RE: Early China, allies strat (Full Version)

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Jonathan Pollard -> RE: Early China, allies strat (10/31/2009 3:52:02 PM)

A US government-sponsored documentary apparently from early 1944 which does not cover the gains the Japanese made in their 1944 offensive.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tOtVQ7cNWY



Menser -> RE: Early China, allies strat (10/31/2009 9:21:17 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

1. Chinese units in open terrain are toast. Move them. Now.

2. Chinese units even in decent terrain (like forest hexes) take tremendous losses. Move them unless you really need to guard/block/delay in a decent-terrain hex.

3. Chinese units near the coast can be cut-off and destroyed. I prefer to move them beginning turn one and get them back to my MLR. But it may also be useful to keep them behind Jap lines to threaten LOS and LOC. Choose your poison.

4. The only way the Chinese can stand is to get into base hexes and behind forts. The best chain of bases to form an MLR appears to be Nanning, Liuchow, Kweilin, Hengyang, Changsha, Chengtow, Nanyang, Chengchow, Loyang, Sian. If the Japs bust through Nanyang/Chengchow or Loyang, the Chinese MLR can be consolidated at Sian. If Changsha, Chengtow, Hengyang, or Kweilin fall, though, it appears that the Chinese will have to fall back and defend Chungking and Chengtu. Yikes!

5. Thus far I have been able to hold the MLR described above. In part this is due to big forts and in part because the Japanese have to be careful not to advance to far and get cut-off themselves. I *think* this line is tenable. At the very least I hope it will buy me enough time to allow Chinese troops and aircraft squadrons to train and to begin to bring in Western Allied aircraft squadrons.

6. Replace as many low quality Chinese leaders with better quality leaders.


I would add...

7. Almost all chinese units start with a high number of disabled squads and devices, any unit not in enemy contact and you are not moving (or engineer units not building forts or other facilities) should be put immediately on rest mode to "repair" them, then switched to training if needed (i.e of thier objective is at 100 and thier exp is below 45).

8. Turn off repair of all factories and resorces, especially near the central rail lines the japanese will run roughshod over, you will need that supply elswhere and each point of repair sucks up 1000 supply.

9. Use river crossings, rough(all types) and mountainous terrain to slow the japanese western advances once they run out of rail line to use.



PaxMondo -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/2/2009 3:46:49 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: stuman

What I am a bit unclear on from a historical perspective is whether Jap. could not conquer more of China than it did, or chose not to conquer more.

It is a complex answer. First, you need to understand the socio-political nature of the Japan leadership at that time and why they were in China to begin with. To say they were there for resources ignores the context of the times.

Japan in the 30's was experiencing a throw-back to the fuedal days. Each general was styling himself more as a daimyo than a general as we would understand it. The imperial court was very much hostage to a group of generals and their interests.

What were those interests? Far ranging. Some wanted to claim land for themselves in China as there was none left in Japan. Literally fiefdoms. Some thought to conquer china as it was Japan's manifest destiny. Bottom line was, there was no consensus on China, but rather a large number of personal agendas that had some congruency for fighting in China.

When the USA put the oil embargo in place, things changed. The hithertofore separate groups became much more homogenized. Japan was staring at an industrial shutdown far worse than the USA projections. Unemployment rates of greater than 50%, lack of heating oil, etc. Something to make the early 30's in the USA look like a recession in comparison. These generals and their corporate backers could not allow this to happen. Thus, the SRA was born in a united self interest. This is why you hear that Yamamoto was against the war, but powerless to avoid. He was. There really was no alternative except to capitulate which went completely against the culture.

Was the USA right to embargo JAPAN over the genocide in China and so precipitate Japan's entry into the war? That's a value question, and I won't touch it. But it is very clear in hindsight that the embargo did trigger it and the USA really did not think it would. Inability to understand other cultures and attempting to apply USA culture to international decisions has been a "hallmark" of USA foreign policy since Teddy Roosevelt. That, by the way, is not a good thing. Oh well.

Now I will touch Mike's statements above that history proves Japan could not conquer China. The answer is both yes and no. With their socio-polictical status, the impetus that put them in conflict would never allow them to weld sufficient united effort to conquer China. However, absent this, Jap had both the technology and industry to do whatever she wanted assuming a national interest to do so. Flipping that around, the only reason JAP could do so was that the chinese socio-political situation with the warlords was so much worse that they could rarely keep agreement to help each other more than a few weeks. IF china had united under Mao in 1929 instad of 1949, they could have run Japan out of china at any time they wanted.

It is clear that the game allows the player to make a united Japan effort in China. Something that after PH easily could have happened. It didn't only because the controlling IJA thought the war was won by Jan 1, 1942. They were actually waiting for Roosevelt to propose settlement terms. kinda funny that. Goes to show that that JAPAN leadership of the time made the exact same mistake that the USA did with the embargo: applied JAPAN culture values to a USA decision and the result was completely opposite of what they thought would happen. It really took until Aug 7, 1942 before the IJA understood that the war was just starting, but 8 months had been wasted in many ways.

There is a lot of good reading on this. "Japanese Destroyer Captain" is a long time favorite. Written by one of the very best who actually survived the war. Captained the Shuguri at one time amoung many other ships.



Jim D Burns -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/2/2009 5:20:17 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: stuman

What I am a bit unclear on from a historical perspective is whether Jap. could not conquer more of China than it did, or chose not to conquer more.


One of the biggest problems with the Chinese land war in game is it fails utterly to simulate the problems Japan faced in keeping its troops fed deep inside China. Japan basically had to garrison ever foot of any transportation route it used to supply its troops in the interior, so a large chunk of its army was not available for campaigns.

The Japanese player enjoys far too much combat power in game. There should probably be at a minimum a garrison regiment (brigade or division for large population areas) required to be in every single road or rail hex captured by the Japanese. Fail to garrison a hex and it should be immediately cut and unavailable for supply movement use.

Japan’s army far outclassed the Chinese and could take whatever it wanted given time and supplies, but it was already too small to properly hold on to what it had in its possession on Dec. 41. Launching further offensives into the interior of China would and did require a large influx of new units be brought in. But in game Japan can attack non-stop from day one because it doesn’t have to worry about the transportation net behind its army.

The designers should make every major road or rail hex in China a 0 (0) dot base and put a Japanese regimental sized garrison requirement at each. This includes hexes that are in Chinese hands as well, pushing deeper into China would simply magnify the problems they already faced along the coastal areas. That would simulate the true problems Japan faced in China.

Jim

Edit: I guess another way to handle it would be to create a bunch of guerilla units that reconstitute like regular Chinese units do. But instead of appearing in Chungking, have 1 unit assigned to reconstitute in each road or rail hex. That way Japan would have to keep a land unit in each hex to prevent guerillas reconstituting in the rear along the road/rail net.



stuman -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/2/2009 6:25:55 AM)

I have started to do some research in this area just this weekend. I have a ways to go !



treespider -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/2/2009 10:58:55 AM)

Required reading :

History of the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945 compiled by Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-Kai ----- considered by many to be the 'bible' when it comes to the Chinese OOB.... the actual narrative is farsical at best.

The Sino-Japanese War 1937-1941 by Frank Dorn ----- a nice accompaniment for the first work as it presents an unvarnished account of the campaigns for the first 4 years.

United States Army in World War Two ----- the US Army "green" books...
- Stilwell's Mission to China
- Stilwell's Command Problems
- Time Runs Out in CBI

The Japanese Monograph series - prepared after the war by Japanese officers provides a japanese perspective of many campaigns, some records are more complete than others
-Japanese Monograph No 70, China Area Operations Record, July 1937 - November 1941
-Japanese Monograph No 71, Army Operations in China, December 1941 - December 1943
-Japanese Monograph No 72, Army Operations in China, January 1944 - August 1945
-Japanese Monograph No 76, Air Operations in the China Area July 1937-August 1945
-Japanese Monograph No 129, China Area Operations Record- Command of the China Expeditionary Army August 1943-August 1945
-Japanese Monograph No 178, North China Area Operations, July 1937-May 1941
-Japanese Monograph No 179, Central China Area Operations Record, 1937-1941

China's Bitter Victory edited by James C. Hsiung & Steven I. Levine ----- a collection of essays about China during the war

Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S Service -----Service was a State Dept officer assigned to China from 1933-1945. This work is a collection of the reports he sent from China during the conflict

The Chinese Army 1937-49 by Phillip Jowett ----- the Osprey book on the Chinese Army has some decent nuggets of info as well...

Rays of the Rising Sun by Phillip Jowett ----- details the Chinese puppets

When Tigers Fight by Dick Wilson --- a generlised account of the conflict with some good anecdotal accounts of some of the fighting

Village China at war: the impact of resistance to Japan, 1937-1945 By Dagfinn Gatu

The Chinese People's Liberation Army by Samuel B Griffith II ----- a history of the communist army.

The Cambridge History of China,Volume 13, Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2 edited by Fairbank, John King, etal.








wpurdom -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/2/2009 2:19:08 PM)

I fear it is a hopeless task to simulate the China front historically in a Pacific-oriented game.

1. Consider first that some things should be even harder in China for the Allied leadership. Most notably for the period of the Pacifac War until about the time of the Russian intervention, the Red Army and the Japanese have a de facto truce. This followed the Hundred Regiments offensive where the Red Army attacked and did the Japanese large damage and the Japanese counterattacked and devastated the best Red Army formations. The Red Army is busy building up an infratructure behind Japanese lines, but it is not actively engaging the Japanese. It is fighting the Nationalists more than the Japanese, largely behind Japanese front lines.
2. The Hundred regiments offensive was apparently launched by Red Army commanders against Mao's wishes, at a time when Chiang was afraid everything was about to fall apart politically and militarily.
3. After the Chinese defenses had time to solidify, the Japanese Army made an assessement like that suggested by Jim Burns - that they did not have the wherewithal to drive on and take Chungking without losing control of either their logistical support or large areas they were occupying - even when limited to consideration of the part of China controlled by the Nationalists. They did not think that lesser conquests would serve much purpose as long as the political support for resistance remained, and they thought that political support was propped up by Western and Soviet support for Chiang.
4. As for whether they were right, who knows. It's sorta like the Germans had gone on the defensive, except for limited punishing counterattacks after the winter of 1941-42. (Let's say they smash the Kharkov offensive and stop). We would be in a poor position to judge whether they were right or wrong.
5. Some specifics that are wrong IMHO on the China front, but don't address many fundamental issues:
a. Allies being able to use the Red Army without a Japanese attack on it.
b. Offensive use of artillery to wear down Chinese forces outside of fixed defenses, like cities. (See next for distinction between light contact and hold fast).
c. Lack of Chinese option to break contact at low cost in the countryside and retreat - they should have a hold fast and light contact option on defend. Perhaps one could have special rules for combat with units in reserve, with putting all your forces in reserve being a sensible light contact option, so that the artilley can't get them and the caualties before retreat being minimized.
d. Chinese infantry are overvalued in victory points - their value should be minimal, perhaps a fifth.
e. Chinese infantry units should be able to reconstitute on any unoccupied hex with a Chinese controlled hexside. They should be able to send small infantry units to continually break supply lines and be able to afford it in victory points. And if occupation forces get too low they should be able to form in surrounding unoccupied hexes, even if all hex sides are Jap controlled.

But making the China front work would be a whole game within a game requiring the work-up of a separate release.



treespider -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/2/2009 2:33:07 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: wpurdom

I fear it is a hopeless task to simulate the China front historically in a Pacific-oriented game.

1. Consider first that some things should be even harder in China for the Allied leadership. Most notably for the period of the Pacifac War until about the time of the Russian intervention, the Red Army and the Japanese have a de facto truce. This followed the Hundred Regiments offensive where the Red Army attacked and did the Japanese large damage and the Japanese counterattacked and devastated the best Red Army formations. The Red Army is busy building up an infratructure behind Japanese lines, but it is not actively engaging the Japanese. It is fighting the Nationalists more than the Japanese, largely behind Japanese front lines.


Except for the fact that Communist guerillas continued to harass the Japanese throughout the war...ref the works of Ford and Service...and little nuggets from the Monographs. I forgot to add a nice little recent work entitled Village China at War.

quote:


2. The Hundred regiments offensive was apparently launched by Red Army commanders against Mao's wishes, at a time when Chiang was afraid everything was about to fall apart politically and militarily.
3. After the Chinese defenses had time to solidify, the Japanese Army made an assessement like that suggested by Jim Burns - that they did not have the wherewithal to drive on and take Chungking without losing control of either their logistical support or large areas they were occupying - even when limited to consideration of the part of China controlled by the Nationalists. They did not think that lesser conquests would serve much purpose as long as the political support for resistance remained, and they thought that political support was propped up by Western and Soviet support for Chiang.


Except as noted in Monograph No 71 pp 121-125 in early 1942 after it was seen that the occupation of the SRA was proceeding satisfactorily Imperial General Headquarters began planning for and implementing preparations for the coup de grace' on China. It was anticipated that the subjugation of Szechwan province would begin early in 1943. Not until September 21, 1942 after things in the Solomons began to turn for the worse was a decision made to postpone the Szechwan Operation.

quote:


4. As for whether they were right, who knows. It's sorta like the Germans had gone on the defensive, except for limited punishing counterattacks after the winter of 1941-42. (Let's say they smash the Kharkov offensive and stop). We would be in a poor position to judge whether they were right or wrong.
5. Some specifics that are wrong IMHO on the China front, but don't address many fundamental issues:
a. Allies being able to use the Red Army without a Japanese attack on it.
b. Offensive use of artillery to wear down Chinese forces outside of fixed defenses, like cities. (See next for distinction between light contact and hold fast).
c. Lack of Chinese option to break contact at low cost in the countryside and retreat - they should have a hold fast and light contact option on defend. Perhaps one could have special rules for combat with units in reserve, with putting all your forces in reserve being a sensible light contact option, so that the artilley can't get them and the caualties before retreat being minimized.


You can already place units in reserve and they are unaffected by the artillery...but you run the risk of being retreated out of the hex.

quote:


d. Chinese infantry are overvalued in victory points - their value should be minimal, perhaps a fifth.
e. Chinese infantry units should be able to reconstitute on any unoccupied hex with a Chinese controlled hexside. They should be able to send small infantry units to continually break supply lines and be able to afford it in victory points. And if occupation forces get too low they should be able to form in surrounding unoccupied hexes, even if all hex sides are Jap controlled.


You can already subdivide the existing "small" corps into three sub sections and send them hither and yon...and when eliminted they reappear in Chungking stronger than what they started.

quote:


But making the China front work would be a whole game within a game requiring the work-up of a separate release.







Smeulders -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/2/2009 3:52:26 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: treespider

You can already subdivide the existing "small" corps into three sub sections and send them hither and yon...and when eliminted they reappear in Chungking stronger than what they started.



One problem with this though, if you try to break up a unit that is already very small, one or two of the parts will immediately be 'destroyed' and they aren't coming back.



wpurdom -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/2/2009 6:04:14 PM)

quote:


quote:


quote:

4. As for whether they were right, who knows. It's sorta like the Germans had gone on the defensive, except for limited punishing counterattacks after the winter of 1941-42. (Let's say they smash the Kharkov offensive and stop). We would be in a poor position to judge whether they were right or wrong.
5. Some specifics that are wrong IMHO on the China front, but don't address many fundamental issues:
a. Allies being able to use the Red Army without a Japanese attack on it.
b. Offensive use of artillery to wear down Chinese forces outside of fixed defenses, like cities. (See next for distinction between light contact and hold fast).
c. Lack of Chinese option to break contact at low cost in the countryside and retreat - they should have a hold fast and light contact option on defend. Perhaps one could have special rules for combat with units in reserve, with putting all your forces in reserve being a sensible light contact option, so that the artilley can't get them and the caualties before retreat being minimized.


You can already place units in reserve and they are unaffected by the artillery...but you run the risk of being retreated out of the hex.


But do you take light casualties and limited morale drops from the resulting attack and the armor follow-up? I get the impression not, but don't really know. If the casualties are light under those circumstances, my apologies.

To judge what the war should be like in 1942, we need to look at the repulse of the Chinese offensive towards Canton and the counter-repulse of the Japanese counter-attack towards Changsha. I have no idea of how accurate the Wikipedia account is, but its hard to see something like this happening in AE

quote:

The third Battle of Changsha (December 24, 1941 – January 15, 1942) was the first major offensive in China by Imperial Japanese forces following the Japanese attack on the Western Allies.

The offensive was originally intended to prevent Chinese forces from reinforcing the British Commonwealth forces engaged in Hong Kong. With the capture of Hong Kong on December 25, however, it was decided to continue the offensive against Changsha in order to maximize the blow against the Chinese government.[1]

The offensive resulted in failure for the Japanese, as Chinese forces were able to lure them into a trap and encircle them. After suffering heavy casualties, Japanese forces called for a general retreat.[1]

Course of battle
On December 27, the Japanese 3rd, 6th, and 40th Divisions massed at Yueyang and advanced southward in three columns and crossed the Sinchiang River, and tried again to cross the Milo River to reach Changsha. However, the Chinese formed a deep pocket around the city and set up ambush parties around the Luoyang River. Halfway from Milo River and Changsha, the Japanese columns faced strong resistance from the Chinese and the eastern column was forced to take a detour further east, and the other two columns had to move closer together than originally planned. During the southward advance the Japanese encountered three Chinese army divisions that were pushed aside but not crushed; they retreated into the eastern mountains.

Changsha was evacuated except for the Chinese army and some 160 civilians who wished to stay to help the defense. On December 31, the Japanese troops stormed the southeastern defense of the city but failed to make any gains, and then made an attempt at the southern and then eastern part of the defense. Meanwhile, the northern part of the city was heavily bombarded. The Japanese eventually cut through the first line of defense, only to meet stubborn resistance from a second line of defense near the city center.

On January 1, the Chinese quickly counter-attacked and surprised the Japanese with heavy guns and inflicted heavy casualties on them. At about the same time, the previous army units that had retreated to the mountains swept down to attack the Japanese supply lines, with plenty of aid from local guerillas. The Japanese line collapsed on January 4. The three Japanese divisions were besieged and requested the help of the Japanese 9th Independent Brigade stationed in Yueyang. However, on January 9 they faced heavy fighting with the Chinese and were unable to relieve the besieged Japanese divisions. The Japanese then attempted to retreat through the Luoyang River, not knowing that an ambush party was already stationed in the region. Losing heavily at the river crossing, the Japanese eventually reached the Sinchiang River on January 15 to complete the retreat.


And the 1942 repulse followed a repulse in 1939 of a similar Japanese offensive.



Barb -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/2/2009 10:11:04 PM)

At first - Japanese didnt want to have China under their complete control and occupation - too much troops required for that. What they prefered was to have China with some leader colaborating with them who will sign a peace treaty, assign all Japanese controled areas to them officially and to keep peace and order in the rest of China - co-prospering with Japan (well we all know this means giving up what they had for "protection").

Japanes know that drive to Chunking even if they tried to would not bring what they wanted, so they focused on isolating China - result was the Vietnam ports closed and later Burma Campaign. But they underestimated the situation.

On the other hand Chiang Kai Shek knows that if he had signed peace treaty with Japan he will be overthrown in no time. He also wanted to get rid of the Communists. Once the Second World War had begun, he wanted the americans to fight the war instead of him, so he could keep his units intact for fight with Communists. He requested 500 airplanes (later raised to 1000) because he was convinced that airpower alone can drive the Japs out of China. Stilwell wanted to have strong Chinese army (disbanding half of the divisions to have sufficient manpower to keep fewer units up to their TOE), train 30, later 60 and 90 Chinese divisions with american tactics, equip them with american weapons and have excellent core force, which could take up the Japs and later the Communists. Chiangs opinion prevailed and more effort was thrown into the "Hump" than Ramagh.

The crisis in China started when the Japanese begin their Ichi-go offensive. As Chiang didnt want to commit his own central reserve troops and various generals commanding War areas (Warlords) retreated before the Japanese.

Result: The Japanese had not enough forces to subdue whole China and China was forceless to do something with the situation.



Mike Scholl -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/2/2009 11:02:00 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Barb

Result: The Japanese had not enough forces to subdue whole China and China was forceless to do something with the situation.




Gee..., this sounds a lot like what I said way back on page one of this discussion...

"China should simply be a quagmire eating the efforts of both sides for minimal return. Anything else is wrong..., and game-warpingly so."



findmeifyoucan -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/3/2009 2:26:48 AM)

It seems that just like SPI's WIP and this game WIPAE, the China land war is very hard to simulate and make realistic to the historical war. I remember when I played the Allies I took advantage of the rules with unlimited stacking for the Chinese and destroyed Japanese stack after Japanese stack one at a time with Japan having no chance to defend against it in the SPI WIP game. We ended up making a house rule of stacking limitations for the Chinese.
It seems from reading many comments in this game that the Chinese cannot defend against the Japanese artillery and that it is a cake walk for the Japanese through China.

I will find out myself as I am new to the WIPAE. Only time will tell.



stuman -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/3/2009 3:08:59 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Barb

At first - Japanese didnt want to have China under their complete control and occupation - too much troops required for that. What they prefered was to have China with some leader colaborating with them who will sign a peace treaty, assign all Japanese controled areas to them officially and to keep peace and order in the rest of China - co-prospering with Japan (well we all know this means giving up what they had for "protection").

Japanes know that drive to Chunking even if they tried to would not bring what they wanted, so they focused on isolating China - result was the Vietnam ports closed and later Burma Campaign. But they underestimated the situation.

On the other hand Chiang Kai Shek knows that if he had signed peace treaty with Japan he will be overthrown in no time. He also wanted to get rid of the Communists. Once the Second World War had begun, he wanted the americans to fight the war instead of him, so he could keep his units intact for fight with Communists. He requested 500 airplanes (later raised to 1000) because he was convinced that airpower alone can drive the Japs out of China. Stilwell wanted to have strong Chinese army (disbanding half of the divisions to have sufficient manpower to keep fewer units up to their TOE), train 30, later 60 and 90 Chinese divisions with american tactics, equip them with american weapons and have excellent core force, which could take up the Japs and later the Communists. Chiangs opinion prevailed and more effort was thrown into the "Hump" than Ramagh.

The crisis in China started when the Japanese begin their Ichi-go offensive. As Chiang didnt want to commit his own central reserve troops and various generals commanding War areas (Warlords) retreated before the Japanese.

Result: The Japanese had not enough forces to subdue whole China and China was forceless to do something with the situation.




So then a question from one ignorant of the details of the China front : if Ichi-go was successful late war, why not an version of Ichi-go two years earlier ?



Mike Scholl -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/3/2009 4:27:22 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: stuman

So then a question from one ignorant of the details of the China front : if Ichi-go was successful late war, why not an version of Ichi-go two years earlier ?


It will make more sense if you think of "Ichi-Go" as a good weather raid. The Japanese pulled a lot of units out of garrisons to drive on the B-29 airfields, but had to return them to their original positions soon after or lose control of areas they already held. China simply proved too big and too populated for them to hold down.



Jim D Burns -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/3/2009 7:36:55 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


quote:

ORIGINAL: stuman

So then a question from one ignorant of the details of the China front : if Ichi-go was successful late war, why not an version of Ichi-go two years earlier ?


It will make more sense if you think of "Ichi-Go" as a good weather raid. The Japanese pulled a lot of units out of garrisons to drive on the B-29 airfields, but had to return them to their original positions soon after or lose control of areas they already held. China simply proved too big and too populated for them to hold down.



Not to mention the fact Japan had brought in a LOT more force into China in the preceding two years that weren't available two years before. Also they didn't have the supplies on hand two years prior to launch an Ichi-Go style offensive. Japan's supply situation in China was a nightmare in 1941.

Every time Japan would launch an operation to clear their rear areas, the Chinese formations would simply melt away into the local populace. Once Japan had moved through an area, the units would fully reconstitute again in their rear in very short order and wreak havoc.

Given the kind of war they faced in China, Japan had no choice but to station large strong permanent garrisons along all their supply routes to prevent these guerilla type forces from starving their inland troops. In fact Japan was having major troubles in Dec. 41 keeping their logistic network functioning, as they lacked sufficient troops to hold open supply routes to everything they had.

Jim



Mike Scholl -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/3/2009 11:07:29 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Jim D Burns

Given the kind of war they faced in China, Japan had no choice but to station large strong permanent garrisons along all their supply routes to prevent these guerilla type forces from starving their inland troops. In fact Japan was having major troubles in Dec. 41 keeping their logistic network functioning, as they lacked sufficient troops to hold open supply routes to everything they had.

Jim




Truth be told, Japan NEVER controlled the Chinese countryside..., which is how the Doolittle survivors were spirited right across the length of the country to freedom under their noses. At harvest time, the Japanese would organize raids from the major pop centers they did occupy into the countryside to steal as much food as they could lay their hands on, then run back to the cities. That was the only way most of the interior garrisons kept off starvation.



Barb -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/3/2009 7:04:16 PM)

1. Why not Ichi-go two years earlier?
Because they were thinking that by grabing Burma they will cut-off China and without help the China will fall to their hands all by himself. For the Ichi-go they needed many supplies that has to be used in SRA and Solomon-New Guinea Campaigns.

2. Japanese had brought in a lot more force into China ...
You are not really right. In fact many seasoned divisions of China Expeditionary army were send to New Guinea, Philipines, Marianas and Ryukyus. To fill the vacuum, some of the garrisoning independent infantry brigades were reinforced and reconstructed as Type B divisions. So you ended with the same number of division, but less combat efficient then the previous ones were. (You can easily see this in witp-AE - there are some brigades that will become divisons when their other parts arrive in 1944). I think only 1-2 divisions were actually borrowed from Manchuria with two Army HQs.

3. One of the reasons of the "Japanese run wild in AE"
Did the Japanese player buy out Artillery, Engineers, Armor and Air forces from Manchukuo? Well for few PPs and no decrease of AV in Manchuria he has twice the firepower Japan could have in the area. Japanese feared the Russian attack so they should in no way pull all their corps artillery, mobile reserves and air force out of Manchuria - exactly the thing any Japanese player will do ASAP. [:-]



Mike Scholl -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/3/2009 10:30:21 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Barb
3. One of the reasons of the "Japanese run wild in AE"
Did the Japanese player buy out Artillery, Engineers, Armor and Air forces from Manchukuo? Well for few PPs and no decrease of AV in Manchuria he has twice the firepower Japan could have in the area. Japanese feared the Russian attack so they should in no way pull all their corps artillery, mobile reserves and air force out of Manchuria - exactly the thing any Japanese player will do ASAP. [:-]


Totally agree. Real problem is poor basic design of the PP rules by 2by3. If the Manchurian Garrison Rules valued Artillery, Engineers, Armor, and Air Power the same way the Land Combat Rules do, pulling them out would cost "an arm and a leg"...., and trigger Soviet intervention to boot.



maybee -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/5/2009 2:40:56 AM)

IMHO...

The underlining issue is that there is only one allies player, whereas there should be multiple allies players of conflicting interests. An acceptable fix in game term is by adding one more leader attribute called "subordination". Units under leader of low subordination will have higher probability of insubordination (not responsive to player commands). That's they have their own (AI) minds.

In extreme dice rolls, an insubordinate unit would become partisan and functions as an enemy unit to both allies and japan players. It'd require the allies player to "re-conquer" an insubordinate unit by some kind of game mechanism.

For most Chinese leaders, their inspiration/leadership and other useful attributes should be inversely proportional to subordination. So that the Chinese command is effectively paralyzed.

If one increases the garrison requirement on the Japanese side at the same time, wouldn't it be a more realistic simulation?








Jim D Burns -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/5/2009 3:08:33 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: maybee
there should be multiple allies players of conflicting interests.


CHS actually did China pretty well by fixing large numbers of Chinese units in place to simulate the uncooperative warlords Chiang had to deal with. This basically meant that China was unable to launch any kind of significant offensive because about half its army was fixed in place.

Japan’s garrison requirements were still far too low in CHS, but Chinese units preformed well enough in combats that they could at least stand up to the Japanese. AE has nerfed the Chinese unit’s combat abilities to such an extent and made artillery so completely overpowered that it has ruined the game and turned China into a complete blowout again.

Japan needs to be nerfed in kind by vastly increasing the garrison needs so huge armies can’t be formed to crush the pitifully weak Chinese. Artillery also need to be nerfed and supply costs for using artillery need to be increased dramatically so that players can’t sit back day after day and launch massive bombardments with no real detriment to their supply stocks.

Jim



vonTirpitz -> RE: Early China, allies strat (11/28/2009 7:56:25 PM)

I totally disagree. I have one PBEM opponent who has managed to gather at least 2 stacks of +200k and 2-3 more stacks of +80k Chinese and run rampant over the map by late December 41. One stack easily routed 3 full strength defending IJA divisions. So unless one of you is going to inform me that his tactics aren't sustainable then I have to disagree entirely with your assessments about the so-called Japanese advantages...

T



herwin -> RE: Early China, allies strat (4/4/2010 3:49:35 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: vonTirpitz

I totally disagree. I have one PBEM opponent who has managed to gather at least 2 stacks of +200k and 2-3 more stacks of +80k Chinese and run rampant over the map by late December 41. One stack easily routed 3 full strength defending IJA divisions. So unless one of you is going to inform me that his tactics aren't sustainable then I have to disagree entirely with your assessments about the so-called Japanese advantages...

T


Playing the latest patch here. My Japanese opponent neglected the Chinese theatre, and so far (mid-Dec 1941) the Chinese have captured Ichang and are pursuing the retreating Japanese.



Marcus_Antonius -> RE: Early China, allies strat (4/5/2010 4:31:54 AM)

I am in late January of 1941 in my first AE game, and the Japanese are far from running all over the Chinese. The Chinese have in fact taken the initiative and forced me to pay more attention to China than I had initially planned to early in the game.

I suspect this Chinese effort will not be sustainable, but its a headache all the same. After all what is the point of pouring effort into China in 1942 when so many other richer prizes are up for grabs?

While I can see the point of denying the Americans strategic air bases in China later in the game (if it is really possible for the Allied side to supply them), China seems like a bit of a sideshow to me. The Japanese can't win the war by simply conquering China, can they? I'd rather keep it as quiet as possible for as long as possible.



Chickenboy -> RE: Early China, allies strat (4/5/2010 1:24:02 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Jim D Burns
AE has nerfed the Chinese unit’s combat abilities to such an extent and made artillery so completely overpowered that it has ruined the game and turned China into a complete blowout again.

Jim,

With all due respect, I believe that your comments are no longer applicable after Patch III. It effectively neutralized (read: nerfed) artillery in most any setting, particularly against troops in terrain or fortifications.

I can't say yet about the ability of Chinese LCUs to mount an effective defense. In those games that preclude strategic bombing of resource centers in China and now have nerfed artillery, the Chinese are in a much better position to survive, defend and even counterattack later. IIRC, Patch III new starts have additional Chinese garrison requirements for the IJA, thus bleeding off yet more of its attacking strength. It's turning into something akin to the quagmire that it was for the Japs IRL.



Canoerebel -> RE: Early China, allies strat (4/5/2010 3:38:30 PM)

From what I've seen pre- and post-patch, here's what I think of China:

1.  Artillery is essentially toothless now - at least against troops in any kind of fortifications (but I think it's better for artillery to be too weak than too strong if you have to have one extreme; but I bet developers continue to tweak until it's just right).

2.  I'm not sure about the effect of artillery against unintrenched troops.

3.  Chinese troops in well-fortified bases perform well on the defensive.

4.  Chinese troops on the attack perform very, very poorly.

Based upon these factors, my strategy in China would be:

1.  Early in the war:  Get the Chinese into an MLR and build fortifications; use small units to harrass Japanese LOC.
2.  Mid-war:  Same as early war.
3.  Late-war:  The Chinese can go on the offensive if the Japanaese have weakly-held positions.  IE, the Chinese "hordes" can overrun weak IJA positions.  But the Chinese against well-entrenched IJA positions are in deep do-do. 



Q-Ball -> RE: Early China, allies strat (4/5/2010 4:17:37 PM)

With all the changes, China looks like a quagmire now. The Chinese probably still need to pull back from Wenchow and those SE cities, and maybe the central plain around Loyang and Nanyang, since that open terran is pretty indefensible. That should be as far as the Japanese can go.

I can't see tons of progress either by the Allies, because by the time you can go to the offensive, the Japs should be pretty dug in. They also have more mobility to shift troops around to trouble spots.



FatR -> RE: Early China, allies strat (4/5/2010 4:31:01 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

His position is that Japan CAN conquer China while at the same time taking on the Western Powers. My position is that if Japan couldn't conquer China when she had nothing else "one her plate", she damned well shouldn't be able to do it after starting the "War in the Pacific".

Japan never really was in such situation, though. And in 1941, in particular, the best part of their forces was in Manchukuo, awaiting the fall of Russia. Assuming the player diverts a large pile of extra units to China, which seems to be a usual requirement for major offensives there, we have no reason to assume that Chinese army won't be crushed and swept before the Japanese assault, until IJA overextends itself by garrizoning new captured territories. Which is totall likely to happen.






FatR -> RE: Early China, allies strat (4/5/2010 4:37:31 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: USS America

I am eager to see several games progress into late '42 and '43 when Japan has spent an enormous amount of supplies on the offensive in China.  I have a suspicion that putting so much focus on China will slow down the Japanese advance elsewhere in the Pacific, and make her weaker when the Allies come calling.  

The biggest Japanese problem with China is that even if you somehow overrun in completely - which, to my knowledge, never was done by any player to date - you still need to leave a ton of garrizons everywhere, and, combined with inevitable losses, this makes the perspective of freeing IJA for other fronts rather dubious. The second biggest problems is that you must attack and destroy Chinese forces actively, while they are weak, or be eventually overrun. Unlike RL, Chinese can successfully lauch major offensives, if left alone long enough.



FatR -> RE: Early China, allies strat (4/5/2010 4:42:10 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Just as one that allowed the US to leap the entire Pacific and land in Tokyo in 1944 would be wrong.

This is perfectly possible, even against a good player. In fact, at least 4 current AARs are highly likely to end like this, or in some comparably decisive Japanese defeat. Can you please stop projecting your own problems on the game mechanics?



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