Raindem -> RE: CSV T46 (6/15/2008 3:42:13 PM)
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Allied Turns 41-46: The war has fallen into a cyclic set of repititive operations. Each turn what VC there are will split up and convert surrounding hexes. In my turn I go around after them and mop up. We are not utilizing any optional rules and this is where Optional Rule #1 really benefits the NLF, in that the Allied player doesn't automatically know exactly where to go. Every 2 or 3 turns an artillery unit blasts 20 or 30 planes in an airbase attack. Larry will leave the artillery unit on the map (instead of disbanding) in order to squeeze out those last couple of rounds. Bad for me, but at least I get to KIA the aggressors. My air losses have thus been high considering the limited amount of on-field action there is. And every 4 months or so the NVA muster up enough strength to cross the border and cause some trouble. But it's not like the first time. If they penetrate far enough for me to get behind them I can usually squash the threat the same turn it appears. Otherwise I will just engage and wear them down a couple of turns before attacking. This keeps my losses down but increases the risk of losing points to NLF activity activations. Fortunately they've not penetrated far enough to trigger those. As we approach the end of 1968 it's time to take a reckoning of the situtation. The victory level is at 65. This is a marginal Allied victory. The EEV is at 55, which is way low historically and compared to most other games of CSV. At this rate the U.S. won't be forced into withdrawal until 1974 which doesn't give the NLF enough time to complete the conquest. So the situation is cause for optimism, but not celebration. The reason it's not is because Larry has been conserving his VC strength and he knows how to use them. Since I've given up attacks against the HCM trail he's getting thousands of new recruits. So the potential is there and I'm aware of it. However, with the NVA weakend by questionable border raids (I don't see the cost benefit), his options are limited.
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