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RE: CV strike composition - 1/1/2005 10:50:44 PM   
Halsey

 

Posts: 5069
Joined: 2/7/2004
Status: offline 		Good data gathering!

Keep up the good work spence.

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Post #: 31
RE: CV strike composition - 1/1/2005 11:21:46 PM   
Philwd

 

Posts: 285
Joined: 3/19/2002
From: Arizona
Status: offline 		I think you guys are missing the most important element here. Its not the total number of planes but rather the number of planes each CV can launch in a certain time interval. PH strike was limited by how many planes Nagumo could get into the air at one time. Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz had far fewer CVs avail to launch so the strike packages were much smaller. The land strikes really give us the raw data we need to determine how many planes could be put into the air. For the IJN it seems to be ~ 30-35 per CV or slightly under 50% of the plane complement. I would stick with a hard number rather than a % as plane losses accumulate the % will become too low.

And I totally agree that CAP for both sides is very overpowered for 1942. There is little data for '43 as the IJN hid all year but we all know how good the USN is in '44. So put '43 somewhere in the middle for CAP effectiveness. And cut '42 by a significant %.

Also one more option might be good here. A button that is either an alpha strike with the kitchen sink thrown in or a 50% strike with a reserve held back just in case. There is no easy way to do this now unless you have many CV together and just set some to port attack and rest to naval etc.

Ducking for cover now.

Quark

(in reply to Halsey)
Post #: 32
RE: CV strike composition - 1/2/2005 12:03:34 AM   
jwilkerson


Posts: 10525
Joined: 9/15/2002
From: Kansas
Status: offline 		I agree the problem is more complex but at the same time looking at the hard numbers can't be a bad thing.

When the IJN raided Ceylon we perhaps have the best model for what they would do when they were in control of the course of events. Launch about 180 planes at the imobile land target and 80-90 at the mobile sea target. Allowing KB to launch 180 planes and a just spotted fast moving carrier force assumes they were in "ambush mode" ... I'd go with 180-190 tops for land targets and about 100 tops for sea targets until 44.

(in reply to Philwd)
Post #: 33
RE: CV strike composition - 1/3/2005 1:53:32 AM   
Halsey

 

Posts: 5069
Joined: 2/7/2004
Status: offline 		So Nik, there is no foundation to these statistics? Just curious.

< Message edited by Halsey -- 1/2/2005 11:21:11 PM >

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Post #: 34
RE: CV strike composition - 1/3/2005 6:45:46 AM   
jwilkerson


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From: Kansas
Status: offline 		No comprende ?

(in reply to Halsey)
Post #: 35
RE: CV strike composition - 1/3/2005 7:20:53 AM   
Halsey

 

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Status: offline 		That one was for Nikademus. oops!

I was wondering what the historical precedent was. Not sure if he was refering to Zero's, which I think the bonus is alright also. Or, the coordination rules, regarding the limit on planes in a strike. Which I think could use a little more balance, and less bias towards the Allies.

< Message edited by Halsey -- 1/2/2005 11:21:27 PM >

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Post #: 36
RE: CV strike composition - 1/3/2005 10:47:41 AM   
LargeSlowTarget


Posts: 4443
Joined: 9/23/2000
From: Hessen, Germany - now living in France
Status: offline
quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Terrific! Someone finally presents some solid support for applying this restrictive rule
equalhandedly..., and the forum virtually ignores it. Come on, all you supporters of
the "hamstring the Allies" movement. Let's hear some well thought out response,,,,


Probably not well thought-out, but...

We started talking about numbers of CVs per TF, now we talk strike sizes, okay. I've argued that the Japanese have been using six carriers concentrated in one TF from Day 1 of the war, and tended to keep KB together for the most part (Hiryu/Soryu detached for Midway, Shok/Zuik for Coral Sea, one CV (Kaga or Akagi?) absent in the Indian Ocean due to upkeep). I also claim that the JN was able to launch coordinated strikes from those carriers, the number of a/c per strike being limited only by the inherent restrictions of carrier ops, i.e. the ability of the carriers to launch only a certain number of a/c at once. I agree that the PH strike was a maximum effort and that the JN apparently could launch slightly less than 50% of its CAG in one wave. This is already modelled by the number of carrier ops points. Furtermore I've argued that Japanese strike waves tended to have better coordination and cohesion and usually arrived (or failed to find the target) in distinct and compact waves. I have also agreed that JN CAP did not benefit from fighter direction centers and therefore should suffer a CAP penalty (or the USN a CAP benefit, or both)

On the other side, I went on to argue that the USN did not operate multi-CV-TFs early in the war due to inferior doctrine regarding carrier warfare and shortage of CVs (and pressing strategic demands which precluded concentration of CVs, I might add - theoretically they could have concentrated six fleet CVs in one TF as well). Even if several CVs were available, they were operated in seperate TFs (although Task Group would be the proper term, but that wasn't used until later in the war). The same inherent restrictions to carrier ops also applied to the USN, whose 'full deckloads' also comprised only part of the total number of a/c aboard (can someone come up with the precise number of a/c per full deckload?). From what I have read I have gained the impression that USN carrier air strikes tended to be launched and/or to arrive at the target area piecemeal and rather uncoordinated but for chance (Midway), with strike groups from different carriers not joining up, taking different paths to the target area, parts of strike groups becoming separated, lost or joining up with 'wrong' elements of other strike groups. Simply adding up the numbers of a/c launched per carrier battle doesn't say anything at all in this regard. I have also stated that the USN enjoyed a certain CAP advantage due to fighter directors, which performed less-than-optimal early in the war but became better with time.

Translated into WitP:
1a. CAP penalty for JN and/or CAP benefit for USN growing with time
1b. related to this, penalty for JN strike escorts (hand signals, few radios), none for USN
2. limit of numbers of a/c that can be launched per given time per carrier
3. limit on number of CVs that USN can operate in one TF early in the war
4. JN strikes tending to be bigger, but prone to miss the target entirely, USN strikes tending to split up in uncoordinated smaller strikes (some of which failing to find target)

Question is how #3 can be achieved - by house rules in PBEM, Malthusian 'moral restraint' if playing against AI or by denying the player the ahistorical benefits of concentrating his CVs with an early war strike penalty (or a what-if-scenario with no penalty if we assume that the USN did have an early war doctrine for concentrated CV-TFs and the means, training and experience for such operations).

< Message edited by LargeSlowTarget -- 1/3/2005 8:51:17 AM >

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Post #: 37
RE: CV strike composition - 1/3/2005 12:10:32 PM   
jwilkerson


Posts: 10525
Joined: 9/15/2002
From: Kansas
Status: offline 		Someone who knows more about modeling carrier tactics in WWII than any of us ever will ... came to the conclusion that carrier ops in 1942 were about a 1-1 draw. The data we've presented support that. Hence some of us have difficulty supporting a rule which attempts to produce non-equal results.

This person is CPT Wayne P. Hughes Jr. ( USN Ret.) The book is "FLEET TACTICS" [ Naval Institute Press]. In this book CPT Hughes describes a model of carrier battles for WWII which predicts the results. CPT Hughes was professor of Operations Research at Monterey, CA and held the Chair of Tactical Analysis at that postgraduate school.

A key variable is whether to concentrate or disperse. LST contends that to disperse is "inferior doctrine". It is true that after the battle of Midway, Adm. King "ordered" that US carriers operate in single carrier task forces, with a ( Rear ) Admiral commanding each. However, after Midway and before mid-1943 the opportunity for the USN to have more than 2 carriers in a single task force could be numbered in a few weeks. Thus this point was moot until sufficient carriers arrived to force a resolution of doctrine. Ted Sherman had consistently argued for multi-carrier task forces before the war ( has had RAdm Yamaguchi on the Japanese side - his ideas were implemented after Midway - producing 2 and later 3 muti-carrier task forces in the IJN ... i.e. increasing dispersion vis-a-vis the pre-Midway tactics). When the war began there was no clear doctrine on the US side. Depending on your definition the US used 2 CV task forces in both of the battles before Adm.King released his order. Note that his order ( for single carrier TF ) was due to a desire to avoid suffering a reverse Midway. Also depending on your definition the IJN used 2 single carrier TFs at Coral Sea ... the distance between the carriers was 8 miles. And, actually, the IJN had more than one carrier task force in every carrier battle except Midway.

As CPT Hughes makes clear, in Naval tactics, dispersal reduces offensive firepower while concentration increases it. However, also in general, dispersal increases defense by increasing survivabilty by forcing the opponent to disperse his fire across more widely dispersed targets. This fundamental trade off must be evaluated by the Fleet Commander and the correct decision made for each circumstance.

Thus if you can survive an opponents strike - you should clearly concentrate - if you cannot - you should probably disperse. The IJN did not disperse at Midway and did not survive the enemy first strike and thus could not effectively hit back.

This question of fleet tactics is fundamental. I would submit that it should be a decision of the players as to whether to concentrate or disperse. The game should model the laws of physics not force fundamental doctrine upon the players. The so called "co-ordination" rule ... is merely a restriction on the US ... which as LST indicates is attempting to model US doctrine. Probably the Adm. King order. But by using this rule we also allow the Japanese to disperse their carriers and still operate with out any doctrinal disadvantage.

Testing has indicated that using anything more than single carrier task forces for the US will results in sub-optimal strike totals. However, if facing the "Death Star" ... the US is actually best off ( given the existence of "THE RULE" ) to use single carrier TF ... most times ( 3 out of 4 ) the Japanese only get one massive strike ... killing one CV ... the others survive and ( assuming they are in the same hex or different hexes at the same range ) still get a chance to coordinate their strikes without suffering the penalty of "THE RULE". I've actually had one test where the USN got all planes coordinated into one 200+ strike when operating with 4 single carrier TF.

So I submit that "THE RULE" has the effect in 1942 ... of encouraging the US to use the unrealistic tactic of single carrier TF when facing the Death Star. It is far more likely IRL that strike concentration would be optimized by having the ships in one TF ... but "THE RULE" prevents this ... and avoidance of the rule ... by using single carrier TF gets better concentration AND better defensive dispersal ... so "THE RULE" produces an invalid state of affairs.

For my money ... the simplest fix is to eliminate "the rule" all together ... the game already models strike coordination whether in the same TF or not. Placing additional restrictions is not having either historical results or even the desired effect.

And a final note. The historical strike totals in the 1942 carrier battles make it clear that 2 carrier task forces never launched more than 100 planes in a strike. The existing rule ( based on testing ) gives the Japanese a greater than 50/50 chance of launching well more than 50% and often 100% of the total planes on board, while ensuring that the USN rarely exceed the 50% ( one carriers worth ). The historical launch numbers for Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz just don't bare giving either side an advantage. The rule does give one side an advantage.

Occam's Razor says eliminate the rule or at least make it an option.

(in reply to LargeSlowTarget)
Post #: 38
RE: CV strike composition - 1/3/2005 9:13:08 PM   
LargeSlowTarget


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Joined: 9/23/2000
From: Hessen, Germany - now living in France
Status: offline 		Don't know this book, yet... Were carrier ops a draw because both sides had more or less the same capabilities, or were they a draw because the advantages/deficits each side had canceled each other out?

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Post #: 39
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 12:13:37 AM   
USSMaine

 

Posts: 213
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From: Maine (USA)
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

Another example of the lingering fact that game design is based more on earlier gaming assumptions than fact. This assumption that Japan was better at CV opshas been around since AH games.


Not that I disagree with your premise .... but ....

In all fairness Ron - I had a bunch of AH games - and they only had a couple dealing with carrier combat and I don't recall any rules like this - some were too simple (Midway) and others were more tactical (Flattop) perhaps SPI is more to blame ;)

< Message edited by USSMaine -- 1/3/2005 5:15:14 PM >

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Post #: 40
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 4:25:44 AM   
Mike Scholl

 

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From: Kansas City, MO
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quote:

ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget


Probably not well thought-out, but...


Translated into WitP:
1a. CAP penalty for JN and/or CAP benefit for USN growing with time
1b. related to this, penalty for JN strike escorts (hand signals, few radios), none for USN
2. limit of numbers of a/c that can be launched per given time per carrier
3. limit on number of CVs that USN can operate in one TF early in the war
4. JN strikes tending to be bigger, but prone to miss the target entirely, USN strikes tending to split up in uncoordinated smaller strikes (some of which failing to find target)

Question is how #3 can be achieved - by house rules in PBEM, Malthusian 'moral restraint' if playing against AI or by denying the player the ahistorical benefits of concentrating his CVs with an early war strike penalty (or a what-if-scenario with no penalty if we assume that the USN did have an early war doctrine for concentrated CV-TFs and the means, training and experience for such operations).


LST Do you realize that the whole basis for your arguement is NEGATIVE? The US
DID NOT operate CV's in groups larger than 1-2 during 1942---so that must mean
that they COULD NOT operate CV's in any larger number? And a rule PENALIZING
such behavior must be in the game. By this logic, Neither side should be able to
do anything that isn't exactly historical. What, the Japanese Player wants to try to
invade Australia? Never happened..., there for the Game should HALVE the values
of all troops he lands there! And now the cheating Japanese are actually forming
ASW convoys and TF's in 1942? Never happened..., so the game needs to HALVE
the ASW values of All Japanese Escorts! That's the kind of circular reasoning your
arguement is based on.

Jwilkerson provided the launch figures for all the CV battles of 1942..., and the num-
bers suggest that NEITHER side could get a strike of more than 100 in during that
time. No matter how many or few CV's were in how many TF's. Certainly seemed
to suggest that NEITHER SIDE had any real advantage, though the numbers leaned
just a little towards the US. Of course, thet would mean no "crutch" for the Japanese
Fan-Boys..., but it would be fair. And realistic... And Historical. DID NOT does not
mean COULD NOT! And any rule that pelalizes one side over the other should at the
very least be proven historical fact with no questions attached. This one is not.

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Post #: 41
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 6:46:59 AM   
Mr.Frag


Posts: 13410
Joined: 12/18/2002
From: Purgatory
Status: offline 		CAP flying over a hex covers the whole hex, not just a single TF. 6 single CV TF's put up exactly the same cap as 1 TF with 6 CV's.

Based on how strikes fly, it is much safer to have multiple TF's but if you guys insist on grouping your CV's to make sure they all get hit in 1 strike, thats completely up to you.

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Post #: 42
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 7:28:53 AM   
Ron Saueracker


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag

CAP flying over a hex covers the whole hex, not just a single TF. 6 single CV TF's put up exactly the same cap as 1 TF with 6 CV's.

Based on how strikes fly, it is much safer to have multiple TF's but if you guys insist on grouping your CV's to make sure they all get hit in 1 strike, thats completely up to you.


I think people grouptheir CVs in one TF mainly to KEEP THE DARN AI FROM REACTING WHEN ORDERED NOT TO REACT, EVEN WITH NO BOMBERS, THEREBY SPLITTING UP THE TFS ORDERED TO FOLLOW EACH OTHER.Just a shameless plug for the TG idea.

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Yammas from The Apo-Tiki Lounge. Future site of WITP AE benders! And then the s--t hit the fan

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Post #: 43
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 8:13:26 AM   
jwilkerson


Posts: 10525
Joined: 9/15/2002
From: Kansas
Status: offline 		Paraphrasing from Hughes:

Initially in early 42 both sides were more or less equal in that striking power dominated defense ( though not by as much as either side believed ). By August the US increased defensive power and thus prevented higher losses. The Americans and Japanese belived that one carrier could destroy 2-3 similar enemy ships. IRL there was never really more than one carrier sunk per air wing attack ( and he uses an "effective air wing attack ...in other words about 70 planes being 1 full airwing ).

American superiority in Cryptanalysis and radar prevented the Japanese from achieving any measure of surprise on the Americans ( either operational or tactical ). This counteracted initial Japanese quantitative superiority. He rates them even on qualitative.

CPT Hughes does not fault the Japanese for physically massing their carriers even though they erroneously believed that 1 carrier could destroy 2 enemy carriers ( such firepower dominance would indicate dispersal as the superior tactic ).

Reasons to concentrate/disperse.

1. If one carrier can eliminate 2-3 enemy carriers then concentration is bad as one enemy carrier could more easily locate and destroy multiple friendly carriers.

2. If it takes more than one carriers worth of strike to eliminate one enemy carrier then concentration is desired. Physical massing however is only necessary if strikes from separate forces cannot be otherwise coordinated.

3. If concentration increases defensive firepower to the point where an offensive strike from a same sized enemy force can be defeated then physical massing is desired.

He does not say why he doesn't take the Japanese to task for concentrating at Midway.


But pieces of reason 2 and 3 could both apply. Perhaps the Japanese felt gained coordinating advantage by concentrating and perhaps they could increase their defensive power ( at least of the cap ). But they mis-calculated in that the defensive power of their 4 carriers was insufficient to overcome the offensive power of 3 enemy "carriers" ... ( counting Midway itself as one carrier group ... Yorktown as another and Enterprise/Hornet as the third ).

CPT Hughes believes that in early 1942 on balance it was better to operate single carrier task forces - by the end of 42 it was getting better for the Americans to concentrate as their AA firepower advantage began to reduce the losses they would have taken had they been dispersed.

full data on this book...

FLEET TACTICS - Theory and Practice. CPT Wayne P. Hughes Jr. USN retired. Naval Institute Press 1986.

( no longer paraphrasing from Hughes ! )

Note that the above [Hughes] analysis applies to carrier versus carrier only ! To launch "surprise" attacks against land installations physical massing is desired if this produces sufficient firepower to cripple the enemy LBA to counterattack the carrier fleet. If coordination can be achieved without physical massing then physical massing is unnecessary. Note than in testing I have gotten full coordination from 2-3 task forces each containing one carrier all attacking the same land base at the same range even if not in the same hex ( haven't tried it over and over as I was more focusing on carrier versus carrier in my testing).

Thus the entire discussion we're having about CV coordination should only apply to CV versus CV ( or task force not in base hex ) ... both sides should be able to launch without this restriction if attacking land installations.


The proposal that probably is easiest and makes the most sense is...

1. Use existing "availability determination" to determine whether air units attack at 100%, 50% or 0% strength ( I'm just trying to say ... have it do what it does )

2. Eliminate the doubling of chance of strike uncoordination due to number of planes in the same TF. Instead increase the chance a strike is uncoordinated if the there are other TF from the same side air striking the same task force.

3. Limit maximum number of CV, CVL, CVE in a TF to 6 for both sides for the duration.

4. If there are multiple task forces in the same hex, allow 50% plus RND[50]% of the planes CAPing the hex to intercept the first strike ... decrease total number of planes CAPing hex from strike to strike in the same phase exactly as is done now ... then apply the percentage to determine the number of effective planes which were redirected to cover the task force being attacked ( this is overly generous but ensures that the most important TF has a chance of maximum coverage.


Regarding 1 ... this is just saying have the game determine strike availability as it does now [ less the effects of the carrier TF coordinating rule ].

Regarding 2 ... this essentially reverses the current rule saying that greater availability will be found by massing the carriers than by not massing them ... the reflects the state of affairs in 1942. It was more difficult to coordinate physically dispersed TF and easier to coordinate physically massed TF.

Regarding 3 ... I'd say do this regardless. Six was the most CV/CVL either side contemplated putting into a single TF (may one TAFFY had 7 ... but it won't kill any one if they have give give up 1 CVE in 1 TF 1 time.

Regarding 4 could be used or not used separately but someone was arguing for a "CAP Coordination" rule and the current practice of allowing both sides 100% coverage of all TF in the hex is even more overly generous.

Of course the above could easily be made more complex and thus possibly more accurate ... but being a programmer myself I know if some one is proposing a change it is more likely to get done if it is an "easy" one.

If the game more or less correctly models defensive fire against air strikes ... then the above will work ... however if the game has been "balanced" to require a-historically large strikes to obtain damage then the above may result in carrier battles that result in lots of strikes but no damage. In this case we should probably just abandon the existing CV coordination rule. If strikes against TF in non-base hexes are still too large ( producing a-historical results ) then put a hard cap on strike size as well of say 216 ( largest documented strike ) or some similar number.

(in reply to LargeSlowTarget)
Post #: 44
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 8:39:21 AM   
Nikademus


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quote:

ORIGINAL: Halsey

That one was for Nikademus. oops!

I was wondering what the historical precedent was. Not sure if he was refering to Zero's, which I think the bonus is alright also. Or, the coordination rules, regarding the limit on planes in a strike. Which I think could use a little more balance, and less bias towards the Allies.


Prior to the war, the USN had no multi-carrier doctrine. Even coordination of a strike from a single carrier was subject to problems due to an overcomplicated depature scheme (no less than 3 schemes) exaserbated by differing ranges and cruising speeds for the 3 main plane types. Particularily hard hit were the F4F's which would have to throttle back to nearly stalling speed and still have to do S-turns in order to not pull away from their charges. This resulted in shortening even further their already short range.

Thats the Con. The Pro was that USN CAG's were more flexible in deployment vs the IJN since the CAG's were not organic to the carrier but could be shuffled about. This allowed USN Carriers to remain active even if their [current] CAG was hard hit. They'd simply shuffle in another VF or VB or VT and boom, carrier back in action.

IJN was the opposite. Multi-carrier doctrine existed and the CAG's were organic to their Carriers and trained as an overall part of a carrier division. This and similar ranged aircraft alllowed a far better chance for coordinated strike and the Japanese 'were' the first navy to form an air fleet. Not in the same organizational league as the later war "Task Group" but from a striking power point of view, just as potent. (just not as self sufficient)

Thats the Pro. The Con, as demonstrated after Coral Sea was that if the CAG of a carrier or Carrier Division got decimated that pretty much knocked out the carrier until a new airgroup could be worked up via replacements and training. Further, the air mechanical crews were also organic to the CV in question and could not be shuffled around as easily as could be in the US navy.

Please note that the above were not absolutes but should be treated more as probabilities. Not all IJN "strikes" were suberb examples of coordination and not all USN strikes were discombobulated messes, but the tendancy for discoordination was far more likely with a USN strike, the more carriers involved the greater the chance vs an IJN group in 1942. Simple cause and effect....the Japanese organized for it, the USN didn't. (at the time) Pearl Harbor is probably the best example of a massive and well coordinated set of strikes. Yes it involved months of prior planning but that planning and preperation required that the crews of the CV's be able to work together and coordinate their actions. That they did. The training paid off.

As for the Zero "bonus", not sure what you are referring too. If your asking if there is a historical precedent for it. Yes there is though it wasn't restricted to the Zero but to the Japanese as a whole, their pilots and their planes were beriddled in Allied circles as 2nd rate. The overconfidence and underestimation of their soon to be opponents would have fatal consequences. Personally as far as the game is concerned i would have preferred if the EXP variable produced the "shock" effect in place of an overarching bonus but given the how certain other variables dominate, I dont have a problem with the bonus having seen it in action though if one really wants to "historical" it should include all Japanese fighters, mainly Oscar.....even the Nate suprised more than a few when it roared over the Malayan peninsula.

Chris Shores made an interesting comment about the Zero "legend" (1/2 of which was made at the Oscar's expense) His theory was that part of the reason why the legend got started was that it was psychologically easier for Allied (i.e. Western) minds to accept that they'd been defeated due to a technological gap (Zero....the super plane) vs. the harder to swallow idea that they'd been in many cases outfought by well trained pilots....the same pilots who's aptitude they'd beriddled prior to the start of hostilities.

anyway, as everyone knows...once the shock wore off, things wern't nearly so one sided but it was a hard lesson that could have been avoided.

_____________________________


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Post #: 45
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 9:06:25 AM   
freeboy

 

Posts: 9088
Joined: 5/16/2004
From: Colorado
Status: offline 		I do not mind the idea of a strike "penelty.. but it seems too sevear..
I think a more realistic one would be when the flight ops fail the test to break up the strike into components that each get to attack and be intercepted...
and like at Midway it could favor either side...
historical note at Midway a lone group of torpedo bombers "stripped " the fighter cover attacking and being slaughtered, allowing later arriving dive bombers clear attack runs...

(in reply to spence)
Post #: 46
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 1:53:06 PM   
Skander

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: freeboy

I do not mind the idea of a strike "penelty.. but it seems too sevear..
I think a more realistic one would be when the flight ops fail the test to break up the strike into components that each get to attack and be intercepted...
and like at Midway it could favor either side...
historical note at Midway a lone group of torpedo bombers "stripped " the fighter cover attacking and being slaughtered, allowing later arriving dive bombers clear attack runs...


Yes! Both the strike groups and the CAP need to have more chances to be split into smaller groups, some of which won't do anything useful sometimes.

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Post #: 47
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 4:28:20 PM   
TIMJOT

 

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quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Jwilkerson provided the launch figures for all the CV battles of 1942..., and the num-
bers suggest that NEITHER side could get a strike of more than 100 in during that
time. No matter how many or few CV's were in how many TF's. Certainly seemed
to suggest that NEITHER SIDE had any real advantage, though the numbers leaned
just a little towards the US. Of course, thet would mean no "crutch" for the Japanese
Fan-Boys..., but it would be fair. And realistic... And Historical. DID NOT does not
mean COULD NOT! And any rule that pelalizes one side over the other should at the
very least be proven historical fact with no questions attached. This one is not.


With all due respect to Jwilerson's figures. I believe the applicable "POINT" isnt the numbers of aircraft "LAUNCHED" but rather the number of aircraft put "ON TARGET" in a "COORDINATED" Strike. In 1942 not always but, more often than not USN's larger CV strikes tended to loose cohesion in transit. At Coral Sea the strike on Shoho was pretty coordinated but the main strike the following day was not. The Lexington and Yorktown strikes were unable to form up and ended up comming in individually. The Yorktown strike was poorly timed and the resulting delay in forming up the DBs and TBs allowed the Zuikaku to escape in a rain squal and the Shokaku to launch additional CAP. At Midway all TB sqds. and DBs sqds. came in penny packets or not at all. At E.Solomons the Saratogas strike on the Ryujo was fairly well coordinated but again lost contact with the Enterprise strike in transit, which resulted in the Enterprise strike comming in late with nothing tp hit but the already sinking Ryujo. At Santa Cruz the USN strikes again lost all cohesion and were completely uncoordinated.

Now the IJN didnt always find there targets (first day at Coral Sea and 2nd Strike at E.Solomons come to mind) but more often than not their strikes retained cohesion in transit and when the target was hit it was hit with a coordinated strike as Coral Sea, E.Solomons, and Santa Cruz attest.

I would agree the USN shouldnt be limited in strike size or number of CVs in a TF persay but clearly there is historical precendence that there was a greater "CHANCE' the USN strikes would come in uncoordinated in 1942 at least.

I would also agree that there needs to be some kind of limits/restrictions on CAP for both sides early with the US gaining some sort of CAP bonus as war goes on.

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Post #: 48
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 4:50:49 PM   
Feinder


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quote:

CAP flying over a hex covers the whole hex, not just a single TF. 6 single CV TF's put up exactly the same cap as 1 TF with 6 CV's.

Based on how strikes fly, it is much safer to have multiple TF's but if you guys insist on grouping your CV's to make sure they all get hit in 1 strike, thats completely up to you.



Frag,

Good point.

But wouldn't you lose the advantage of radar outside of your TF. So if you put Kit/Oi with your one 6x CV TF, it's helps your CAP percentage with a successful interecept roll. But if you were to split into six 1x CV TFs (with Kit/Oi in one of them), you'd only get the benefit of radar (increasing the %age of CAP) for only one TF (and therefore only one CV), but the other 5 are now flying with a lower %age.

-F-

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Post #: 49
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 5:12:23 PM   
Ron Saueracker


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quote:

I would also agree that there needs to be some kind of limits/restrictions on CAP for both sides early with the US gaining some sort of CAP bonus as war goes on.


CAP simply needs to be made more "TF" oriented and less "Hex" oriented. CAP generally flew over the parent CVs and LRCAP flew over a wider area (generally within hex unless tasked with a specific mission such as protection of an Amphib TF). The overly powerful CAP we have now is further compounded by the entire CAP gauntlet which each strike needs to pass through. The CAP seems to be in every place at once. The CAP degredation feature is a good idea but I think it fails to limit the CAP's effectiveness enough.

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Post #: 50
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 5:14:42 PM   
Ron Saueracker


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quote:

CAP flying over a hex covers the whole hex, not just a single TF. 6 single CV TF's put up exactly the same cap as 1 TF with 6 CV's


Herein lies the problem with CAP being too powerful. See previous post.

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Post #: 51
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 5:27:35 PM   
tsimmonds


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Status: offline 		One problem with CAP as modeled is that, no matter how many VF were available for that day's standing CAP, only a portion of them would be in the air at any given time. Of those, only a portion would then be in position for interception (at least before the introduction and perfection by the USN of FDO doctrine). To me, the air combat routines don't really seem to model this very well; at the start of combat the whole CAP seems to be available throughout the entire hex. Is there any attempt made in this routine to simulate the possibility (dare I say, probability?) that significant portions of CAP at any given moment might be stacked too low, or chasing down phantoms on the disengaged side of the TF, or too low on fuel to engage incoming strike a/c (all of which mishaps befell the US forces IRL at Santa Cruz)?

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Post #: 52
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 7:21:10 PM   
Ron Saueracker


Posts: 12121
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quote:

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

One problem with CAP as modeled is that, no matter how many VF were available for that day's standing CAP, only a portion of them would be in the air at any given time. Of those, only a portion would then be in position for interception (at least before the introduction and perfection by the USN of FDO doctrine). To me, the air combat routines don't really seem to model this very well; at the start of combat the whole CAP seems to be available throughout the entire hex. Is there any attempt made in this routine to simulate the possibility (dare I say, probability?) that significant portions of CAP at any given moment might be stacked too low, or chasing down phantoms on the disengaged side of the TF, or too low on fuel to engage incoming strike a/c (all of which mishaps befell the US forces IRL at Santa Cruz)?


Exactly!!

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Post #: 53
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 7:49:05 PM   
Mike Scholl

 

Posts: 9349
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From: Kansas City, MO
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quote:

ORIGINAL: TIMJOT


With all due respect to Jwilerson's figures. I believe the applicable "POINT" isnt the numbers of aircraft "LAUNCHED" but rather the number of aircraft put "ON TARGET" in a "COORDINATED" Strike. In 1942 not always but, more often than not USN's larger CV strikes tended to loose cohesion in transit. At Coral Sea the strike on Shoho was pretty coordinated but the main strike the following day was not. The Lexington and Yorktown strikes were unable to form up and ended up comming in individually. The Yorktown strike was poorly timed and the resulting delay in forming up the DBs and TBs allowed the Zuikaku to escape in a rain squal and the Shokaku to launch additional CAP. At Midway all TB sqds. and DBs sqds. came in penny packets or not at all. At E.Solomons the Saratogas strike on the Ryujo was fairly well coordinated but again lost contact with the Enterprise strike in transit, which resulted in the Enterprise strike comming in late with nothing tp hit but the already sinking Ryujo. At Santa Cruz the USN strikes again lost all cohesion and were completely uncoordinated.

Now the IJN didnt always find there targets (first day at Coral Sea and 2nd Strike at E.Solomons come to mind) but more often than not their strikes retained cohesion in transit and when the target was hit it was hit with a coordinated strike as Coral Sea, E.Solomons, and Santa Cruz attest.

I would agree the USN shouldnt be limited in strike size or number of CVs in a TF persay but clearly there is historical precendence that there was a greater "CHANCE' the USN strikes would come in uncoordinated in 1942 at least.

I would also agree that there needs to be some kind of limits/restrictions on CAP for both sides early with the US gaining some sort of CAP bonus as war goes on.


I have less trouble with this general approach than that now in the game. Though it
seems to be built in to some extent in the form of pilot experiance/morale and TF
leadership. It's the "artificial" and unjustified rule that because something DIDN'T
happen, it COULDN'T happen, that really seems unjustified. And it admits that as
the US gains both a training edge and a technical edge as the war goes on their
abilities (especially in CAP usage) there should be a cooresponding growth of abil-
ities in the game.

The real point of jwilkerson's figures, and my use of them to debunk the "limits"
placed only on the Allies in the game rule. The abilities in 1942 should be basically
equal..., with the Japanese perhaps having a slight edge in "coordinating their strikes"
due to more experianced pilots/leaders until losses catch up to them. I. for one would
not have a problem with that situation. Gives the US a reason to fight..., the sooner
the quality levels of the Japanese Airmen are whittled down through combat, the sooner
US technology can reverse the advantage.

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Post #: 54
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 8:25:05 PM   
TIMJOT

 

Posts: 1822
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

The real point of jwilkerson's figures, and my use of them to debunk the "limits"
placed only on the Allies in the game rule. The abilities in 1942 should be basically
equal..., with the Japanese perhaps having a slight edge in "coordinating their strikes"
due to more experianced pilots/leaders until losses catch up to them. I. for one would
not have a problem with that situation. Gives the US a reason to fight..., the sooner
the quality levels of the Japanese Airmen are whittled down through combat, the sooner
US technology can reverse the advantage.


Not sure it can be tied to pilot experience/moral, since at the same time USN suffered from strike coordination/cohesion there SBD pilots for example were quite good at placing bombs on target. So unless strike coordination/cohesion has a much higher experience requirement threshold than individual pilots tactical strike ability it would tieing it to experience/moral would really work.

Then again we dont really know how well the USN would have been in placeing ordnance on moving targets early in the war since most of our historical examples took place 5 to 6 months into the war, after ample time for additional training and practice. The Lae raid is the earliest strike that comes to mind on ships and even that they were kind of sitting ducks.

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Post #: 55
RE: CV strike composition - 1/4/2005 8:26:50 PM   
von Murrin


Posts: 1760
Joined: 11/13/2001
From: That from which there is no escape.
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

quote:

I would also agree that there needs to be some kind of limits/restrictions on CAP for both sides early with the US gaining some sort of CAP bonus as war goes on.


CAP simply needs to be made more "TF" oriented and less "Hex" oriented. CAP generally flew over the parent CVs and LRCAP flew over a wider area (generally within hex unless tasked with a specific mission such as protection of an Amphib TF). The overly powerful CAP we have now is further compounded by the entire CAP gauntlet which each strike needs to pass through. The CAP seems to be in every place at once. The CAP degredation feature is a good idea but I think it fails to limit the CAP's effectiveness enough.


The system as is isn't horrible, but a better CAP model would make it so much better. That and no more 100% strikes would significantly reduce the excessive numbers of hits and aerial bloodlettings.

The largest battle I've had in WITP involved 13 CV's and while it was fun to set up and watch, 800+ aircraft downed entirely by flak and CAP in one day is pretty excessive.

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Post #: 56
RE: CV strike composition - 1/5/2005 12:39:48 AM   
Ron Saueracker


Posts: 12121
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From: Ottawa, Canada OR Zakynthos Island, Greece
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quote:

The largest battle I've had in WITP involved 13 CV's and while it was fun to set up and watch, 800+ aircraft downed entirely by flak and CAP in one day is pretty excessive.


This in itself is cause for concern. Thegame is definitley on the bloodthirsty side.

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Post #: 57
RE: CV strike composition - 1/5/2005 4:10:53 AM   
von Murrin


Posts: 1760
Joined: 11/13/2001
From: That from which there is no escape.
Status: offline 		Heh, that was pretty brutal. I also think a lot of it had to do with high morale and experience as well as excellent leaders. I'm pretty sure the high casualty rate was driven by the fact that the pilots just... would - not - give - up. Huge CAP totals ripped into (and were torn up by) escorts, and the survivors just tore through the bombers, who wouldn't go home either. I didn't see a single unit or unit fragment break off an attack.

Combat Mission had a similar problem, where high experience troops with good leaders could get slaughtered if you weren't careful. If you told elite troops to walk across an open field into enemy fire, they would do just that with predictable results. Lesser quality troops would rout after taking some damage.

50% max strikes and CAP depletion. I'm all for this one, guys.

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Post #: 58
RE: CV strike composition - 1/5/2005 4:32:46 AM   
Mr.Frag


Posts: 13410
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quote:

One problem with CAP as modeled is that, no matter how many VF were available for that day's standing CAP, only a portion of them would be in the air at any given time. Of those, only a portion would then be in position for interception (at least before the introduction and perfection by the USN of FDO doctrine). To me, the air combat routines don't really seem to model this very well; at the start of combat the whole CAP seems to be available throughout the entire hex. Is there any attempt made in this routine to simulate the possibility (dare I say, probability?) that significant portions of CAP at any given moment might be stacked too low, or chasing down phantoms on the disengaged side of the TF, or too low on fuel to engage incoming strike a/c (all of which mishaps befell the US forces IRL at Santa Cruz)?


Not quite ...

CAP consists of two parts, not one.

The first part is the already airborne group.

The second part is the aircraft scrambling from the base (CV) to intercept.

Both rely on their own sighting data (radar, sound, etc)

The second group is bound by climb speed. (if they can't climb to the raid height, they don't intercept, they also fight at a disadvantage when climbing into combat - bounce)

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Post #: 59
RE: CV strike composition - 1/5/2005 5:14:55 AM   
tsimmonds


Posts: 5498
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From: astride Mason and Dixon's Line
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quote:

ORIGINAL: Mr.Frag

quote:

One problem with CAP as modeled is that, no matter how many VF were available for that day's standing CAP, only a portion of them would be in the air at any given time. Of those, only a portion would then be in position for interception (at least before the introduction and perfection by the USN of FDO doctrine). To me, the air combat routines don't really seem to model this very well; at the start of combat the whole CAP seems to be available throughout the entire hex. Is there any attempt made in this routine to simulate the possibility (dare I say, probability?) that significant portions of CAP at any given moment might be stacked too low, or chasing down phantoms on the disengaged side of the TF, or too low on fuel to engage incoming strike a/c (all of which mishaps befell the US forces IRL at Santa Cruz)?


Not quite ...

CAP consists of two parts, not one.

The first part is the already airborne group.

The second part is the aircraft scrambling from the base (CV) to intercept.

Both rely on their own sighting data (radar, sound, etc)

The second group is bound by climb speed. (if they can't climb to the raid height, they don't intercept, they also fight at a disadvantage when climbing into combat - bounce)


Yabbut. Let's put some examples in the air.

Based on my (possibly flawed) understanding from previous discussions:

Assume 6 VF units in a hex. Each with 24 a/c. Each set on Escort with 70% CAP. In this case the "already airborne group" consists of 24x6x0.7 = 108 a/c. These are all available to intercept any inbound airstrikes. The "second group" consists of the other 36 fighters in these 6 groups. These are also available, subject to the limitations that you mention. My point is that the "already airborne group" should have some checks to pass, as historically there were significant obstacles in the way of effectively deploying a standing CAP, particularly in the early part of the war.

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