RE: The B.S. Power of CD

RE: The B.S. Power of CD (Full Version)

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hosho -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (11/23/2007 12:08:15 PM)
[/quote] I'm not the data guru that others here are, but I can tell ya Germany had some of the best direct fire weapons of the war. However the U.S. had the edge in indirect fire, stemming all the way back to the end of the Civil War and leading all the way through today [/quote] what gave the edge to U.S. was absolute air supremacy then and today! you can`t group your artillery when enemy bombers and assault aircrafts are around ( and germans couldn`t use their artillery effectively ). so imho U.S. didn`t have the edge over german artillery when we take only "guns" into considearation. of course this is only academical .......

moses -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (11/26/2007 9:54:34 PM)
quote: This means that a total of 5,000 troops have nearly wiped out 35,000 soldiers. Talk about CRAP... [:@][:@][:@] 5000 troops in a really good defensive position can really stuff a large force. And you don't get a much better position then when a bunch of troops are dribbling across the water in small boats. Without a whole lot of air and bombardment support, a slaughter should be the expected result. You mention AK/AP losses but no damage to any other ships. So I'm guessing that there were no significant bombardment ships in your transport fleet. Also I see no mention of a naval or air bombardment. So it would appear that 15-20 big troop and cargo ships dropped anchor half a mile offshore and began loading troops and supplies onto wooden boats. Under those conditions 3 or 4 well placed guns should be all that is needed. This is a dream come true for those gunners.

John 3rd -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (11/26/2007 10:02:12 PM)
Greg! Haven't heard from you with the emails I have been sending you...hope you are well! The first convoy didn't have an escort organic to it. I had an escort TF traveling with it instead. The second life had several cruisers and DDs with it. Didn't help any either. I ended up losing about 20 ships total with another 20 damaged. The troops loss is the major problem. Luckily I evacuated about 8,000 troops from the Infantry Division and it will rebuild...

Sheytan -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/2/2008 1:27:39 AM)
The Red Army regarded artillery as the King of battle. No army in modern history massed as many guns as the Red Army did in the post 1943 campaigns. The germans may have engineered some interesting guns, but the resources used to build very large siege and railway guns would have been better used building mobile field artillery. IMO however the german 88mm gun was the best fieldpiece of WW2. quote: ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez Well, the Russians had some pretty good indirect fire stuff too, some of it was lend-lease but a large portion was of their own making. Chez

Bogo Mil -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/2/2008 11:27:29 AM)
I think the key at Pago Pago could have been the Japanese air superiority. Do one or two "port attacks" by all KB-bombers in preparation of the assault, and these 155mm guns are almost completely gone. Without defending infantery, the atoll probably falls in the first attack. To improve the game mechanics in a future game, I think there should be a flotilla structure for small boats (PT, barges, landing craft, ...) comparable to the aircraft squadrons. The boats would be produced in factories like planes are produced now, the flottillas can draw new craft from the pool in large ports (I think at least size 6, maybe 8 or even 10), and some ships (e.g. APA) can carry such boat flotillas around. My 2 cents about the comparision of the armies: I think the Americans are the kings of logistics. It is incredible, how well they could and can coordinate supply streams, how many sorties their aircraft can fly (from CVs as well as from airfields), how fast they can build/repair airstrips/roads etc. pp. The Russians had very bad organisation, especially at the beginning of the war. For instance, for the first year, most Russian artillery units were not trained to do indirect fire. Russians combat forces were generally low on supplies and the lack of competent support troops was crippled them. They improved a lot during the war, but never came close to American standards. On the other hand, the Russians certainly had the most cost effective weapons of the world. The T-34 was weaker than a German Panther, but with the same amount of labour as needed for 1 Panther, they built almost 3 T-34 (and Russian factories usually didn't have as modern tools as the German ones). You can find more examples in aircraft, guns etc. pp. The Russians built quite crude and simple stuff, which wins every comparision if you take the production cost into account (many authors irgnore these).

Feltan -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/2/2008 7:52:41 PM)
It isn't just the U.S. hardware that makes a difference, it is the process for calling in indirect fire. Most countries used a "point-of-reference" system for calling in arty, and concentration of fire was difficult because you needed a spotter for every firing battalion. The Russians used this sytem, and had a heavy reliance on pre-planned fires -- they made up for the inefficiency by having lots of tubes or rockets. The U.S. used, and uses, a more elaborate and sophisticated mapping concept in conjuction with a Fire Direction Center (FDC). Multiple battalions of arty can be coordinated on a single target by one lone spotter -- and then rapidly shift fire. I won't argue direct fire weapons or tanks or infantry -- but the U.S. had/has the best Field Artillery in the world hands down. Regards, Feltan

Mark VII -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/3/2008 12:19:25 AM)
There is one word that will explain why this unsupported Jap invasion got stopped in its tracks.[:D] MARINES! The Marines of the defense battalion were dug-in, in-depth starting at the edge of the beach with their heads up since there was no naval or air bombardment. The Marines were just waiting. They waited and waited and the waves of Jap barges got closer and closer. Fingers were twitching near triggers but they knew the plan so they waited. They even waited as the Jap soldiers from the first wave started jumping in the water 50 yards off the beach. All this time the Jap invasion transports were edging in since it seemed the silly Americans were asleep so lets get closer so we can unload quicker. Just as the first Japanese soldiers emerged from the water, the order was given. COMMENCE FIRING! FIRE AT WILL! Since they waited, all the Marine weapons were now in range and able to fire. After two minutes the Japanese first wave ceased to exist except for a few individuals trying to hide behind their dead or dying buddies. The water at the edge of the beach was quickly turning red! The Jap second and third waves were nearing their drop-off points but they still did not realise the magnitude of the fire storm they were about to enter. About this time a Marine Captain ordered his heavy CD guns to open fire on the enemy transports that were only 4000yards off shore. The crew of Battery Two were quickly rewarded with the sight of one of the transports just blowing up. At least a hundred Japanese soldiers were blown into the air, twirling like Autumn leaves as they fell into the bluegreen ocean. It was now time to let the Army puke's who were hiding in the middle of the island to join the party. The Captain nodded to his Gunny. The Sgt picked up a phone and said "they landed right were we thought they would, your indirect anti-beach guns may commence firing, I will call with corrections as needed. Your guns assigned to the anti-ship mission may also open fire. The Jap transports have been sucked into point blank range. Good hunting!" Well, you all know the rest of the story. The defenders were well supplied and thus had plenty of ammo. Since there was no heavy fire coming in from the Japs, they just kept firing and firing and the Japs just kept dying. The American guns needed water poured on them because the weapons were becoming red hot from the near constant firing. The Japs just kept coming and coming only to be mowed down time after time. (remember a new Shock Attack with each new landing) Maybe 5% of each wave would make it to the beach alive. With no heavy fire support the invasion was doomed and could not get more than a hundred yards off the beach. A Japanese Private who was trying to dig a hole in the soft sand of the beach was heard to say "who ever planned this fiasco should be shot"! Five minutes later, as reinforcements arrived, the next Banzai charge was ordered and the Private started running up the body covered beach. He had run only 10 yards and was killed instantly by a 30cal Rifle slug thru the heart. Remember those Marines. Especially when not harassed by heavy fire, Marines don't miss![sm=00000054.gif]

John 3rd -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/3/2008 1:40:04 AM)
I was shocked to see my old Thread move back up to the top of the line here!

Sheytan -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/4/2008 6:29:19 AM)
Id have to disagree with the assertion that the Red army artillery arm was not versed in the use of indirect fire. The Red army offensive to break the Mannerhiem line in Finland during the Winter war was tremendiously supported by thousands of fieldpieces firing indirect fire missions of such length and saturation that finnish survivors of the ordeal called it "hell on earth". It also was probably the single deciding factor in forcing Finland to accept terms. Prior to the change of command for the campaign the Red army attempted to attack "everywhere". "In January 1940, Timoshenko took charge of the Soviet armies fighting Finland in the Soviet-Finnish War. This had begun the previous November, under the disastrous command of Kliment Voroshilov. Under Timoshenko's leadership, the Soviets succeeded in breaking through the Finnish Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus, prompting Finland to sue for peace in March. His reputation increased, Timoshenko was made the People's Commissar for Defence and a Marshal of the Soviet Union in May." From Wiki. quote: ORIGINAL: Bogo Mil I think the key at Pago Pago could have been the Japanese air superiority. Do one or two "port attacks" by all KB-bombers in preparation of the assault, and these 155mm guns are almost completely gone. Without defending infantery, the atoll probably falls in the first attack. To improve the game mechanics in a future game, I think there should be a flotilla structure for small boats (PT, barges, landing craft, ...) comparable to the aircraft squadrons. The boats would be produced in factories like planes are produced now, the flottillas can draw new craft from the pool in large ports (I think at least size 6, maybe 8 or even 10), and some ships (e.g. APA) can carry such boat flotillas around. My 2 cents about the comparision of the armies: I think the Americans are the kings of logistics. It is incredible, how well they could and can coordinate supply streams, how many sorties their aircraft can fly (from CVs as well as from airfields), how fast they can build/repair airstrips/roads etc. pp. The Russians had very bad organisation, especially at the beginning of the war. For instance, for the first year, most Russian artillery units were not trained to do indirect fire. Russians combat forces were generally low on supplies and the lack of competent support troops was crippled them. They improved a lot during the war, but never came close to American standards. On the other hand, the Russians certainly had the most cost effective weapons of the world. The T-34 was weaker than a German Panther, but with the same amount of labour as needed for 1 Panther, they built almost 3 T-34 (and Russian factories usually didn't have as modern tools as the German ones). You can find more examples in aircraft, guns etc. pp. The Russians built quite crude and simple stuff, which wins every comparision if you take the production cost into account (many authors irgnore these). [image]local://upfiles/23053/972123482AC14ADFB4E0552BACD11070.jpg[/image]

Bogo Mil -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/4/2008 10:08:56 AM)
I didn't say they were completely unable to do indirect fire, but most units were very badly trained at it. Pre-planned bombardement against well known enemy positions was possible - this is the "easiest" way of indirect fire. But in a moving battlefield, when the batteries have to calculate their aiming themselves and time is an issue, they were usually not able to do it fast and accurate enough. Thus they usually relied on direct fire during the first year of the Great Patriotic War.

herwin -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/4/2008 10:59:13 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Bogo Mil I didn't say they were completely unable to do indirect fire, but most units were very badly trained at it. Pre-planned bombardement against well known enemy positions was possible - this is the "easiest" way of indirect fire. But in a moving battlefield, when the batteries have to calculate their aiming themselves and time is an issue, they were usually not able to do it fast and accurate enough. Thus they usually relied on direct fire during the first year of the Great Patriotic War. The Warsaw Pact was still relying heavily on direct fire support in the 1970s and 1980s. In analyses, we generally carried WP DF artillery as having about 3 times the firepower of indirect artillery of the same calibre (ceteris paribus). There were two downsides: ammunition supply and flexibility. In these analyses, we considered the difference between general support and direct support as well. On a scale of 1-20, a light direct-fire howitzer in direct support was about 10 in that mission, with the lighter the calibre the higher the firepower. Guns, howitzers, and mortars of the same calibre and at the same rate of fire were 1:2:3 in relative firepower based on lethal area, so a 75 mm gun in direct fire was about the same effectiveness as the light howitzer--the howitzer was better in indirect fire. The light howitzer in direct support indirect-fire was 3. Medium caliber howitzers were 2, and heavy howitzers were 1, mostly due to less lethal area per minute. On the other hand, for general support missions, where shell explosive charge was more important than lethal area (which was based on fragmentation), for example against fortifications, artillery emplacements, armour or dug-in positions, the corresponding ratings were 1 for a light weapon, 2 for a medium weapon, and 3 for a heavy weapon.

Sheytan -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/10/2008 9:51:01 AM)
Interesting, heres a tidbit for you, while I was assigned to the 1/26 Inf 1st Inf Foreward, our batallion was expected to have roughly 50% losses in transit just to get to our assembly area in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of West Germany. This from Red Army rocket, artillery and airstrikes. At the time I was a track driver, M113A1. Being that this vehicle is made out of alluminum (its also colder inside this vehicle as a result then it was outside in below zero temps, if anyone here served as a track driver in Germany back then and drove a M113 tell me your secret on how you stayed warm, and ill tell you mine ;}) I didnt have very much confidence in my survival. And thankfully I never had to experience war. quote: ORIGINAL: herwin quote: ORIGINAL: Bogo Mil I didn't say they were completely unable to do indirect fire, but most units were very badly trained at it. Pre-planned bombardement against well known enemy positions was possible - this is the "easiest" way of indirect fire. But in a moving battlefield, when the batteries have to calculate their aiming themselves and time is an issue, they were usually not able to do it fast and accurate enough. Thus they usually relied on direct fire during the first year of the Great Patriotic War. The Warsaw Pact was still relying heavily on direct fire support in the 1970s and 1980s. In analyses, we generally carried WP DF artillery as having about 3 times the firepower of indirect artillery of the same calibre (ceteris paribus). There were two downsides: ammunition supply and flexibility. In these analyses, we considered the difference between general support and direct support as well. On a scale of 1-20, a light direct-fire howitzer in direct support was about 10 in that mission, with the lighter the calibre the higher the firepower. Guns, howitzers, and mortars of the same calibre and at the same rate of fire were 1:2:3 in relative firepower based on lethal area, so a 75 mm gun in direct fire was about the same effectiveness as the light howitzer--the howitzer was better in indirect fire. The light howitzer in direct support indirect-fire was 3. Medium caliber howitzers were 2, and heavy howitzers were 1, mostly due to less lethal area per minute. On the other hand, for general support missions, where shell explosive charge was more important than lethal area (which was based on fragmentation), for example against fortifications, artillery emplacements, armour or dug-in positions, the corresponding ratings were 1 for a light weapon, 2 for a medium weapon, and 3 for a heavy weapon.

castor troy -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/10/2008 11:54:43 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Sheytan Interesting, heres a tidbit for you, while I was assigned to the 1/26 Inf 1st Inf Foreward, our batallion was expected to have roughly 50% losses in transit just to get to our assembly area in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of West Germany. This from Red Army rocket, artillery and airstrikes. At the time I was a track driver, M113A1. Being that this vehicle is made out of alluminum (its also colder inside this vehicle as a result then it was outside in below zero temps, if anyone here served as a track driver in Germany back then and drove a M113 tell me your secret on how you stayed warm, and ill tell you mine ;}) I didnt have very much confidence in my survival. And thankfully I never had to experience war. 50% losses in transit to the assembly area? [X(] Was there really someone in the Nato that thought they could stop the Warsaw pact forces?

gladiatt -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/10/2008 12:02:52 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: castor troy quote: ORIGINAL: Sheytan Interesting, heres a tidbit for you, while I was assigned to the 1/26 Inf 1st Inf Foreward, our batallion was expected to have roughly 50% losses in transit just to get to our assembly area in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of West Germany. This from Red Army rocket, artillery and airstrikes. At the time I was a track driver, M113A1. Being that this vehicle is made out of alluminum (its also colder inside this vehicle as a result then it was outside in below zero temps, if anyone here served as a track driver in Germany back then and drove a M113 tell me your secret on how you stayed warm, and ill tell you mine ;}) I didnt have very much confidence in my survival. And thankfully I never had to experience war. 50% losses in transit to the assembly area? [X(] Was there really someone in the Nato that thought they could stop the Warsaw pact forces? I fink NATO relied on airstrike to stop the supply flow, and on town combat to cripple the armor power of Warsaw pact forces: that mean no real hopes in open land....SO in fact it was just aiming for a stalemate, not on real victory.

rjopel -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/10/2008 1:02:56 PM)
NATO hope to have at least some warning prior to a Warsaw Pact attack. Even 12 hours would be enough to get a large number of of troops to thier General Defense Plan positions. I think (and worked as a intel analyst during the cold war) that NATO would have a 48-72 hr period of mobilization prior to an attack. The scary scenario was an attack by the Soviets straight out of the barracks with GSFG, with no reinorcement from the other GOF's or the Western Military Districts.

Charbroiled -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/11/2008 9:43:39 PM)
When I served during the cold war, I was stationed in Berlin, Germany (before the wall came down). For those that don't know, Berlin was located about 120 miles inside of East Germany and there was a wall completely around West Berlin. West Berlin was home to French, British and US forces. The wall was there to keep East Germans from defecting to West Berlin. While stationed there, the main consensus was that if the Warsaw Pact attacked, we would effectively become POWs, since our "prison" wall was already in place.[X(]

herwin -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/11/2008 9:59:44 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: castor troy quote: ORIGINAL: Sheytan Interesting, heres a tidbit for you, while I was assigned to the 1/26 Inf 1st Inf Foreward, our batallion was expected to have roughly 50% losses in transit just to get to our assembly area in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of West Germany. This from Red Army rocket, artillery and airstrikes. At the time I was a track driver, M113A1. Being that this vehicle is made out of alluminum (its also colder inside this vehicle as a result then it was outside in below zero temps, if anyone here served as a track driver in Germany back then and drove a M113 tell me your secret on how you stayed warm, and ill tell you mine ;}) I didnt have very much confidence in my survival. And thankfully I never had to experience war. 50% losses in transit to the assembly area? [X(] Was there really someone in the Nato that thought they could stop the Warsaw pact forces? The only way they could maintain the operational tempo they wanted was by not stopping to fight. There was no way they could win in a conventional war--it was going to be a target-rich environment and we could shoot them down as fast as they came into view, even after taking 50% casualties moving to the assembly areas. We expected the war to go chemical/nuclear out of the box. I was really glad to see 1992.

2ndACR -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/12/2008 3:08:12 AM)
In the 2nd Amored Cavalry stationed in Bamburg, WG we were told that we (the regiment) would cease to exist a a fighting force after 7 days combat against the Warsaw Pact. 7 out of 10 would be dead, missing or wounded. Of course, we would start the fight at the border and trade lives for time until the Russians hit the MLR about 60 miles behind us. Lucky for me, the wall fell and then we went and beat up on the Iraqi's.

Hornblower -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/12/2008 9:46:07 AM)
mother often said- amongst other words of wisdom, pot to pee in window to toss it out, was I born yesterday, etc.- is that even a bind Squirrel can find a nut. I take that to mean if you bring enough ordnance to the table you will overcome your enemy.

herwin -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/12/2008 1:07:24 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: 2ndACR In the 2nd Amored Cavalry stationed in Bamburg, WG we were told that we (the regiment) would cease to exist a a fighting force after 7 days combat against the Warsaw Pact. 7 out of 10 would be dead, missing or wounded. Of course, we would start the fight at the border and trade lives for time until the Russians hit the MLR about 60 miles behind us. Lucky for me, the wall fell and then we went and beat up on the Iraqi's. I agree with your sentiment. The point is that the Warsaw Pact forces would have been burnt out more quickly. Your ACR could reasonably expect to ruin a couple of divisions and perhaps a corps in those seven days. Mission accomplished.

castor troy -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/12/2008 2:09:40 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: herwin quote: ORIGINAL: 2ndACR In the 2nd Amored Cavalry stationed in Bamburg, WG we were told that we (the regiment) would cease to exist a a fighting force after 7 days combat against the Warsaw Pact. 7 out of 10 would be dead, missing or wounded. Of course, we would start the fight at the border and trade lives for time until the Russians hit the MLR about 60 miles behind us. Lucky for me, the wall fell and then we went and beat up on the Iraqi's. I agree with your sentiment. The point is that the Warsaw Pact forces would have been burnt out more quickly. Your ACR could reasonably expect to ruin a couple of divisions and perhaps a corps in those seven days. Mission accomplished. a couple of divisions? What does acr stand for? Armored cavalry rgt? How big is a rgt in the US forces when they could expect to wreck a couple of Soviet divisions. And why should the Warsaw pact divisions so much worse?

rtrapasso -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/12/2008 2:17:26 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: castor troy quote: ORIGINAL: herwin quote: ORIGINAL: 2ndACR In the 2nd Amored Cavalry stationed in Bamburg, WG we were told that we (the regiment) would cease to exist a a fighting force after 7 days combat against the Warsaw Pact. 7 out of 10 would be dead, missing or wounded. Of course, we would start the fight at the border and trade lives for time until the Russians hit the MLR about 60 miles behind us. Lucky for me, the wall fell and then we went and beat up on the Iraqi's. I agree with your sentiment. The point is that the Warsaw Pact forces would have been burnt out more quickly. Your ACR could reasonably expect to ruin a couple of divisions and perhaps a corps in those seven days. Mission accomplished. a couple of divisions? What does acr stand for? Armored cavalry rgt? How big is a rgt in the US forces when they could expect to wreck a couple of Soviet divisions. And why should the Warsaw pact divisions so much worse? ACR = Armored Cavalry Regiment. Precision munitions, esp. wire guided AT missiles operated from concealed positions against enemy trying to move forward were why a small force could be expected to hurt any attackers so much. Of course, this theory was never tested, so it remains a moot point whether or not it would have worked.

wdolson -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/12/2008 2:40:32 PM)
The NATO force would have going for them well prepared positions (years in preparation), pre-spotted artillery, the defender has the espirit de corps of an all volunteer force (in the case of the Americans), the fact the defender has a built in advantage, and better overall equipment quality. The Soviets need to breakthrough the NATO line. The NATO guys win if they prevent breakthrough. I don't know if Soviet divisions were the same size in the 70s as during WW II, but they tended to be smaller than most other countries during that war. Up to the end of the USSR, most Soviet NCOs were draftees. They had very few career enlisted personnel. The only volunteers were the officers. The US, with an all volunteer force and NCOs who had been in the service for multiple enlistments had a significant advantage in morale and unit cohesiveness. I could see one regiment mauling a division or two in that situation. Bill

herwin -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/12/2008 2:44:37 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: rtrapasso quote: ORIGINAL: castor troy quote: ORIGINAL: herwin quote: ORIGINAL: 2ndACR In the 2nd Amored Cavalry stationed in Bamburg, WG we were told that we (the regiment) would cease to exist a a fighting force after 7 days combat against the Warsaw Pact. 7 out of 10 would be dead, missing or wounded. Of course, we would start the fight at the border and trade lives for time until the Russians hit the MLR about 60 miles behind us. Lucky for me, the wall fell and then we went and beat up on the Iraqi's. I agree with your sentiment. The point is that the Warsaw Pact forces would have been burnt out more quickly. Your ACR could reasonably expect to ruin a couple of divisions and perhaps a corps in those seven days. Mission accomplished. a couple of divisions? What does acr stand for? Armored cavalry rgt? How big is a rgt in the US forces when they could expect to wreck a couple of Soviet divisions. And why should the Warsaw pact divisions so much worse? ACR = Armored Cavalry Regiment. Precision munitions, esp. wire guided AT missiles operated from concealed positions against enemy trying to move forward were why a small force could be expected to hurt any attackers so much. Of course, this theory was never tested, so it remains a moot point whether or not it would have worked. Iraq definitely reset the indicator lights of a lot of people who had bought into Soviet military doctrine. The Active Defense doctrine was actually more effective than the Air-Land Battle doctrine at blocking a Soviet offensive, but it was much less effective during the counterattack phase. Soviet tanks were designed for offensive operations along well-developed transportation routes. They couldn't fight from hull-down positions, and they lacked high cross-country mobility. Their small crews (and the lack of accompanying infantry on the ground) meant that their target acquisition was slow, so that a target an American tank would handle alone required a Soviet tank platoon or more. To make the advance rates their doctrine required, they had to be in column with perhaps a platoon deployed in lead. Basically if you could acquire and kill them at least as fast as they closed, you would win.

wdolson -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/13/2008 3:35:17 AM)
The Abrams also had better long range fire control, so they could hit the Iraqi tanks before the Iraqi tanks could have any hope of hitting the Abrams. Necessity breeds innovation. The western allies knew they could not compete with the Soviets in equal numbers, so they developed the best systems they could. Western armies and air forces also trust their soldiers to do their jobs. A high degee of independence on the battle field is given to tank crews and aircraft crews. Soviet doctrine had their troops hamstrung and controlled centrally. The western allies did not completely appreciate what a limitation this was until after the Soviet Union fell. I read an article about Germany's Soviet fighters they inherited from East Germany during unification. They kept them on strength but in secondary roles. Aerodynamically, they were advanced airplanes, but they were built for a much more limited doctrine than western fighters and they were of limited use to the Germans, who were using West German doctrine. Back in 1986, a Russian MiG-25 pilot defected by flying his plane to Japan. I read his biography in college. The Americans treated him quite well and his belief in the differences between the Soviet system and the American system came slowly. His initial position was that he was just seeing what the elites had. When they were taking him to a safe house in some American city, they stopped at a market to get supplies. Suddenly his agents realized he was gone and went on a frantic search. They found him staring at the meat case in disbelief. All that meat and it wasn't rotting. That was the first indication to him that things were different in the US. What finally convinced him that the US was completely different was when he was taken aboard a US carrier and watched flight ops. He said afterwards that the Soviets would never be able to operate a fleet carrier. Everybody on that flight deck needs to trust everyone else. The person in charge of the deck is an enlisted man. For some things, the NCO in charge of the deck trumps the captain of the ship. No NCO in the USSR would have ever been given that level of authority. Few officers would have. Fighter pilots were under complete ground control every minute they were in the air. They didn't do anything without control from the ground. Bill

2ndACR -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/13/2008 3:45:56 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: castor troy quote: ORIGINAL: herwin quote: ORIGINAL: 2ndACR In the 2nd Amored Cavalry stationed in Bamburg, WG we were told that we (the regiment) would cease to exist a a fighting force after 7 days combat against the Warsaw Pact. 7 out of 10 would be dead, missing or wounded. Of course, we would start the fight at the border and trade lives for time until the Russians hit the MLR about 60 miles behind us. Lucky for me, the wall fell and then we went and beat up on the Iraqi's. I agree with your sentiment. The point is that the Warsaw Pact forces would have been burnt out more quickly. Your ACR could reasonably expect to ruin a couple of divisions and perhaps a corps in those seven days. Mission accomplished. a couple of divisions? What does acr stand for? Armored cavalry rgt? How big is a rgt in the US forces when they could expect to wreck a couple of Soviet divisions. And why should the Warsaw pact divisions so much worse? Back then, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment could easily take on 3-1 odds and kick the stuffing out of it. An ACR has alot of teeth but short on tail. 2/3rds the combat power of an Armored Division with only 1/3 the manpower. In 1989-1991 we had (deployed to Iraq) 160 M1a1 heavy armor, 160 M3 Bradleys, 24 M109a2 155mm howitzers, 24 Cobra's. With 4800 personnel in the regiment. We carry enough ammo and supplies for 7 days combat internally. We have 3 Cav Squadrons each with 3 Cav troops, 1 tank company, 1 how battery and a service company. Each Cav troop is equipped with 13 M3 Bradleys, 9 M1a1 HA, 2 120mm mortar tracks and a Fist track. The tank company has 14 M1a1 HA and 2 120mm mortar tracks, plus FIST. The you add in the CO, XO, S3 who all have M1a1 HA and I think they had 6 Bradleys. Basically we have a tank Battalion and a mech Infantry Battalion worth of Bradleys (but not the infantrymen) all in one Squadron (Battalion). We are the ultimate in combined arms warriors. I still think the army should have nothing but ACR's for armored formations. Once in theater (Saudi) we were assigned, the 214th arty brigade, an attack helcopter brigade, an engineer brigade and an MP battalion and also a combat support BN. Our full bird Colonel had under his command if my memory serves, 16,000 troops. So basically we became a division.

castor troy -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/15/2008 12:35:44 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: 2ndACR quote: ORIGINAL: castor troy quote: ORIGINAL: herwin quote: ORIGINAL: 2ndACR In the 2nd Amored Cavalry stationed in Bamburg, WG we were told that we (the regiment) would cease to exist a a fighting force after 7 days combat against the Warsaw Pact. 7 out of 10 would be dead, missing or wounded. Of course, we would start the fight at the border and trade lives for time until the Russians hit the MLR about 60 miles behind us. Lucky for me, the wall fell and then we went and beat up on the Iraqi's. I agree with your sentiment. The point is that the Warsaw Pact forces would have been burnt out more quickly. Your ACR could reasonably expect to ruin a couple of divisions and perhaps a corps in those seven days. Mission accomplished. a couple of divisions? What does acr stand for? Armored cavalry rgt? How big is a rgt in the US forces when they could expect to wreck a couple of Soviet divisions. And why should the Warsaw pact divisions so much worse? Back then, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment could easily take on 3-1 odds and kick the stuffing out of it. An ACR has alot of teeth but short on tail. 2/3rds the combat power of an Armored Division with only 1/3 the manpower. In 1989-1991 we had (deployed to Iraq) 160 M1a1 heavy armor, 160 M3 Bradleys, 24 M109a2 155mm howitzers, 24 Cobra's. With 4800 personnel in the regiment. We carry enough ammo and supplies for 7 days combat internally. We have 3 Cav Squadrons each with 3 Cav troops, 1 tank company, 1 how battery and a service company. Each Cav troop is equipped with 13 M3 Bradleys, 9 M1a1 HA, 2 120mm mortar tracks and a Fist track. The tank company has 14 M1a1 HA and 2 120mm mortar tracks, plus FIST. The you add in the CO, XO, S3 who all have M1a1 HA and I think they had 6 Bradleys. Basically we have a tank Battalion and a mech Infantry Battalion worth of Bradleys (but not the infantrymen) all in one Squadron (Battalion). We are the ultimate in combined arms warriors. I still think the army should have nothing but ACR's for armored formations. Once in theater (Saudi) we were assigned, the 214th arty brigade, an attack helcopter brigade, an engineer brigade and an MP battalion and also a combat support BN. Our full bird Colonel had under his command if my memory serves, 16,000 troops. So basically we became a division. I see, thx for the info. Now I know that an ACR has more firepower than the whole Austrian Army! [X(]

herwin -> RE: The B.S. Power of CD (6/15/2008 7:21:29 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: castor troy I see, thx for the info. Now I know that an ACR has more firepower than the whole Austrian Army! [X(] At one point in my professional career, I put together an OB for all the troops on both sides in Central Europe, including their peacetime garrison locations. I believe at that time, an ACR did have more firepower than the whole Austrian Army. It was certainly comparable.

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