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ShermanM4 -> AEF In WWI (10/12/2006 5:02:50 AM)

Hi all,
I've been reading an interresting account of the American Expiditionary Force during World War I. The book talks a lot about General John Pershing and the challanges he faced. Also, it gives an account of the battle of Belleau Woods, the Fighting along the Marne, and the St. Mihiel Salliant. Briefly, I've paused just prior to reading about the Battle of the Meuse Argon. I have one question looming in my mind that the author does not answer.

Just prior to the Meuse Argon it gave an account of the 14 mile wide front that British General Haig attacked that was much further north of the American sector. It said that British, Anzac, and Canadian troops advanced nine miles and captured 15,000 Germans in one day. Three days later the advance was stopped but those same troops captured another 12,000 Germans. Once the advance stopped, Marshall Foch attacked with the French further north of the British position which met with great success aswell. The British and the French reclaimed all of the ground taken by the Germans earlier in March 1918.

As General Pershing planned the attack on the Meuse Argon, he noted the American soldiers killed in action, from the earlier actions listed above, totalled around 50,000. If succesful, He believed his campaign through the Meuse Argon would put the AEF right into Saarbrucken, Germany. Now here is my question. Did the AEF bring or introduce any tactics, training, or fighting style that their European allies did not posess? Did the AEF have better strategies? Or was it just that the Germans were so tired of war that the AEF could absorb man-for-man casualties with the Germans?

It seems to me that Haig and Foch's push in the north was a masterful stroke of brilliance not previously displayed by the France and Britain. I enjoyed reading about the battles of Belleau Wood, the Marne, and the St. Mihiel salliant. I think Pershing's attack into the St. Mihiel salliant was a good idea. However, I am not clear that if the AEF brought a better level of fighting or if they simply made many of the same mistake France and Britain made but were simply able to just absorb the casualties.



Sarge -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/12/2006 6:29:38 AM)

I don’t believe any of the troops irregardless of their origin were adequately trained for trench warfare, not to mention the quality of replacements by 1918.
The casualties of the nations involved in the west had reached a staggering level by 1918, combined with the new and untapped resource of American men and material flooding into the war ,Germanys had no other option .

General Pershing was in the right place/position at the right time, don’t get me wrong I am not calling Pershing’s credentials questionable. I am just pointing out that how far Americas involvement tips the scale. You could have “ filled in the blank “ with number of Generals of the time and basically had the same conclusions.



ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/12/2006 7:32:36 AM)

quote:

I don’t believe any of the troops irregardless of their origin were adequately trained for trench warfare, not to mention the quality of replacements by 1918.
The casualties of the nations involved in the west had reached a staggering level by 1918, combined with the new and untapped resource of American men and material flooding into the war ,Germanys had no other option .


Good point. Although on September 12, 1918 when the AEF effectively captured the saliant, they did it great percision. The Army and Marine Corps infantry mainted a steady march with their artillery just infront of them. One of the factors that helped them was the US Army Corps of Engineers. Just the bombardment started the engineers carefully laid chicken wire over the barbed wire. In some cases they did this while under fire. The Germans of course were catching the artillery while trying to stop the engineers. When the infantry came through the merely had to walk over the top of the barbed wire paved with chicken wire. Who else did that? Did the British and French or the Germans ever try that?



Sarge -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/12/2006 8:24:43 AM)

Chicken wire, I don’t know, maybe?

But if your referring to combination of arms the answer is yes. There is a whole host of tactics used by front line troops to clear wire, some successful ,some not.

This was no cake walk/route for Pershing, By the end of October he had traded 100,000 casualties for the ground. In fact Pershing was becoming exceedingly apprehensive with the pressures implied from the home front . I truly believe with out the pressure from Marshal Foch the offensive would have slowed to a stalemate by fall.

Once the Germans managed to get off their heals in October the American general inexperience started to rear its ugly head. Phase three of the offensive was basically a failure for the Americans, at best by October we started to trade man for man.



Sarge -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/12/2006 8:32:02 AM)

PS: what book are you reading, is it a new title. I would like to get a look at it. [:)]



AbsntMndedProf -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/12/2006 8:16:21 PM)

"Did the AEF bring or introduce any tactics, training, or fighting style that their European allies did not posess? Did the AEF have better strategies? Or was it just that the Germans were so tired of war that the AEF could absorb man-for-man casualties with the Germans?"
---- Quoted from ShermanM4


In a manner of speaking, yes the AEF did bring something new to the battlefield that helped overcome the German defenses. However it wasn't a new weapon or tactic. (Or at least not intentionally so.) It was the Spanish Flu. In the Summer of 1918 A new malady began to infect troops on the Western Front. Doctors took to calling it the 'three day flu'. Few soldiers died of the disease through the Summer. However, in the fall of 1918 soldiers on both sides began to drop like flies to what Allied soldiers called the Spanish Flu, although it now seems likely to have been brought over with AEF troops from Kansas.

The German nation, already bled white by the horrific casualties of the previous years of war, were unable to replace the troops infected and/or killled by the flu. The Brits and the French had similar problems providing replacements. However the inflow of fresh troops from America, and the promise of more to come, proved a deciding factor in the outcome of the battle and the war.

[Source: http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWinfluenzia.htm]

Btw, I finally got control of my PC back! It was a very hairy few months trying to debug my pc, but it finally is free of the malware that had taken over my mouse.

Its good to be back.

Cheers!
Eric Maietta



Big B -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/12/2006 8:26:45 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

... Now here is my question. Did the AEF bring or introduce any tactics, training, or fighting style that their European allies did not posess? Did the AEF have better strategies? Or was it just that the Germans were so tired of war that the AEF could absorb man-for-man casualties with the Germans?


quote:

ORIGINAL: Sarge

I don’t believe any of the troops irregardless of their origin were adequately trained for trench warfare, not to mention the quality of replacements by 1918.
The casualties of the nations involved in the west had reached a staggering level by 1918, combined with the new and untapped resource of American men and material flooding into the war ,Germanys had no other option .

General Pershing was in the right place/position at the right time, don’t get me wrong I am not calling Pershing’s credentials questionable. I am just pointing out that how far Americas involvement tips the scale. You could have “ filled in the blank “ with number of Generals of the time and basically had the same conclusions.


One of the things the AEF had going for it, as Sarge pointed to above, was that not only did America have tremendous manpower available - but most importantly - it was "fresh" manpower.

US troops had their own élan which did much to overcome their shortcomings in battle experience. This combination of 'lack of battle experience' but 'great fighting spirit' was noted by the Germans in early 1918, and was very troubling to them.

I wouldn't say that US troops were not properly trained (by summer 1918) because the troops entering the great battles of 1918 had been well trained by the French for many months (except for the II Corps troops, who were trained by and served under the British).

I don't think American troops showed themselves inferior to their European counterparts at all - their first time in battle. It's just that the Europeans all had a few years of very tough battle experience by 1918 and the US was still getting that initial lesson.

Also, compared to the shortcomings in the French and British Armies (that were never wholly corrected during the war - read Paddy Grifith, and John Mosier), The US Army developed a sound organization that served it well during the war and in the next war.
I would contend that, overall, the two soundest Armies in terms of organization, tactics, and practice were the German and US Armies - by the end of the war.



ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/13/2006 6:29:03 AM)

quote:

Also, compared to the shortcomings in the French and British Armies (that were never wholly corrected during the war - read Paddy Grifith, and John Mosier), The US Army developed a sound organization that served it well during the war and in the next war.
I would contend that, overall, the two soundest Armies in terms of organization, tactics, and practice were the German and US Armies - by the end of the war.


Interresting. One of the things the book mentions was the difficulty with the French transit, port, and telephone system. Pershing was able to bring thousands of American stevadors to work in the ports. Bell Atlantic and the engineers came and built a phone system just for the AEF. Railmen from Pennsylvania came and re-built parts of the French rail line! Amazing! It almost seems like what the US is doing abroad right now is not all that new.



Sarge -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/13/2006 7:47:02 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Big B

{snip}
Also, compared to the shortcomings in the French and British Armies (that were never wholly corrected during the war - read Paddy Grifith, and John Mosier), The US Army developed a sound organization that served it well during the war and in the next war.
I would contend that, overall, the two soundest Armies in terms of organization, tactics, and practice were the German and US Armies - by the end of the war.




Yes agreed,

But also don’t forget to take into consideration, Germany had suffered 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 causalities by the time Americans entered the war.



anarchyintheuk -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/13/2006 8:42:01 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

As General Pershing planned the attack on the Meuse Argon, he noted the American soldiers killed in action, from the earlier actions listed above, totalled around 50,000. If succesful, He believed his campaign through the Meuse Argon would put the AEF right into Saarbrucken, Germany. Now here is my question. Did the AEF bring or introduce any tactics, training, or fighting style that their European allies did not posess? Did the AEF have better strategies? Or was it just that the Germans were so tired of war that the AEF could absorb man-for-man casualties with the Germans?



Short answer, no. In some ways the AEF was a throwback to the problems experienced by armies in the earlier years of the war (e.g. insufficient artillery prep due to lack of numbers and weight of shell, unnecessarily slow and dense tactical formations, etc.). The lack of artillery (especially heavy artillery) couldn't be helped, the US wasn't producing sufficent quantities of artillery and had to rely on the British and French who were, understandibly, reluctant to short their own troops. However, some of it could. The Germans commented on how dense AEF formations were. That lesson could and should have been learned. Instructors detailed from the British and French noted amongst some commanders a "what they've been doing for 4 years hasn't been working so far, why should we listen to them" attitude.



IronDuke_slith -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/14/2006 3:23:57 AM)



Pershing insisted on keeping the Americans together, ignored offers of help and instruction, and re-learned the mistakes of 1915-1916 all over again. Americans tipped the scale to some extent with numbers, but not by combat effectiveness.

By the war's end, I think the British army was the most effective having worked out a method that worked and set about relentlessly applying it. The Germans were shot, and part of the Allied success was down to German defensive tactics not being feasible in light of the poor quality manpower left after their 1918 offensive.

I understood over half the Prisoners taken in the late war fighting were taken by Commonwealth forces, they enjoyed a long spell of victory and finished the war in effective shape.

regards,
IronDuke



ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/14/2006 3:24:34 AM)

quote:

Short answer, no. In some ways the AEF was a throwback to the problems experienced by armies in the earlier years of the war (e.g. insufficient artillery prep due to lack of numbers and weight of shell, unnecessarily slow and dense tactical formations, etc.). The lack of artillery (especially heavy artillery) couldn't be helped, the US wasn't producing sufficent quantities of artillery and had to rely on the British and French who were, understandibly, reluctant to short their own troops. However, some of it could. The Germans commented on how dense AEF formations were. That lesson could and should have been learned. Instructors detailed from the British and French noted amongst some commanders a "what they've been doing for 4 years hasn't been working so far, why should we listen to them" attitude.


I read that! It seems like the AEF was lacking in Artillery. Although, here is an interresting fact. During the pre-assault bombardment on the Meuse-Argone, more artillery was fired than during the entire American Civil War. Frightlful what breach loading French 75's can do.



ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/17/2006 6:16:35 AM)

quote:

Pershing insisted on keeping the Americans together, ignored offers of help and instruction, and re-learned the mistakes of 1915-1916 all over again. Americans tipped the scale to some extent with numbers, but not by combat effectiveness.

By the war's end, I think the British army was the most effective having worked out a method that worked and set about relentlessly applying it. The Germans were shot, and part of the Allied success was down to German defensive tactics not being feasible in light of the poor quality manpower left after their 1918 offensive.

I understood over half the Prisoners taken in the late war fighting were taken by Commonwealth forces, they enjoyed a long spell of victory and finished the war in effective shape.

regards,
IronDuke


What method was that?



Sarge -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/17/2006 7:51:37 AM)

The UK was free to experiment with new and more effective tactics primarily due to the fact, The Americans lightened the work load considerably . All considering, the Germans up till mid 17 were doing a pretty damn good job fighting a multiple front war.
America basically took responsibility for up to 1/3 of the front, along with the market share of material by early 18.

Now don’t get me wrong,

The UK was the ONLY thing between the front line trench and the Cannel for the critical war years. Even by early 17 the war was far from over. The Germans by 18 just could no longer supply a front that had settled into a stalemate ,where meters taken would equate into the decimation of the male population of countless villages back home.

But this much is true, Pershing basically had settled into a patronizing mentality towards the tactics France and the UK had employed.
I don’t know if I blame the decision, as we all know a slow moving defense posture is costly and ineffective if under any realistic time table restraints the penny pinchers like to impose back home.



IronDuke_slith -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/18/2006 1:10:39 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

quote:

Pershing insisted on keeping the Americans together, ignored offers of help and instruction, and re-learned the mistakes of 1915-1916 all over again. Americans tipped the scale to some extent with numbers, but not by combat effectiveness.

By the war's end, I think the British army was the most effective having worked out a method that worked and set about relentlessly applying it. The Germans were shot, and part of the Allied success was down to German defensive tactics not being feasible in light of the poor quality manpower left after their 1918 offensive.

I understood over half the Prisoners taken in the late war fighting were taken by Commonwealth forces, they enjoyed a long spell of victory and finished the war in effective shape.

regards,
IronDuke


What method was that?


Bite and hold.

Part of the WWI problem was that the Allies continuously looked for chances to break through and exploit, but the churning of the ground under intense bombardments together with the new weaponry and unbroken lines of trenches meant this was difficult. Units would advance and attempt to continue advancing. Slow advances allowed the defensive rail and road net behind the front line to transport German reserves to threatened areas to avert breakthrough. These forces together with local reserves launched counterattacks and restored the situation.

the British ceased bombarding for days (which only alerted the Germans to the likelihood of an attack) and instead opted for ferocious but shortlived barrages that rolled forward with the infantry in their wake. More flexible infantry tactics proved more effective at rolling up trenches. The key, though, was more limited objectives. The initial objectives were set at 1500-2000 yards so that when the troops took them, they were still within range of their supporting artillery and machine guns and these elements together with reserves brought up for the job, could dig in, hold and then savage any German counterattacks.

Attacks were therefore built to not only take objectives but defeat German countermeasures. At that point, the process would start all over again.

What is interesting is that this is a fair description of British tactical and operational method as it evolved under montgomery during the second world war as well.



ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/18/2006 3:19:13 AM)

quote:

ite and hold.

Part of the WWI problem was that the Allies continuously looked for chances to break through and exploit, but the churning of the ground under intense bombardments together with the new weaponry and unbroken lines of trenches meant this was difficult. Units would advance and attempt to continue advancing. Slow advances allowed the defensive rail and road net behind the front line to transport German reserves to threatened areas to avert breakthrough. These forces together with local reserves launched counterattacks and restored the situation.

the British ceased bombarding for days (which only alerted the Germans to the likelihood of an attack) and instead opted for ferocious but shortlived barrages that rolled forward with the infantry in their wake. More flexible infantry tactics proved more effective at rolling up trenches. The key, though, was more limited objectives. The initial objectives were set at 1500-2000 yards so that when the troops took them, they were still within range of their supporting artillery and machine guns and these elements together with reserves brought up for the job, could dig in, hold and then savage any German counterattacks.

Attacks were therefore built to not only take objectives but defeat German countermeasures. At that point, the process would start all over again.

What is interesting is that this is a fair description of British tactical and operational method as it evolved under montgomery during the second world war as well.


I think there a several similarities between Haig and Montgomery.

As for the bite and hold method, was this not what Pershing did with the US Army and Marines in the Soissons Salient and the St. Mihiel Saliant?

As I stated earlier, Marhsall Foch and Haig mounted offensives north of the American sector following the German failure along the Marne and Belleau Woods during the Spring of 1918. In which, the British captured 27,000 German soldiers. Were the British already practicing this bite and hold method? Is this what made them succesful in that sector?



Big B -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/18/2006 7:23:53 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

quote:

ite and hold.

Part of the WWI problem was that the Allies continuously looked for chances to break through and exploit, but the churning of the ground under intense bombardments together with the new weaponry and unbroken lines of trenches meant this was difficult. Units would advance and attempt to continue advancing. Slow advances allowed the defensive rail and road net behind the front line to transport German reserves to threatened areas to avert breakthrough. These forces together with local reserves launched counterattacks and restored the situation.

the British ceased bombarding for days (which only alerted the Germans to the likelihood of an attack) and instead opted for ferocious but shortlived barrages that rolled forward with the infantry in their wake. More flexible infantry tactics proved more effective at rolling up trenches. The key, though, was more limited objectives. The initial objectives were set at 1500-2000 yards so that when the troops took them, they were still within range of their supporting artillery and machine guns and these elements together with reserves brought up for the job, could dig in, hold and then savage any German counterattacks.

Attacks were therefore built to not only take objectives but defeat German countermeasures. At that point, the process would start all over again.

What is interesting is that this is a fair description of British tactical and operational method as it evolved under montgomery during the second world war as well.


I think there a several similarities between Haig and Montgomery.

As for the bite and hold method, was this not what Pershing did with the US Army and Marines in the Soissons Salient and the St. Mihiel Saliant?

As I stated earlier, Marhsall Foch and Haig mounted offensives north of the American sector following the German failure along the Marne and Belleau Woods during the Spring of 1918. In which, the British captured 27,000 German soldiers. Were the British already practicing this bite and hold method? Is this what made them succesful in that sector?


First of all, by 1917 the British were already using bite and hold tactics.
But the distinguishing feature of British 'bite and hold' tactics of the First World War was to have very limited battles - usually battalion sized affairs, and by definition - these were not intended to be war ending breakthroughs.
What happened at Soissons and St Mihel were not the same - these were large Corps and Army sized battles (though still limited in scope - i.e. not intended to end the war with a breakthrough) aimed at hammering the hinges in German lines, or pinching off large salients.

Bite and hold attacks did not end the war, large offensives with limited scope - launched in a sequence of continuing hammer blows - is what won the war. But that was only possible once American forces entered the war in great numbers (over two million men sent to France - more than the entire British Empire had on the Western Front by the end of the war).
1918 started with German troops on the Western Front actually outnumbering the combined Western Allies for the first time. That is what the armistice of Russia meant for the Allies - freed a lot of German manpower which made the massive German 1918 offensives possible.

In the final analysis, it was only fresh American troops by the million which swung the war to Allied victory. Also don't forget that the USA was making the majority (or a large percentage) of all Allied munitions since the early days of the war - American factories were not geared up making lots of tanks, planes, and guns - but they did make most of the Allies ammo.



Maliki -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/31/2006 12:34:20 PM)

Wow..This is such a complicated and controversial subject.[;)]

There has already been a few things mentioned that i agree with on the impact of AEF forces on WWI.

The major contribution of American forces Was not fresh or innovative tactics.As a matter of fact they were a throwback to pre- and early war doctrines of the attack will carry the field.Right or wrong it fit well and that tactic worked with the numbers of fresh and motivated troops that the US brought into the theater.

Several drawbacks to the AEF,,and one plus,were the large and unweildy size of her divisions.Operationally it was a nightmare,and alot of the problems encountered during the final months of the war had less to do with German opposistion,then the fact that no one in the American army had any experience in leading forces that large or in how to best use and keep them supplied.The AEF was also given some of the worst terrain to fight through as a prize for it not being broken up among the French and British armies.French,British,and Commonwealth officers and NCO's were used to help drill it for combat..some of which was taken to heart but other advice was given short shrift as there was a bias among American officers that those armies had been too long in the trenches and adverse to offensive operations.

The AEF's combat casualties were actually fairly light,compared to the time spent on the line and the type of operations carried out compared to Entente casualties during similair operations.I also don't think that it is stretching things too much to say that the major impact of the AEF was psychological upon the General staff of the German Army.Once American forces took the field they were faced with what seemed like an almost unlimited supply of manpower compared to their own dwindling reserves.The main effect on the battlefield was to throw it from stalemate to Germany being forced into a constant defensive from its introduction as an independent fighting force.The other major impact of it introduction being that it helped shorten the war by several years.Another year or two for the Entente in securing victory may have proven just as devestating domestically,and socially,as eventual defeat did for Imperial Germany.



ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/31/2006 6:59:04 PM)

quote:

The major contribution of American forces Was not fresh or innovative tactics.As a matter of fact they were a throwback to pre- and early war doctrines of the attack will carry the field.Right or wrong it fit well and that tactic worked with the numbers of fresh and motivated troops that the US brought into the theater.


I do not know for sure wether the AEF brought better strategies or any fresh way to fight. Nonetheless, it never lost a major campaign, and it won many battles that counted. How do you account for the use of Chicken wire bridges?

quote:

Good point. Although on September 12, 1918 when the AEF effectively captured the saliant, they did it with great percision. The Army and Marine Corps infantry mainted a steady march with their artillery just infront of them. One of the factors that helped them was the US Army Corps of Engineers. Just the bombardment started the engineers carefully laid chicken wire over the barbed wire. In some cases they did this while under fire. The Germans of course were catching the artillery while trying to stop the engineers. When the infantry came through the merely had to walk over the top of the barbed wire paved with chicken wire. Who else did that? Did the British and French or the Germans ever try that?


Or What about the battle of Blanc Mont Ridge in which the 5 marine regiment (US Marine 2nd Division) suffered 90% casualties and the US Army 36th division mounted a counter assault to break off the attackers? This action caused the Germans to abadone Champagne.



Big B -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/31/2006 7:36:57 PM)

I would like to note that much has been made of poor American tactics in 1918.

It is true that the bulk of the US Army was very 'green' in spring-summer 1918. The largest criticism of the troops was that in their first battles they forgot their training by bunching up or walking upright...

But there was nothing wrong with their tactics as taught - I own an original 1917 enlisted men's field manual. I was a former infantryman myself many years ago - and the tactics taught in the 1917 Field Manual are valid today (accounting for the lack of radios and night vision devices they never had).
Patrolling basics, cover and concealment, movement to contact, base of fire and use of terrain, camouflage from enemy observation...it's ALL there, and outside of the fact that hardware available has changed - the basic tactics have not.

Beyond that, US Army never suffered mass surrenders as the British and French did in the 1918 battles - though they did stem the German tide in bloody encounters at Belleau Wood, Chateau Thierry, Vaux, etc. As I recal reading, in those battles they met the French Army going the other way...(and the British Army was no sounder after the Germans finished with them in the spring 1918), nor did US Generals ever lead their Armies into mass slaughters the likes of Verdun, the Somme, Paschendael, or Nivelle's offensive of 1917.

I don't understand the controversy over the contribution of the US Army in WWI, the Western Allies at the time certainly understood. The USA came very late into the ground war, but their contribution was timely, and decisive.

All of the "controversy" about "effectiveness" is just clouding the issue long after the fact.



anarchyintheuk -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/31/2006 10:29:54 PM)

What controversy? The original poster basically asked how effective the AEF was. The responses seemed to stay on topic. MOO from what I've read is that the AEF was behind the British and French in terms of equipment, training and experience, i.e. its effectiveness, although inexperience in some instances was probably an advantage. I've never really anything on the Belgian Army so I don't have an opinion there.

As to whether the AEF was "decisive", guess that depends on your definition. IMHO I think the psychological effect of the AEF was more important than its actual accomplishments on the ground, important though they were.



Big B -> RE: AEF In WWI (10/31/2006 11:43:12 PM)

Well, the accomplishments of the AEF on the ground was nothing less than saving France from defeat in May-June 1918 by being the only force available to stop the German offensive (on the Marne)..that's pretty darn big in itself, and if France collapsed - which was a huge possibility at the time - then Britain alone would have been sumarily kicked off the continenet.

In the counter offensives of summer 1918, US troops played the pivitol role. US Troops eliminated the St Mihel salient brilliantly, US divisions also fought under the British for the rest of the war - taking the St Quentin Canal, and in the Muese Argonne, they had to take on the best troops the Germans had left and over the worst part of the Western Front - and the only spot on the front where the Germans were determined to hold. Although the American Argonne drive stalled for a week in October - it got back on track and delivered the the main arterial rail line near Metz in November.

By November the US had more troops in France, and in the line than the entire British Empire.

So no, America did not win the war singlehanded. America was in fact a very late comer to the war - and America's greatest contribution may indeed have been the uplift it provided the Allies just by finally getting there...

But I see no evidence to suggest that the troops themselves weren't as good as their Allies, had deficincies greater than anyone else during the war, or were otherwise ineffective....which it seemed to me to be the general tone of some commentary.
[sm=00000436.gif]



anarchyintheuk -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/1/2006 12:25:09 AM)

US forces only had limited (mostly insignificant in terms of numbers) exposure/effect during the early part of the Kaiserschlacht that started in late March, the only real period where there was a chance of defeat on the western front. Maybe I'm confused about the timeline, but I thought 2nd Marne was the last one and it was in July. The offensive was the least successful out the five. From memory, most of the forces were French, not US.



Big B -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/1/2006 12:55:25 AM)

The spring offensives of March and April, were all aimed at maiming the British and Allied Armies in the north - as a prelude to the main effort against the French down the Marne in the late Spring and early summer.

The Germans did not try to knock out the British, fail, and then grumpily move southward searching for better luck - the plan was to punish the British Army, knock it back and leave it incapable of interference with the efforts against the French (who were the main objective). So no, the Americans were not engaged in Operation Michael in the Spring, but the Germans did indeed accomplish their objectives as far as plans against the British and Belgians went in the North.

In the late Spring and Summer, the Germans carried out their second - and most important part of their offensives - down the Chemin Des Dames to the Marne and on toward Paris. It wasn't until Summer 1918 that the Paris Gun was used, when the French Gov was getting ready to evacuate, and the crisis meeting of the Allied High Command took place - where Pershing cabled Washington that the crisis had come and he agreed to send American divisions into the line befor Paris.

Were the Majority of the troops in the line in that sector French? Yes, however, the French Field Army (4th?)in the Marne Sector was being destroyed and the troops sent into the Apex of the German advance were Amaerican - at Chateau Thierry and Belleau Wood - and there were no major French (or British) formations to throw into the line at that point...when Paris was threatened (and along with it, the French Gov).

Prior to that point, direct American presence at the front was meager and for training purposes only - from June on, the number of American troops taking part in major combat swelled enormously - like a tidal wave (outnumbering the British, I can't recall if they quite equaled the French - probably not in 1918). But that continuing tidal wave of troops is what caused the German collapse of all hope of winning the war.



ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/1/2006 6:35:22 PM)

quote:

US forces only had limited (mostly insignificant in terms of numbers) exposure/effect during the early part of the Kaiserschlacht that started in late March, the only real period where there was a chance of defeat on the western front. Maybe I'm confused about the timeline, but I thought 2nd Marne was the last one and it was in July. The offensive was the least successful out the five. From memory, most of the forces were French, not US.


No not at all.....

quote:

The spring offensives of March and April, were all aimed at maiming the British and Allied Armies in the north - as a prelude to the main effort against the French down the Marne in the late Spring and early summer.

The Germans did not try to knock out the British, fail, and then grumpily move southward searching for better luck - the plan was to punish the British Army, knock it back and leave it incapable of interference with the efforts against the French (who were the main objective). So no, the Americans were not engaged in Operation Michael in the Spring, but the Germans did indeed accomplish their objectives as far as plans against the British and Belgians went in the North.

In the late Spring and Summer, the Germans carried out their second - and most important part of their offensives - down the Chemin Des Dames to the Marne and on toward Paris. It wasn't until Summer 1918 that the Paris Gun was used, when the French Gov was getting ready to evacuate, and the crisis meeting of the Allied High Command took place - where Pershing cabled Washington that the crisis had come and he agreed to send American divisions into the line befor Paris.

Were the Majority of the troops in the line in that sector French? Yes, however, the French Field Army (4th?)in the Marne Sector was being destroyed and the troops sent into the Apex of the German advance were Amaerican - at Chateau Thierry and Belleau Wood - and there were no major French (or British) formations to throw into the line at that point...when Paris was threatened (and along with it, the French Gov).

Prior to that point, direct American presence at the front was meager and for training purposes only - from June on, the number of American troops taking part in major combat swelled enormously - like a tidal wave (outnumbering the British, I can't recall if they quite equaled the French - probably not in 1918). But that continuing tidal wave of troops is what caused the German collapse of all hope of winning the war.


Yes and infact by the end of November 1918, The US Forces almost outnumbered both the French and British. Well, I will have to check on that when I get home from work. There were almost 1 million US Soldiers in France by the end of 1918.

Good points Big B. The Americans were put into the line along Marne and back east along the shoulder of the German advance in what was known Cheateu Thierry and Bellau Woods. Belleau Woods is where the 2nd Marine division really cut its teath. The famed Marine Corps line "Dig in? Hell we just got here..." was uttered there.

Anarchy in the UK if you interested in what the Americans did you shoud consider General US Grant and the "Rock of the Marne," "The Lost Battalion," The Soissons Salient, THe St. Mihiel Saliant, the Battle of Blanc Mont Ridge, the Meause-Argon Offensive. I am not trying to steal any thunder from the UK or the French, but I think the contribution has to be greater than just

quote:

As to whether the AEF was "decisive", guess that depends on your definition. IMHO I think the psychological effect of the AEF was more important than its actual accomplishments on the ground, important though they were.


psychological factor as you suggest. Still, I am not sure if the AEF brought any better strategies to the battle field or a better way of fighting. Though, I am impressed with the battles and Campaigns the AEF partook of, and I can't believe that the only real impact they had was limited to numbers or psychological factors. Also, it has been mentioned that the Germans did not have quality replacements by 1918. They were suffering from supply shortages, low moral, and fatigue. I just don't believe that was the only reason why the Americans had success on the battlefield.

Another thing about the number men of uniform was the losses. We can't forget that the French and the British paid an enormous price in terms of men for the amount of time they remained in the war. The US did not start taking heavy losses until the summer of 1918. I am pretty sure France suffered more killed in action than Great Britain and certainly the US. Though the populations of the two countries, France and Great Britain, are almost even today, I think at that time Great Britain actually had a larger population. Lets not forget, France was the first country in Europe to legalize contrceptives and Great Britain, by comparison, has always been the master of managing and allocating resources. France had a smaller population, suffered more losses, and had less men in uniform by 1918 than Great Britain and the US.



Big B -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/1/2006 8:13:54 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4


... Still, I am not sure if the AEF brought any better strategies to the battle field or a better way of fighting. Though, I am impressed with the battles and Campaigns the AEF partook of, and I can't believe that the only real impact they had was limited to numbers or psychological factors. Also, it has been mentioned that the Germans did not have quality replacements by 1918. They were suffering from supply shortages, low moral, and fatigue. I just don't believe that was the only reason why the Americans had success on the battlefield.


It wasn't at all, The Americans enjoyed as much success on the battlefield under adversity as anyone else did - especially when we compare the USA's efforts to everyone else's early efforts (because as I said above, for most of the troops the battles of Summer and Fall 1918 were their first combat experiences).
Different tactics and ways of doing things? All the Allied armies were different to a degree. The best book to read about the different approaches is called "The Defeat of the Imperial German Army 1917-1918" by Rod Paschall
US Doctrine put the emphasis on the primacy controlled rifle fire power, though Paschall comes to the conclusion that neither Britain, France, nor America had the right doctrine.(maybe - maybe not)

quote:

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4
Another thing about the number men of uniform was the losses. We can't forget that the French and the British paid an enormous price in terms of men for the amount of time they remained in the war. The US did not start taking heavy losses until the summer of 1918. I am pretty sure France suffered more killed in action than Great Britain and certainly the US. Though the populations of the two countries, France and Great Britain, are almost even today, I think at that time Great Britain actually had a larger population. Lets not forget, France was the first country in Europe to legalize contrceptives and Great Britain, by comparison, has always been the master of managing and allocating resources. France had a smaller population, suffered more losses, and had less men in uniform by 1918 than Great Britain and the US.

No - actually I'm pretty sure France has always had a bigger population that GB, but French casualties in WWI were notably higher than GB's. Here is the list;
Belgium 45,550
British Empire 942,135
France 1,368,000
Greece 23,098
Italy 680,000
Japan 1,344
Montenegro 3,000
Portugal 8,145
Romania 300,000
Russia 1,700,000
Serbia 45,000
United States 116,516
Austria-Hungary 1,200,000
Bulgaria 87,495
Germany 1,935,000
Ottoman Empire 725,000



ShermanM4 -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/1/2006 9:55:56 PM)

quote:

No - actually I'm pretty sure France has always had a bigger population that GB, but French casualties in WWI were notably higher than GB's. Here is the list;
Belgium 45,550
British Empire 942,135
France 1,368,000
Greece 23,098
Italy 680,000
Japan 1,344
Montenegro 3,000
Portugal 8,145
Romania 300,000
Russia 1,700,000
Serbia 45,000
United States 116,516
Austria-Hungary 1,200,000
Bulgaria 87,495
Germany 1,935,000
Ottoman Empire 725,000


[8D]Great thanks for the list! I've seen these numbers differ some what. Does this list account for for KIA, WIA, and MIA or is it just KIA? As for the populations of the two countries they are now almost 66million each. Both countires have similar reasons for this and other differing factors aswell. I will have to check up on the historical populations, but I thought I read at one time that Great Britain got ahead.



Big B -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/1/2006 10:59:00 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: ShermanM4

quote:

No - actually I'm pretty sure France has always had a bigger population than GB, but French casualties in WWI were notably higher than GB's. Here is the list;
Belgium 45,550
British Empire 942,135
France 1,368,000
Greece 23,098
Italy 680,000
Japan 1,344
Montenegro 3,000
Portugal 8,145
Romania 300,000
Russia 1,700,000
Serbia 45,000
United States 116,516
Austria-Hungary 1,200,000
Bulgaria 87,495
Germany 1,935,000
Ottoman Empire 725,000


[8D]Great thanks for the list! I've seen these numbers differ some what. Does this list account for for KIA, WIA, and MIA or is it just KIA? As for the populations of the two countries they are now almost 66million each. Both countires have similar reasons for this and other differing factors aswell. I will have to check up on the historical populations, but I thought I read at one time that Great Britain got ahead.

Those numbers are all dead - no wounded (or missing) included. Are they all KIA, or do they include non battle deaths? I'm not sure, but I think they include all dead who died in the war zone - from KIA, DOW, and Illness... but I can't say for absolute fact.



Maliki -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/2/2006 6:44:44 AM)

I only called it controversial because there seems to be a large difference of opinion between European and American historians on the AEFs impact.Most of which i think boils down to national pride.

As for the Meuse Aragonne campaign..I touched upon this earlier.It was some of the worst terrain to conduct an offensive operation in on the Western Front.The AEF did very well in conducting the campaign there.This was the prize given to it for not giving in to French and British demands of it being broken up and used as cannon fodder in their armies.

In most aspects,given its inexperience,the AEF performed well.But..The fact of the matter is that the inexperience of high and mid-level officers in command and control of such large numbers of troops and the logistics behind that,led to a less than optimal performance.I would give the AEF a B+ for effort in its operations...and also the fact that the Germans were alarmed enough by its entry that they launched a last desperate offenisve before it could be utilized as a whole in theater.Also that they were very impressed with the high morale and doggedness of the forces it employed.

Once again the major impact was a pyshcological one upon the German army.

The war may have been won by the major Entente powers by the starvation of the German home populace even without its introduction.It is also important to to remember that the US was viewed as a minor power by France and Britain..along the lines of Portugal.[X(]..Another major impact of it being that France and Britian did not face major social uphevial after wars end by it soaking up casualties that they would needed to have taken if the US had not entered the war.The two major powers were treading a very fine line,domestically,before Americas entry,



Big B -> RE: AEF In WWI (11/2/2006 6:00:09 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Maliki

I only called it controversial because there seems to be a large difference of opinion between European and American historians on the AEFs impact.Most of which i think boils down to national pride.


This is very true, and I would like to point out that there has been a long revisionist movement by historians from across the pound to downplay the USA's contribution after the war. In Britain particularly, it has become chique for historians to barley even mention US involvment...kind of like ignoring the elephant standing in the room.

quote:


As for the Meuse Aragonne campaign..I touched upon this earlier.It was some of the worst terrain to conduct an offensive operation in on the Western Front.The AEF did very well in conducting the campaign there.This was the prize given to it for not giving in to French and British demands of it being broken up and used as cannon fodder in their armies.

In most aspects,given its inexperience,the AEF performed well.But..The fact of the matter is that the inexperience of high and mid-level officers in command and control of such large numbers of troops and the logistics behind that,led to a less than optimal performance. I would give the AEF a B+ for effort in its operations...and also the fact that the Germans were alarmed enough by its entry that they launched a last desperate offenisve before it could be utilized as a whole in theater.Also that they were very impressed with the high morale and doggedness of the forces it employed.

Once again the major impact was a pyshcological one upon the German army.


Well, I may disagree a small bit (the US Army certainly did have officers that needed to be and were replaced...but like I pointed out earlier - as mediocre as some US officers certainly were, that paled in significance compared to some of France and Britain's Senior Generals during the war).
Regardless - it is certainly true that US involvement made a massive psycological impact on the German High Command.


quote:


The war may have been won by the major Entente powers by the starvation of the German home populace even without its introduction.

Theoretically - perhaps. In the face of reality in 1918 with America as a nuetral..not a chance. The Germans would certainly have won the war outright on the battlefield in France long before the economic effects would have brought Germany down - in fact, under the assumption of US neutrality, with Russia out of the war and Eastern Europe pacified and Germany no longer fighting a two major front war - I see no reason to even expect that Germany would starve.

quote:


It is also important to to remember that the US was viewed as a minor power by France and Britain..along the lines of Portugal.[X(]..Another major impact of it being that France and Britian did not face major social uphevial after wars end by it soaking up casualties that they would needed to have taken if the US had not entered the war.The two major powers were treading a very fine line,domestically,before Americas entry,


Well, Britain and France may have wanted to view the US as a power as signifigant as Portugal, but the reality was quite different and Britain and France knew that all too well - that was one of the reasons why Pershing alone, of all the Allied National commanders, didn't have to do what Foch said or wanted. Pershing not only was the only Supreme commander with the full backing of his government - but it was also well understood of the power the USA wielded among the Big Three (GB, FR, USA) the USA could basically call the shots by 1918...it wasn't until after the war that Britain and France took advantage of Wilson's political weaknesses visa-vie an isolationist Congress, and shoved him aside at the Peace Table.

But overal Maliki, we pretty much agree..[;)]

Here are the facts of America's contribution from the Doughboy Center (online)

AMERICA'S MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO VICTORY IN THE GREAT WAR
When America entered the Great War in April 1917, it had a small constabulary Army with no experience in industrial age warfare. It was spread from the east coast across the nation and the Pacific to the Philippines. Nineteen months later the United States had a 2 million man force concentrated in France. Flanders and Italy. Towards the war's end the American Expeditionary Force or AEF, as it came to be known, was occupying more of the Western Front than Britain and all her Commonwealth Nations combined, lending combat divisions to all the allies and leading offensive operations against the best defended sector still occupied by the Germans. The AEF could claim when the Armistice came to have never failed on the defensive to turn back the enemy nor failed on the attack to achieve its aims.
Much has been made in the last 80 years by former allies, academic historians and documentary film makers of the rough fits and starts and frequent gross inefficiencies of the American troops and their commanders during the First World War. Claims have been made on television recently that the United States made minimal military contribution to the war's conclusion and [grossly inaccurately] that the US only fought in one battle. The intriguing new work by Niall Ferguson THE PITY OF WAR, an effort to explain the causes and dynamics of the war is the latest work to treat the AEF's contribution somewhat dismissively.

John J. Pershing was certainly not an original thinking strategist nor tactician and he was apparently unfamiliar with the management principle of span of control. Casualties were often heavier than should have been necessary and the US First Army got bogged down temporarily in its biggest operation, the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. But there were reasons for all this from a lack of experience by all the American soldiers starting with Black Jack Pershing to the insufficient number of trucks provided and the inadequate road network for the Argonne battle. Besides, the generals and doughboys of the AEF by the urgency of the moment had to learn by fighting; and the logistical problems of the Meuse-Argonne were all solved within a few weeks with the adversary driven from a position he had occupied and fortified for four years .
It is astonishing to discover other historians or commentators who miss the overarching point of the American participation in the Great War. In minimizing the value of the AEF on the battlefield they fail to analyze what its absence would have meant.
Without General Pershing's forces on the Western Front, Germany would have won the World War! By New Year's Day 1918, the British Army had been bled before Passchendaele, the French Army had suffered both defeat and mutiny from the Nivelle Offensive and Russia, then under Lenin, had withdrawn from the war. With its victory on the Eastern Front, the German Army had available over a million additional men to transfer to the West.
The key to Allied victory was Morale. It was the intense and undiminished morale of the US military combined with a staunch domestic backing which convinced the German they could no longer continue. When their morale collapsed on all fronts they sued for peace. The AEF with its operations broke the German morale.
Absent the arrival of the Americans, Ludendorff and Hindenburg did not have to make a desperate and exhausting roll of the dice as they did in resuming the offensive in March 1918. As Winston Churchill pointed out, with their reinforcements from the East they could have sat on their occupied sections of France and Flanders and dared the Entente to attack. Would Petain have ordered his enervated Poilus back on the offensive? Would Lloyd George have provided Douglas Haig the manpower to attempt a new variation on his 1917 campaign in the Ypres Salient? Without the presence of the AEF to provide the decisive margin it would have been most unlikely.

In addition to this strategic point, the specific contributions of the American armed forces to the demoralization and military defeat of the Central Powers can be easily charted chronologically:
• Spring 1917
The promise of a large AEF buoys French morale when their Army has been defeated and in mutiny.
American naval vessels allow the convoy system to succeed, keeping Britain in the war and facilitating the transport of the full expeditionary force to France, while freeing British ships to turn their blockade of Germany into what Capt. Liddell Hart called a "true stranglehold".
• Late 1917
American soldiers arriving in accelerating numbers compel the German High Command to attempt to win the war in early 1918 before the American presence can be decisive.
Initially, the doughboys are able to take over quiet sectors of the front, allowing British and French units to rest or redeploy to more active locales.
• May & June 1918
The AEF defends Paris on the Marne River line at Chateau Thierry.
• July 1918
American troops play the critical role in turning back the last German Offensive of World War I
Subsequently, US divisions totaling a quarter of a million men serve as the core attacking units in the Aisne-Marne counteroffensive of the Second Battle of the Marne.
• Late Summer 1918
The continuing avalanche of fresh American troops devastate the morale of both Germany's frontline soldiers and their high command; their presence also encourages the governments of Great Britain and France to allow their armies to continue the offensive operations necessary to expel the opposition from occupied territory.
• September 1918
At the St. Mihiel Salient and in the Argonne Forest, the US First Army mounts two major offensives on the same front within two weeks of one another; concurrently, the II Corps of the AEF collaborates with Australian troops in capturing the St. Quentin Canal in the Somme Sector.
• October 1918
55,000 Americans fighting under the 4th French Army capture Blanc Mont Ridge and force the abandonment of the Champagne by the German Army; King Albert of Belgium receives comparable American reinforcements for his assault in Flanders.
• November 1918
The reorganized First Army, despite enormous criticism, has met all the objectives of the Meuse Argonne Offensive and is threatening the Meuse-Antwerp line, the latest defensive position of the enemy.
The new US Second Army is deploying and initiating operations below Metz to the east. The AEF is now occupying 83 miles of the Western Front compared to 70 for the British Army and is planning to mount yet another major offensive on November 14th.
Only half of the expected AEF reached France before the Armistice; the rest were still training stateside. By November 11, 1918, 2,057,675 military personnel would arrive in France. Slightly over half of the 2 million+ were combat effectives and of the remainder about 30% had already become casualties.
By the War's end, the American units in France and Flanders commanded 83 miles of the 392 mile long Western Front. The other Allies held sections of the following lengths:
Belgian Army - 25 miles, British & Commonwealth - 70 miles, and French 214 miles.




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