jtownsend2k -> RE: What WW2 Scenario Would We Like? (1/30/2007 7:31:17 AM)
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Mm. Where I see French political problems as coming into play is with the politicians in late May through June. The option of fighting the war tooth and nail was there- but it would have allowed the left to gain the upper hand in French society and no doubt would have had repercussions for the Empire. Instead the French decided to make peace and focus on the enemy within. Unquestionably the 'psychodrama of the French right" played a role in Bordeaux, but for me, an honour-saving flight of an 'official enough' government to the Empire was close enough to realization; if it weren't for Reynaud's terrible self-inflicted antagonists, he, his durs, and especially Mandel could have done far more than de Gaulle did both to salvage French prestige and to help the war effort go on. (Some, of course, have wondered if further resistance might have led to an entirely new set of allied military disasters in Africa, but at any rate, outside of our scope here. quote:
Well, we represented about 10% of the Allied army. How much influence do you think we had? Moreover it had been British policy since about 1915 to let the French have overall command on their own soil. Ultimately, Britain's borders lay on the Rhine. We had to accept French strategic perogatives or else risk a split in the alliance. I don't suggest otherwise; but as Churchill asks at some length in the relevant part of his Second World War, why the devil didn't they know what the plan was, what the reserves would look like? Why didn't they know they didn't know? And part of that is having a 'jovial battalion commander' in charge of the BEF. I hate picking on Gort after he saved civilization and all that, but he certainly wasn't an incipient Napoleon. quote:
As to whether Gort was the right choice, I don't really know who the possible alternatives where. Suggesting O'Connor, Montgomery or Slim isn't much good- obviously these men's talents weren't known at the time. Gort at least had the virtue of being optimistic (upon seeing all the glum faces at his newly-formed HQ, he remarked "I suppose I can't expect everyone to be as enthusiastic as I am"). Well, I think Dill was passed over for CIGS both when Gort and Ironside got it, and I think he'd have been meaningfully better than either in that role. As for CiC BEF fair enough; I'm not sure if Wavell or Brooke would even be faintly plausible for that role in 1940. I guess what I'm trying to get at is that even if British commanders were both more effective and more succesful, an element of that is either irrelevant and/or related to circumstances, and Britain wasn't then awash in commanders notably superior to the derided French ones. quote:
Yet the French armies that moved into Flanders didn't do much better. Gort found himself attacking the German flank alone. The troops at Lille surrendered in 24 hours. The force driving into Holland was driven back not by stiff ground resistance, but by air attack. Well, "force shock" and "disengagement penalties" happen to everyone; it's impossible to establish what impact the war being over before it began had on subsequent events; the overall strategic map, Eben Emael and the low countries' capitulations could scarcely be conducive to the morale of an army expecting to fight an tough defensive battle that was to be won by a slim margin. All credit for the British for their performance, but there was the channel and the Royal Navy. (Which isn't to say the army commanders didn't expect to be back at grips with the Nazis, but I think it's a meaningful point.) quote:
There is something in this- that armies tended to do rather badly the first time they encountered the Wehrmacht. Yet you should bear in mind that this was the British Army's first time too. Divisions which had not existed until September at least stood and fought as formed entities- if not very effectively. Long-standing French reserve formations often failed to even do that. I do not cast any aspersion on the performance of the BEF, its '5 division' check on Rommel and so on. But it did lead something of a charmed life as 10-division bodies of the Allied army of 1940 go. It is true that as a body of multiple troops it can be seen as "100% debacle free" which can't be said of the many French divisions which likewise acquitted themselves well. But there wasn't a whole lot of room for glory or even self respect for most of the badly dislocated allied force. quote:
It was only hopelessly, fatally dislocated according to their doctrine. Another staff would have taken a shot at getting it out. Of course with the same army they might have failed. I think they would have. I mean, we shouldn't conceive of the 'clotting' and 'continuous line' doctrines as being such shackles; the real shackle was that the reserve formations were not nearly numerically or materially adequate to the task of 'colmattage,' let alone the prescribed counterattack. And the 'checkerboard'/'box defence' approaches were already doctrinally sanctioned before the defeat; in my view the problem is that there's nothing that can maneuver effectively in front of Army Group A (barring, again, the inexplicably lacking staff planning for moving Army Group 2 Northwest). So for me, it's less about the doctrine and more about the inability (with existing dispositions and the blind eye to the flexibility of the Maginot interval forces) to make any doctrine work. Certainly there is something faintly discreditable about not trying to do the impossible... But that's probably just the anglo-saxon roastbeef talking? ;) quote:
No. But the whole point is that French doctrine was built on the idea of the "methodical battle", where everything would proceed according to a predefined plan- so why bother to ensure your tanks can fight for three days without resupply? This is a fundamentally flawed concept. Arguably, so is the chimerical pursuit of The Decisive Kickass Armoured Breakthrough and Exploitation. We make fun of WWI cavalrymen, we make fun of Soviet blitzkrieg tanker fantasies, but Guderian gets a walk because, well, he happened to make it <i>work.</i> Again, I can't see 'methodical battle' as being decisive when 'super improvised, low-level initiative, task-oriented commands' would also have had sweet FA in terms of forms corps of men to throw at Army Group A. If anything, violations of methodical battle doctrine - infantry commanders chucking in tanks the moment they saw them, the dribbling in of forces peacemeal - typified some of the disastrous early mistakes. I can see the point that some of the cautious Meuse decisions to delay attacks near Hout and Sedan might be laid at the feet of methodical battle, but alternatively we can just call that lack of command nerve - no shortage of that in the German command, 'progressive doctrine' or not, it just didn't have decisive effects until Dunkirk. quote:
Perhaps; but the French should have been able to see this wasn't going to happen. Not after Poland. Instead we got "We are not Poles. It could not happen here." There was some of that; but every army has blustering, conservative fools. There were also changes made, information disseminated, and tank formations prioritized. The revisionist literature is pretty hard on the "Poland ignored" thesis, which seems to rest more on some idiot quotations than analysis. quote:
There's this notion that the French had vast, unused air legions. I'm not convinced of it- and in any case none of their fighter aircraft were a match for the Me-109, and their most modern types were not available in much quantity until 1941. Of course, British fighter production boomed in late 1940 (exceeding Germany's), but we were unable to produce enough trained pilots for them. I think Germany will retain air superiority throughout the year. It may fall off, but the Allies face an uphill struggle to regain the air battlefield. I don't think they even could, Allied air strength was only 'superior' with the empires counted, which is a silly way to do the tally, especially for Britain. The French case is less an 'unusued legion' than it is 'chaos during the decisive hours, and the usual dog's breakfast after the war was effectively lost in a week." It's quite possible that committing the whole RAF - while intrinsically vastly smarter in a Clausewitzian sense than just having them guard against the phantom blitz - would just have gotten the RAF decimated, and thus a new dark age, made darker and etc. However; in the event this becomes a long war the allied air production - which was impressive - becomes much more important than the disorder and stupidity that typified the airpower usage of both Allies in May 1940. quote:
I think you're missing the point especially when it comes to aircraft. The French grossly neglected their air industry. Extra investment in the early to mid 30s would have had a huge impact by 1940. I think 'missing the point' is a bit strong; I'd say rather that that is an area that could have benefited more, earlier. I think in terms of 'lucky bargain' the Maginot line is still better than "more tanks built in the Maginot line construction period rather than the "Maginot line." Given the disparities in ground forces between Germany and France the Maginot Line was money well spent, and then a good purchase wasted. Additionally, part of the problem wasn't just that there wasn't enough money going into aircraft; it was that there was a severe lack of coherence to 1930s French air force philosophy. I'd point to Robert Young's “The Strategic Dream: French Air Doctrine in the Inter-war period, 1919-1939.” Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 9 No. 4 (1974): 57-76. and Harvey, A.D. “The French Armée de l’Air in May 1940: A Failure of Conception.” Journal of Contemporary History. Vol. 25 No. 4 (1990) 447-465. (I copied and pasted the bibliographical entries since just dropping the names would be pretty useless. I don't mean to suddenly get all 'formal' all of a sudden) quote:
This assuming that tanks are intended to fight tanks. That's not the case- anti-tank guns are for fighting tanks. Tanks are for screwing around with your enemy's lines of communication. I'm happier with them mentally pigeon-holed in a multi-role fashion, for any given post-WWI era. (As opposed to a more 'indirect approach' single-role conception.) Armour plate, firepower, mobility, engages tanks, engages fortifications, engages infantry... there might be a future in these tank things.
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