|
Terminus -> RE: Operation AI aka Battle of Midway (8/27/2009 8:27:16 PM)
|
Geography, doctrine, relative strengths, equipment, you name it. Let's start from the beginning:
GEOGRAPHY: Midway Atoll is surrounded by a coral reef. Completely surrounded. Ask yourself what happened when the US Marines attempted to land on Tarawa, another speck of sand surrounded by coral 18 months later.
DOCTRINE: The Japanese had no amphibious assault doctrine. Ask yourself how many amphibious assaults (i.e. opposed landings) the Japs conducted and how successful they were. There was also a complete absence of ship-to-shore and air-to-shore support doctrine, i.e. no effective bombardment from the sea or air. We all know how ineffective subsequent USN bombardment of Jap shore defences turned out to be.
RELATIVE STRENGTHS: The Japs brought two poorly-integrated "assault" units, one IJA and one IJN to attack a heavily-fortified atoll, held by USMC regulars and raiders, who could bring every inch of the coral reef under fire. There were about 5,000 Japs to about 2,500 heavily fortified Marines and maybe 1,000 other personnel (USN and USAAF). An old truism is that an attacker needs 3-to-1 odds to succeed. In an amphibious assault over a coral reef, that might (in my view) be more like 6-to-1.
EQUIPMENT: Back to Tarawa. The USMC 2nd Division was bled white whilst landing on Tarawa, despite having Higgins Boats and Amtraks. The Japanese had Daihatsu barges, which would have gotten stuck on the Midway reef (just like the Higgins Boats did a year and a half later), about 200 yards off shore, forcing their human cargo to wade to the beach, under fire from every weapon imaginable.
The outcome of a Midway battle which resulted in the loss of all three US carriers would NOT have included Midway as a Jap base, unless the US decided to subsequently evacuate it.
|
|
|
|
