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GoodGuy -> RE: D-Day (12/8/2009 8:49:06 AM)
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ORIGINAL: Joe D.
According to a History Channel special that featured newly discovered aerial maps of the beach head, Gen. Bradley was at the point of withdrawing the Omaha landing forces, but then used his last "ace": the DDs.
The HC said the DDs moved-in at point-blank range and obliterated German positons; the show presented aerial photos of the DDs in action to back-up their claim.
Joe, I can imagine that it's tempting to believe such claims. What you have to know (or keep in mind), though, is that the quality of HC features went downhill many many moons ago.
When I've been to the US for a few weeks in 1998, visiting friends, I watched the History Channel only. I found many of the WWII features to be halfway accurate and interesting, well with some factual errors regarding German details here and there. In 2007, when I got back to the US for a few months, I figured how HC had deteriorated. Shows packed with factual errors and/or tabloid approaches that leave out or boast details or water down crucial details.
Same with the recent feature about Patton, where HC claimed Patton had been sent to Northern France to save the post D-Day operations, which is pretty off, as he was part of the planning since either January 1944 or somewhere between March and May 1944 (the exact time frame is still a bit controversial, as commands had been merged and/or renamed). He was not appointed to "save" the operation.
Back to the Destroyers. Let me quote from the COMINCH (Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet) After Action Review:
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ORIGINAL: COMINCH P-006
Amphibious Operations
Invasion of Northern France
Western Task Force
June 1944
Chapter II
Naval Gunfire
page 5
From: Commander Assault Force "0", (Commander Eleventh Amphibious Force).
At this juncture the destroyers CARMICK, DOYLE, MCCOOK, THOMPSON, FRANKFORD, HARDING, EMMONS, and BALDWIN and the three British Hunts MELBREAK, TALYBONT and TANATSIDE closed the beach and took under fire many of the enemy positions. Their fire was directed in part from the ships and in part from Shore Fire Control Parties which managed to set up communications. Too much credit cannot be given the destroyers which participated in this bombardment. Lacking complete knowledge of their own troops positions, and hard pressed to pick out enemy positions, they closed in some cases to within 800 yards of the beach. Position after position was taken under direct fire. It is certain that they destroyed many of the enemy positions and it is probable that without their assistance the casualties on the beach would have been considerably higher.
Of the destroyers mentioned above only USS Frankford and USS McCook are really sticking out if you read veteran accounts. One of these DDs moved from Les Moulins (sp?) all the way to the East to sector Fox Red (this distance displayed almost half of the entire Omaha Beach), as most of the troops had failed to hit their assigned beach sectors (all landed east of their assigned slots), firing at targets of opportunity all the way.
The comment "too much credit cannot be given to the destroyers" surely refers to their contribution at this particular juncture, and not to the overall effort, and it mostly refers to the fact that they kept firing at targets (and most likely knocked out some of them) until afternoon/evening, means hours after INF had infiltrated the MLR, and - starting around midday - notably with the help of shore fire control parties, who were then save (less or no enemy fire) to direct things. During the first hours, individual DDs got to point-blank range, but not every DD kept spilling rounds, as they had to watch their ammo level (eg. USS Herndon's report below) and they always feared to hit their own troops.
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page 13
From: Deputy Commander Destroyer Fire Support Group. Force "0", (Commander Destroyer Division 36).
At H minus 40 minutes (0550 B) or shortly thereafter all destroyers opened fire on their assigned targets. Coastal artillery immediately answered the fire and from then on until late the next day all destroyers were under intermittent fire by enemy coastal defenses, mortars and heavy machine guns. During the period of scheduled fire from H minus 40 minutes to H hour it was necessary for the destroyers to occasionally shift fire from their assigned target to some enemy gun that was shooting at them. In most of these instances a few salvos were sufficient to temporarily silence these enemy guns and fire was then immediately shifted back to scheduled targets. The fire of all destroyers during this period was fast and accurate. There were no material or personnel casualties during this phase of the Support Fire although many enemy shells fell close aboard the destroyers. As the first wave closed the beach the Fire Support destroyers preceded them closing the beach to from one thousand (1000) to two thousand (2000) yards. At 0617 (H minus 13 minutes) LCT(R)s commenced firing rockets drenching the area just inland from the beaches. Fire from this beach was temporarily silenced and the entire area covered with heavy smoke and dust. Troops landed and proceeded up the beach into the smoke.
From the landing of the troops until the establishment of Shore Fire Control Parties the Fire Support Destroyers fired on targets of opportunity. It is considered that the support of destroyers during this phase was not utilized to over twenty (20) percent of their possibilities. There was no communication with the beach and on numerous occasions destroyers could not fire on targets which should have been fired on because they did not know the location of our own troops. This is a most crucial period in the assault and some method of communication between troops and Fire Support Ships must be devised. The Destroyers acquitted themselves well indeed whenever a target presented itself. Numerous guns firing on the beaches were detected by their flashes and were destroyed by the Fire Support Ships. The destroyers closed to less than a thousand (1000) yards from the beach, the fire of each ship being directed by the Commanding Officer.
Most notably here, a 75mm gun position had been knocked out, and one of the bigger (MG)gun nests.
Some of the groups/vessels mentioned below were either assigned to UTAH or the British beachhead, iirc, I would have to dig for the exact assignments, too lazy now.
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During the remainder of the day Fire Support Destroyers fired at targets as directed by Shore Fire Control Parties, Commander Destroyer Squadron EIGHTEEN, Commander Task Group 124.9, and by their own commanding officers. (For individual ship targets and ammunition expenditure on each target see Reports of Action by Ships). At 1750 SATTERLEE had fired over seventy (70) percent of her bombardment ammunition. Directed THOMPSON to relieve her in support of Rangers and shifted my pennant and staff to HARDING. SATTERLEE departed Fire Support Area to report to Area Screen Commander. At 1800 BARTON (Commander Destroyers Squadron SIXTY) and O'BRIEN reported to Fire Support Area and were assigned stations and Shore Fire Control Parties. At 2000 directed CARMICK to report to Area Screen Commander she having expended over seventy (70) percent of her bombardment ammunition. OMAHA beaches were under sporadic but heavy shelling during most of the afternoon and evening of D day. This fire came from sources Fire Support Ships had great difficulty in locating. However it was evidently controlled by observers watching the beaches. There were numerous houses behind the beaches and on adjacent hills and cliffs overlooking the beaches which had not been thoroughly shelled even at this late date. I believe that this was a costly error on our part and for future landing operations I strongly advocate the demolishment of all structures, houses, churches, etc., that could possibly house light artillery, machine guns, mortars and/or observation and communication posts prior to and immediately after the landing of troops. This could have readily been done by the destroyers but by the time we realized this our troops were advancing and we were unable to obtain permission to shell any but a few of the most obvious. It was most galling and depressing to lie idly a few hundred yards off the beaches and watch our troops, tanks, landing boats, and motor vehicles being heavily shelled and not be able to fire a shot to help them just because we had no information as to what to shoot at and were unable to detect the source of the enemy fire. Advancing troops must have some visual means to call for immediate fire support from close Fire Support Ships. A mortar shell with a distinctively colored smoke would have been most effective and would have insured immediate destruction of a target so designated.
The phrase I highlighted above indicates that DDs could have contributed way more to the troops' attempts (later on) to move further inland, if there would have been sufficient communication between vessels AND troops on the ground, and if there would have been a sufficient number of shore fire control teams.
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ORIGINAL: page 18, 19
From: USS FRANKFORD (DD).
Conclusions and Recommendations. In spite of the difficulty of the lack of a shore fire control it is felt that the fire delivered on targets of opportunity was effective and of material aid to the troops on the beach. Some of the targets selected may have been already immobilized but every effort was made by this vessel to fire on targets that more definitely seem to hold up the advance of our troops from the beaches. Several attempts were made to communicate visually with units on the beach to determine where we could fire to aid them but none of these visual messages furnished us with enough information to open fire on dangerous nearby targets. It is recommended that men in the first wave, particularly signal corps personnel, be advised of the capabilities of the destroyer fire control systems and be instructed how to designate close-up targets that are within range of the 5 inch guns. If this were accomplished destroyers could be of more aid to men on the beaches even though shore fire control parties were knocked out or pinned down.
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ORIGINAL: 2-(page)20
From: Commander Gunfire Support Craft Eleventh Amphibious Force.
At about H plus 6 hours on D day, we proceeded close inshore all along the OMAHA beach. We were under fire the whole way. Troops were unable to advance. I reported this to the Task Force Commander and requested permission to lay down rocket barrage. The request was refused because of the possibility of killing our own troops. I then proceeded to the force flagship to report in person to the Task Force Commander, Major-Generals HEUBNER and GEROW were aboard. After reviewing the conditions observed, it was again decided not to use the rockets for fear of endangering own troops who may have filtered through.
I'm not sure what sector USS Herndon was assigned to, but at 1310 the MLR had been infiltrated hours ago, so the Herndon CO might refer to targets way off the beach exits (where some were being processed by engineers around that time already - in some sectors -, to pave the way), and/or pockets of resistance:
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page 18
From: USS HERNDON (DD).
At approximately 1310 the Shore Fire Control Party called for a large left spot. MPI was then adjusted by several small spots and rapid fire commenced at an initial rate of 12 round per minute. The Shore Fire Control Party kept requesting an increasing rate of fire until finally we were firing four gun salvos at five second intervals. Spots were applied as called for without checking fire. After the initial spot all deflection spots were to the right at the rate of a 100 yard right spot about every minute as the Army advanced normal to our line of fire. Five second salvos were maintained until ammunition supply failed. Lower hoists will not supply ammunition at that rate. Fire was slowed to ten and fifteen second salvos. At this time it was explained to the Shore Fire Control Party that rate of fire was very high and ammunition was being used up. They replied that results were excellent, that the enemy was on the run, and requested that high rate of fire be continued.
USS Herndon's report shows that the DDs could not sustain high rates of fire for longer periods, and that they were running low on ammo at 13:00 already.
Anyway, these statements and assessments indicate that DDs contributed. They also had difficulties to tell friend from foe, giving them a hard time to deliver sufficient immediate support, as there was no (or insufficient) shore fire control until around 12:00 or 13:00 or even later, at a point when US infantry actually had already succeeded to capture parts of the top of the cliffs and a number of gun nests.
The DDs might have reduced the casualty rate that day (which was already extremely high, some sources say 2000 troops killed, another thousand wounded), so they contributed to quite some extent (unlike the capital ships), but I wouldn't call it key role, and I wouldn't refer to them as units that turned the tide either.
Last but not least it was Bradley's own stubborn decision (against the advice of officers with experience in amph. landings in the Pacific), not to extend the naval pre-landing bombardment (40 minutes only), that had endangered the success of the landing.
The key factors for success were the lack of reserves on the German side, German mistakes and the German 352th Div's fragmented message (where it "seemed" to indicate that the US landing effort had been thrown back into the sea during the initial phase, so that the last reserve was moved to the British beachhead) contributed big time, well along with dedication and stubbornness among US troopers on the beach.
No analyzis indicates that the DDs involved had turned the tide or that they had played a key role, besides for substantial local/individual fire support. DDs delivered useful support, with individual DDs really sticking out, but they could not knock out bunkers or reinforced gun positions with their 5inch-guns - these had to be captured/overcome by troops on the ground.
Throughout D-Day, there were occasions where Allied capital ships (eg. cruisers) reported that they had silenced particular German coastal batteries or bunkers, only to see them open fire again after a while (as they had waited for the cruisers to target other German positions), and occasions where "knocked out" guns became active again a few hours later, after the German crews had managed to remove rubble that was blocking the bunkers' embrasures.
With these positions, the German order/decision to retreat or the US troops on the ground were the only tools that could eject them.
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