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John 3rd -> From the President of the United States (2/15/2009 11:05:35 PM)
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This is Dan's response:
[font="arial" lang="0"]John,
It's really interesting to read your analysis, but I think you may have fallen into the trap of seeing your weaknesses, assuming I can see them too, and forgetting that I have problems of my own. (And you'll think the same of my analysis when you read my take on these things).
1) My troops in Hue had no supplies and I feared that they could be pushed out easily. I had already prepped them for Hanoi so that I could try to make a stand there. Had you moved north from Camranh Bay, I was going to have to pull back. The supply sitaution for the Chinese was that troubling.
2) The Japs have more ground troops than they'll ever need in this game; time and territory are the real enemies. The Japs could have tied up the Allies in SEAC for many more invaluable months. You would have lost a bunch of troops in the end, but you would have held key bases, and tied up critical Allied assets, for a long time to come. You say I could have had this territory three or four months ago; I think you could've still had a blocking presence there for at least that much longer.
3) Iwo was one of three possible targets (along with Philippines and Hokkaido) after the Midway invasion. Formosa/Okinawa weren't in consideration. I didn't know how strongly you held those two at the time, but I do know that I could have never supplied those bases had I taken them. I would've taken them, but couldn't have supplied them and it would've become a nightmare. Heck, my bases on Sikhalin Island were very tenuous for about three months, and Sikhlalin much more secure than Formosa or Okinawa would've been.
4) The original target of my December invasion was Hokkaido alone; but the invasion fell apart and the Sikhalin bases and Aleutians became last minute objectives hoping to salvage something (fortunately, that turned out well). I was basing that move on the assumption that you would commit the KB and your combat ships to halt the invasion of Hokkaido, which you would have succeeded in doing; when you didn't do so, I unexpectedly managed to get alot of troops ashlucky to have anything ashore at Hokkaido, and very, very lucky to have had the foresite (or maybe the dumb luck) to seize those Sikhlain bases. It was winter. If you'd have 50-75 AV at both bases I'd never have gotten them.
5) Had you committed your combat ships and the full KB defending Hokkaido, the war would have ended there with a Japanese victory. I still don't know why your combat ships didn't hit the invasion beaches, and why the KB didn't come full steam ahead, especially after you wiped out the American carrier strike aircraft.
Now, that's just from MY perspective; undoubtedly, my interpretation is colored by my own perceptions about your strengths and my weaknesses.
I am proud of the Malaya campaign for several reasons. The few comments I got on my AAR urged me to concentrate on a land campaign, but I rejected that and decided I wanted the British to remain mobile. That amphibious mobility became a huge asset. Even then, that campaign was intended to be nothing more than a "meat-grinder" to draw Japanese forces and to attrition them if possible. That was successful too. But I never expected SEAC to host such major Allied advances. When the KB and your combat ships went that way, it allowed me to bring in the supplies and reinforcements I needed to secure Sikhalin Island and allow it to serve as a base for bombers.
So both of us have had opportunities that we've missed, and seen weaknesses in our own situations that we may have over emphasized, and successes.
You're right; the game has been a blast! Thanks for sticking in so long and so faithfully. Yo'ure a tremendously clever and meticulous opponent.
Dan
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