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Ron Saueracker -> (4/7/2002 6:28:01 PM)
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My concept of variables were not clearly presented in the above. The above refers to a head to head match between to humans (no AI) from start of May 42 campaign, and possible outcomes which lend themselves to the "Midway Happens" (offboard) default setting, and, of course, to whatever reinforcements are available post Midway.
One can never guarantee the same result at Coral Sea as the historical. Regardless of minor ships, and strategic acquisitions, it's the heavy CVs which count. The Japanese disaster at Midway was, in many ways, the result of the IJN splitting up it's six strong carrier fleet in order to conduct two almost simultaneous forays against the allies (Coral Sea and Midway). Having lost the use of both Shokaku and Zuikaku in May, only the four heavies were available for Midway. Having sunk Lexington, but only slightly damaging Yorktown (IJN thought she went down), left the three Yorktown class to thwart the Midway operation.
So, historically, it was 4 heavy IJN CVs vs. 3 heavy USN CVs = 4 CV lost for Japan, 1 CV lost for USN at Midway. My point is, should all four IJN carriers (Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu) be lost if let's say in our game, the Lexington and Yorktown were both sunk in May and obviously not available in June (or any other time except as guest cameos on a Robert Ballard National Geographic Explorer special)? Conversely, if only Shokaku was damaged and Zuikaku's air group was more or less intact, and same result on USN side (both CVs sunk) for the month of May, theoretically, there would have been 5 IJN CV vs 2 USN CV for "offboard" Midway clash. The IJN should not automatically lose Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, while the USN still has Enterprise and Hornet as reinforcements.
There should be a facility in the campaign which can interpret altered odds (number of heavy CVs on either side) for offboard Midway debacle. Midway should still be weighted heavily on allied side to simulate the mauling wrought oupon IJN by the surprise acheived through code breaking, but if 5 IJN CVs were to go up against 2 USN CVs, perhaps the Japanese lose 2, and suffer 1 severley damaged, while the USN suffers the loss of 1 CV and the other severly damaged (but somehow scare the IJN away, thrwarting the landing), thereby somewhat abstractly dealing with whatever may have happenned to the assets utilized (and, or lost) in month of May 42, and reflecting this in the post Midway reinforcement pipeline.
The results of a May 42 confrontation should have as direct a result on the fortunes of war in the game as they did historically. If the Allies were to suffer a defeat in May, any offboard "Midway happens" odds will not give them parity in carriers, so no Guadalcanal landing. This of course lends the rest of the campaign to a holding action in South Pacific theatre against a Japanese thrust south, as you and I have suggested above. If altered odds can't be taken into consideration for the "Midway Happens" default, then it should be skipped and the assumption should be made that the Japanese go for the showdown in South Pacific as ADM King put a high priority on maintaining lines of communication along the Hawaii/Samoa and Samoa/Australia corridor.
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