RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like?

RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (Full Version)

All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> Norm Koger's The Operational Art Of War III >> Scenario Design

Message

a white rabbit -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/24/2007 2:41:41 PM)
..sorry Ben, it all hinges on Dinant, if the French had kept the 1st class 1st Div there then, mmmm, game on but to replace it with the rubbish x div (i can't remember and i did the scen arghhh[X(]), and then only a couple of days before the German attack.. ..that attack slit the throat of the Dyle plan..

golden delicious -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/24/2007 4:01:12 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: a white rabbit ..sorry Ben, it all hinges on Dinant, if the French had kept the 1st class 1st Div there then, mmmm, game on but to replace it with the rubbish x div (i can't remember and i did the scen arghhh[X(]), and then only a couple of days before the German attack.. ..that attack slit the throat of the Dyle plan.. Well a) if the battle was so important, finish your damned scenario on it. and b) the vast bulk of the German panzer force went through on the crossings to the south, and Dinant could have been taken in the flank from there.

jtownsend2k -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/26/2007 12:53:57 AM)
GD: I am enough of a revisionist to say that the war wasn't lost in the 30s. A few brief counterarguments to the usual retorts: Political division - Very well handled after the general strike of 1938. The whole "bourgeois in terror preferring Hitler to Blum" thing is very 1936-1938 1940-44; ie, the Reynaud rightward shift neutralized it, while Blum and the SFIO majority went along with it because of the immediacy of the German threat. Army morale - So much of what we know comes from the reactions of an army that was, after the first 3-4 days, pretty much royally screwed. The nature of the initial army disposition and the subsequent campaign tended to maximize panic and demoralization, whatever the quality of the 6/7ths of the army that weren't Series B. Also, D. Alexander noted the French army had more full-time officers and NCOs than the Wehrmacht, both proportionately -and- absolutely. Interesting tidbit. High command morale was dismal, even if it's been embroidered a bit. (Cairns debunked an anecdote in Beaufre, for example, that makes me wonder about all the other funny ones. The classic 'death in the family' scene at La Ferte, eg.) Unquestionably Georges, Bilotte, and Blanchard all dropped the ball hard - but then again, if I was in their position - being able to look at a map and realize that the war has been lost before it began - who knows, I might have a breakdown and become useless. Material - well, the 37mm tank guns blew, but of course the 47s were beautiful, the 25s were adequate, the tank armour was unmatched. We all know the flaws with the turrets and radio. The weaknesses, material and disposition-wise, of the best Allied equipment and the Allied airforces was greatly magnified, IMO, by the fact that the attacker was always able to gamble through concentration; the Allies didn't know, as the Germans did, to have an entire army group of crack troops, tanks, and the entire Allied air-fleet ready to defend the Meuse. That's why I think that a retired and reactive French disposition - that trades the small countries for time and possibly a slower campaign pace once the main combatants lock horns - gives the French their best chance. Now, between the Germans' seasoning of their troops in various large and small actions between 36, their small unit tactics, their good fortune in having excellent commanders in the right spot, and their ability to pick the crucial battlefield and concentrate, I think the Germans -might- win no matter what the French do. But I think if I had the chance to completely re-do France's deployments, I could give them at the very least even money - perhaps more, if the imponderables are more favourable than we know. As someone or other - Gunsburg or Young - mentioned, the Maginot line was in some ways beautiful. Bloch and others have derided the French for putting money into concrete when they could have put it in tank divisions - but then again, tank divisions fielded in 1935-7 would have been obsolete Panzer-I/II wastes of tank crews in a long French campaign, wheras the Maginot line retained its value quite well. You can actually look it as an excellent economy in both equipment development and troop conservation, if only it had been used more daringly (ie held more weakly with fewer reserves behind it)

Graymane -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/26/2007 4:38:03 PM)
The problem that I see with altering the French dispositions too much is that the Germans must also be allowed to alter their dispositions. Plans are usually not made in a vacuum and v. Manstein's plan was no exception. He decided on a stab through the Ardenne precisely because he (correctly) estimated the French commander's reaction to an attack by Germany. He also understood the rather large numbers of troops in the Maginot line and directly behind it. He then calculated that neither wing of the French army would be able to react to the Ardenne in a timely fashion. An offensive in this area also had the added strategic benefit that the French would not be able to anticipate whether the spearhead was aimed for Paris or the coast. If the French are allowed to change their plans, then the German must also be given that same opportunity in response to what the French have done. At the end of the day, I don't think there is any disposition that makes it such that the Germans lose. The aim of the French (the victory conditions) must be to hold a strong line and turn the conflict into trench warfare for a long, drawn-out campaign. The reason I believe this is that the Germans were much more adaptable to changing conditions than were the French. It could be days before a new plan would be implemented by the French where the same thing could be done in hours by the Germans. Also, because the Germans choose to concentrate their tanks into panzer groups, they will always have the advantage at any area of the line they choose to attack. It is exactly the same reason that Guderian gives in Panzer Leader for his argument about why you want concentrated armor instead of spread out over each infrantry division as support.

golden delicious -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/26/2007 6:07:43 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: jtownsend2k Political division - Very well handled after the general strike of 1938. The whole "bourgeois in terror preferring Hitler to Blum" thing is very 1936-1938 1940-44; ie, the Reynaud rightward shift neutralized it, while Blum and the SFIO majority went along with it because of the immediacy of the German threat. Yet (as I recall) several hundred anti-tank guns were put beyond use in a Communist sabotage attack during the Phoney War. quote: Army morale - So much of what we know comes from the reactions of an army that was, after the first 3-4 days, pretty much royally screwed. So was the BEF- yet Gort reacted cooly and correctly to the situation and got everything out that could be got out. Again, see the reaction of the Poles to their situation a week or two after the start of the war- they at least tried to fight. Obviously, armies are capable of taking this kind of shock and dealing with it. quote: Also, D. Alexander noted the French army had more full-time officers and NCOs than the Wehrmacht, both proportionately -and- absolutely. Interesting tidbit. I don't see how it supports your argument, though. Rather, it would imply that the French should have been able to cope better. They were not. quote: Unquestionably Georges, Bilotte, and Blanchard all dropped the ball hard - but then again, if I was in their position - being able to look at a map and realize that the war has been lost before it began - who knows, I might have a breakdown and become useless. If you had had the same training, in particular. That's part of my point. quote: Material - well, the 37mm tank guns blew, but of course the 47s were beautiful, the 25s were adequate, the tank armour was unmatched. We all know the flaws with the turrets and radio. French tanks also tended to have less endurance (i.e. miles on a single tank of petrol) than the German, as I recall. Obviously, if your supply chain is shot to hell, this leads to lots of abandoned tanks. The armour doesn't matter if there's no-one inside. The designs, though, were a result of the specificatios issues, which in turn were a result of the doctrine. The French could have produced faster, lighter tanks if they'd wanted them. quote: That's why I think that a retired and reactive French disposition - that trades the small countries for time and possibly a slower campaign pace once the main combatants lock horns - gives the French their best chance. It gives the French a shot at surviving that first attack without losing all their best troops. The Germans, though, are still going to be able to deliver a fatal blow at some point in 1940. quote: As someone or other - Gunsburg or Young - mentioned, the Maginot line was in some ways beautiful. Bloch and others have derided the French for putting money into concrete when they could have put it in tank divisions - but then again, tank divisions fielded in 1935-7 would have been obsolete Panzer-I/II wastes of tank crews in a long French campaign, I hate to point it out but a) the French were building R-35s and H-35s in 1935-7 and b) a large chunk of their tank force was using the far more obsolete FT-17. The Pz-II was a nifty little thing provided it didn't come up against any enemy armour, and exactly what the Germans needed for 1940. The Maginot line made sense given French doctrine and strategy. However those underlying principles were at fault from the first. It didn't have to be this way. It was Weygand before his initial retirement who set out a clear plan for producing a highly professional, mechanised force as the core of the French army. This was rejected. Sorry for breaking this up into so many points. Let me know if it bothers you.

golden delicious -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/26/2007 6:10:23 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Graymane The problem that I see with altering the French dispositions too much is that the Germans must also be allowed to alter their dispositions. I agree that this has to be done- but it's not really a problem. In fact it allows us to model the better use the Germans seem to have made of the available intelligence. quote: At the end of the day, I don't think there is any disposition that makes it such that the Germans lose. The aim of the French (the victory conditions) must be to hold a strong line and turn the conflict into trench warfare for a long, drawn-out campaign. Mm. Moreover, said defensive line has to be in front of the key industrial areas of Pas de Calais and Alsace-Lorraine. Otherwise Germany may still be able to outbuild the Allies.

jtownsend2k -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/26/2007 10:56:06 PM)
Greymane: I agree. I'm not sure to what extent the Germans had -exact- information; eg, were they 100% positive the French hadn't made much better provisions for tree demolition? Did they know the 3rd Army cavalry would be going forward? But if you give the French all these theatre options it'd be pretty unconscionable to leave the Germans stuck with the Manstein Plan. quote: Yet (as I recall) several hundred anti-tank guns were put beyond use in a Communist sabotage attack during the Phoney War. My point isn't that there weren't political divisions; and the 'revisionist' (ie, France-boosting) historiography works best for say November 38-November 39. After that there is a school of thought (Talbot Imlay for one) that thinks the French started having political problems again, and that was reflected in some of the screwy strategic planning that went on. I don't see it as being very decisive, though, and I'm not all that impressed with some of Imlay's special pleading. quote: So was the BEF- yet Gort reacted cooly and correctly to the situation and got everything out that could be got out. Again, see the reaction of the Poles to their situation a week or two after the start of the war- they at least tried to fight. Obviously, armies are capable of taking this kind of shock and dealing with it. I think there's no question British commanders showed more sang-froid - but they knew there was a channel there. Even allowing for the fact that they were notably less panicky, they weren't exactly falling back in disarray from the Battle of the Thames with England lying naked before the panzers, either. Plus, Gort... for all that he saved the BEF and displayed sang froid, he was also an unquestionably bad choice for his old job as CIGS and his new job as CinC of the BEF. Ironside was also out of his depth, and I think that's part of why Britain needs to take some blame for not having a more robust involvement in army planning and averting the horrible disposition errors. Lots of sang-froid, but what else did Ironside and Gort bring to the table? I'm not trying to be unkind, just fair. quote: I don't see how it supports your argument, though. Rather, it would imply that the French should have been able to cope better. They were not. The point is to emphasize the unused, untested quality of those parts of the French Army which were, unlike the Series B divisions, not starved of talent. The immediate - and permanent - contact between the cream of Army Group A and the dregs of the French army (and then reinforcements which were always piecemeal) is a poor laboratory test of any army's performance. What of Gazala? Kasserine? Indicators of Anglo-American defeatism, legacy of political division and the spectre of the great war? France just had its Gazala/Kasserine/etc in the wrong place. quote: If you had had the same training, in particular. That's part of my point. Well, they went from the expectation of victory one day, to the correct appreciation that their army - still 90% intact - was hopelessly, fatally dislocated beyond hope of redemption. They had failed France, their country was to suffer god knows what under the Nazis. Yes, the Poles fought hard, but surely they were less surprised. I'd chalk it up to their unusual bravery and the harsh nature of recent Polish history sooner than the French being less capable of resistance than the other Western Allies. quote: French tanks also tended to have less endurance (i.e. miles on a single tank of petrol) than the German, as I recall. Obviously, if your supply chain is shot to hell, this leads to lots of abandoned tanks. The armour doesn't matter if there's no-one inside. The designs, though, were a result of the specificatios issues, which in turn were a result of the doctrine. The French could have produced faster, lighter tanks if they'd wanted them. They weren't aiming for Guderian like thrusts, though, and really, should they have been? I ought to have mentioned that in discussing the material weaknesses, along with the lack of auxilliary tracked vehicles like tenders. But had the units themselves not been disorganized and sent in piecemeal when sent in at all, this would hadly be as significant. There's a story about French tankers crying on returning from the northern pocket and seeing 100 of the best new Bs burning, unused. If the war had developed in a less Guderian-like fashion, the greater numbers of heavier tanks might well have trumped the real deficiencies of French armour. After all, it's easy to make the reverse argument; the Germans were insane to send so many precious tank crews forward in machine-gun toting sardine-cans. It served a valuable diversionary purpose in the north, but in a fight in which French strengths rather than weaknesses had been highlighted; like, for example, a renewed German offensive in a less decisive battle of France, they could have resulted in a panzer kindermorden.. quote: It gives the French a shot at surviving that first attack without losing all their best troops. The Germans, though, are still going to be able to deliver a fatal blow at some point in 1940. I never rule this out, in the least, I just don't think the converse can be ruled out either. There are a lot of imponderables the longer the conflict went on; the Allies using their existing air-strength more rationally; and above all, strength being met with strength without the Germans having the sort of 3-1 superiority commanders would like; indeed, Allied superiority in artillery and tank armor could make any attempt at a decisive battle extremely dangerous for the Germans later on, with both sides feeding in force on a roughly equal, more attritional basis. quote: I hate to point it out but a) the French were building R-35s and H-35s in 1935-7 and b) a large chunk of their tank force was using the far more obsolete FT-17. The Pz-II was a nifty little thing provided it didn't come up against any enemy armour, and exactly what the Germans needed for 1940. The point Bloch was making, I believe, is that the French ought to have put the costs of the Maginot fortifications into tanks and aircraft - the counterpoint being that more (as opposed to any) mid-30s tanks and aircraft would not be as useful in 1940 as the Maginot line could have been. In the right circumstances lightly armoured tanks could be very useful, no question, but I'm not talking about the right circumstances, nor do I really agree with optimistic planning; if I were a generalissimo I would prefer not to have a large proportion of my tank crews in vulnerable machines. For all the flaws of the French tank force, it had, spitballing here, about 2000 tanks with armour at or approaching (or exceeding) that of the Panzer III; including some called 'light.' If the Allied battle line hadn't been so glass-jawed, there's in my view no telling what the verdict would be on deep flaws of each tank fleet. quote: The Maginot line made sense given French doctrine and strategy. However those underlying principles were at fault from the first. It didn't have to be this way. It was Weygand before his initial retirement who set out a clear plan for producing a highly professional, mechanised force as the core of the French army. This was rejected. Martin Alexander has made a pretty good case for Gamelin in fact being a splendid modernizer of the French Army; certainly the material results were excellent. Weygand, de Gaulle and Reynaud might, if anything, have hurt Gamelin's efforts by politicizing the nature of army modernization; the SFIO and Radicals didn't want a right wing army de metier invading places and staging coups, but good old subfusc and supposedly 'republican' Gamelin just kept under the radar, leaving the French army more mechanized and with more, heavier materiel than the next-door neighbors in spite of France having 1/3rd the industrial plant. quote: Sorry for breaking this up into so many points. Let me know if it bothers you. I'm used to forum-warrioring. I don't quite understand how the quote nesting works so I'm just using simple quotes. I don't think our views are extremely far apart on this subject at any rate. We're just differing on an inherently hazy counterfactual.

82nd Airborne -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/26/2007 11:49:30 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Der Oberst Folks, There have been a huge number of WW2 scenarios built for this game. Some very good ones! My question to the community is: What other WW2 scenarios would you like to see? I've got some time and interest to begin building something, and would like to work on something the community sees as having value. Any ideas or thoughts? a better Patton vs Russia / West vs Russia May 45

Telumar -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/27/2007 12:23:58 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: 82nd Airborne quote: ORIGINAL: Der Oberst Folks, There have been a huge number of WW2 scenarios built for this game. Some very good ones! My question to the community is: What other WW2 scenarios would you like to see? I've got some time and interest to begin building something, and would like to work on something the community sees as having value. Any ideas or thoughts? a better Patton vs Russia / West vs Russia May 45 There is already one in the making, look here.

golden delicious -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/29/2007 4:28:50 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: jtownsend2k My point isn't that there weren't political divisions; and the 'revisionist' (ie, France-boosting) historiography works best for say November 38-November 39. After that there is a school of thought (Talbot Imlay for one) that thinks the French started having political problems again, and that was reflected in some of the screwy strategic planning that went on. I don't see it as being very decisive, though, and I'm not all that impressed with some of Imlay's special pleading. Mm. Where I see French political problems as coming into play is with the politicians in late May through June. The option of fighting the war tooth and nail was there- but it would have allowed the left to gain the upper hand in French society and no doubt would have had repercussions for the Empire. Instead the French decided to make peace and focus on the enemy within. quote: I think there's no question British commanders showed more sang-froid - but they knew there was a channel there. Even allowing for the fact that they were notably less panicky, they weren't exactly falling back in disarray from the Battle of the Thames with England lying naked before the panzers, either. Plus, Gort... for all that he saved the BEF and displayed sang froid, he was also an unquestionably bad choice for his old job as CIGS and his new job as CinC of the BEF. Ironside was also out of his depth, and I think that's part of why Britain needs to take some blame for not having a more robust involvement in army planning and averting the horrible disposition errors. Well, we represented about 10% of the Allied army. How much influence do you think we had? Moreover it had been British policy since about 1915 to let the French have overall command on their own soil. Ultimately, Britain's borders lay on the Rhine. We had to accept French strategic perogatives or else risk a split in the alliance. As to whether Gort was the right choice, I don't really know who the possible alternatives where. Suggesting O'Connor, Montgomery or Slim isn't much good- obviously these men's talents weren't known at the time. Gort at least had the virtue of being optimistic (upon seeing all the glum faces at his newly-formed HQ, he remarked "I suppose I can't expect everyone to be as enthusiastic as I am"). quote: The point is to emphasize the unused, untested quality of those parts of the French Army which were, unlike the Series B divisions, not starved of talent. The immediate - and permanent - contact between the cream of Army Group A and the dregs of the French army (and then reinforcements which were always piecemeal) is a poor laboratory test of any army's performance. Yet the French armies that moved into Flanders didn't do much better. Gort found himself attacking the German flank alone. The troops at Lille surrendered in 24 hours. The force driving into Holland was driven back not by stiff ground resistance, but by air attack. quote: What of Gazala? Kasserine? Indicators of Anglo-American defeatism, legacy of political division and the spectre of the great war? France just had its Gazala/Kasserine/etc in the wrong place. There is something in this- that armies tended to do rather badly the first time they encountered the Wehrmacht. Yet you should bear in mind that this was the British Army's first time too. Divisions which had not existed until September at least stood and fought as formed entities- if not very effectively. Long-standing French reserve formations often failed to even do that. quote: Well, they went from the expectation of victory one day, to the correct appreciation that their army - still 90% intact - was hopelessly, fatally dislocated beyond hope of redemption. It was only hopelessly, fatally dislocated according to their doctrine. Another staff would have taken a shot at getting it out. Of course with the same army they might have failed. quote: They weren't aiming for Guderian like thrusts, though, and really, should they have been? No. But the whole point is that French doctrine was built on the idea of the "methodical battle", where everything would proceed according to a predefined plan- so why bother to ensure your tanks can fight for three days without resupply? This is a fundamentally flawed concept. quote: If the war had developed in a less Guderian-like fashion, the greater numbers of heavier tanks might well have trumped the real deficiencies of French armour. Perhaps; but the French should have been able to see this wasn't going to happen. Not after Poland. Instead we got "We are not Poles. It could not happen here." quote: I never rule this out, in the least, I just don't think the converse can be ruled out either. There are a lot of imponderables the longer the conflict went on; the Allies using their existing air-strength more rationally; There's this notion that the French had vast, unused air legions. I'm not convinced of it- and in any case none of their fighter aircraft were a match for the Me-109, and their most modern types were not available in much quantity until 1941. Of course, British fighter production boomed in late 1940 (exceeding Germany's), but we were unable to produce enough trained pilots for them. I think Germany will retain air superiority throughout the year. It may fall off, but the Allies face an uphill struggle to regain the air battlefield. quote: The point Bloch was making, I believe, is that the French ought to have put the costs of the Maginot fortifications into tanks and aircraft - the counterpoint being that more (as opposed to any) mid-30s tanks and aircraft would not be as useful in 1940 as the Maginot line could have been. I think you're missing the point especially when it comes to aircraft. The French grossly neglected their air industry. Extra investment in the early to mid 30s would have had a huge impact by 1940. quote: For all the flaws of the French tank force, it had, spitballing here, about 2000 tanks with armour at or approaching (or exceeding) that of the Panzer III; including some called 'light.' If the Allied battle line hadn't been so glass-jawed, there's in my view no telling what the verdict would be on deep flaws of each tank fleet. This assuming that tanks are intended to fight tanks. That's not the case- anti-tank guns are for fighting tanks. Tanks are for screwing around with your enemy's lines of communication. quote: Martin Alexander has made a pretty good case for Gamelin in fact being a splendid modernizer of the French Army; certainly the material results were excellent. Weygand, de Gaulle and Reynaud might, if anything, have hurt Gamelin's efforts by politicizing the nature of army modernization; the SFIO and Radicals didn't want a right wing army de metier invading places and staging coups, but good old subfusc and supposedly 'republican' Gamelin just kept under the radar, leaving the French army more mechanized and with more, heavier materiel than the next-door neighbors in spite of France having 1/3rd the industrial plant. France had the experience. She had built thousands of tanks between 1917 and 1924. Germany had built about a dozen. This goes a long way to explaining their ability to build so many in the 30s. France also had a stronger motor industry, I believe. The expansion of Germany's motorised forces for Barbarossa was largely done with French trucks. quote: I'm used to forum-warrioring. I don't quite understand how the quote nesting works so I'm just using simple quotes. I don't think our views are extremely far apart on this subject at any rate. We're just differing on an inherently hazy counterfactual. You're rpobably right.

jtownsend2k -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/30/2007 7:31:17 AM)
quote: Mm. Where I see French political problems as coming into play is with the politicians in late May through June. The option of fighting the war tooth and nail was there- but it would have allowed the left to gain the upper hand in French society and no doubt would have had repercussions for the Empire. Instead the French decided to make peace and focus on the enemy within. Unquestionably the 'psychodrama of the French right" played a role in Bordeaux, but for me, an honour-saving flight of an 'official enough' government to the Empire was close enough to realization; if it weren't for Reynaud's terrible self-inflicted antagonists, he, his durs, and especially Mandel could have done far more than de Gaulle did both to salvage French prestige and to help the war effort go on. (Some, of course, have wondered if further resistance might have led to an entirely new set of allied military disasters in Africa, but at any rate, outside of our scope here. quote: Well, we represented about 10% of the Allied army. How much influence do you think we had? Moreover it had been British policy since about 1915 to let the French have overall command on their own soil. Ultimately, Britain's borders lay on the Rhine. We had to accept French strategic perogatives or else risk a split in the alliance. I don't suggest otherwise; but as Churchill asks at some length in the relevant part of his Second World War, why the devil didn't they know what the plan was, what the reserves would look like? Why didn't they know they didn't know? And part of that is having a 'jovial battalion commander' in charge of the BEF. I hate picking on Gort after he saved civilization and all that, but he certainly wasn't an incipient Napoleon. quote: As to whether Gort was the right choice, I don't really know who the possible alternatives where. Suggesting O'Connor, Montgomery or Slim isn't much good- obviously these men's talents weren't known at the time. Gort at least had the virtue of being optimistic (upon seeing all the glum faces at his newly-formed HQ, he remarked "I suppose I can't expect everyone to be as enthusiastic as I am"). Well, I think Dill was passed over for CIGS both when Gort and Ironside got it, and I think he'd have been meaningfully better than either in that role. As for CiC BEF fair enough; I'm not sure if Wavell or Brooke would even be faintly plausible for that role in 1940. I guess what I'm trying to get at is that even if British commanders were both more effective and more succesful, an element of that is either irrelevant and/or related to circumstances, and Britain wasn't then awash in commanders notably superior to the derided French ones. quote: Yet the French armies that moved into Flanders didn't do much better. Gort found himself attacking the German flank alone. The troops at Lille surrendered in 24 hours. The force driving into Holland was driven back not by stiff ground resistance, but by air attack. Well, "force shock" and "disengagement penalties" happen to everyone; it's impossible to establish what impact the war being over before it began had on subsequent events; the overall strategic map, Eben Emael and the low countries' capitulations could scarcely be conducive to the morale of an army expecting to fight an tough defensive battle that was to be won by a slim margin. All credit for the British for their performance, but there was the channel and the Royal Navy. (Which isn't to say the army commanders didn't expect to be back at grips with the Nazis, but I think it's a meaningful point.) quote: There is something in this- that armies tended to do rather badly the first time they encountered the Wehrmacht. Yet you should bear in mind that this was the British Army's first time too. Divisions which had not existed until September at least stood and fought as formed entities- if not very effectively. Long-standing French reserve formations often failed to even do that. I do not cast any aspersion on the performance of the BEF, its '5 division' check on Rommel and so on. But it did lead something of a charmed life as 10-division bodies of the Allied army of 1940 go. It is true that as a body of multiple troops it can be seen as "100% debacle free" which can't be said of the many French divisions which likewise acquitted themselves well. But there wasn't a whole lot of room for glory or even self respect for most of the badly dislocated allied force. quote: It was only hopelessly, fatally dislocated according to their doctrine. Another staff would have taken a shot at getting it out. Of course with the same army they might have failed. I think they would have. I mean, we shouldn't conceive of the 'clotting' and 'continuous line' doctrines as being such shackles; the real shackle was that the reserve formations were not nearly numerically or materially adequate to the task of 'colmattage,' let alone the prescribed counterattack. And the 'checkerboard'/'box defence' approaches were already doctrinally sanctioned before the defeat; in my view the problem is that there's nothing that can maneuver effectively in front of Army Group A (barring, again, the inexplicably lacking staff planning for moving Army Group 2 Northwest). So for me, it's less about the doctrine and more about the inability (with existing dispositions and the blind eye to the flexibility of the Maginot interval forces) to make any doctrine work. Certainly there is something faintly discreditable about not trying to do the impossible... But that's probably just the anglo-saxon roastbeef talking? ;) quote: No. But the whole point is that French doctrine was built on the idea of the "methodical battle", where everything would proceed according to a predefined plan- so why bother to ensure your tanks can fight for three days without resupply? This is a fundamentally flawed concept. Arguably, so is the chimerical pursuit of The Decisive Kickass Armoured Breakthrough and Exploitation. We make fun of WWI cavalrymen, we make fun of Soviet blitzkrieg tanker fantasies, but Guderian gets a walk because, well, he happened to make it <i>work.</i> Again, I can't see 'methodical battle' as being decisive when 'super improvised, low-level initiative, task-oriented commands' would also have had sweet FA in terms of forms corps of men to throw at Army Group A. If anything, violations of methodical battle doctrine - infantry commanders chucking in tanks the moment they saw them, the dribbling in of forces peacemeal - typified some of the disastrous early mistakes. I can see the point that some of the cautious Meuse decisions to delay attacks near Hout and Sedan might be laid at the feet of methodical battle, but alternatively we can just call that lack of command nerve - no shortage of that in the German command, 'progressive doctrine' or not, it just didn't have decisive effects until Dunkirk. quote: Perhaps; but the French should have been able to see this wasn't going to happen. Not after Poland. Instead we got "We are not Poles. It could not happen here." There was some of that; but every army has blustering, conservative fools. There were also changes made, information disseminated, and tank formations prioritized. The revisionist literature is pretty hard on the "Poland ignored" thesis, which seems to rest more on some idiot quotations than analysis. quote: There's this notion that the French had vast, unused air legions. I'm not convinced of it- and in any case none of their fighter aircraft were a match for the Me-109, and their most modern types were not available in much quantity until 1941. Of course, British fighter production boomed in late 1940 (exceeding Germany's), but we were unable to produce enough trained pilots for them. I think Germany will retain air superiority throughout the year. It may fall off, but the Allies face an uphill struggle to regain the air battlefield. I don't think they even could, Allied air strength was only 'superior' with the empires counted, which is a silly way to do the tally, especially for Britain. The French case is less an 'unusued legion' than it is 'chaos during the decisive hours, and the usual dog's breakfast after the war was effectively lost in a week." It's quite possible that committing the whole RAF - while intrinsically vastly smarter in a Clausewitzian sense than just having them guard against the phantom blitz - would just have gotten the RAF decimated, and thus a new dark age, made darker and etc. However; in the event this becomes a long war the allied air production - which was impressive - becomes much more important than the disorder and stupidity that typified the airpower usage of both Allies in May 1940. quote: I think you're missing the point especially when it comes to aircraft. The French grossly neglected their air industry. Extra investment in the early to mid 30s would have had a huge impact by 1940. I think 'missing the point' is a bit strong; I'd say rather that that is an area that could have benefited more, earlier. I think in terms of 'lucky bargain' the Maginot line is still better than "more tanks built in the Maginot line construction period rather than the "Maginot line." Given the disparities in ground forces between Germany and France the Maginot Line was money well spent, and then a good purchase wasted. Additionally, part of the problem wasn't just that there wasn't enough money going into aircraft; it was that there was a severe lack of coherence to 1930s French air force philosophy. I'd point to Robert Young's “The Strategic Dream: French Air Doctrine in the Inter-war period, 1919-1939.” Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 9 No. 4 (1974): 57-76. and Harvey, A.D. “The French Armée de l’Air in May 1940: A Failure of Conception.” Journal of Contemporary History. Vol. 25 No. 4 (1990) 447-465. (I copied and pasted the bibliographical entries since just dropping the names would be pretty useless. I don't mean to suddenly get all 'formal' all of a sudden) quote: This assuming that tanks are intended to fight tanks. That's not the case- anti-tank guns are for fighting tanks. Tanks are for screwing around with your enemy's lines of communication. I'm happier with them mentally pigeon-holed in a multi-role fashion, for any given post-WWI era. (As opposed to a more 'indirect approach' single-role conception.) Armour plate, firepower, mobility, engages tanks, engages fortifications, engages infantry... there might be a future in these tank things.

golden delicious -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/30/2007 1:15:53 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: jtownsend2k Unquestionably the 'psychodrama of the French right" played a role in Bordeaux, but for me, an honour-saving flight of an 'official enough' government to the Empire was close enough to realization; if it weren't for Reynaud's terrible self-inflicted antagonists, he, his durs, and especially Mandel could have done far more than de Gaulle did both to salvage French prestige and to help the war effort go on. There was obviously enough doubt for it not to happen. quote: Well, I think Dill was passed over for CIGS both when Gort and Ironside got it, and I think he'd have been meaningfully better than either in that role. As for CiC BEF fair enough; I'm not sure if Wavell or Brooke would even be faintly plausible for that role in 1940. I don't really know enough about the talents of Dill or Brooke as operational commanders. Both would have been better choices for CIGS, I agree, though I'm not sure just how much difference this would have made in May and June. Wavell was not particularly impressive in North Africa. quote: I guess what I'm trying to get at is that even if British commanders were both more effective and more succesful, an element of that is either irrelevant and/or related to circumstances, and Britain wasn't then awash in commanders notably superior to the derided French ones. Well, they were at least prepared to do something. As Rommel noted, any decision is better than no decision. I'd say this is a marked improvement over the French system which encouraged commanders at low and intermediate levels to just wait for orders. quote: I think they would have. I mean, we shouldn't conceive of the 'clotting' and 'continuous line' doctrines as being such shackles; the real shackle was that the reserve formations were not nearly numerically or materially adequate to the task of 'colmattage,' let alone the prescribed counterattack. I'm not convinced. SHQ had thirteen infantry divisions. One was motorised, one Polish (and therefore experienced), four North African (which tended to be good troops) and five of the remaining seven numbered less than 30e. This on top of the two forming DCRs. Then there's the around 35 divisions available to 2e and 3e Groupments des Armees, excluding fortress troops and various brigades. quote: And the 'checkerboard'/'box defence' approaches were already doctrinally sanctioned before the defeat; in my view the problem is that there's nothing that can maneuver effectively in front of Army Group A (barring, again, the inexplicably lacking staff planning for moving Army Group 2 Northwest). I'd suggest that the reason for the lack of such planning was the tacit acceptance that in a situation where such a move was called for, it would be time to throw in the towel anyway. quote: Arguably, so is the chimerical pursuit of The Decisive Kickass Armoured Breakthrough and Exploitation. We make fun of WWI cavalrymen, we make fun of Soviet blitzkrieg tanker fantasies, but Guderian gets a walk because, well, he happened to make it <i>work.</i> The battle that was actually fought was an extreme example of type. Even if the Germans had been more cautious than they were, there was still going to be a mobile battle fought. Whole divisions and corps were going to be cut off from their supply lines. Further, this should have been pretty clear. Apart from the example of Poland, German doctrine was just a natural progression of what they had been doing in 1918. quote: If anything, violations of methodical battle doctrine - infantry commanders chucking in tanks the moment they saw them, the dribbling in of forces peacemeal - typified some of the disastrous early mistakes. The reason they stand out is because nothing else was done. The middle-level commanders were not producing the orders that would co-ordinate significant actions because they were waiting for their own orders from above. quote: There was some of that; but every army has blustering, conservative fools. True. This particular blustering, conservative fool was overall commander of the French army. quote: There were also changes made, information disseminated, and tank formations prioritized. The revisionist literature is pretty hard on the "Poland ignored" thesis, which seems to rest more on some idiot quotations than analysis. Two of the three DLMs were already formed before Poland, and the DCRs were being planned throughout 1938 and 1939- None were formed until January 1940. Anyway, forming armoured divisions- particularly of the DCR pattern which were grossly short on infantry and fairly so on artillery- didn't make up for the lack of preparations to meet the new style of warfare. Again, one doesn't deal with panzer divisions just by throwing in panzer divisions of one's own. quote: I don't think they even could, Allied air strength was only 'superior' with the empires counted, which is a silly way to do the tally, especially for Britain. The French case is less an 'unusued legion' than it is 'chaos during the decisive hours, and the usual dog's breakfast after the war was effectively lost in a week." It's quite possible that committing the whole RAF - while intrinsically vastly smarter in a Clausewitzian sense than just having them guard against the phantom blitz - would just have gotten the RAF decimated, and thus a new dark age, made darker and etc. However; in the event this becomes a long war the allied air production - which was impressive - becomes much more important than the disorder and stupidity that typified the airpower usage of both Allies in May 1940. See the shortage of trained pilots. Looking at the comparative air strengths, what stands out is just how many, many thousands of trainers the Luftwaffe had. They were producing more pilots than they had machines for by the Battle of Britain. The reverse was the case for the Allies. quote: I think 'missing the point' is a bit strong; I'd say rather that that is an area that could have benefited more, earlier. I think in terms of 'lucky bargain' the Maginot line is still better than "more tanks built in the Maginot line construction period rather than the "Maginot line." Given the disparities in ground forces between Germany and France the Maginot Line was money well spent, and then a good purchase wasted. You're probably right that the Maginot Line at least should have been more value than the equivalent in extra tanks; the reverse thesis relies on the theory that the French didn't have enough of the latter, which we know to be false. The trouble is that in the event, the French failed to make proper use of the Maginot Line until they had already lost the battle in Flanders, leaving far to large a force fixed behind it. quote: Additionally, part of the problem wasn't just that there wasn't enough money going into aircraft; it was that there was a severe lack of coherence to 1930s French air force philosophy. That's true- but I think the multiplace de combat concept would have seemed like less of a dismal failure if the French had been able to produce enough good single-engined fighters to cover them in action. Other armies had success with fighter-bomber aircraft in conditions of air superiority. quote: I'm happier with them mentally pigeon-holed in a multi-role fashion, for any given post-WWI era. (As opposed to a more 'indirect approach' single-role conception.) Armour plate, firepower, mobility, engages tanks, engages fortifications, engages infantry... there might be a future in these tank things. Mobility is the thing. For firepower, you have artillery and airpower. Our ideas do seem to be converging somewhat. There were a couple of paragraphs there that I could pass over without comment...

golden delicious -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/30/2007 1:22:33 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: jtownsend2k Some, of course, have wondered if further resistance might have led to an entirely new set of allied military disasters in Africa, but at any rate, outside of our scope here. It would at least have the virue of offering us some interesting hypothetical scenarios. Obviously if Germany gets her hands on Bizerte the Allies are going to be in a tight spot. Moreover such a move would probably see German troops in Africa four or five months earlier than they arrived historically.

Graymane -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/30/2007 5:15:16 PM)
Maybe you two could summarize your positions without quoting each sentence individually, it is getting darn hard to follow the train of thought here =)

a white rabbit -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/30/2007 5:58:42 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: golden delicious quote: ORIGINAL: a white rabbit ..sorry Ben, it all hinges on Dinant, if the French had kept the 1st class 1st Div there then, mmmm, game on but to replace it with the rubbish x div (i can't remember and i did the scen arghhh[X(]), and then only a couple of days before the German attack.. ..that attack slit the throat of the Dyle plan.. Well a) if the battle was so important, finish your damned scenario on it. and b) the vast bulk of the German panzer force went through on the crossings to the south, and Dinant could have been taken in the flank from there. ..i would finish but, gotta a few native types to look after ol' man, y'know how it is , , th' Empire, a white man's burden an' all that.. ..otherwise, Sedan ?..mmm, it would have meant " game on", nothing more..

golden delicious -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/30/2007 6:33:56 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Graymane Maybe you two could summarize your positions Well here's the main argument; I believe French doctrine, which was to a large extent a consequence of the French nation's experience of the First World War, led to their inability to cope with a mobile battle, and that this would have been their downfall even if the initial German blow had been less devastating. jtownend2k puts more emphasis on a failure of dispositions and plans. It's not a radical disagreement. We just disagree of the relative importance of factors.

golden delicious -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/30/2007 6:37:29 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: a white rabbit ..i would finish but, gotta a few native types to look after ol' man, y'know how it is , , th' Empire, a white man's burden an' all that.. ..otherwise, Sedan ?..mmm, it would have meant " game on", nothing more.. I really doubt that holding at Dinant would have enabled France to react. As it was, there was nil southward effort from 1er Groupment des Armees, with the exception of the BEF.

a white rabbit -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/30/2007 6:47:44 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Graymane Maybe you two could summarize your positions without quoting each sentence individually, it is getting darn hard to follow the train of thought here =) ..[:D]..

a white rabbit -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/30/2007 7:06:57 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: golden delicious quote: ORIGINAL: a white rabbit ..i would finish but, gotta a few native types to look after ol' man, y'know how it is , , th' Empire, a white man's burden an' all that.. ..otherwise, Sedan ?..mmm, it would have meant " game on", nothing more.. I really doubt that holding at Dinant would have enabled France to react. As it was, there was nil southward effort from 1er Groupment des Armees, with the exception of the BEF. ..oh pls, Sedan without Dinant was an isolated thrust, yup the rubbish in Sedan would have followed the historical, but then ? a few klcks into France, nothing more.. ..the 'neck of the chicken' was Dinant, the German's knew this, had the French not put rubbish in place just before the attack* i consider it would have held, so no Rommel advance to the ports, no Dunkirk, with as a result, another 14/18 style trench system.. ..* as in they were still taking up positions when the Germans attacked, a B class div, under TOE and under trained...

jtownsend2k -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/30/2007 10:19:58 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: golden delicious quote: ORIGINAL: Graymane Maybe you two could summarize your positions Well here's the main argument; I believe French doctrine, which was to a large extent a consequence of the French nation's experience of the First World War, led to their inability to cope with a mobile battle, and that this would have been their downfall even if the initial German blow had been less devastating. jtownend2k puts more emphasis on a failure of dispositions and plans. It's not a radical disagreement. We just disagree of the relative importance of factors. Works for me. I also tend to differ somewhat on a lot of the imponderable value judgements.

golden delicious -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/31/2007 12:26:18 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: a white rabbit ..oh pls, Sedan without Dinant was an isolated thrust, An "isolated thrust" that contained the vast majority of the German mechanised force. Dinant was two panzer and one motorised divisions, as I recall. Sedan was the biggie. The French, in any case, were unable to react. What does it matter if the German spearhead is vulnerable to being cut off if the French make no attempt to do so? It was vulnerable as it was. Nothing happened. quote: ** a B class div, under TOE and under trained... Great excuse. Funny that the 3. and 4. Wave German divisions didn't do as badly.

golden delicious -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/31/2007 12:28:46 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: jtownsend2k Works for me. I also tend to differ somewhat on a lot of the imponderable value judgements. The trouble with intangible factors is that they can be very important. As humans we don't like them and would rather deal in concrete facts (hence the popular misconception of the awesomely powerful German panzer force). But this often conceals the truth.

a white rabbit -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/31/2007 1:05:43 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: golden delicious quote: ORIGINAL: a white rabbit ..oh pls, Sedan without Dinant was an isolated thrust, An "isolated thrust" that contained the vast majority of the German mechanised force. Dinant was two panzer and one motorised divisions, as I recall. Sedan was the biggie. The French, in any case, were unable to react. What does it matter if the German spearhead is vulnerable to being cut off if the French make no attempt to do so? It was vulnerable as it was. Nothing happened. quote: ** a B class div, under TOE and under trained... Great excuse. Funny that the 3. and 4. Wave German divisions didn't do as badly. ..nope, Sedan was "a" biggie, it was expected to be a real bitch hence the troops alloted to it, but then what, or rather "where" ? taking it was only flank protection and part of the isolation, then destruction of the Allies in Belgium ( that you would destroy etc- iGo maxim [:)]).. ..2 panzer, 1 mtrsd, 3 or 4 infantry with air on call and added artillery, on a point attack, s'alot to take some unimportant little town held by one division... ..B class french-style, expected and designed to hold already entrenched positions on quiet sections of the front, ..err that they were even worse than that is part of the rot in the french military of the period..

golden delicious -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/31/2007 1:46:26 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: a white rabbit ..nope, Sedan was "a" biggie, it was expected to be a real bitch hence the troops alloted to it, That's nonsense. The reason the panzer divisions were mostly committed to Sedan was because that was where the Schwerepunkt was to be delivered. If heavy resistance was expected they would have bypassed the spot. quote: ..2 panzer, 1 mtrsd, 3 or 4 infantry with air on call and added artillery, on a point attack, s'alot to take some unimportant little town held by one division... It of course adds weight to the German offensive. Of course in light of events we know the French were too paralysed to do anything regardless of whether the German flank was north or south of Dinant.

a white rabbit -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/31/2007 3:29:03 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: golden delicious quote: ORIGINAL: a white rabbit ..nope, Sedan was "a" biggie, it was expected to be a real bitch hence the troops alloted to it, That's nonsense. The reason the panzer divisions were mostly committed to Sedan was because that was where the Schwerepunkt was to be delivered. If heavy resistance was expected they would have bypassed the spot. quote: ..2 panzer, 1 mtrsd, 3 or 4 infantry with air on call and added artillery, on a point attack, s'alot to take some unimportant little town held by one division... It of course adds weight to the German offensive. Of course in light of events we know the French were too paralysed to do anything regardless of whether the German flank was north or south of Dinant. ..Sedan..come on, it was a fortress, in theory anyway, and also a major bridging point, bypassing was not an option if only cos of a lack of bridges elsewhere, it had to be taken and held. The proof is that it was Rommel from Dinant that did the dash to the Channel, not the forces at Sedan.. ..as to French paralysis, sorry, you can't generalise, some mobile divs did well, others lousy, the armoured div (3rd ?)coming from the south did it in unrealistic but just justifiable stages so arrived too late at Sedan to change things, a few days earlier and those German tanks would have been wiped from the map by the Char bis1s of a very good div. ..pls forgive the technical errors, i gave my personal library to my commune before i leaving Europe, now they have possibly one of the best Indochine reference sections in France..sighhh* ..* s'ok, the next one , basically on the military history of Mindanao is already under construction, a white man's burden, educating the natives, right.....

golden delicious -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/31/2007 5:15:37 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: a white rabbit ..Sedan..come on, it was a fortress, in theory anyway, It was a fortress in 1870. In 1940 it was not. quote: The proof is that it was Rommel from Dinant that did the dash to the Channel, not the forces at Sedan.. You're wrong; http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/ww2%20europe/ww2%20europe%20pages/ww2%20europe%20map%2012.htm See where it says "Rommel"? See how it's not moving toward the Channel? quote: ..as to French paralysis, sorry, you can't generalise, some mobile divs did well, others lousy, Well that's just it; there was no organisation. Very little was done- and what was, only on a small scale. quote: a few days earlier and those German tanks would have been wiped from the map by the Char bis1s of a very good div. Well, leaving aside that the Germans would have pulled their tanks back and drawn the B1s onto their anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns (as was done to great effect at Arras), 3ieme DCR was NOT "a very good div". From "France 1940something"; Units lacking in cohesion, divisional staff untried, 42e BCC only two companies strong, no divisional AT battery, no engineer company, no supply or recovery tractors, 50% shortfall of infantry fighting vehicles, large shortfall of radios.

Graymane -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/31/2007 5:54:50 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: golden delicious quote: ORIGINAL: Graymane Maybe you two could summarize your positions Well here's the main argument; I believe French doctrine, which was to a large extent a consequence of the French nation's experience of the First World War, led to their inability to cope with a mobile battle, and that this would have been their downfall even if the initial German blow had been less devastating. jtownend2k puts more emphasis on a failure of dispositions and plans. It's not a radical disagreement. We just disagree of the relative importance of factors. Thank you =) I agree with your assessment. France winning WWI and the losses they took doing it instilled a deep desire to never repeat it again. Everything from planned battles, to the Maginot line, to using armor to support infantry to concentration on doctrines of defense all contribute to a siege mentality. Even the desire to overload the left wing and take the fight into Belgium is simply a desire to not fight on French soil. I tend to think that the failures attributed to dispositions and plans are simply a part of the problems described above. Something along the lines of proximate versus ultimate causes. Analyzing the troops, equipment, dispositions and other aspects of the purely technical side of the campaign shows that the French fighting forces themselves weren't really all that bad. But divorcing that analysis from the fact that the higher and mid-level commands were suffering from a siege mentality and victor's disease can lead one to believe that simply changing the dispositions and a few commanders here and there would change the outcome. I also note that the English suffered from victor's disease as did everyone else pretty much. I think it is manifested in the old boy network of the high command between the wars. I think it is also manifested in the German High Command for good and ill. We all know that it was the younger generation commanders that were so keen on a new kind of warfare and the extent of the fights that people like Manstein and Guderian had to fight to get their ideas modestly accepted. People talk about what France could have done if the dispositions were different? I like to think, what could Germany have done if their higher command had believed in their new kind of warfare more than they did? There were numerous times in the French campaign when higher commands froze the spearheads (and other units as well). It is highly likely and quite possible it would have been all over in the same timeframe as Poland with the loss of the BEF if the Germans wouldn't have put the breaks on the campaign at certain critical times. I think that outside of manstein, guderian and a few others, the rapid success of the germans in France was just as big of a shock to the germans. They just adjusted to it more quickly.

golden delicious -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/31/2007 6:09:23 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Graymane Even the desire to overload the left wing and take the fight into Belgium is simply a desire to not fight on French soil. Yeah. It was even overtly expressed by some politicians as a reason for holding on the frontiers. People are reluctant to admit to visceral motivations. When they do, it means they're pretty strong. quote: I also note that the English suffered from victor's disease as did everyone else pretty much. Yeah. We were certainly expecting a fairly static war. Hence all these 12" guns we brought over with the BEF. Hence Churchill busying himself with a design for a machine to assault trench systems with ("Cultivator No. 6"). However the psychological effect of the First World War on Britain had been less catastrophic than in France, largely because the proportionate dead must have been only about 60% of what France suffered. quote: I think it is manifested in the old boy network of the high command between the wars. I think it is also manifested in the German High Command for good and ill. Well, both armies were dominated by the aristocracy in 1914. One can't expect an overnight transition. Hence the Wehrmacht still had plenty of 'von's even when it was controlled by a socialist dictator. quote: I like to think, what could Germany have done if their higher command had believed in their new kind of warfare more than they did? There were numerous times in the French campaign when higher commands froze the spearheads (and other units as well). It is highly likely and quite possible it would have been all over in the same timeframe as Poland with the loss of the BEF if the Germans wouldn't have put the breaks on the campaign at certain critical times. I doubt the French could have been defeated any more quickly, since it really was necessary to bring stuff forward to the Somme before attacking the new line. However the BEF could certainly have been harried if not actually destroyed. Quite what the ultimate impact of this is not quite clear. Would Britain have come to terms without the nine divisions saved at Dunkirk? I'm not convinced. Certainly no Sealion could be attempted; the Germans still cannot protect their forces sufficiently during the crossing. Perhaps General Student's scheme for an airborne descent in June could have been attempted. This would have been dicey, however; whilst ill-equipped and under-trained, there were still nearly twenty divisions in Britain, including five which would have been combat ready at this time (1st and 2nd Armoured, 43rd Wessex, 52nd Lowland and 1st Canadian).

a white rabbit -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/31/2007 7:27:15 PM)
..thanks for the info/sources.. ..no worries, Ben, it's what we're here for...so we can undertand why/how/what.. ..personaly i still think the bad man (+Devil)+ had a hand in it, just too many f*k ups in the early war, but i may be just have taken too many mind -altering substances....

Graymane -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (2/1/2007 3:31:35 PM)
I really believe Sealion is at most a pipe dream. I really don't see Hitler ever allowing it to come off given his own understanding, beliefs and feelings about the English in an abstract sense (yes, he did bombing and rockets till the end of the war). Also given his strategic aims, I don't believe he ever thought of the west as anything more than a distraction as his eyes lay always on the east, the decisive theatre.

Page: << < prev 2 3 4 [5] 6 next > >>

Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

0.703125