German Blitzkrieg victories against inferior forces.

Did you catch that?

Or am I being too simple for you?

I think you are indeed being too simplistic for him. I think Warhead2's point is that the German method of warfare and their campaigns are far more complicated and technical than your post suggests. My apologies to Warhead2 is I have misread his point (welcome to the fun, Warhead2.)

Can I ask:

Why do you keep saying "Next came Belgium, next came Denmark" etc. Are you aware the Germans actually attacked Holland, Belgium, France etc at the same time. They didn't bully one after the other, but attacked them all simultaneously.

Also, why in these quotes is the word "surprise" used as a criticism, yet when Patton achieved operational surprise in the Ardenne or during the breakout, it is somehow a mark of genius? Is German surprise a different type of surprise to American surprise? Was Patton's surprises somewhat more surprising and deserving of praise than the German's surprises?

IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

My apologies if this post is a bit long, however, I think it is vitally important to read it and understand the situation of Patton and Third Army by September, 1944, before the Battle for Metz started.

Indeed it is, hence my intervention.

quote:

When Patton's troops received enough gasoline to resume their advance towards the Moselle on 5 September, after a delay of nearly a week, the troops quickly discovered that the great pursuit was over. Instead of running down the fleeing fragments of shattered German units, soldiers all along Third Army's front encountered enemy soldiers who contested every foot of ground and who counterattacked viciously to recover lost positions.

I don't know why you included this. It suggests Patton's great sweep across France was unnopposed. I thought you were denying this not so long ago?

quote:

Why did Patton bother with Lorraine at all?

The REASON is that Patton WAS ORDERED to take Lorraine.

Did you catch that?

That's right, Patton and Third Army were ORDERED to attack Metz:

"Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, made up his mind to destroy as many German forces as possible west of the Rhine. Omar Bradley, Patton's immediate superior as commander of 12th Army Group, concurred. All Allied armies were ordered to press ahead on a broad front.."

I occasionally get the feeling you're not entirely arguing in knowledge of all the facts. There are actually two separate campaigns in Lorraine by Third Army, which you seem to be confusing (for what purpose I can only guess at).

The campaign which attracts the criticism was the second campaign beginning in early November. This is the Metz Campaign. The campaign Patton fought in Early/Mid September brought his forces to the Moselle, but not directly to Metz. He moved up to Metz with a series of small attacks during October, but the assault on the city that is presumably the source of this section of the thread did not begin until early November.

This is where you start to lose the plot.

quote:

Patton and Third Army were ORDERED to attack Metz - the MOST HEAVILY FORTIFIED PLACE IN EUROPE.

Actually, no. Patton's September campaign was actually a good one, culminating in 4th Armoured's good performance arround Arracourt defeating a sizeable German counterattack. He didn't attack Metz in this portion of the battle. He was being allowed to advance (his supply situation was not quite as bad as you make out) and was using the advance to convince Bradley he had enough supplies to attack, and thus being allowed to continue.

The real attack on Metz came in November, of which more later.

quote:

It seems in the Lorraine Campaign that the Germans had an unwitting ally - the Allied High Command. What the German armies were incapable of doing - stopping Patton - the Allied High Command did it for them.

This statement betrays a complete lack of understanding of the logistical situation facing SHAEF in late august. Third Army did run out of fuel, but to blame this on Allied High Command is shallow. Firstly, supplies were still being hauled from the Normandy beachheads on the other side of France. The Red Ball Express Convoys were guzzling the equivalent of an Army's fuel hauling the fuel across France. The speed of the advance across France meant they were going further and further every day, and the round trip was becoming longer and longer. The trucks were working non stop and suffering attrition as a result. To accuse the Allied High Command over this is shallow, three new American divisions arrived in france and were promptly immobilised to allow their organic transport to be given to the Red Ball Express to try and cope with the logistical demands placed upon it. SHEAF was trying it's best. but it was simply not possible to keep all the forward Armies supplied. Everybody ran out of steam, because they outran the capabilities (excellent though they were) of the logistics system set up to supply them. Between August 25 and September 6, the Red Ball Express consumed 300 000 tons of gasoline a day in order to supply the front line units with just under 90 000 tons of supplies.

quote:

Read on:


SITUATION OF THIRD ARMY AT METZ


************************

Shortage of Fuel

Although gasoline was plentiful in Normandy, by August 31, Third Army received NO gasoline at all. With fuel tanks running dry, Patton's spearheads captured Verdun and crossed the Meuse River.

For the next 5 days, Third Army was virtually immobilized.

Why?

Eisenhower granted logistical priority to the British and American armies farther north, leaving Third Army with about one-quarter of its required daily gasoline allotments.

This is a good bit. Gasoline was indeed plentiful in Normandy, but then Patton wasn't in Normandy, but the other side of France and fuel had to be driven across France to reach him. Therefore, the fact fuel was plentiful in Normandy is irrelevant.

This also touches on the Patton Legend's assertion that given the fuel, he could have entered Germany through an undefended Metz and ended the war by christmas. SHAEF considered this option in August as he moved across France. Their conclusion was that the logistical system was only capable of carrying him and perhaps 10-12 divisions through the German border as far as Frankfurt. However, they could only do this by immobilising everybody else as far back as the Seine and using the transport to supply Patton. They concluded that 10-12 divisions defending a narrow corridor as much as 500 km long into Germany would be exceptionally vulnerable to the Germans as they regrouped, and that if Patton got into a fight (as he undoubtedly would once the Germans realised what was happening) every other Allied soldier in Europe would be unable to help because they would be immobilised on the Seine. They considered it militarily nonsense. They further concluded that even if attempted, Patton would receive little or no air support, because supplies would not exist to establish, support and defend forward airfields.

quote:

Patton's troops captured some gasoline from the Germans, hijacked some from First Army depots, and received some gasoline by air, but when gasoline receipts finally increased to the point that the advance could be resumed, the opportunity of sweeping through Lorraine unopposed had passed.

This had some effect, but it was a mammoth effort by the Red Ball Express that permitted a limited supply improvement, resulting in the resumption of offensive operations in early September when daily tonnage increased by about 500 tons.

As for:

quote:

Eisenhower granted logistical priority to the British and American armies farther north, leaving Third Army with about one-quarter of its required daily gasoline allotments.

Yes he did, for good reason. Eisenhower had come to the conclusion that a single thrust into Germany was all that could be sustained logistically. There were sound military reasons for that thrust to be in the north around the Ruhr, rather than in Patton's sector.

1. A thrust along the northern coast of France would give the Allies a chance to capture channel ports close to England, thus considerably shortening the supply lines which ran back to Normandy.

2. Along the northern coast, a thrust would have the benefit of air cover and tactical air support from England.

3. It would also have the support of American and Royal Naval vessels in the channel.

Therefore, 21st Army group was given priority, and Hodge's 1st US Army was given US priority as it would be advancing on 21st Army Group's right flank with responsibility of covering that flank.

Therefore, Patton was halted for sound military reasons. Had he been pushed on, he would have been bereft of support and would have been defeated on the German border or just beyond. He would have had little air support and flanks stretching 500 km. There would have been no possibility of other Allied forces moving to his aid. Only in the Patton legend is this manouevre possible.

quote:

************************

Shortage of Supplies


The gasoline shortage was followed by a shortage of ammunition, particularly in the larger artillery calibers that had not been in great demand during the fluid pursuit. By 10 September, Third Army's artillery batteries received only one-third of a unit of fire per day. Other shortages would crop up as the campaign progressed. At one time or another, rations, clothing, mattress covers, coffee, tires, tobacco, antifreeze, winter clothing, and overshoes would all be in critically short supply.

Supply issues in September are not relevant to the second campaign in November where most of the criticism stems. Also, as I've illustrated, this wasn't anybody's fault. the supply situation was critical, Eisenhower's strategy demanded a northern thrust. In November, there were indeed further logistical problems, but Patton was not being ordered to attack Metz at this time.

quote:

At the same time that the Germans received reinforcements, Patton's Third Army was being trimmed down. In the pursuit across France, Third Army had controlled four far-flung corps, but during September two of those corps were REMOVED from Patton's command.

Just before the Battle of Metz, Patton's Third Army was cut in half.

"For most of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army would consist of two corps, the XX and the XII. Four to six infantry divisions and two or three armored divisions would carry the bulk of the burden for the next 3 months."

Some good points here although I suspect your chronology is dodgy, although it begs the question why Patton attacked with this reduced force in November at a point in time he wasn't being ordered to.

quote:

************************

Shortage of Air Power

Patton's arsenal for the Lorraine campaign was the XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC), which had cooperated with Third Army throughout the pursuit across France. Fighter-bombers from the XIX TAC flew 12,000 sorties in support of Third Army during August, but in September, TACs efforts would be divided between the Lorraine front and the battles being waged to reduce the German fortresses still holding out along the French coast. As the autumn wore on, XIX TAC would be increasingly frustrated by poor weather.

Therefore, before the Battle for Metz began, Patton lost HALF of his airforce!

So why fight?

quote:

************************

Conclusion


Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, which Patton WAS ORDERED to pursue, Third Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and denied the full use of its air assets.

You're mixing two campaigns again. The campaign you're concentrating on is one of his better ones, the September attacks into Lorraine.

quote:

On 10 September, 12th Army Group (Bradley) ORDERED Third Army to advance on a BROAD FRONT and seize crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz.

He allowed them the chance to advance after Patton crossed the Moselle in sufficient strength. Bradley was giving out advance warnings to Patton that Market Garden would have to take priority and offensive action would be curtailed. Prior to that, Eisenhower was doing all he could for third Army without jeopardising his operational plan for the sensible northern thrust. He authorised the increase in supplies that resulted in the 5th September operational restart.

quote:

With all these handicaps, Patton and Third Army were ORDERED to attack Metz - the MOST HEAVILY FORTIFIED PLACE IN EUROPE.

Again, Metz came in November, not September. Many of the things you complain about were not part of the equation in September. The weather and air support issues were issues in November, not in early September.

The operations in November were essentially agreed as the Queen plan which grew out of a series of meetings Ike had with senior Commanders on Sept 21. For Third Army, the order was that it would advance only when "logistics permit". It's primary function would be at that point protecting Hodges flank.
Bradley was allocating the bulk of his supplies to the 1st and 9th US armies, in conjunction with the general strategic plan. However, Patton wanted to attack, and Bradley agreed to let him provided the plans were for only a limited move up to the west wall, which Bradley felt the supply situation might be able to support. Patton's start date was 10 November, but he persistently asked to be able to go earlier, evenetually getting Bradley to agree to him attacking on 2 November, although the rains intervened and prevented the assault starting until 8 November. Therefore, Patton requested permission to attack, and was granted it. To suggest he was unwilling or somehow made this attack because Bradley forced him to is nonsense.

IronDuke.

quote:

Actually, no. Patton's September campaign was actually a good one, culminating in 4th Armoured's good performance arround Arracourt defeating a sizeable German counterattack. He didn't attack Metz in this portion of the battle. He was being allowed to advance (his supply situation was not quite as bad as you make out) and was using the advance to convince Bradley he had enough supplies to attack, and thus being allowed to continue.

quote:

This statement betrays a complete lack of understanding of the logistical situation facing SHAEF in late august. Third Army did run out of fuel, but to blame this on Allied High Command is shallow. Firstly, supplies were still being hauled from the Normandy beachheads on the other side of France. The Red Ball Express Convoys were guzzling the equivalent of an Army's fuel hauling the fuel across France. The speed of the advance across France meant they were going further and further every day, and the round trip was becoming longer and longer. The trucks were working non stop and suffering attrition as a result. To accuse the Allied High Command over this is shallow, three new American divisions arrived in france and were promptly immobilised to allow their organic transport to be given to the Red Ball Express to try and cope with the logistical demands placed upon it. SHEAF was trying it's best. but it was simply not possible to keep all the forward Armies supplied. Everybody ran out of steam, because they outran the capabilities (excellent though they were) of the logistics system set up to supply them. Between August 25 and September 6, the Red Ball Express consumed 300 000 tons of gasoline a day in order to supply the front line units with just under 90 000 tons of supplies.

quote:

Yes he did, for good reason. Eisenhower had come to the conclusion that a single thrust into Germany was all that could be sustained logistically. There were sound military reasons for that thrust to be in the north around the Ruhr, rather than in Patton's sector.

1. A thrust along the northern coast of France would give the Allies a chance to capture channel ports close to England, thus considerably shortening the supply lines which ran back to Normandy.

2. Along the northern coast, a thrust would have the benefit of air cover and tactical air support from England.

3. It would also have the support of American and Royal Naval vessels in the channel.

Therefore, 21st Army group was given priority, and Hodge's 1st US Army was given US priority as it would be advancing on 21st Army Group's right flank with responsibility of covering that flank.

Therefore, Patton was halted for sound military reasons. Had he been pushed on, he would have been bereft of support and would have been defeated on the German border or just beyond. He would have had little air support and flanks stretching 500 km. There would have been no possibility of other Allied forces moving to his aid. Only in the Patton legend is this manouevre possible.

quote:

Supply issues in September are not relevant to the second campaign in November where most of the criticism stems. Also, as I've illustrated, this wasn't anybody's fault. the supply situation was critical, Eisenhower's strategy demanded a northern thrust. In November, there were indeed further logistical problems, but Patton was not being ordered to attack Metz at this time.

quote:

He allowed them the chance to advance after Patton crossed the Moselle in sufficient strength. Bradley was giving out advance warnings to Patton that Market Garden would have to take priority and offensive action would be curtailed. Prior to that, Eisenhower was doing all he could for third Army without jeopardising his operational plan for the sensible northern thrust. He authorised the increase in supplies that resulted in the 5th September operational restart.

quote:

You simply can't leave it alone, eh?

OK. . .

Let's get a few things clear, shall we?

There are three reasons why I left this thread:

1) Where I live we are in the middle of a heat wave. Some places here are hotter than in Morocco or Saudi Arabia. So do not equate being tired of the heat with anything you have to say. I am also not a young man anymore, so the terrific heat here is hard on me.

quote:

2) It was very clear from what you posted that you had absolutely NOTHING to say of your own about the Lorraine Campaign and Metz, your pompous posturing not withstanding. By using your own source, I clearly demolished your argument, and showed the state of Patton's forces before he even attacked across the Mosselle or at Metz.
I did not even mention that Third Army faced torrential rain downpours and freezing rain during those three months in the Lorraine or that Third Army suffered 18,000 casualties from Trench Foot and other diseases alone.

quote:

3) The obvious vitriol that is aimed at Patton by a few in this thread, is, quite frankly, bordering on the pathological. That a few people are so determined to destroy Patton's name and reputation by the twisting of facts and intentions, seems to me, to clearly indicate that people still fear Patton's name today, and only points out how dangerous Patton was to the Germans.

quote:

Finally,

What a few people seem to miss, and what seems to escape their limited view of Patton, is this:

1) Had Patton been given the fuel and supplies when he reached the Mosselle, he would have taken Metz and Nancy quickly. Both places, but especially Metz, was the hub of major railways and road networks (much as Cain was). Not only were the Germans using these railways and roads to move in reinforcements, but these were absolutely vital for any army in order to move through the heavily wooded and hilly terrain of Lorraine. Add in the rains, and moving anywhere but by road or rail, would have been a logistical impossibility. That is why Metz was a vital objective.

quote:

2) Most historians (Liddell Hart, Kemp, D'Este, Blumenson, et al), plus most military professionals, agree that Patton had the German forces on the run in September, 1944, and could have been at the Siegfried Line by mid-September.

quote:

Patton believed that the war could have been won in 1944, if only he had been given adequate fuel and ammunition., as did Liddell Hart, who has written that the war ought to have been won in 1944 at a great savings lives. Patton cited 29th August as the critical date:

Patton:
"I presented my case for a rapid advance to the east for the purpose of cutting the Siegfried line before it could be manned."

quote:

D'Este
Unfortunately, the evidence weighs heavily against this notion. There was, of course, no conspiracy by Eisenhower, SHAEF, Montgomery or Lee's supply services to keep the third army immobilised. Historian Anthony Kemp has drawn a compelling scenario for what would probably have happened if Patton had been given all the supplies he needed in the autumn of 1944.

quote:

Kemp:
All the Allied strategists were in agreement that the prime objective was the Ruhr. Patton, however, with his forces in the Frankfurt-Mannheim area, would have had to turn north and advance up the narrow Rhine valley. Simply advancing blindly into Germany would not have fulfilled any strategic purpose, and unless other Allied units had been able to keep pace, the Third Army would have been out on a limb and liable to have its communications cut.

quote:

Kemp
As we know that there were insufficient sources to maintain an offensive along the whole front, Patton would have been on his own anyway.

quote:

Kemp
Every mile advanced by Patton in September would have proportionately increased his lines of communication, requiring more and more trucks to keep up the flow of stores, trucks that were in desparately short supply. More divisions would have had to be immobilised in order to use their transport, which would have further aggravated the main background problem to the Lorraine campaign - shortage of manpower. Patton was simply flying in the face of a situation that had to be faced by all the Army Commanders in Northwest Europe at the time.

quote:

D'Este
Although he would not hear of it, the truth was that Patton was not a victim of Eisenhower or Montgomery, bot of the broad front strategy and a logistics system that was simpy incapable of keeping pace with rapid, mobile warfare.

quote:

D'este
...as Pattons earlier biographer Ladislas Farago right concludes: "Despite it's apparent excellence and Patton's unbounded enthusiasm for it, his plan never had a chance to be accepted, or even to be taken seriously anywhere beyond general Bradley's command post. Not only was close air support vital if the plan was to succeed..

quote:

Farago:
...but the Luftwaffe still retained the capability to interfere seriously with Patton's offensive. Among the other problems Patton faced but failed to acknowledge was the physical exhaustion of the Third Army, which would have faced fgurious resistance from a German Army defending its homeland for the first time.
Indeed, from the moment the Third Army reached the Moselle, Patton had disregarded the reality that the conditions for a breakout and pursuit, which had carried it across the soft underbelly of Normandy, no longer existed in Lorraine.

quote:

3) Had Patton and Third Army been given the supplies that went to Monty (for his failed Market Garden), Liddell Hart agrees that the war in Europe could have ended in late 1944.

quote:

Von Rom
To Bradley's credit, he did argue with Ike against the Broad Front strategy. He wanted Ike to give supplies to 1st and 3rd Armies so that they could punch through the German lines and strike for the German border.

quote:

Von Rom
However, Ike refused, preferring the Broad Front strategy of "pushing" the Germans back. It was also Ike, who commanded all Allied ground forces by September 1, 1944, who ordered ALL Allied armies to attack on a broad front. Patton's forces were along the "Mosselle Front" and so he attacked at Nancy and later at Metz, to secure their road networks, which were absolutely vital due to the terrible mud and rains that struck Lorraine in the fall of 1944.

quote:

Ike's strategy resulted in thousands more Allied and German soldiers dying.

quote:

4) Had Patton's advice been heeded, and the war ended in late 1944, then the following would have been the result:

a) Countless tens of thousands of Allied and Axis soldiers' lives would have been spared.

b) There would have been no Battle of the Bulge

c) Countless Holocaust victims' lives would have been spared

d) There would have been no need to bomb German cities in 1945 thus sparing hundreds of thousands of civilian lives

e) The Soviets would not have taken Berlin

f) etc, etc, etc. . .

quote:

5) Patton's tactics and strategy WERE correct:

quote:

a) At Falaise he wanted to close the Gap - Allied timidity on Bradley's part caused over 100,000 German soldiers to escape, who would later turn up in the Battle of the Bulge and at Lorraine (Metz). To Bradley's credit he later admitted that NOT closing the Gap was a big mistake.

quote:

To Bradley's credit he later admitted that NOT closing the Gap was a big mistake

quote:

D'Este
Bradley never wavered in his original declaration that Montgomery had nothing to do with his decision to halt Patton at Argentan. In his opinion, there were sound ordes and "I believe so to this day."

quote:

b) In the Bulge, had Patton been allowed to close off the salient behind the German thrust, most of the Germans would have been caught. But due to Allied timidity (Ike), the Allied armies were forced to push back the Germans, resulting in many thousands of needless deaths.

quote:

c) In Siciliy, Alexander's strategy allowed the bulk of Axis forces to escape to Italy (some of which would later re-appear in Lorraine to fight Patton again). Even with a two week delay imposed upon him, Patton STILL beat Monty to Messina, conducting lighting armoured thrusts and amphibious operations to by-pass entrenched Germans in mountainous terrain.

quote:

6) After the war, there has been a concerted effort on the part of Ike, Bradley, their supporters and biographers, to try to paint Patton as being less than he was.

Martin Blumenson (in "Patton: The Man Behind the Legend") wrote this:

"Eisenhower invited the four American army commanders to lunch on May 10. He spoke 'very confidentially' of the need for them all to maintain a united and solid front if called to testify before congressional committees that might later investigate the conduct of the war. To Patton, Eisenhower's talk sounded like 'covering up probable criticism of strategical blunders which he unquestionably committed during the campaign.'" (p.269)

They have to destroy Patton's reputation, because if they don't do so, then the light is then directed towards them, and the costly mistakes they made:

quote:

a) Attacking on a Broad Front by Ike - led to needless waste of lives and the inability to supply all armies properly

quote:

b) The failure to close the Falaise Gap by Bradley - due to timidity

quote:

c) The failure to give Third Army the supplies to drive into Germany

quote:

d) The failure to allow Third Army to close the salient behind the German army at the Bulge.

quote:

Anyone can read about these things.

quote:

When viewed by a far-minded person, it can easily be seen that Patton's strategy WAS CORRECT, and that the strategies proposed by Ike (Broad Front; giving Monty supplies for Market Grden), Bradley (failure to close the Falaise Gap), Monty (Operaton Market Garden; failure to seize the Schelt Estuary before the Germans occupied it, etc), were WRONG.

Patton wasn't perfect - he was flawed - as we all are - as Ike, Bradley, Monty, etc were. . .

But Patton was a fighting general, and he knew how to fight. He knew how to strike for the enemy's juggular.

That is why the German High Command feared him, and NOT Bradley, Ike, Monty, Alexander, etc. . .

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

You simply can't leave it alone, eh?

OK. . .

Let's get a few things clear, shall we?

There are three reasons why I left this thread:

1) Where I live we are in the middle of a heat wave. Some places here are hotter than in Morocco or Saudi Arabia. So do not equate being tired of the heat with anything you have to say. I am also not a young man anymore, so the terrific heat here is hard on me.

This isn't worth anyone's health, if you can tell us when/if this becomes too hard in the weather conditions you're enduring, please say and I'll cease posting. I've no wish to affect anyone's health via this discussion.

quote:

2) It was very clear from what you posted that you had absolutely NOTHING to say of your own about the Lorraine Campaign and Metz, your pompous posturing not withstanding. By using your own source, I clearly demolished your argument, and showed the state of Patton's forces before he even attacked across the Mosselle or at Metz.
I did not even mention that Third Army faced torrential rain downpours and freezing rain during those three months in the Lorraine or that Third Army suffered 18,000 casualties from Trench Foot and other diseases alone.

Not aimed at me, and I've dealt with Metz elsewhere.

quote:

3) The obvious vitriol that is aimed at Patton by a few in this thread, is, quite frankly, bordering on the pathological. That a few people are so determined to destroy Patton's name and reputation by the twisting of facts and intentions, seems to me, to clearly indicate that people still fear Patton's name today, and only points out how dangerous Patton was to the Germans.

I think this is rambling. Your defence of him is unwavering in it's adherence to the legend rather than fact. I don't think facts could persuade you that Patton was anything less than perfect. (You occasionally say he wasn't perfect but are yet to elaborate).

quote:

Finally,

What a few people seem to miss, and what seems to escape their limited view of Patton, is this:

1) Had Patton been given the fuel and supplies when he reached the Mosselle, he would have taken Metz and Nancy quickly. Both places, but especially Metz, was the hub of major railways and road networks (much as Cain was). Not only were the Germans using these railways and roads to move in reinforcements, but these were absolutely vital for any army in order to move through the heavily wooded and hilly terrain of Lorraine. Add in the rains, and moving anywhere but by road or rail, would have been a logistical impossibility. That is why Metz was a vital objective.

D'Este points out that Bradley ordered Patton to stop the attacks when it became clear they were a waste of life, and tried to cover Patton's disappointment by telling him he could wheel around Metz and take it from the rear once supplies were available. Evidently, it wasn't that important to Bradley. Likewise, road hubs are not important if you are on the defensive. The Queen plan did not require Patton to go on the attack. He made Metz important by deciding to press for an offensive in his area anyway. Had he done as he was asked, Metz could have happily waited.

quote:

2) Most historians (Liddell Hart, Kemp, D'Este, Blumenson, et al), plus most military professionals, agree that Patton had the German forces on the run in September, 1944, and could have been at the Siegfried Line by mid-September.

Disingenuous at best, wilful misleading at worst. It is correct to say that they agree Patton could have reached the Siegfried line, but you've left out all the best bits, which I shall take the time to reproduce so critical forum readers can make up their own minds:

To quote Colonel D'Este:

quote:

Patton believed that the war could have been won in 1944, if only he had been given adequate fuel and ammunition., as did Liddell Hart, who has written that the war ought to have been won in 1944 at a great savings lives. Patton cited 29th August as the critical date:

Patton:
"I presented my case for a rapid advance to the east for the purpose of cutting the Siegfried line before it could be manned."

Now for the interesting bits you missed out:

quote:

D'Este
Unfortunately, the evidence weighs heavily against this notion. There was, of course, no conspiracy by Eisenhower, SHAEF, Montgomery or Lee's supply services to keep the third army immobilised. Historian Anthony Kemp has drawn a compelling scenario for what would probably have happened if Patton had been given all the supplies he needed in the autumn of 1944.

Not a great start for either the idea the good General would win the war single handed in 1944, or the fantasy there was a Patton conspiracy. But what does Messr Kemp and d'este think would have happened.
Well Patton would have taken the undefended Metz and reached the Siegfried line. Then what?

quote:

Kemp:
All the Allied strategists were in agreement that the prime objective was the Ruhr. Patton, however, with his forces in the Frankfurt-Mannheim area, would have had to turn north and advance up the narrow Rhine valley. Simply advancing blindly into Germany would not have fulfilled any strategic purpose, and unless other Allied units had been able to keep pace, the Third Army would have been out on a limb and liable to have its communications cut.

Oh dear, but before moving on we should note that "all allied units able to keep pace" was what the broad front strategy was all about. Historian Anthony Kemp continues:

quote:

Kemp
As we know that there were insufficient sources to maintain an offensive along the whole front, Patton would have been on his own anyway.

But it gets worse...

quote:

Kemp
Every mile advanced by Patton in September would have proportionately increased his lines of communication, requiring more and more trucks to keep up the flow of stores, trucks that were in desparately short supply. More divisions would have had to be immobilised in order to use their transport, which would have further aggravated the main background problem to the Lorraine campaign - shortage of manpower. Patton was simply flying in the face of a situation that had to be faced by all the Army Commanders in Northwest Europe at the time.

Hmmm....but there's more. D'Este goes onto point out that Senior Engineers at the time said they would not have been enough suitable airfield sites along Pattons axis of advance to keep him covered in the air, to drop him supplies, or provide him with sufficient close air support.

quote:

D'Este
Although he would not hear of it, the truth was that Patton was not a victim of Eisenhower or Montgomery, bot of the broad front strategy and a logistics system that was simpy incapable of keeping pace with rapid, mobile warfare.

To round it all off, D'Este quotes yet more reasons why this fantasy should not be entertained.

quote:

D'este
...as Pattons earlier biographer Ladislas Farago right concludes: "Despite it's apparent excellence and Patton's unbounded enthusiasm for it, his plan never had a chance to be accepted, or even to be taken seriously anywhere beyond general Bradley's command post. Not only was close air support vital if the plan was to succeed..

which would have been missing (see above)

quote:

Farago:
...but the Luftwaffe still retained the capability to interfere seriously with Patton's offensive. Among the other problems Patton faced but failed to acknowledge was the physical exhaustion of the Third Army, which would have faced fgurious resistance from a German Army defending its homeland for the first time.
Indeed, from the moment the Third Army reached the Moselle, Patton had disregarded the reality that the conditions for a breakout and pursuit, which had carried it across the soft underbelly of Normandy, no longer existed in Lorraine.

In other words, Patton would have dragged an exhausted 3rd Army through the undefended Siegfried Line before heading for the Ruhr into a hornet's nest of fanatical German defence. His supply lines would have required the immobilisation of every other allied soldier in Europe, and he would have been without much close air support. Third Army would have been destroyed.

quote:

3) Had Patton and Third Army been given the supplies that went to Monty (for his failed Market Garden), Liddell Hart agrees that the war in Europe could have ended in late 1944.

One of the Patton fantasies, as shown by D'Este, Kemp and Farago above. Also, Patton resumed the offensive into Lorraine on 5th September, five days before Monty was given supply priority for Market Garden on 10th September.

quote:

Von Rom
To Bradley's credit, he did argue with Ike against the Broad Front strategy. He wanted Ike to give supplies to 1st and 3rd Armies so that they could punch through the German lines and strike for the German border.

I'd love to know where you got this from. I see Bradley is getting some credit now. Anyway, the supply situation did not warrant this. What Patton fanboys miss is that Antwerp and the ports in Monty's area of operations were vital for the continuing flow of supplies. Monty made a mess trying to get them, but no one doubted they were a priority.

quote:

Von Rom
However, Ike refused, preferring the Broad Front strategy of "pushing" the Germans back. It was also Ike, who commanded all Allied ground forces by September 1, 1944, who ordered ALL Allied armies to attack on a broad front. Patton's forces were along the "Mosselle Front" and so he attacked at Nancy and later at Metz, to secure their road networks, which were absolutely vital due to the terrible mud and rains that struck Lorraine in the fall of 1944.

Ike's broad front was essentially about keeping everyone happy, but everyone at SHAEF felt the drive had to be to the north to some degree to secure the Ruhr, which was the industrial heartland of Germany. This wasn't in front of Patton.

quote:

Ike's strategy resulted in thousands more Allied and German soldiers dying.

Sources?

quote:

4) Had Patton's advice been heeded, and the war ended in late 1944, then the following would have been the result:

a) Countless tens of thousands of Allied and Axis soldiers' lives would have been spared.

b) There would have been no Battle of the Bulge

c) Countless Holocaust victims' lives would have been spared

d) There would have been no need to bomb German cities in 1945 thus sparing hundreds of thousands of civilian lives

e) The Soviets would not have taken Berlin

f) etc, etc, etc. . .

As the piece above indicates, quite the opposite. An unsupported drive, bereft of proper air cover in to desparate German defences inside the Reich by an exhauseted third Army would have resulted in a military defeat that would have set the Western Allies back months. More Allied soldiers would have been killed (most from Third Army) no holocaust victims would have been saved and more German cities would have been bombed. Ike saved a lot of souls refusing to back Patton's scheme.

quote:

5) Patton's tactics and strategy WERE correct:

No, and by an awful long way, no.

quote:

a) At Falaise he wanted to close the Gap - Allied timidity on Bradley's part caused over 100,000 German soldiers to escape, who would later turn up in the Battle of the Bulge and at Lorraine (Metz). To Bradley's credit he later admitted that NOT closing the Gap was a big mistake.

It's funny this, but you used to claim (go and have a look if you don't believe me) that only 75000 escaped.
D'Este and Hastings put the figure at 20000. Do you have a source for this figure? (Please say Rohmer). Army Group B reported it's eight Panzer divisions got out with about 50-60 tanks and 8 battalions of infantry. The German Army was smashed in Normandy. We've already gone over (or at least I have) the broad versus short envelopment, and proved Patton actually wanted to head for the Seine. Falaise is not nearly as important as most make out.

Also, I like:

quote:

To Bradley's credit he later admitted that NOT closing the Gap was a big mistake

More unusal credit for Patton's biggest critic, Bradley. What is your source for this? D'Este reports:

quote:

D'Este
Bradley never wavered in his original declaration that Montgomery had nothing to do with his decision to halt Patton at Argentan. In his opinion, there were sound ordes and "I believe so to this day."

To the Bulge:

quote:

b) In the Bulge, had Patton been allowed to close off the salient behind the German thrust, most of the Germans would have been caught. But due to Allied timidity (Ike), the Allied armies were forced to push back the Germans, resulting in many thousands of needless deaths.

I know this, I pointed it out to you when you were praising the Bulge about turn and drive. About it, all I would say is that it is debatable. I don't think he could have severed two army groups with three divisions. Bastogne was essential if the Germans were to cross the Meuse, so keeping it in Allied hands ensured the German offensive failed. There were also Allied troops there needing to be relieved (without getting into the 101 debate, no one could assume they would have defended so heroically). Attacking into the base would have drawn German reinforcements like flies, so it was riskier. I think the jury is out, if this is all you have, it doesn't prove genius. Merely a difference of opinion.

quote:

c) In Siciliy, Alexander's strategy allowed the bulk of Axis forces to escape to Italy (some of which would later re-appear in Lorraine to fight Patton again). Even with a two week delay imposed upon him, Patton STILL beat Monty to Messina, conducting lighting armoured thrusts and amphibious operations to by-pass entrenched Germans in mountainous terrain.

Patton's delay was largely caused by his charging in the opposite direction on a glory run rounding up Italian soldiers who didn't want to fight. It took him days to regroup on the northern coast. Also, his drive in the north didn't face the defensive positions in the east Monty faced, which prompted Monty to ask Patton to make the drive in the first place.

quote:

6) After the war, there has been a concerted effort on the part of Ike, Bradley, their supporters and biographers, to try to paint Patton as being less than he was.

Martin Blumenson (in "Patton: The Man Behind the Legend") wrote this:

"Eisenhower invited the four American army commanders to lunch on May 10. He spoke 'very confidentially' of the need for them all to maintain a united and solid front if called to testify before congressional committees that might later investigate the conduct of the war. To Patton, Eisenhower's talk sounded like 'covering up probable criticism of strategical blunders which he unquestionably committed during the campaign.'" (p.269)

They have to destroy Patton's reputation, because if they don't do so, then the light is then directed towards them, and the costly mistakes they made:

I love this. Ike et al decide to detroy Patton's reputation at a meeting on 10 May. Please explain to us why they invited Patton to this meeting??????????? This sounds like Ike wanted all his Generals (Patton included) to come together. It doesn't sound as if he's after Patton in any way. If he was, what a blunder to invite the Good General to the gathering????? I would have hated to be in the shoes of the Staff Officer who arranged this and had to explain why Patton was there to Ike afterwards.

quote:

a) Attacking on a Broad Front by Ike - led to needless waste of lives and the inability to supply all armies properly

Attacking on a narrow front would have led to military disaster. It is proven above.

quote:

b) The failure to close the Falaise Gap by Bradley - due to timidity

Well warranted timidty. With your 100 000 Germans facing four American Divisons strung out with flanks in the air.

quote:

c) The failure to give Third Army the supplies to drive into Germany

Which saved Patton from defeat, see above.

quote:

d) The failure to allow Third Army to close the salient behind the German army at the Bulge.

Highly speculative at best, and bearing in mind how long it took Patton to reach Bastogne and then clear the environs, highly doubful.

quote:

Anyone can read about these things.

I wouldn't advise them to if I were you, you'll lose support.

quote:

When viewed by a far-minded person, it can easily be seen that Patton's strategy WAS CORRECT, and that the strategies proposed by Ike (Broad Front; giving Monty supplies for Market Grden), Bradley (failure to close the Falaise Gap), Monty (Operaton Market Garden; failure to seize the Schelt Estuary before the Germans occupied it, etc), were WRONG.

Patton wasn't perfect - he was flawed - as we all are - as Ike, Bradley, Monty, etc were. . .

But Patton was a fighting general, and he knew how to fight. He knew how to strike for the enemy's juggular.

That is why the German High Command feared him, and NOT Bradley, Ike, Monty, Alexander, etc. . .

One of the main problems I have with the Patton legend, is it is always someone else's fault. At Falaise, it is Bradley, or Monty, Ike and Bradley. In Sicily, Monty and Alexander. At Metz, Bradley and Ike. At Hammelburg, everyone but Patton.

It is how conspiracy theories develop and sustain themsevles, and how legends are born. Patton's greatest problem is his supporters. It is impossible to discuss his talents as a Commander, because his supporters claim the earth for him, and you have to spend most of your time correcting their fantasies. They are easy to correct, but what happens is you discredit everything about him in the process. If his supporters thought about him seriously, he'd be thought of far better, by far more people.

IronDuke

quote:

Here again, we are back into the National Enquirer.

quote:

At the very beginning of D'Este's section on Hammelburg, he prefaces everything by saying that what Patton knew about Water's existence at the POW camp is circumstantial. Get it?

Circumstantial. . .

quote:

It was Hoge who convinced Patton not to send a larger combat command. Patton regretted following his advice.

quote:

In his second letter to his wife, Patton wrote: . ."where John and some 900 POWs are said to be". Note here, it says where John is SAID to be. In other words, the rumour was that Waters MIGHT be at Hammelburg. Get it?

quote:

We are headed right for John's place and may get there before he is moved if he is moved he had better escape or he will end up in Bavaria.

quote:

D'Este also also presents Patton's words out of the context of the letters. What else did Patton say about Waters' situation that was left out by D'Este?

quote:

Patton wanted Stiller to go along becasue IF Waters was at Hammelburg, then Stiller would be able to identify him.

quote:

Much of the other stuff you present is conjecture and second hand information. In other words - it's rumours. . .

quote:

Years later, if people have any axes to grind, they can continue to float the rumour using second-hand knowledge.

It is as D'Este CORRECTLY indictes: it is circumstantial.

When Patton told Waters "He wasn't sure" he was at Hammelburg, he meant it. He had NO reason to lie to his Son In Law.

quote:

Gay, in his diary, states that Patton did NOT know about Waters being at Hammelburg.

quote:

You have a lot of nerve stating Patton didn't care about his men:

If I was Patton, and if I thought the German Army was finished in March, 1945, as Patton did, and if I thought my Son In Law, who had been missing for two years as a POW, MIGHT be at the POW camp at Hammeburg, and which also contained 5,000 POWs, and which was only 40 miles away, I probably would have done the same thing.

Patton did not regret doing what he did - he just wished he had sent a larger task force.

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

Here again, we are back into the National Enquirer.

Not a wise thing for you to say seeing as you've just suggested a Polish Spitfire Pilot tried to assasinate him, he was almost the victim of a runaway ox cart (mysteriously running away, mind you), and the truck driver who hit the car and killed him somehow managed to miss everyone else in the car.

quote:

At the very beginning of D'Este's section on Hammelburg, he prefaces everything by saying that what Patton knew about Water's existence at the POW camp is circumstantial. Get it?

Circumstantial. . .

I don't care whether he was 100% sure he was there or only 70% sure. I object to 304 Americans being sacrificed to get him out. Get it???? It's even worse if he wasn't sure he was there, because then the men were being sacrificed on an off chance.

quote:

It was Hoge who convinced Patton not to send a larger combat command. Patton regretted following his advice.

Source? D'Este says Eddy turned down the sending of the bigger force. Patton doesn't say anything at this juncture according to D'Este. He does later, but I don't think we can take this as fact as he was also denying any knowledge that Waters was at the camp later.

quote:

In his second letter to his wife, Patton wrote: . ."where John and some 900 POWs are said to be". Note here, it says where John is SAID to be. In other words, the rumour was that Waters MIGHT be at Hammelburg. Get it?

And in his first letter before the raid was sent, he says:

quote:

We are headed right for John's place and may get there before he is moved if he is moved he had better escape or he will end up in Bavaria.

Doesn't sound like a rumour. Regardless, I don't care whether he was sure. I care about why the raid was launched.

quote:

D'Este also also presents Patton's words out of the context of the letters. What else did Patton say about Waters' situation that was left out by D'Este?

So, now D'Este is quoting out of context. Surely, it is for you to prove this, not for me? I thought we'd agreed D'Este's work was balanced and fair so why would he quote out of context?

quote:

Patton wanted Stiller to go along becasue IF Waters was at Hammelburg, then Stiller would be able to identify him.

So, Patton thought he might be, and sent 304 Americans to rescue him????

quote:

Much of the other stuff you present is conjecture and second hand information. In other words - it's rumours. . .

The rest doesn't matter, the letters say it all.

quote:

Years later, if people have any axes to grind, they can continue to float the rumour using second-hand knowledge.

It is as D'Este CORRECTLY indictes: it is circumstantial.

When Patton told Waters "He wasn't sure" he was at Hammelburg, he meant it. He had NO reason to lie to his Son In Law.

People were grinding axes within days, it's why Patton had to make false statements at the press conferences.

quote:

Gay, in his diary, states that Patton did NOT know about Waters being at Hammelburg.

D'Este conjectures he doctored it, but no matter, like I said, the letters are conclusive he at least suspected, and that the raid was caused by that conjecture.

quote:

You have a lot of nerve stating Patton didn't care about his men:

If I was Patton, and if I thought the German Army was finished in March, 1945, as Patton did, and if I thought my Son In Law, who had been missing for two years as a POW, MIGHT be at the POW camp at Hammeburg, and which also contained 5,000 POWs, and which was only 40 miles away, I probably would have done the same thing.

Patton did not regret doing what he did - he just wished he had sent a larger task force.

So, Patton's son in law was worth 304 Americans? 304 Americans of his beloved 3rd Army. How do you think one of those soldiers would have felt as they were surrounded and chopped to pieces by the Germans? Do you think it was fair to use 304 human beings for a non military purpose (the raid had no military value). These were American soldiers, not part of some private Army. Your unwillingness to see any fault at all with Patton is illustrated best here, whilst defending the indefensible. You refuse to attach any blame to him, and end up defending something like this. Patton was human, he made a horrendous mistake, but by defending it in this way, you really say more about your own motives than you do about Patton.

Can you not see this?

Ironduke

quote:

Charles Whiting in "The battle of the Bulge".

"Indeed, Patton with three full divisions, one of them armoured, plus overwhelming air and artillery support at his disposal, was stopped by three inferior German divisions, one of which its commander (as we have seen) didn't even wish to take beyond the German border. He wasted his men's lives because he threw them into battle hastily and without enough planning, making up his strategy from day to day. Most important was that Patton, the armoured Commander, who should have known much better attacked on a 25 mile front across countryside that favoured defending infantry on account of its many natural defensive spots. Instead of a massed armour-infantry attack on some concentrated, ole blood and guts , the supposed dashing cavalry General, slogged away like some long in the tooth hidebound first world war infantry commander."

quote:

Are you not aware I was writing quickly?

BTW, I'm still waiting for your PROMISED analysis of Germany's brilliant blitzkrieg victories against inferior countries between Sept/39 to Jan/42.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

Here again, we are back into the National Enquirer.

Not a wise thing for you to say seeing as you've just suggested a Polish Spitfire Pilot tried to assasinate him, he was almost the victim of a runaway ox cart (mysteriously running away, mind you), and the truck driver who hit the car and killed him somehow managed to miss everyone else in the car.

quote:

At the very beginning of D'Este's section on Hammelburg, he prefaces everything by saying that what Patton knew about Water's existence at the POW camp is circumstantial. Get it?

Circumstantial. . .

I don't care whether he was 100% sure he was there or only 70% sure. I object to 304 Americans being sacrificed to get him out. Get it???? It's even worse if he wasn't sure he was there, because then the men were being sacrificed on an off chance.

quote:

It was Hoge who convinced Patton not to send a larger combat command. Patton regretted following his advice.

Source? D'Este says Eddy turned down the sending of the bigger force. Patton doesn't say anything at this juncture according to D'Este. He does later, but I don't think we can take this as fact as he was also denying any knowledge that Waters was at the camp later.

quote:

In his second letter to his wife, Patton wrote: . ."where John and some 900 POWs are said to be". Note here, it says where John is SAID to be. In other words, the rumour was that Waters MIGHT be at Hammelburg. Get it?

And in his first letter before the raid was sent, he says:

quote:

We are headed right for John's place and may get there before he is moved if he is moved he had better escape or he will end up in Bavaria.

Doesn't sound like a rumour. Regardless, I don't care whether he was sure. I care about why the raid was launched.

quote:

D'Este also also presents Patton's words out of the context of the letters. What else did Patton say about Waters' situation that was left out by D'Este?

So, now D'Este is quoting out of context. Surely, it is for you to prove this, not for me? I thought we'd agreed D'Este's work was balanced and fair so why would he quote out of context?

quote:

Patton wanted Stiller to go along becasue IF Waters was at Hammelburg, then Stiller would be able to identify him.

So, Patton thought he might be, and sent 304 Americans to rescue him????

quote:

Much of the other stuff you present is conjecture and second hand information. In other words - it's rumours. . .

The rest doesn't matter, the letters say it all.

quote:

Years later, if people have any axes to grind, they can continue to float the rumour using second-hand knowledge.

It is as D'Este CORRECTLY indictes: it is circumstantial.

When Patton told Waters "He wasn't sure" he was at Hammelburg, he meant it. He had NO reason to lie to his Son In Law.

People were grinding axes within days, it's why Patton had to make false statements at the press conferences.

quote:

Gay, in his diary, states that Patton did NOT know about Waters being at Hammelburg.

D'Este conjectures he doctored it, but no matter, like I said, the letters are conclusive he at least suspected, and that the raid was caused by that conjecture.

quote:

You have a lot of nerve stating Patton didn't care about his men:

If I was Patton, and if I thought the German Army was finished in March, 1945, as Patton did, and if I thought my Son In Law, who had been missing for two years as a POW, MIGHT be at the POW camp at Hammeburg, and which also contained 5,000 POWs, and which was only 40 miles away, I probably would have done the same thing.

Patton did not regret doing what he did - he just wished he had sent a larger task force.

So, Patton's son in law was worth 304 Americans? 304 Americans of his beloved 3rd Army. How do you think one of those soldiers would have felt as they were surrounded and chopped to pieces by the Germans? Do you think it was fair to use 304 human beings for a non military purpose (the raid had no military value). These were American soldiers, not part of some private Army. Your unwillingness to see any fault at all with Patton is illustrated best here, whilst defending the indefensible. You refuse to attach any blame to him, and end up defending something like this. Patton was human, he made a horrendous mistake, but by defending it in this way, you really say more about your own motives than you do about Patton.

Can you not see this?

Ironduke

Blumenson, the well respected historian, wrote about the facts of Patton's plane being attacked by that Polish Spitfire. I drew NO conclusions.

Get your facts straight.

As to the rest of what you wrote - it's rumours. . . and gossip. . . by people who will do anything to destroy Patton's name.

I think they call it character assassination.

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

Are you not aware I was writing quickly?

BTW, I'm still waiting for your PROMISED analysis of Germany's brilliant blitzkrieg victories against inferior countries between Sept/39 to Jan/42.

I wasn't aware actually since you've made similiar statements of similiar length on three or four occasions.

How about...

The Germans beat Poland.

They then invaded Belgium, Holland, Denmark and France, and beat them all.

Ironduke

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

quote:

Here again, we are back into the National Enquirer.

Not a wise thing for you to say seeing as you've just suggested a Polish Spitfire Pilot tried to assasinate him, he was almost the victim of a runaway ox cart (mysteriously running away, mind you), and the truck driver who hit the car and killed him somehow managed to miss everyone else in the car.

quote:

At the very beginning of D'Este's section on Hammelburg, he prefaces everything by saying that what Patton knew about Water's existence at the POW camp is circumstantial. Get it?

Circumstantial. . .

I don't care whether he was 100% sure he was there or only 70% sure. I object to 304 Americans being sacrificed to get him out. Get it???? It's even worse if he wasn't sure he was there, because then the men were being sacrificed on an off chance.

quote:

It was Hoge who convinced Patton not to send a larger combat command. Patton regretted following his advice.

Source? D'Este says Eddy turned down the sending of the bigger force. Patton doesn't say anything at this juncture according to D'Este. He does later, but I don't think we can take this as fact as he was also denying any knowledge that Waters was at the camp later.

quote:

In his second letter to his wife, Patton wrote: . ."where John and some 900 POWs are said to be". Note here, it says where John is SAID to be. In other words, the rumour was that Waters MIGHT be at Hammelburg. Get it?

And in his first letter before the raid was sent, he says:

quote:

We are headed right for John's place and may get there before he is moved if he is moved he had better escape or he will end up in Bavaria.

Doesn't sound like a rumour. Regardless, I don't care whether he was sure. I care about why the raid was launched.

quote:

D'Este also also presents Patton's words out of the context of the letters. What else did Patton say about Waters' situation that was left out by D'Este?

So, now D'Este is quoting out of context. Surely, it is for you to prove this, not for me? I thought we'd agreed D'Este's work was balanced and fair so why would he quote out of context?

quote:

Patton wanted Stiller to go along becasue IF Waters was at Hammelburg, then Stiller would be able to identify him.

So, Patton thought he might be, and sent 304 Americans to rescue him????

quote:

Much of the other stuff you present is conjecture and second hand information. In other words - it's rumours. . .

The rest doesn't matter, the letters say it all.

quote:

Years later, if people have any axes to grind, they can continue to float the rumour using second-hand knowledge.

It is as D'Este CORRECTLY indictes: it is circumstantial.

When Patton told Waters "He wasn't sure" he was at Hammelburg, he meant it. He had NO reason to lie to his Son In Law.

People were grinding axes within days, it's why Patton had to make false statements at the press conferences.

quote:

Gay, in his diary, states that Patton did NOT know about Waters being at Hammelburg.

D'Este conjectures he doctored it, but no matter, like I said, the letters are conclusive he at least suspected, and that the raid was caused by that conjecture.

quote:

You have a lot of nerve stating Patton didn't care about his men:

If I was Patton, and if I thought the German Army was finished in March, 1945, as Patton did, and if I thought my Son In Law, who had been missing for two years as a POW, MIGHT be at the POW camp at Hammeburg, and which also contained 5,000 POWs, and which was only 40 miles away, I probably would have done the same thing.

Patton did not regret doing what he did - he just wished he had sent a larger task force.

So, Patton's son in law was worth 304 Americans? 304 Americans of his beloved 3rd Army. How do you think one of those soldiers would have felt as they were surrounded and chopped to pieces by the Germans? Do you think it was fair to use 304 human beings for a non military purpose (the raid had no military value). These were American soldiers, not part of some private Army. Your unwillingness to see any fault at all with Patton is illustrated best here, whilst defending the indefensible. You refuse to attach any blame to him, and end up defending something like this. Patton was human, he made a horrendous mistake, but by defending it in this way, you really say more about your own motives than you do about Patton.

Can you not see this?

Ironduke

Blumenson, the well respected historian, wrote about the facts of Patton's plane being attacked by that Polish Spitfire. I drew NO conclusions.

Get your facts straight.

As to the rest of what you wrote - it's rumours. . . and gossip. . . by people who will do anything to destroy Patton's name.

I think they call it character assassination.

You're dodging the question. Either demonstrate the raid was launched for reasons other than his son in law, or explain why he was worth it.

quote:

"I never felt I'd have to say things like this on this forum, but your last post asking me to post Whiting's comments for you was most disappointing. I spent a little time trawling through this thread looking for all the times I had challenged you. It was quite a task.

Above, you draw conclusions about Whiting (who'm you have never read) because I refused to reply. I preferred to quote back at you two comments you had made to others when they had asked for sources to back up your extravagant claims. It is hypocritical to push me for info when I have tried and failed to push you for some over 12 long frustrating pages.

You asked me whether I had read anything, yet refused to list what sources you had read about Normandy despite repeated requests. This is hypocrisy, particularly since I listed six of the dozen works I had read. I am challenged above, yet any one who has followed this thread will know the number of unanswered challenges I have posed. I will list a few. I will happily answer your challenge if you answer mine:

I asked for a short precis of what you knew about the battle of Normandy and Patton's part in it. Not material coped verbatim from a fansite
You were silent.

I asked for a source for your erroneous claim the 352nd was a veteran formation.
You were silent (although that didn't stop you repeatedly saying it was. You lack of grace on this matter has been astounding).

You called the 5th Parachute division a veteran formation. I demonstrated otherwise.
You were silent.

I asked for a list of sources you were using about Normandy, and named the six (of the dozen I have read) that I was using to research my words.
You were silent.

I asked you to name where on the drive through France Patton did any serious fighting.
You were silent

I asked for a source on your assertion that Rommel was hamstrung in Africa by Jodl and Keitel.
You said nothing.

I asked you why we should take seriously websites capable of committing gross errors such as where Patton was around Falaise, and who gave the order to halt (Your website claimed SHAEF)
You never explained why, although without admitting anything was wrong, you asked me why it mattered, as you were presenting merely an oveview of facts (which was wrong becuase facts are correct, these weren't)

You told us "You really need to read up on Patton's activities in Normandy."
Then refused to tell us what you had read.

I asked you why you had posted the same 3 or 4 bits of information over and over again.
You never said

I quoted from several historians about Patton, then watched as you ignored all the major players to launch a diversionary raid on Whiting. We spent page after page debating your thoughts on him (a man you never actually read) whilst all the time you refused to say anything about D'Este, Hastings, Weigley, Carr, Neillands and a host of others. You chose one inconsequential quote, and seeing a potential weakness, went after it so you didn't need to face up to answering Patton's other critics, whose credentials you could not impugn.

I offered to withdraw Whiting if you would analyse the reputation of the six others I had cited:
You were silent

I asked again what you knew of the major historians I was citing, and what you thought of these men as historians
You again remained silent

The one time you even acknowledged I had made a request, you said:
"And no I am not doing any investigation.
or
Do I have to find everything for you?

Do some reading. . ."

You accused me of lacking critical thinking skills, then posted verbatim from Patton's homepage, Patton Society website, the Patton museum and Patton uncovered.

You printed several times a list of German officers who had said nice things about Patton, and never included the ones who had criticised him.

You consistently used the phrase many historians when telling us who agreed with you.
You were silent when asked to name them

You claimed time and agin to be merely telling us about Whiting and leaving for us to decide. I quoted several of your utterances which proved otherwise.
You did not admit your agenda.

I asked which history book you had used to gain information about Patton's drive on Bastogne.
I received no response.

Every time I pointed out your fatcs were wrong (Sicily on page 5 is a further example), you accused me of being nitpicky, without realising no opinion is right if the facts upon which it is based are wrong, superficial or one sided.
You were silent when challenged to admit these facts were wrong.

You listed sites that made gross factual errors about basic things, and never admitted the errors when challenged.

You invented a story (without evidence) that D'Este used researchers and didn't read everything he quoted to get around the fact he had quoted whiting. No evidence has been forthcoming, you have made no retraction.

You took a thread about Patton's drive on Bastogne and instead chose to post information about units that didn't even belong to him (106th) or weren't even part of the drive (35th).

You accused me of only wanting to state one side then copied huge chunks of the Patton home page and other Patton fan sites into the thread as if they ever stated anything else.

You patronise by stating things like "I am posting this only for the more thoughtful reader" insinuating critics of Patton are not thoughtful readers (despite the fact we've clearly read more serious history than you have).

You accused me of only wanting to state one side, then never once admitted Patton was guilty of anything, despite the fact I made several references to his skills. Even on the Hammelburg incident I elicited only a couple of lines from you that I could sue Patton if I was unhappy about the shameless waste of life.

You slap Patton on the back for his surprise flank attack at Bastonge and then write long lists of reasons why the German victories of 1940 were poor because they suprised their enemies.

Your basic tactics seem to be to hide behind long chunks of text copied from the web (see above for numerous examples), to ignore, patronise or tease when challenged (Did you not know this, do some reading, I can not believe you seriously believe this, I was only being facetious) or when in a corner, invent (D'Este's imaginary researchers, and his inability to read books he quotes from).

I am sorry it has come to this, this was at times most enjoyable. I will post my thoughts on Patton once more (although I am not arrogant enough to believe many will be interested) then move on.

Ironduke"