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Feinder -> RE: IS THE ABDA HEADQUARTERS UNIT WORTH SAVING? (1/8/2007 11:32:34 PM)
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“I imagine many of the garrison ground forces were made up of colonist militias. As such I would expect them to fight to the last to save their homesteads.”
Actually, I expect the Dutch were much in the same boat the British in Malaya and Burma. I recently finished reading the “Forgotten Armies : The Fall of British Asia 1941 - 1945”. Frankly, it goes into more detail about the politics than I had hoped, but it’s fairly revealing about a conflict that is rarely addressed.
1. Historically, there were plenty of militia-type units (pre capitulation, and post as guerrillas). These are not really represented in WitP.
2. Part of the problem that both sides (colonial British & Dutch, and empire as Japan) encountered, was that neither fully appreciated the complexity (and diversity) of the populations that they were attempting to rule.
3. The native populations basically wanted to be independent to begin with. There was already a strong independence movement before the war across all of the colonies. But when you have no military or means of sustaining one, you’re stuck (or in Ghandi’s case, you start the Quit India movement with the whole “passive resistance” thing).
4. However, the native politicians (in-power) pretty much understood they PERSONALLY had a pretty good thing going, because the colonial British (and Dutch) afforded THEM a pretty good life-style as long as they played along.
5. The native worker-bees weren’t particularly happy with the situation, but frankly, they’d been passed among colonial masters for the last 50 years. They knew they weren’t in a position to militarily usurp, so they didn’t. If you’re the guy working on the rubber plantation before the insurrection, you’re still going to be the guy working on the rubber plantation after the insurrection, so why risk your life over it.
6. The native populations were also very fragmented to begin with. There were a dozen kings in Malaya alone, that served the British crown, but they each had separate populations and agendas (which is partly why independence movements were always frustrated).
7. The European colonials were a mixed lot as well. You had some that –did- see themselves first as Asians, then as Brits (indeed, many were mixed descent). You also had Europeans colonials who saw it as adventurous or as opportunity. And you had colonials that were literally “stuck” out to the Indies, because they had p1ssed somebody else off. However, very few European colonials (political or military) were actually native to Malaya. Very few of the colonials saw things as “defending their homesteads”.
8. Many of the military formations were native soldiers, led by European colonial leaders. So yes, quite a few units were somewhat “defending their homeland”. However, the soldiers were just as likely to have been pulled from every other corner of the empire. And many of them were of the perspective that they were serving in an “occupying army” to begin with.
9. During the evacuations of Malaya, Sumatra, and Java, the conduct of the colonials, as viewed by the natives and integrated formations, was deplorable. Native integrated formations were often considered expendable to cover the retreat of non-integrated formations; fighting all the while with substandard equipment. Evacuation on transports was largely reserved for whites (so colonials of mixed heritage with darker skin were screwed). The loyalty of many serving in mixed formations was greatly tested, when you know you’re a second class citizen.
10. There were many desertions among the integrated units. Famine killed about 10% of the civilian population during the war years. That’s a LOT of people. Means that life for the survivors still wasn’t easy, and if you’re in an integrated unit, thinking of your family starving because you can’t work the rice paddy is a pretty solid motivator.
11. Still, many (indeed most) integrated formations served admirably, many individuals maintaining the attitude of, “We serve now because we know Japan isn’t the answer, but we’re really expecting some concessions when this war is over.”
12. It’s not to say that the native populations welcomed the Japanese, but they often saw them as, “Well, you kicked out the colonials which is a good thing. We’re not that naïve to think you’re actually going to give us real independence, but we’ll take what you give us, if it’s more than the Brits.”
13. There was a sizable number that actually Joined the Japanese (BIA –Burma Independence Army – numbered about 12,000, were generally ill-trained and poorly equipped, but the allegence of the region was certainly “conflicted”.
14. Basically, the Japanese eventually traded out the native politicals under the Brits, for a new group.
15. Meanwhile, those who would actually become the post war politicals remained active, and when the war ended they were able to lead revolts (no more Japanese, British/French/Dutch military weakness, and US not willing to assist colonial governments anyway), they were able take advantage of the situation of seize power.
16. Interesting side-note I hadn’t thought about until reading the book. Esp with Ben Kingsly and our own history books portray Ghandi very favorably. Sweet little guy who prays a lot and avocates independence thru non-violance (again, it’s pretty hard to advocate military insurrection without guns). However, Quit India produced –massive- strikes throughout India in 08-42. While it certainly worked to get the attention of the British, it coincided with a VERY BAD time for Britian to have to deal with her largest colony not producing anything for the war effort. Then consider the perspective of the colonial officers deployed to India, risking your life in famished malaria infested hole, by a population who doesn’t even want you there. Needless to say, things were often “tense”.
17. It really helps to understand the region in pre-WW2 terms, to see the developing conflicts that continued after the war for then next 40 years.
Whatever. Was an interesting read.
-F-
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