RE: Pearl - one hour alert (Full Version)

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borner -> RE: Pearl - one hour alert (5/6/2009 3:32:41 AM)

There had also been repeated alerts, so the situation there was not a complete peacetime footing. I agree the AA guns of the ships woudl have been manned and ready. I am unsure of the approach the Kates took to Battleship row, and how much fire they would have taken. I do not think getting underway in an hour with a short crew is realistic though. overall, the biggest difference would have been seen in the fleet in regards to increased effectiveness.

On land, I think some of the installations and guns would have been manned, but agree not all. An infantry division is a pretty big monster to get moving at a monents notice.

The big question is the airfileds. How many, if any, alert fighters did they have, that if given 60 minutes notice could have gotten in the air? How much of an effect do these have in damage to the fields, and readiness for the second wave.

One big point is to look at the KB's raids in the Indian Ocean, and again at Midway. When they encountered opponents ready for them, the effectiveness of the strikes were much less, even if the opposition was overcome. Would that have then translated to the Pearl Harbor attack?




anarchyintheuk -> RE: Pearl - one hour alert (5/6/2009 4:55:51 PM)

I wouldn't have wanted be standing directly across from BB row while the Kates were coming in if the ship's aa batteries had been alerted.




Knavey -> RE: Pearl - one hour alert (5/6/2009 9:38:59 PM)

No way the ships would have gotten underway in an hour unless they were already making preps.

Warming up the boilers and getting steam from cold iron takes a while.

Making the transition from shore power to ships power...etc.

Would be interesting to know what state Nevada was in when the bombs started falling.

Still, it has been pointed out that the BBs would have been sunk in deeper water had they made it out of port, and I agree with that assessment.




bobogoboom -> RE: Pearl - one hour alert (5/7/2009 12:07:06 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

I wouldn't have wanted be standing directly across from BB row while the Kates were coming in if the ship's aa batteries had been alerted.

from everything i have read. the 50 cals that were mounted at the time were pretty ineffective v aircraft and im not sure if any of the bbs had the newer 5inch guns. i thought they got all the new stuff after the refits.




engineer -> RE: Pearl - one hour alert (5/7/2009 12:53:07 AM)

According to accounts, Nevada got under way at 0840 and only started raising steam at the outset of the attack.  That doesn't correspond with other accounts I recall that said that Nevada was already raising steam at the outset of the attack.  It seems that 1-2 hours to raise steam is reasonable.  I was able to run down a declassified after action report from the USS Pennsylvania at Pearl Harbor.  She was taking power and steam from shore while in drydock.  Bomb damage interrupted these supplies.  A boiler was fired at 0830 and by 1028 they had enough steam to spin a pair of generators to restore electric power to the ship.  Storage batteries provided back-up power during the interval between interrupting the shore power and bringing the generators on line. http://usspennsylvania.org/Dec71941report.htm 




treespider -> RE: Pearl - one hour alert (5/7/2009 12:56:39 AM)

Picked this up in a used book store -

Long Day's Journey into War: December 7, 1941
Stanley Weintraub

An hour by hour account of events across the globe on December 7, 1941 starting at:

Hour 1
Midnight - December 7 - Wake Island
10:00pm- December 6 - Tokyo
2:00pm - December 6 - Moscow
2:30am - December 6 - Pearl Harbor


The following extract is from Hour 29
2:00am - December 8 - Tokyo
11:40pm - December 7 - Malaya
12:00noon December 7 - Washington
6:30 am - December 7 - Pearl Harbor

quote:

The five mobile radar stations on Oahu were to close their practice hours at 7:00. Four of the five shut down promptly. At Opana, Private Elliott asked his operator, Private Lockard, to stay on longer for more plotting instruction. From 6:45 to 7:00 they had tracked a lone blip close in, and had duly reported it to Fort Shafter, where it was yawned off. It was one of the float planes reconnoitering ahead of Fuchida's first wave.

Elliott was at the screen at 7: 02 when he observed "something completely out of the ordinary." Taking over, Lockard plotted the flight they had picked up. It was at the edge of their reach-137 miles and nearly due north, then 132 miles, then ...

Lockard telephoned Shafter; the operator could find no one on duty. A few minutes later, someone called back. It was the watch officer, Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, a fighter pilot in the 78th Pursuit Squadron. The early morning hours, especially on Sunday, were dreary; he was looking forward to going off duty at eight. Because a bomber-pilot friend had told him that KGMB played music through the night when mainland flights were expected, to help them home in on Hawaii, he had flipped on his car radio en route to duty just before four, to cut through the quiet. Sure enough, there had been music.

The blips he was seeing, Lockard told Tyler, suggested "an unusually large flight~in fact, the largest I have ever seen on the equipment." The phenomenon was now less than 130 miles away, three degrees east of north.

Tyler sounded relieved. The B-17 s from California were on course..

"Well," he assured the Opana crew, "don't worry about it." In the paradise that was Oahu, everyone or nearly everyone lived in a haze of immunity from attack. By then it was 7: 15 and the blips had closed to 88 miles. Lockard wanted to shut down but Elliott, insisting, "It is a fine problem," wanted to stay at the dials. He was posting a new and shorter distance every three minutes. By 7:30 he posted 45 miles.

-----


Lieutenant Commander Kaminsky was keeping busy. In between his dialing skeptical Navy brass, the Ward managed to get a message to him at 7:20. Outerbridge had intercepted a suspicious small boat in the defensive zone. ''We are escorting this sampan into Honolulu. Please inform Coast Guard to send cutter [to] relieve us of sampan." The sampan's crew had improvised a white surrender flag, which struck Outerbridge as odd. Kaminsky continued telephoning.

En route to the Coast Guard station, the Ward encountered what looked like another undersea object three hundred yards away. Outerbridge ordered five depth charges released. Deckhands thought they saw an oil bubble rise to the surface and burst, but the water was seething with the explosions.

In his minisub, Ensign Sakamaki "heard an enormous noise and felt the ship shaking." He hit his head against something and was knocked out-his "first contact with war." Quickly regaining consciousness, he saw "white smoke" in the sub and turned away from the harbor so that he could check for damage. He noticed none, and Chief Warrant Officer Inagaki, his crewman, was unhurt; Sakamaki felt the blast and pressure of additional depth charges, and the sub rocked. He knew from having surfaced earlier that there were old four stacker destroyers above him. "I did not want to waste my torpedoes on those destroyers .... The depth charges fell near us but not as close as the last time. I had to speed up again and turn the ship."

No one at 14th Naval District headquarters thought of telephoning their Army counterparts about the Ward's encounter, nor had the Navy learned anything about Lockard's radar blips.

Readiness was scarce on Sunday morning. The 300-mile air patrols from Oahu maintained by Admiral James O. Richardson until December 5, 1940, had not been continued by his successor, Admiral Kimmel, because the pilots protested seven-day-a-week duty, and Patrol Wing headquarters complained that air reconnaissance was wearing out its sixty PBYs. Three-quarters of the 780 AA guns on ships in the harbor were unmanned altogether, and only four of the Army's 31 AA batteries were in position-without ammunition, which had to be returned to depots after practice, as it was allegedly "apt to disintegrate or get rusty." Most ammo was stored remote from the guns, often locked up by someone with a key who was nowhere nearby. Especially on weekends.





witpqs -> RE: Pearl - one hour alert (5/7/2009 1:03:40 AM)

Being in drydock, might she have been in a state of even less readiness? This is a total guess, those in the know please speak up, could she have even drained her boilers and needed to fill them or something? For all I know this might even be a stupid question.




treespider -> RE: Pearl - one hour alert (5/7/2009 1:09:08 AM)

Actually several of the BB's and cruisers were either undergoing inspection or scheduiled for inspection on Monday...again from Weintraubs account -

In regards to the California - "Also scheduled for inspection on Monday, the battleship had been made ready early to keep Sunday free. Covers had been removed from six of the manholes opening into her double bottom, and a dozen more loosened. Water surged through them."




treespider -> RE: Pearl - one hour alert (5/7/2009 1:15:08 AM)

Prange in At Dawn We Slept indicates Nevada was under partial steam when the first wave struck.




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