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Larry Reese -> RE: Amphibious Landings (2/27/2010 10:01:42 PM)
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Hey there Random, Paul, I understand your point, but think it can be interpreted differently. The peninsular campaign failed because of fighting on land, far removed from the beaches/ports that was on the scale of any other land fighting in the civil war. The Union kept a truly massive force supplied only by sea (they also imported several locomotives and rolling stock to reactivate the railways they captured and improve the efficiency of supply). They lost a land battle and elected to eventually evacuate by sea for that reason, not because they were inherently in trouble with supply or other complications from being inserted and supported by SLOC. This, to me, stands for the fact that the major southern response that was required by the landing (this was the event that caused the ANV to be formed) was successful in defeating the union forces in regular combat, not an invalidation of large scale psuedo-amphibious landings (I use this term because as noted the Union did not land versus an opposing force, though it could be argued that Magruder himself obviated this by burning the city and high tailing it). Simply because they eventually evacuated after a succession of land battles (some victorious some not, and those not due to the same tactical problems that plagued the north in other land engagements) does not prove the amphibious attack/movement/support theory in the civil war is invalid, only that a military reverse was suffered just as had been suffered elsewhere by completely land-moved and -supported forces. Had the Union simply taken the entire peninsula (which they did) and entrenched, forcing Lee to attack, rather than engage in a battle of maneuver, or been lead more competently, things might have been very different. What i'm saying is, the fact they didn't capture Richmond because of a lost land battle that had nothing to do with their waterborne arrival or supply can’t invalidate that process. In fact, the Union successfully operated a truly huge force more than 50 miles inland for two months. That’s a successful amphibious operation in my book; that the resultant operations failed does not effect the success of the amphib ops (Gallipoli for example was a clear failure of amphibious operations, as Normandy would have been had it been defeated on the beaches). If they’d stalled at the beaches, or been beaten because of lack of supply, that would be entirely different; but they were not. As the game system stands now, the entire historical peninsular campaign cannot be waged and I find this a pretty significant failing of the game system. There are several very good West Point and Command and Staff College studies of this campaign that back this up. The fact it was amphibious had no impact on the fighting and in fact clearly proved that major armies could be successfully supplied across very rudimentary port and beach facilities given proper preparation and scope of authority. Oh, and I noticed I did not say what I thought the limits should be on landings per turn. Since our forces in FoF do not take into account logistical, medical and administrative tails, I would limit landings in one turn to 50,000 men in the game. Still a considerable number, but manageable I think. On Veracruz, I think Scott’s move to cut free from his supply base (which was adequately supplied) is more about manpower and freedom of maneuver than anything to do with amphibious operations. Had he had more men, I’m sure Scott would have left conventional garrisons rather than take that risk. In fact, this move had a particular impact on Grant, who served as a quartermaster in one of Scott’s units. He would later cut loose from a supply base as well, in land operations (and of course, that’s the definition of what Sherman did still later – it should also be recalled that at its peak, the peninsular forces of the Union encompassed more than 15 times Scott’s force). Scott's move was bold and audacious. It also was not without its critics. Upon learning of Scott's decision, the Duke of Wellington—the great victor over Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, who had been following the campaign closely—declared, "Scott is lost! He has been carried away by success! He can't take the city [Mexico City], and he can't fall back on his base." Scott, however, would prove the skeptics wrong. He developed an effective system of local supply that included a prohibition against forced requisitions and an insistence on purchasing supplies from the locals. By ridding himself of the requirement to secure his lines of communication with garrisons in his rear, Scott was able to increase his force to some 14,000 men from ~5,500. This greater strength and his freedom from a fixed line of supply allowed Scott to fight the war of maneuver that he desired. Scott's lead elements departed Puebla on 7 August. By 18 August, it appeared that the Duke of Wellington might be right after all. Scott's situation had become serious, if not desperate. Colonel Ethan Hitchcock wrote, "We have no forage for our horses; our hard bread is getting musty; we have four days' rations for the army and some beef on hoof." Edmund Kirby Smith had similar concerns: "Mexico must fall or we must all find a grave between this and the city." Scott's bold move of cutting loose from his line of supply would require a quick victory to eliminate the increasing danger to his army. Scott got his victory at Contreras on 19 August and Churubusco on 20 August. With these two successes, Scott had crossed the entire Valley of Mexico. Russell F. Weigley concludes, in The American Way of War, "Scott was a bold strategist. His march from Vera Cruz into the interior was one of the most daring movements of American military history." Even the Duke of Wellington reversed himself, declaring Scott to be "the greatest living soldier" and urging young English officers to study the campaign as one "unsurpassed in military annals." As a young lieutenant, Ulysses Grant was a participant in Scott's great Mexican campaign. Serving as a quartermaster and commissary attached to Brigadier General William Worth's division, Grant describes in his Memoirs at least one instance in which he marched with a large wagon train to procure forage. The Mexican War taught Grant that an army could cut loose from its line of supply and survive. It was a lesson that Grant, as a major general in the Union Army, remembered in his Vicksburg campaign. Grant's line of supply for his advance into Mississippi was the Mississippi Central Railroad, originating in Grand Junction, Tennessee. Maintaining the railroad cost the Union Army troops, who were needed both to guard and repair it. It was the same problem Scott had faced in Mexico. On 12 December 1862, Lieutenant General John Pemberton, the Confederate commander opposing Grant, ordered Major General Earl Van Dorn to take command of all the cavalry in the vicinity of Grenada, Mississippi, launch a sweep around Grant's left flank, destroy the Union depot at Holly Springs, Mississippi, and wreck as much of the Mississippi Central and the parallel Memphis and Charleston Railroad as he could. On 18 December, Van Dorn and 3,500 cavalrymen left Grenada, and on 20 December they surprised the weaker Union force at Holly Springs and destroyed an estimated $500,000 worth of supplies there. Van Dorn then proceeded north, destroying as much of the railroad as he could before returning to Grenada on 28 December. Simultaneously, a twin raid was conducted by Lieutenant General Nathan Bedford Forrest against the important rail junction at Jackson, Tennessee, on 20 December. The two raids left Grant in serious danger. As Timothy Donovan writes in The American Civil War— "To attempt to measure the amount of influence of the two cavalry raids on the subsequent decision by Grant to abandon his overland approach can only lead to a subjective estimate at best . . . [Nonetheless], the raids of Van Dorn and Forrest displayed cavalry in a classic example of the excellent use of a small, highly mobile unit in an economy of force role. Indeed, Pemberton's superior, General Joseph E. Johnston, came to place his main reliance in defeating Grant on cavalry raids against the vulnerable rail communications in western Tennessee. The Confederate raiders presented Grant with the same threat to a vulnerable line of supply that Mexican guerrillas had presented to Scott."
On 3 May 1863, Grant learned that Major General Nathaniel P. Banks would be delayed in joining him. In his Memoirs, Grant writes, "Up to this time my intention had been to secure Grand Gulf, as a base of supplies, detach [Major General John] McClernand's corps to Banks and cooperate with him in the reduction of Port Hudson." With the delay of Banks, Grant instead "determined to move independently of Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of Vicksburg or invest or capture the city." Grant's decision at Vicksburg shared several things in common with Scott's decision in Mexico. First of all, it was daring and subject to criticism. Recognizing this, Grant purposely delayed notifying the Union Army General in Chief, Major General Henry W. Halleck, until it was too late to stop it because he "knew well that Halleck's caution would lead him to disprove of this course." Even Grant's friend, Brigadier General William T. Sherman, wrote Grant to advise him "of the impossibility of supplying our army over a single road." Grant's and Scott's operations both involved use of forage. To Sherman's protestations, Grant replied— I do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it will be impossible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance. In his Memoirs, Grant wrote, "We started from Bruinsburg [Mississippi] with an average of about two days' rations, and received no more from our supplies for some days; abundance was found in the meantime." Time was also a critical factor in both campaigns. Even with the abundant forage Grant expected to find, he knew he could not afford any long halts that would exhaust available local supplies. He would have to keep his army moving. To this end, he wrote Sherman, "I believe we could be in Vicksburg in seven days." Grant's decision to cut his line of supply, like Scott's, also facilitated maneuver. Grant was able to position his army between Pemberton at Vicksburg and Johnston in Jackson. Through the use of interior lines, Grant gained the opportunity of "threatening both or striking at either." So he struck at both, capturing Jackson on 14 May and then defeating Pemberton at Champion's Hill (between Jackson and Vicksburg) on 16 May. Pemberton then withdrew into Vicksburg, and on 18 May Grant's siege of the city began. The final point Scott's and Grant's campaigns had in common is that both were successful. Russell Weigley writes that Grant considered his decision to cut loose from his line of supply to be the most important innovation in the Vicksburg Campaign. While Pemberton was preoccupied with trying to cut Grant's nonexistent line of communications, Vicksburg fell to Grant's siege. Grant usually is thought of as the Federal commander who eventually defeated the great Robert E. Lee in Virginia. His service as a quartermaster in Mexico is at best a footnote to his career, but it was through that experience that Grant learned a valuable logistics lesson. Scott had shown him that, under certain conditions, an army could cut loose from its line of supply, survive, and win. Putting his quartermaster experience to good effect, Grant replicated that strategy outside of Vicksburg in 1862 and 1863. In the case of the peninsula, there was no cutting loose from the base of supply. The federal army in the peninsula was exquisitely supplied, a fact much lamented by the Confederates. This supply issue here is quite different than that of Veracruz (or Vicksburg). It is apples to oranges. But we're each entitled to our opinions.
On another point I think that FoF has a problem with scale, preventing things like this from being effective. I personally feel provinces should be smaller and much more numerous. But I’ll get off my soap box.
Later,
LR
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