RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted

RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (Full Version)

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Barb -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/29/2009 10:35:14 PM)
Well, as pointed out previously: The japanese spy will surely hear crew recals, see the ships sailing out of the harbor as fast as they can. Nagumo gets the message. "WTF?!", turn his back and run back for Japan. No PH. [:)]

stuman -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/29/2009 11:12:56 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Barb Well, as pointed out previously: The japanese spy will surely hear crew recals, see the ships sailing out of the harbor as fast as they can. Nagumo gets the message. "WTF?!", turn his back and run back for Japan. No PH. [:)] WTF?! ... does that stand for " Westerly Task Force " ?

HMAS Sydney -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 12:12:47 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: witpqs I suspect the best action (this is with all hindsight) would have been staying in PH fully alert and ready. Torpedo nets? Yeah! Why the heck didn't they already do that anyway? Serious question, BTW, I've never heard why. It was believed the harbour was too shallow to allow torpedoes. It was believed they would hit the bottom when dropped. The Japanese also believed this at first but they designed a way to enable torpedoes to not hit the bottom.

witpqs -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 12:23:33 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Barb Well, as pointed out previously: The japanese spy will surely hear crew recals, see the ships sailing out of the harbor as fast as they can. Nagumo gets the message. "WTF?!", turn his back and run back for Japan. No PH. [:)] I doubt that any spy in Hawaii could have contacted Nagumo's task force, even indirectly. I think any alert would have taken too long to get to him.

AW1Steve -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 2:02:40 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: stuman quote: ORIGINAL: Barb Well, as pointed out previously: The japanese spy will surely hear crew recals, see the ships sailing out of the harbor as fast as they can. Nagumo gets the message. "WTF?!", turn his back and run back for Japan. No PH. [:)] WTF?! ... does that stand for " Westerly Task Force " ? A common USN radio call , used when someone is doing something extremely stupid. As in "what the fudge? Over". [:D]

Anthropoid -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 2:30:19 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: witpqs quote: ORIGINAL: Barb Well, as pointed out previously: The japanese spy will surely hear crew recals, see the ships sailing out of the harbor as fast as they can. Nagumo gets the message. "WTF?!", turn his back and run back for Japan. No PH. [:)] I doubt that any spy in Hawaii could have contacted Nagumo's task force, even indirectly. I think any alert would have taken too long to get to him. Given the radio silence under which KB operated, I tend to agree: even if battle fleet had pulled out the day before, 12 or 18 hours before the attack, I don't see how Kido Butai could have gotten word of it. Add to this that their sub screen had not deployed as intended: properly warned, US might well have slipped most of the fleet out to a safe area, and then when the Japanese strike force arrived they would have been dropping those fancy torpedoes on empty berths, and getting shot down in substantially higher numbers. In sum, the outcome might well have been a disaster for Japan, instead of a disaster for U.S.

Hornblower -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 2:33:42 AM)
what if nagomo saw a PBY or B-17 suddenly loom out of the clouds over head, would he still attack?

Nikademus -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 2:44:37 AM)
I believe they had a surprise failed option....but the approach route was chosen deliberately to avoid detection

witpqs -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 2:46:21 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Anthropoid Add to this that their sub screen had not deployed as intended... This I didn't know about. What happened?

witpqs -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 2:47:52 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Nikademus I believe they had a surprise failed option....but the approach route was chosen deliberately to avoid detection I just remembered the big chance for alert (because there was early detection) was if Joe Stalin had decided to pass that merchant ship sighting along to the US.

borner -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 3:26:27 AM)
you also have to figure it was a weekend, with a lot of crew on shore leave. If you give the US commanders 24 hours notice, how long would it take to get the fleet ready to get underway and out to sea?

Nikademus -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 3:45:04 AM)
I believe the ship's were crewed enough to put to sea relatively quickly. 24 hours notice would be more than enough time. Some might not make it back in time but not enough to prevent the ship from being sortied.

DivePac88 -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 3:56:41 AM)
Depends on their fuel status, if they were in a ready condition, or on something like 24-36-48hrs notice (remember it was peace time). I think the Home Fleet during WW2 at Scapa Flow, was on something like 9hrs notice when not on operations.

Barb -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 8:53:59 AM)
radio silence equals not transmitting while receiving is possible. Of course the spy must have phone to Tokio and than the message has to be transmitted through half of the world and received properly. It will take some time surely. Depends on time of the warning for the PH. On the other hand there is possibility that USN sortied out, and as Japanese attacking waves are met with fierce fighter/Ack-Ack opposition they will find anchorages empty. At the time Second wave will be already in the air, so no real possibility to send them to search for US Fleet. If so, 800kg AP bombs carried by Kates will be mostly ineffectual agains maneuvring ships at sea -dropped from height. So this will require 3rd wave. And lurking in range of LBAs isnt a clever idea as air force would surely send all their bombers out of the fields ASAP. Add surprise in form of Lexington + Enterprise striking from good position and with little luck you could have half of the KB in Davy Jones Locker (Lex and Big E + some old battlewagons too).

herwin -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 9:32:12 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Barb radio silence equals not transmitting while receiving is possible. Of course the spy must have phone to Tokio and than the message has to be transmitted through half of the world and received properly. It will take some time surely. Depends on time of the warning for the PH. It was all set up beforehand. The spy at the Japanese consulate had a routine that would have provided adequate notice of the fleet deploying--remember, to get steam up and recall the crews would have taken several very public hours in peacetime.

spence -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 11:33:20 AM)
quote: It was all set up beforehand. The spy at the Japanese consulate had a routine that would have provided adequate notice of the fleet deploying-- "Tora, Tora, Tora" showed just how "efficiently" and "securely" the Japanese diplomatic service handled communications. Practically instantaneous.[sm=00000506.gif][sm=00000280.gif]

John Lansford -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 12:01:34 PM)
The KB strike force had two attack plans, one if surprise was achieved and one if they didn't. IIRC the "no surprise" plan was for the DB's and fighters to hit the airfields first, and the ship attack planes follow them in. The surprise option reversed that order. Fuchida saw that he had surprise, so he fired one flare as that was the signal, but when a flight of planes didn't respond he fired another to get their attention. Two flares, though, was the signal for "no surprise", and the DB's took off for the airfields simultaneously with the ship attack planes, creating a bit of confusion but ultimately making little difference in the outcome.

Anthropoid -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 2:30:56 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: witpqs quote: ORIGINAL: Anthropoid Add to this that their sub screen had not deployed as intended... This I didn't know about. What happened? Maybe I'm confusing with Midway? Somebody check me on this . . . I remembered that they had intended to have a sub 'cordon' around the PH area to monitor ship traffic, but that it had not got into position. I do seem to recall now that this was the case with Midway, and maybe the sub screen was in position for PH??

Anthropoid -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 2:40:23 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: herwin quote: ORIGINAL: Barb radio silence equals not transmitting while receiving is possible. Of course the spy must have phone to Tokio and than the message has to be transmitted through half of the world and received properly. It will take some time surely. Depends on time of the warning for the PH. It was all set up beforehand. The spy at the Japanese consulate had a routine that would have provided adequate notice of the fleet deploying--remember, to get steam up and recall the crews would have taken several very public hours in peacetime. Okay, I didn't realize "silence" only meant no transmissions. So what you guys are saying: If the USN had sortied the fleet during the night of Dec 6, the spy would have been out there at night, observing the port? I find that hard to believe. Had the fleet sortied during business hours on Dec 6, then yes perhaps word would have made it back to Tokyo and to the Fleet before they launched their planes in the wee hours of Dec 7. Interestingly, this suggests a curvilinear relationship between the impact of an "alert." Had PH been elerted 20 or 24 hours before KB launched her planes, and sortied during daylight/business hours of Dec 6, the whole thing might never have happened, else the Japanese might have adjusted their plan to cope with the fact that their primary target (the BBs) would not be in its waiting, vulnerable location. But as you get to more like 8 or 12 hours before the KB launched her planes (end of day Dec 6, or evening Dec 6) the chance that the spy would have been watching to notice the Battle Fleet sortying would arguably been lower (he had a Dentist office that overlooked the port right?), and therefore that the KB attack would have been launched anyway might have increased?

anarchyintheuk -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 5:25:08 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Anthropoid quote: ORIGINAL: witpqs quote: ORIGINAL: Anthropoid Add to this that their sub screen had not deployed as intended... This I didn't know about. What happened? Maybe I'm confusing with Midway? Somebody check me on this . . . I remembered that they had intended to have a sub 'cordon' around the PH area to monitor ship traffic, but that it had not got into position. I do seem to recall now that this was the case with Midway, and maybe the sub screen was in position for PH?? Pretty sure you're thinking of Midway. The sub cordon was late setting up. TFs 16 & 17 had already cleared the area on the way to Point Luck.

John Lansford -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 6:09:34 PM)
Even if the Japanese informant found out the fleet was leaving Pearl Harbor that evening, how would he alert the KB? He didn't have direct contact with them, and by the time he got a telegram or phone call to Japan and they decided to tell the strike force the KB would almost be in position and ready to launch. This is assuming that the PacFleet began recalling their crews off of shore leave the evening of the 6th, btw.

Joe Kemper -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 6:40:24 PM)
I want to thank everyone for their comments. I have learned quite a bit. The reason I asked the question is to use AE, when available, to try various alternative situations to the attack on Pearl Harbor. One scenario has Pearl Harbor alerted to a carrier attack with the KB unaware that the fleet has sortied, radio problems or something of that sort that would have prevented them from knowing (please indulge me here). Anyway, I don't know what the pre-war doctrine would have produced in the way of a response. I don't want my game response to be implausible. So, the KB is coming unaware. We know it is a carrier strike force but actual composition unknown. We know generally what direction they are coming from. Out of the list of possibilities, I wonder which ones would have been likely responses. 1. If time permitted, have Enterprise join the battleship fleet and attempt to engage. Have Lexington attempt to intercept independently. 2. If time did not permit, attempt to engage or drive away the enemy fleet with the battleships, without air cover(pre-war belief that the battleships can defend themselves against air attack). Have Enterprise and Lexington attack independently as soon as they could. 2a. Same as 2 but keep the battleships within land based air cover. 3. Withdraw the battleships to safe waters. Still have Enterprise and Lexington attack independently. 4. Withdraw the battleships to safe waters. Order the carriers to not engage but re-join the fleet. Or none of the above, these are just the ones I can think of, I'm sure there are others. At this point, I'm not really concerned with guessing the outcomes of these events (I'll let the AE combat system decide that). Again, I am interested in what the decision makers of that time would most likely have done. Thanks again.

engineer -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 8:24:50 PM)
Interesting question.� One of the reference books I have back in my library recounts that Kimmel did react to one of the early alerts in November 1941 with a sortie against a suspected Japanese strike.� He slipped out of Pearl just after dark and made for the area from which the KB would launch the it's own�air strikes on December 7th.� If this had happened on December 7, the sun would have come up with four US battleships and the Lexington with their escorts in contact with KB from first light.� The LBA on Oahu would have been on alert to support the fleet.� It would seem to me that the�outcome would have entailed: Sinking�Lexington and�the battleships.� Any cruisers at sea would have probably also been sunk or damaged. Disrupted the strike on Pearl Harbor itself so the CAP would have had a reasonable chance to break up the attack, certainly the contact reports from the radar station on Oahu wouldn't have been dismissed. The Americans would have had a slim chance of damaging one or more of the KB's carriers with gunfire, air strikes from�Lexington or air strikes from Oahu.� The KB would have almost certainly suffered higher than historical air crew losses from the alerted US defenses. In WitP, the result would be far more favorable to the US.� The KB would have it's strike aircraft on a "Port Attack" or "Airfield Attack" while the Lexington would have a "Naval Strike" selected.�The battleships would have been in a second TF on a "surface combat" mission. The residual CAP over the KB would probably stop most of the bombers, but�some lucky SBD's might punch a couple of bombs into a carrier.� The alerted LBA at Pearl would launch their own naval strikes from high altitude and do little but give Japanese pilots victories.� However, the CAP would at least winnow the strike on Pearl.� The remaining ships in harbor would be pummeled.� After the air strikes were resolved sinking or badly damaging the battleships in Pearl Harbor and wrecking the air fields, there would possibly�be�a surface action with four dreadnoughts plus escorts versus the KB.� The presence of a damaged carrier might well be decisive there in terms of prolonging the engagement.� How that battle resolved would cast a shadow on the rest of the war.� This would go down in the history books as insanely good fortune for the US that would be been rewarded or punished by the events of the day. However, historically, the Japanese got the breaks. This would have just tilted the table the other way.

engineer -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 8:31:13 PM)
Miller's War Plan Orange talks about Kimmel's war plans in detail. He shared the sentiment that the KB would probably stay in the western Pacific supporting the attack on the Philippines or SRA at the outset of the war. His operational plans called for an offensive sweep into the Marshalls with the battle line as bait and his carriers operating in consort to ambush anything that the Japanese sortied to engage the Pacific Fleet.

witpqs -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 8:44:06 PM)
engineer, it was Enterprise that was close to PH on 12/7, Lexington was much farther away. I agree with your analysis, BTW. Even in a surface engagement the KB would have had some punch. They did have a lot of torpedoes present, didn't they?

engineer -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 8:49:44 PM)
No, Enterprise was out towards Johnston Island. I think she arrived at Pearl soon after the attack, on either the 8th or 9th. The sortie I described was back closer to Thanksgiving, before Lexington made her run out to Wake to deliver Marine fighters to the island.

Anthropoid -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 8:53:30 PM)
Of course you know I respect your opinion tremendously Enginneer, but how is it that the KB strike would necessarily _both_ tangle with the Oahu CAP / pummel the remaining ships in harbor _and_ sink the lead ships in two different but converging TFs (Lex from the south-southwest and Kimmels BB TF from Oahu?). Depending on the exact timing of sightings, wouldn't it be equaly plausible that: 6:00 AM KB launches her first wave pre-dawn, meanwhile Lex TF and Kimmel BB TF are steaming more-or-less in their direction. quote: 06:00 The first wave of the Japanese attack takes off for Hawaii from ships anchored north of the islands. 06:26 Japanese pilots bound for Pearl see the sun rise, and the vivid shafts of light bring to mind their naval flag. Sunrise comes, and the second wave of KB is in preparation to launch, as is suggested by the information at this site quote: Near Oahu - At 7:15 a.m., a second attack wave of 167 planes takes off from the Japanese carriers and heads for Pearl Harbor. I note from the wiki page for Pearl Harbor attack that out of the total planned CAP 48 fighters, only "nine fighters from the first wave." quote: In all, 405 aircraft were intended to be used: 360 for the two attack waves, 48 on defensive combat air patrol (CAP), including nine fighters from the first wave. The first wave was to be the primary attack, while the second wave was to finish whatever tasks remained. The first wave contained the bulk of the weapons to attack capital ships, mainly torpedoes. The aircrews were ordered to select the highest value targets (battleships and aircraft carriers) or, if either were not present, any other high value ships (cruisers and destroyers). Dive bombers were to attack ground targets. Fighters were ordered to strafe and destroy as many parked aircraft as possible to ensure they did not get into the air to counterattack the bombers, especially in the first wave. When the fighters' fuel got low they were to refuel at the aircraft carriers and return to combat. Fighters were to serve CAP duties where needed, especially over US airfields. So assuming your scenario is correct and Kimmel sorties in the middle of the night to the area from which KB launched her first wave, then we could pretty safely assume that (a) KB would not know, unless a sub saw the fleet sortie; and (b) by about 6:15 am (10 minutes before sunrise) the bulk of the weapons for attacking capital ships would be in the air in the 183 planes of the first wave and on their way to the harbor, where, in actual history, they arrived and began to attack at 7:48 am. A _LOT_ could depend on the exact sequence of events between 6am and 8am. KB's second wave did not launch until 7:15AM, so if planes from Lex happened to spot KB sometime between 6:26 and 7am they would only have had a cap of 9 fighters to contend with. If at the same time, an LBA and US TF with multiple BBs (why would it necessarily have been only four of them?) etc. are bearing down on the KB with only two BBs, two CAs, one CL, sundry DDs . . . well it seems like there are a whole range of possible outcomes.

witpqs -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 8:58:40 PM)
I thought you meant if they had sortied on Dec 7, in which case Enterprise was the closer one. BTW, I'm not sure how far away she was on the morning of Dec 7, but close enough that a few of her planes were in combat with some KB planes near PH.

jeffk3510 -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 9:10:09 PM)
Had Ben Affleck and Josh Hartnett been around in 41', things wouldn't have been as bad. I've heard too many things to really form an opinion of the whole thing..... I think we had an idea something was going to happen, somewhere...that is about all the farther I stick my neck out to argue with anyone I come around.

John Lansford -> RE: Pearl Harbor Alerted (4/30/2009 9:10:18 PM)
IIRC Enterprise was close enough to have actually entered Pearl Harbor the afternoon of the 7th, but Halsey stayed out for a day longer to patrol south of Oahu. Some of his planes landed that afternoon at Ford Island and a couple were shot down by trigger happy gunners.

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