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Curtis Lemay -> RE: The Truck Unit Icon (1/27/2008 6:04:33 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
The current supply system 'works fine' in the sense that designers restrict themselves to topics where the flaws aren't crippling and then treat those topics in such a way as to simply rule out the sort of abuses that the current system would permit. Like, what happens if one sends an armored brigade into the deep desert in CFNA? Well, you can't -- the deep desert isn't there for you to do the impossible in.

Even when the scenarios do work, they do so in spite of the supply system, not because of it. One never has to deal with the fact that this one road can't support ten divisions, etc -- one just attacks anyway, and it doesn't look too bad.

On the whole, to say that scenarios work and that therefore the supply system is just fine is a bit like observing that humanity survived the Middle Ages and that therefore medical practices were just fine. Not exactly -- TOAW is merely not rendered completely unusable in all cases by its supply system. This is not evidence that the supply system is just fine. In fact, one look at its underlying paradigm and it becomes clear that it is not and never can be.


Again, you're listing benefits that are so small that they can't possibly justify the enormous cost of physically handling supplies. Most of these are footnote issues at best. The real beneficiaries of moving supplies are going to be the subjects that depend upon extensive sea communications. It's just a waste to create that system until those sea communication issues have been addressed.




ColinWright -> RE: The Truck Unit Icon (1/27/2008 9:28:47 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: JAMiAM
You did read the 5, or so, pages that deal with supplies, didn't you?

Mechanically, it is fairly simplistic, and any discrete supply paradigm must maintain a reasonable level of simplicity for usability's sake. I'm not looking at ripping off the OCS system, whole cloth, but rather taking the concept and extending its usability by utilizing the strengths of our computers to keep track of the supply stockpiles, proportional unit usages, estimating/projecting formation requirements, transport (delivery) capacities, etc.


No I didn't, and I'm not going to be able to for a while. But it seemed likely that units were characterized simply by a combat strength and either had supply or didn't. So I'm guessing that elevating that concept to TOAW's level, where units are complex amalgamations of hundreds of peices of assorted types of equipment and have unit supply values ranging from 1 to 100, the subject would become about as complex as what I've been describing.

I'll also guess that the prerequisite issues I've listed are probably already implemented in that system. So there are ways to lift supply by truck, horse teams, cargo/amphibious vessels, aircraft, etc. And ways to interdict them. Because those issues are easy to add to a board game - about as easy as adding them to a wishlist.


After all, if Curtis has decided something is a 'prerequisite,' to a system, and there's already a such system, it follows that it must have satisfied those prerequisites.

Either that, or....




ColinWright -> RE: The Truck Unit Icon (1/27/2008 9:29:30 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
The current supply system 'works fine' in the sense that designers restrict themselves to topics where the flaws aren't crippling and then treat those topics in such a way as to simply rule out the sort of abuses that the current system would permit. Like, what happens if one sends an armored brigade into the deep desert in CFNA? Well, you can't -- the deep desert isn't there for you to do the impossible in.

Even when the scenarios do work, they do so in spite of the supply system, not because of it. One never has to deal with the fact that this one road can't support ten divisions, etc -- one just attacks anyway, and it doesn't look too bad.

On the whole, to say that scenarios work and that therefore the supply system is just fine is a bit like observing that humanity survived the Middle Ages and that therefore medical practices were just fine. Not exactly -- TOAW is merely not rendered completely unusable in all cases by its supply system. This is not evidence that the supply system is just fine. In fact, one look at its underlying paradigm and it becomes clear that it is not and never can be.


Again, you're listing benefits that are so small that they can't possibly justify the enormous cost of physically handling supplies. Most of these are footnote issues at best. The real beneficiaries of moving supplies are going to be the subjects that depend upon extensive sea communications. It's just a waste to create that system until those sea communication issues have been addressed.


footnote issue. Yes, Curtis.




ColinWright -> RE: The Truck Unit Icon (1/29/2008 5:11:21 AM)

I'm not sure there's actually any point in attempting to argue this issue -- my opponent seems to be essentially bullet-proof in the relevant departments -- but here's another example of how supply volume is neither a 'footnote issue' nor only relevant only to 'marginal scenarios.'

The passage below is from Barrie Pitt's 1918: the Last Act. It refers to a situation that was neither trivial nor marginal. It's not even amphibious. In fact, it's squarely in the middle of a primary, land-based front -- and deals with a failed attack that did much to mark the last hurrah of one of the contestants. It has to do with the reasons for Ludendorff's catastrophically unsuccessful Rheims offensive in 1918.

"...as his entire front in the Marne bulge had to be supplied through the single rail way junction of Soissons on the extreme west, he was under pressure from his Staff to mount yet another attack in the area in order to capture Rheims and give himself another supply line on the east..."

Now in TOAW-land, why would Ludendorff want to do that? After all, if one rail line will suffice to support ten divisions, it will suffice to support forty. No need at all to clear a second rail line -- unless one assumes that supply is in fact volume-based, and that a flow that will suffice for x divisions will not necessarily suffice for 2x divisions.

Really one can find this sort of thing all over the place if one chooses to look for it, and in fact, if one can make a perfectly good scenario covering the Western Front in 1918, it will be good in spite of TOAW's supply paradigm, not because of it. After all, in TOAW-land, clear one rail line, and you'll be fine. Supply is like cell-phone coverage. If you've got a signal, you've got a signal. Doesn't matter how many others are trying to use the same signal.

I didn't go looking for this. I just happened to be reading -- and there it was. I'm confident that I could pick up another book on another campaign in another war -- and find something similar. Supply in actual warfare is not like cell phone coverage. It's volume-based, and if TOAW is to accurately reflect the needs and constraints that govern actual warfare, then it needs to have a volume-based supply system as well.




Curtis Lemay -> RE: The Truck Unit Icon (1/30/2008 5:10:15 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
"...as his entire front in the Marne bulge had to be supplied through the single rail way junction of Soissons on the extreme west, he was under pressure from his Staff to mount yet another attack in the area in order to capture Rheims and give himself another supply line on the east..."


Sounds to me that it was the distance the eastern part of the operation was from the railhead, not the railhead's capacity that was the issue. TOAW's paradigm does model supply disipation due to distance (the supply radius thing).




ColinWright -> RE: The Truck Unit Icon (1/30/2008 10:24:05 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay


quote:

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
"...as his entire front in the Marne bulge had to be supplied through the single rail way junction of Soissons on the extreme west, he was under pressure from his Staff to mount yet another attack in the area in order to capture Rheims and give himself another supply line on the east..."


Sounds to me that it was the distance the eastern part of the operation was from the railhead, not the railhead's capacity that was the issue. TOAW's paradigm does model supply disipation due to distance (the supply radius thing).


There is that argument.




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