From here to...well...it SEEMS like an eternity (Full Version)

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Cap Mandrake -> From here to...well...it SEEMS like an eternity (7/2/2006 10:46:24 PM)

Google defines intelligence as: the ability to comprehend; to understand and profit from experience

Clearly, that doesn't apply here, as Tabpub and I, having forgotten about all the time we burnt up playing WITP, have agreed to take on John 3rd and Moses in a 2 v 2 contest. Here are the rules Moses gave us (he claims to have gotten them somewhere else).

I. Thou shalt be the Allies and shalt not display any Japanese Fanboyism, even if thou ist mightily impressed when 3 Zeroes shoot down 32 Wirraways and 17 Brewsters in one battle.
II. Thou shalt use stock scenario 15 and shalt not make lauditory remarks or post pictures of any user upgrades or artwork.
III. Thou shalt not use the name, G.G., 2by3 or Matrix in vane....or artery for that matter either.
IV. Thou shalt adhere to a schedule of one day per turn, especially on the Sabbath because thou ist not supposed to be working then anyway, stupid.
V. Thou shalt honor thy General and thy Admiral and shalt not redeploy ground troops out of theatre in an unhistorical fashion without paying the political points.*
VI. Thou shalt use version 1.8 so that thou doesn't kill off thine leaders.
VII. Thou shalt not view thine opponent's AAR in an adulterous fashion.
VIII. Thou shalt not steal ships or aircraft from thine fellow believers.
IX. Thou shalt not lie and say that thou wilst not move thine ships in port or aircraft on turn one, then turn around like a low-borne helminth and move thine ships and planes.
X. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's four-engine bombers, unless one is destined to have four-engine bombers by the prophesies.

* This does not apply to troops rescued from the Philippines, Borneo and Malaya



Cap Mandrake -> RE: From here to...well...it SEEMS like an eternity (7/4/2006 6:49:49 PM)

The division of command according to the Lahaina Conference of November 1941.

[image]local://upfiles/7983/72FEE5D3941F4B42B836E5F0CAA3981C.jpg[/image]



Cap Mandrake -> the McCollum Memo (7/10/2006 5:25:15 PM)

October 7, 1940.

Memo from Lt. Cmdr. Arthur McCollum, Office of Naval Intelligence to Cpts. Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox. Anderson was a close military advisor to FDR. Anderson's comments are appended.

Pay close attention to McCollum's 8 suggested action points (section 9, A-H on page 4) and see if it sparks an insight into the initial disposition and alliances of US Forces 14 months later.

[image]local://upfiles/7983/C718E2B3E9BC4654ACF68F64ACE2D945.jpg[/image]



Cap Mandrake -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/10/2006 5:26:04 PM)

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Cap Mandrake -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/10/2006 5:26:38 PM)

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Cap Mandrake -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/10/2006 5:27:36 PM)

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Cap Mandrake -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/10/2006 5:28:29 PM)

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Cap Mandrake -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/10/2006 5:30:05 PM)

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Wellard -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/10/2006 8:32:55 PM)

like the google earth pic Captain.I have been perusing the South Seas recently just to try and get a feel for the places we spend so much time fighting over.

Interesting memo, which I hadn't seen before.Now I get even more convinced that PH was a setup.Shame that NI underestimated Japanese capabilities so badly at the start.I seriously believe that FDR reckoned on losing 1 or two BBs but having the rest available together with his excuse for going to war.But then conspiracy theory isjust a hobby for me



mlees -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/10/2006 9:01:41 PM)

quote:

Interesting memo, which I hadn't seen before.Now I get even more convinced that PH was a setup.Shame that NI underestimated Japanese capabilities so badly at the start.I seriously believe that FDR reckoned on losing 1 or two BBs but having the rest available together with his excuse for going to war.But then conspiracy theory isjust a hobby for me.


I agree that the memo appears to be an interesting, and mostly accurate, assesment of the US options at that time.

However, I disagree that the memo "proves" the PH was a setup.

The memo recognises Japan's aggressive nature, but makes no predictions on actual opening attacks. The only objectives mentioned are thrusts/attacks on Malaya, the DEI, and the Indian ocean in an attempt to harm Englands' supply, morale, and prestige.

Part of the reason that PH was a surprise, was that PH was our strongest base outside of the USA. War dictum's state to attack your enemy where he is weakest (like Guam), not where he is strongest.

Japan's meticulous planning, and US peacetime routines, contributed to the Japanese success. It was not due to FDR's deliberate planning.



Wellard -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/10/2006 9:09:11 PM)

Like I said conspiracy theory(and the debunking of it) is my favourite non wargames related hobby.My comments were supposed to be tounge in cheek(should have used a smiley)[:)]

On the other comment do you have any plans to use google earth for more detailed operational maps?



Cap Mandrake -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/10/2006 9:30:59 PM)

mlees;

Of course you are right..the memo does not prove that Pearl was offered up as bait. It does show that, contrary to the common "lay" perception, war with Japan was no surprise and it suggests FDR took measures to make it more likely (note: I am not saying he was wrong..there was really no way to stand up to Japan without war by 1940).

It is fascinating how many of McCollum's recommendations were accepted:

A..Naval treaty with Britain in the Far East...check
B..Treaty with the Dutch (Government in Exile)...check
C..Aid to the generalissimo..check
D..Cruisers to the PI....check (sort of)...CNO later advocated for only one or two and FDR backed down
E...Subs to Manila.....check
F...Main Pacific Fleet moved from West Coast to PH...check
G..No Dutch Oil for the Japs...check
H..Oil Embargo....check



mlees -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/10/2006 10:05:44 PM)

quote:

It does show that, contrary to the common "lay" perception, war with Japan was no surprise and it suggests FDR took measures to make it more likely


I am not a historian, only a fan of history.

Is it still really "lay" perception that (eventual) war with Japan was a surprise?

I thought that only the specific opening moves (and the exact date) was a surprise...

Page 4, Para 9, seems to indicate that there was still hope that the Japanese might "modify" their belligerent attitude if the US presented a more forceful military and political front. (Up to the time of the memo, Oct '40, the USA was seen as pretty insular and ineffective, politically and diplomatically speaking.)

The memo seems to have assumed that the Axis powers wanted to defeat the British before taking on the USA, NOT engage them at the same time. (Page 1/2, Para 2-4.)

It might be inferred that the author assumed that the Japanese and it's European Axis partners were working more closely in their strategic planning than was actually the case...

Therefore, if Japan and the EuroAxis want to defeat the UK seperately, and if the EuroAxis needs Japan's help in finally defeating the UK (Suez and India are specifically mentioned as targets), than discouraging Japan from attacking, while at the same time, bolstering the UK as much as possible (short of declaring ourselves in the war), seems to be the advice of the memo. (Which, as you point out, the advice of Page 4, para 9, was for the large part, accepted and enacted.)

The only flaw of the memo, as far as I can see it, was assuming that Japan would not want to DOW (or could not fight) both the UK and US at the same time. But Japan decided on war for it's own reasons (and not quite the reasons we assumed), with an expectation of a quick war. (Perhaps they thought that the US would abandon the Pacific in favor of war in Europe. I don't think the "Germany First" policy was all that secret...)

In summary, I don't see the "puppet-master-string-pulling" by FDR.

I think he wanted to bolster England, I think he observed the over aggressiveness of Germany and Japan, and I think he saw the ultimate involvment, by the USA, in hostilities versus those nations.

FDR was trying to play for time (in order to sway domestic public opinion to a less isolationist stance, keep the UK in the war, and build up the US military, all without getting voted out of office).

The less time the US had, the less time it's military and industry would have to prepare/strengthen. So, he didnt want to push Japan into war before '43 (when the USAAF and USN were slated to receive it's new construction and aircraft models).



Wellard -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/10/2006 10:16:40 PM)

You also need to take into account the special relationship between Churchill and FDR. Both men had spent much time in naval circles Winnie as First Lord of the Admiralty and FDR as ASECNAV.Add the fact that Churchill was 1/2 American and FDR was an Anglophile and the US was bound to aid us.It was Congress that insisted on the lend-lease provisions which bankrupted the Empire and caused its demise.



Cap Mandrake -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/10/2006 10:50:09 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees

quote:

It does show that, contrary to the common "lay" perception, war with Japan was no surprise and it suggests FDR took measures to make it more likely


I am not a historian, only a fan of history.

Is it still really "lay" perception that (eventual) war with Japan was a surprise?

I thought that only the specific opening moves (and the exact date) was a surprise...


By "lay" perception I meant not merely non-professionals, but the great unwashed, many of whom might be surprised that Pearl Harbor is right next to the cool place with the luaus and Don Ho clones. I think it is fair to say anyone hanging around an internet site dedicated to a masochistically detailed recreation of the Pacific Theater in WWII is bound to have mor ethan a passing knowledge. [;)]


quote:


...In summary, I don't see the "puppet-master-string-pulling" by FDR.

I think he wanted to bolster England, I think he observed the over aggressiveness of Germany and Japan, and I think he saw the ultimate involvment, by the USA, in hostilities versus those nations.

FDR was trying to play for time (in order to sway domestic public opinion to a less isolationist stance, keep the UK in the war, and build up the US military, all without getting voted out of office).

The less time the US had, the less time it's military and industry would have to prepare/strengthen. So, he didnt want to push Japan into war before '43 (when the USAAF and USN were slated to receive it's new construction and aircraft models).


As to FDR wanting to aid Britain..I agree 100%. I think it was his purpose to nudge the American populace from their isolationist stance. Japan was a tool to do that. I can't see him waiting till '43 becaue of conditions in Europe...nor is there any way for Japan to wait till '43 once an oil embargo was applied.

As I see it, FDR wanted Japan to comit an overt act, effectively ending debate. I can't seriously believe that he wanted > 2000 soldiers, marines and airmen to lose their lives on Dec 7.

As to McCollum sincerely hoping to get the Japanese to back down..perhaps...but you do wonder if he seriously thought the Japs would be cowed by 15 S-boats and a couple of cruisers at Manila. It seems to me that he underestimated, like many others, how bad the hornets could sting once you jiggled their nest a few times.





Wellard -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/10/2006 10:58:33 PM)

Which proves rule number 2 the one about Military intelligence being a contradiction in terms.

Rule number one is of course "never fight a land war in Asia"[:-]

(no hope for us then is there)[:)]



mlees -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/10/2006 11:24:05 PM)

quote:

I think it was his purpose to nudge the American populace from their isolationist stance. Japan was a tool to do that.


I am not so sure. It would still be a tough sell to convince the "unwashed" that even if Japan attacked, we would need to DOW Germany... Fortunately for him, Herr Hitler saved him the trouble.

quote:

I can't see him waiting till '43 because of conditions in Europe...nor is there any way for Japan to wait till '43 once an oil embargo was applied.


The memo was written in October, 1940.

1940 was a tough year. Norway, the low countries, and France overrun. The Battle of Britain was still raging, and had a high "puker factor". The Uboats rampaged in the North Atlantic. But the US army was smaller than Greece's IIRC. The USN still had bi-planes based on it's carriers. (So did the UK, but the UK's carriers had less room aboard, and were older, generally.) So the US did not want to fight versus Japan in 1940.

At this point, the best the US could do was to shore up Britain. And that was the purpose of the memo. To examine the options.

1941: The Uboat menace recedes (somewhat) due to code breaking and better convoying tactics/escorts. The Battle of Britain was pretty much seen as "won" by the UK. Italian East africa secured, and Britain seems a little safer, and getting safer every day.

Germany invades the Balkans, and the USSR in May '41, and appears it will need the rest of the year, at least, to defeat them. Seesaw war in Egypt, but the Germans don't seem to be investing heavily. (And the war with USSR will reveal where the "main" German campaigning will be done that year.)

The US begins a "neutrality patrol" extended further eastwards than before. The US gets economic sanctions imposed on Japan. (I am guessing that the administration did not realise just how much these sanctions would force Japan to make hard choices as fast as they did.) Murmansk convoys to shore up the USSR. Two Ocean Navy bill, with the Essex/Iowa class ships laid down. (And a host of smaller stuff.) Reservists and National Guardsman called to active duty.

The measures taken by the US, however, will still need time to "ramp up". So I am thinking that, if FDR had his druthers, no war with Japan in '41 or even early '42.



Cap Mandrake -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/11/2006 12:05:02 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees

....
The US begins a "neutrality patrol" extended further eastwards than before. The US gets economic sanctions imposed on Japan. (I am guessing that the administration did not realise just how much these sanctions would force Japan to make hard choices as fast as they did.) Murmansk convoys to shore up the USSR. Two Ocean Navy bill, with the Essex/Iowa class ships laid down. (And a host of smaller stuff.) Reservists and National Guardsman called to active duty.

The measures taken by the US, however, will still need time to "ramp up". So I am thinking that, if FDR had his druthers, no war with Japan in '41 or even early '42.


In the event..there very nearly was no war with Japan in '41 (missed it by 3 weeks). What you say is true..the US did embark on some shipbuilding, but there was no hope of anything like the astounding tranformation of the US economy to a war footing until there was a war....so there wasn't going to be the billions of dollars spent on the B-29 program or 90 Army divisions until we were at war. I don't think FDR imagined Singapore and Bataan falling..he likely thought we would lose a few ships and planes but not possessions with tens of thousands of American troops falling into captivity. If his goal was to wait till 43..then he could have reined in Hull, or even thrown the Japs a big bone. He didn't.



mlees -> RE: the McCollum Memo (7/11/2006 12:24:18 AM)

Sounds good, Cap. I'll concede to your last point.

I must apologise. It just seems that every time the "FDR Knew! FDR finagled us into WAR!" conspiracy theories are read by me, they seem to be infering that peace had a chance. Maybe I read too much into that... But anyway, I don't know what else FDR could have done, considering the world situation.



Cap Mandrake -> RE: From here to...well...it SEEMS like an eternity (7/11/2006 3:49:20 AM)

mlees;

I think we largely agree. FDR could have tucked the head of the US military back in it's shell..not provided enhanced funding..and not confronted the Japanese.

Ultimately, this would only have exacerbated things as Japan would likely have gone on to seize the DEI, take Singapore and with 6 fleet carriers free to operate in the Indian Ocean..blockading the big Indian ports and likely capturing Ceylon.

He did the right thing by standing up to Japan and Germany. It was not an easy decision, but he hardly seemed to suffer from a lack of confidence.

Now...the Social Security thing....that is a whole new matter [:)]



Cap Mandrake -> Write your Congressman..now! (7/11/2006 5:40:03 PM)

Here is the kind of stuff FDR was up against.

[image]local://upfiles/7983/5D8CE22AAEBD4F2B97B9AAE24E2C93EF.jpg[/image]



Cap Mandrake -> Over brandy and cigars (7/11/2006 5:55:10 PM)

*********January 1941, Churchill's Wartime Offices*****************

Harry Hopkins (special emissary from the President): "The President is determined that we shall win the war together. Make no mistake about it. He has sent me here to tell you that at all costs and by all means he will carry you through, no matter what happens to him. There is nothing he will not do so far as he has human power."



Wellard -> RE: Over brandy and cigars (7/11/2006 6:22:45 PM)

So did Mr Bailey change his tune after Dec 7th? I suspect he did.



mlees -> RE: Over brandy and cigars (7/11/2006 6:30:49 PM)

I got a chuckle from that last paragraph:

quote:

send a contribution TODAY to enable us to carry on this campaign blah blah blah


I get the same spam snail mail from the RNC and the NRA today.



Cap Mandrake -> RE: Over brandy and cigars (7/11/2006 6:35:08 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Wellard

So did Mr Bailey change his tune after Dec 7th? I suspect he did.


I suspect his donations dried up a bit. [;)]



Cap Mandrake -> RE: Over brandy and cigars (7/11/2006 6:38:19 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: mlees

I got a chuckle from that last paragraph:

quote:

send a contribution TODAY to enable us to carry on this campaign blah blah blah


I get the same spam snail mail from the RNC and the NRA today.


Classic fundraising technique...highlight the "outrageous" behavior of one's opponent...get the juices flowing...then make your pitch. This guy seems to think that "CAPS LOCK" is an effective motivator.[:)]



Cap Mandrake -> Oh..C***! Not Richardson again. (7/11/2006 6:43:29 PM)

Admiral Richardson heads to Washington to agitate against the Pacific Fleet move to Pearl. It seems he thinks that the defenses are inadequate, especially the inadequate early warning system for attack from the North of Oahu. He was so vociferous about it I have my own theory that he may have had a mistress in San Diego

[image]local://upfiles/7983/D0967E1870024155B12AB78EA252AD35.jpg[/image]



Cap Mandrake -> Lend Lease (7/11/2006 7:24:17 PM)

Bet You thought the Lend Lease Act only applied to Britain?

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Cap Mandrake -> Axis of Evil (7/11/2006 7:56:34 PM)

July 25, 1941

The Vichy Government cedes to Japan a "Joint Protectorate" over French Indochina.



Hmmm...I wonder who got to them?




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Cap Mandrake -> A company of Stewarts for ol' Mac (7/11/2006 8:09:33 PM)

Whew...I was beginning to worry. This should fix everything.

[image]local://upfiles/7983/7CFBA64F38F9407BBEFA0D0C1B49C2ED.jpg[/image]



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