RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A)

RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (Full Version)

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Nemo121 -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/8/2010 11:13:06 PM)
Hartwig, Or me sometimes when work gets buzzing... [8D]

Nemo121 -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/10/2010 10:19:52 PM)
January 15th... Update from 14th. A LOT more bombers went down than I had thought. It appears that roughly 35 Sallys and Lillys went down yesterday. Not bad at all. My first Hurricane II squadron now has 33 kills in return for 4 losses. I'm anticipating the arrival of the other 3 Hurricane squadrons will help the rate of attrition over Southern Sumatra. Two of my CLs got in amongst the enemy shipping at Mersing and after a brief exchange of fire got a single 6 inch hit on DD Nowaki. Then, despite crossing the T they decided that valour wasn't really for them and buggered off back to Palembang. Ah well, reload, refuel and then to get back out there. Mike continues his night bombing attacks on Palembang. It looks like he lost 3 bombers to fighters and another couple ot FlAK. In return he got 4 hits on the runway and airfield area. Manilla: Something very weird has happened here... I had about 25,000 tons of supplies in Manilla a week ago and now I suddenly only have 6,500 tons of supplies. Some of the supply propagation in this game is VERY strange. KB remains in hiding although the presence of multiple TFs and radio traffic at Truk strongly hint that it is refuelling at Truk. Fortunately my CVs have already turned around and are heading for bases to refuel and reprovision. In other news my forces should be 1 day from their invasion beaches in the Kurles. They remain utterly unspotted and I think should give Mike something to think about and react to when they land.

Nemo121 -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/10/2010 10:56:29 PM)
A question: at 14,000 feet do the divebombers actually divebomb? I ask because while a, roughly, 10% hit rate vs BBs etc isn't abysmal it isn't great either and I want to be sure that I'm not inadvertently giving them the wrong height to fly at.

Alfred -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/11/2010 12:55:05 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Nemo121 A question: at 14,000 feet do the divebombers actually divebomb? I ask because while a, roughly, 10% hit rate vs BBs etc isn't abysmal it isn't great either and I want to be sure that I'm not inadvertently giving them the wrong height to fly at. Yes according to a post from michaelm, a developer, they dive bomb in the range 10-15k. Alfred

Nemo121 -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/13/2010 12:54:09 AM)
January 16th. Landings were accomplished on all 4 Kuriles islands with no advance warning whatsoever. Unfortunately my troops didn't shock attack so Mike may be able to fly additional troops in to hold most of the bases. I've taken the precaution of loading a couple of extra AKs for the most important island. In other areas: Manilla - the damned supply SNAFU at the phillipines continues to baffle me. 25,000+ supplies to 6,500 in about 4 days is incredibly strange. This bug or whatever it is threatens the whole plan as it will allow Mike to free his troops from the Phillipines a good month or 6 weeks earlier than I had planned for. That's precious time lost fortifying southern Sumatra. Singapore - I've evacuated all of the troops which are non-restricted from Malaysia. At present only 11 x 25 pounder guns and an engineer vehicle remain in Singapore. I'm sending an xAP into try to rescue them. If I can get them out then only 70 AV will be left in Singapore when the Japanese march in. This 70 AV will comprise only permanently restricted units and will mean that literally every soldier who could escape has escaped. Southern Sumatra will, with the arrival of an Australian Division which is currently arriving at Aden end, end up with some 1500 AV guarding Palembang ( currently almost at Level 4 fortifications ) and 2,000 AV guarding Oosthaven ( again behind level 4 fortifications with another 100 AV at each of the dot bases within Southern Sumatra and an armoured reserve of some 300 to 400 AV in the interior ready to react to whichever of the coastal bases Mike decides to most heavily attack. Fiji - My CVs have gotten clean away and are making for their refuelling bases. My shipping is almost entirely gathered now and the troops are ashore and recovering from their naval excursions. Roughly 900 AV are now gathered in Fiji ready for offensive action in the Marshalls --- or elsewhere if he insists on maintaining KB in the Marshalls.

Nemo121 -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/13/2010 2:19:46 PM)
January 17th The big news today was that: a) none of my units attacked in the Aleutians. What the hell? At least one of the units has over a dozen AV ashore and should attack, the others were badly beaten up and so might not attack., Enemy response is limited to about 30 Netties dropping bombs from 8,000 feet. b) The big IJA artillery stack hits. My troops were almost all behind Level 1 and 2 fortifications but still over 70 squads were DESTROYED - not disabled, but outright destroyed - in a single day. My AV dropped from 2605 to 2510 or so. My return bombardment was much more in keeping with the results expected so I'm putting these terrible results down to the inevitable outcome of troops facing outsized artillery units - I'm facing 24cm mortars etc. So, I think I'll hold until I can prepare a trap and then begin to withdraw. Ground combat at 86,41 Japanese Bombardment attack Attacking force 21676 troops, 350 guns, 320 vehicles, Assault Value = 986 Defending force 85129 troops, 562 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 2605 Japanese ground losses: 12 casualties reported Squads: 0 destroyed, 1 disabled Non Combat: 0 destroyed, 1 disabled Engineers: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled Allied ground losses: 1543 casualties reported Squads: 30 destroyed, 59 disabled Non Combat: 40 destroyed, 59 disabled Engineers: 1 destroyed, 0 disabled Guns lost 14 (4 destroyed, 10 disabled) Assaulting units: 20th Recon Regiment 15th Tank Regiment 9th Tank Regiment 5th Tank Regiment 20th Engineer Regiment 37th Division 3rd Tank Regiment 9th Ind.Mixed Brigade 5th Armored Car Co 2nd Hvy.Artillery Regiment 1st Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion 9th Medium Field Artillery Regiment 26th Field Artillery Regiment 1st Army 15th Medium Field Artillery Regiment 3rd Hvy.Artillery Regiment 4th Medium Field Artillery Regiment 22nd Medium Field Artillery Regiment 4th Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion Defending units: 43rd Chinese Corps 57th Chinese Corps 1st Chinese Corps 61st Chinese Corps 17th Chinese Corps 3rd Chinese Corps 76th Chinese Corps 47th Chinese Corps 33rd Chinese Corps 15th Chinese Corps 36th Chinese Corps 40th Chinese Corps 29th Chinese Corps 34th Chinese Corps 38th Chinese Corps 8th New Chinese Corps 34th Group Army 4th Group Army 36th Group Army 39th Group Army 24th Group Army 8th Group Army 7th Group Army 57th AT Gun Regiment -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ground combat at 86,41 Allied Bombardment attack Attacking force 76136 troops, 559 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 2511 Defending force 28765 troops, 357 guns, 813 vehicles, Assault Value = 985 Japanese ground losses: 70 casualties reported Squads: 1 destroyed, 4 disabled Non Combat: 1 destroyed, 27 disabled Engineers: 0 destroyed, 2 disabled Vehicles lost 24 (4 destroyed, 20 disabled) This is more in keeping with what I'd expected. So, I think the results above were just the outcome of outsize artillery. The good news is that there isn't much outsize artillery around so if I can destroy a few units of outsize artillery it should take him quite a bit of time to get more. Assaulting units: 47th Chinese Corps 3rd Chinese Corps 38th Chinese Corps 36th Chinese Corps 76th Chinese Corps 57th Chinese Corps 61st Chinese Corps 17th Chinese Corps 34th Chinese Corps 43rd Chinese Corps 15th Chinese Corps 33rd Chinese Corps 29th Chinese Corps 40th Chinese Corps 1st Chinese Corps 8th New Chinese Corps 39th Group Army 34th Group Army 4th Group Army 7th Group Army 36th Group Army 24th Group Army 8th Group Army 57th AT Gun Regiment Defending units: 9th Tank Regiment 5th Tank Regiment 9th Ind.Mixed Brigade 20th Engineer Regiment 37th Division 20th Recon Regiment 3rd Tank Regiment 15th Tank Regiment 5th Armored Car Co 26th Field Artillery Regiment 1st Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion 4th Medium Field Artillery Regiment 1st Army 15th Medium Field Artillery Regiment 2nd Hvy.Artillery Regiment 22nd Medium Field Artillery Regiment 9th Medium Field Artillery Regiment 3rd Hvy.Artillery Regiment 4th Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion [image]local://upfiles/10809/6882B174349B42448780DBACB3D8229F.jpg[/image]

Nemo121 -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/13/2010 6:40:39 PM)
As an aside.... I've been reading a lot of the AARs here and some are quite literary, some frequently hilarious (Cap Mandrake, I'm looking at you here ) and others show lots of bloody combat - not all of it particularly strategically relevant or well-thought out... I would urge everyone to read the Aussies vs Amis AAR http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=2200574 It is very obvious when professionals go to work and it shows a very balanced, strategic view of things with the tactical and operational suborned to the strategic as they should be. In addition they've obviously done a lot of good pilot management in addition to declining unnecessary exchanges. There's lots to learn there.

Rob Brennan UK -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/13/2010 10:08:37 PM)
Thanks for the link Nemo .. I have read some AAR's but can't take time to read them all. and i like learning.

bklooste -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/14/2010 12:43:25 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Nemo121 As an aside.... I've been reading a lot of the AARs here and some are quite literary, some frequently hilarious (Cap Mandrake, I'm looking at you here ) and others show lots of bloody combat - not all of it particularly strategically relevant or well-thought out... I would urge everyone to read the Aussies vs Amis AAR http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=2200574 It is very obvious when professionals go to work and it shows a very balanced, strategic view of things with the tactical and operational suborned to the strategic as they should be. In addition they've obviously done a lot of good pilot management in addition to declining unnecessary exchanges. There's lots to learn there. Agree , its prob the best but they dont give the tactical detail only strategic a and tactical results. Most AAR IMHO use very sub standard strategy esp China.

pat.casey -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/14/2010 4:20:29 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: bklooste Agree , its prob the best but they dont give the tactical detail only strategic a and tactical results. Most AAR IMHO use very sub standard strategy esp China. Nothing wrong with an example of a conventional plan done well. I like reading AARs about high risk/high reward operations, because they're fun to watch/read about, but I think a more conventional plan is more likely to win the war sooner as the allies over enough repetitions.

Nemo121 -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/14/2010 7:23:30 PM)
bklooste - that's precisely why it is so good. "I moved 10 planes here and set them at 2,000 feet, 4 were met by Zeroes, 2 were intercepted by Claudes, I incurred 3 damaged planes and 1 destroyed before they dived... At that point 3 more were damaged while 1 was destroyed. I scored a single bomb hit which hit x gun mount and then on the egress they were, again, intercepted by Claudes with the result that Captain Who Cares' plane was further damaged. I checked and it appears he went down 3 hexes from my own CVs. I am sending Lieutenant Wainthorpe's floatplane squadron out to search for him." Wow, lots of detail but not really much of any value for anyone trying to learn about the strategic level of the game and trying to improve their play. It can be fun to read some of those blow by blow accounts but I don't think you're going to learn much abotu strategic assessment from those kinds of AARs. Now that's fine for many of them since many are written with a view to describing the war from a low vantage point and not bothering with the strategic level and others ( Mandrake etc ) are written for literary or comedic value. For strategic level thinking and consideration though there are few AARs out there which can be read and which add knowledge etc to players. Pat, Hmm, I'm not sure I'd agree. I would say that so long as the plan suits the ability and tenor of the player then the plan is likely to succeed. Most people will do better following conventional plans in a conventional manner and will do well when they do so. Some will do much better when they pursue the unconventional as that's the way their mind and temperament predispose them to operate. Very few people will do well when operating in diametric opposition to their predispositions. In other news: January 18th -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sub attack near Eniwetok at 127,108 Japanese Ships PB Ikunta Maru, Torpedo hits 2, on fire, heavy damage PB Kaikei Maru Allied Ships SS S-34, hits 1 SS S-34 launches 4 torpedoes at PB Ikunta Maru PB Kaikei Maru attacking submerged sub .... PB Kaikei Maru fails to find sub, continues to search... PB Kaikei Maru attacking submerged sub .... PB Kaikei Maru fails to find sub, continues to search... PB Kaikei Maru fails to find sub, continues to search... Escort abandons search for sub I think this means he is reinforcing Eniwetok and other bases in the Marshalls region. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Morning Air attack on TF, near Onnekotan-jima at 136,48 Weather in hex: Severe storms Raid spotted at 34 NM, estimated altitude 11,000 feet. Estimated time to target is 11 minutes Japanese aircraft G3M2 Nell x 12 G4M1 Betty x 12 Japanese aircraft losses G3M2 Nell: 5 damaged G4M1 Betty: 7 damaged Allied Ships BB Colorado BB Maryland Aircraft Attacking: 6 x G4M1 Betty bombing from 6000 feet Naval Attack: 2 x 250 kg SAP Bomb, 4 x 60 kg GP Bomb 12 x G3M2 Nell bombing from 6000 feet Naval Attack: 2 x 250 kg SAP Bomb, 4 x 60 kg GP Bomb 6 x G4M1 Betty bombing from 6000 feet Naval Attack: 2 x 250 kg SAP Bomb, 4 x 60 kg GP Bomb Lots of bombing but no torpedoes. Ah well, another day of unloading and then I'll pull out. Quite a successful little raid actually. The winter disablement rules mean the bases at which I dropped a company of troops have NO combat-capable squads and so cannot be attacked. Onnekotan was the one base I actually wanted and so I landed significantly more troops there and it looks like I'll take it this turn. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ground combat at 86,41 Japanese Bombardment attack Attacking force 21597 troops, 352 guns, 322 vehicles, Assault Value = 981 Defending force 84681 troops, 559 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 2570 Japanese ground losses: Vehicles lost 1 (0 destroyed, 1 disabled) Allied ground losses: 1377 casualties reported Squads: 16 destroyed, 73 disabled Non Combat: 53 destroyed, 98 disabled Engineers: 0 destroyed, 1 disabled Guns lost 10 (2 destroyed, 8 disabled) Assaulting units: 3rd Tank Regiment 9th Tank Regiment 15th Tank Regiment 20th Engineer Regiment 37th Division 9th Ind.Mixed Brigade 5th Tank Regiment 20th Recon Regiment 5th Armored Car Co 26th Field Artillery Regiment 15th Medium Field Artillery Regiment 22nd Medium Field Artillery Regiment 3rd Hvy.Artillery Regiment 4th Medium Field Artillery Regiment 2nd Hvy.Artillery Regiment 1st Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion 9th Medium Field Artillery Regiment 1st Army 4th Ind.Hvy.Art. Battalion Defending units: 40th Chinese Corps 36th Chinese Corps 17th Chinese Corps 29th Chinese Corps 47th Chinese Corps 69th Chinese Corps 61st Chinese Corps 33rd Chinese Corps 76th Chinese Corps 34th Chinese Corps 38th Chinese Corps 3rd Chinese Corps 15th Chinese Corps 43rd Chinese Corps 1st Chinese Corps 57th Chinese Corps 8th New Chinese Corps 8th Group Army 36th Group Army 34th Group Army 24th Group Army 4th Group Army 7th Group Army 39th Group Army 57th AT Gun Regiment -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ground combat at 86,41 Allied Bombardment attack Attacking force 75124 troops, 557 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 2487 Defending force 28644 troops, 359 guns, 815 vehicles, Assault Value = 981 Japanese ground losses: 69 casualties reported Squads: 1 destroyed, 1 disabled Non Combat: 0 destroyed, 18 disabled Engineers: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled Guns lost 1 (0 destroyed, 1 disabled) Vehicles lost 17 (0 destroyed, 17 disabled) The artillery concentration here is pretty much unbeatable. I'm going to have to try to transition this into a war of movement unless my losses fall significantly but it will take time to get my troops in position plus the perils of a war of movement pitting infantry against armoured formations should be pretty obvious. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ground combat at Onnekotan-jima (136,48) Allied Deliberate attack Attacking force 442 troops, 30 guns, 18 vehicles, Assault Value = 9 Defending force 0 troops, 0 guns, 0 vehicles, Assault Value = 0 Allied adjusted assault: 4 Japanese adjusted defense: 1 Allied assault odds: 4 to 1 (fort level 0) Allied forces CAPTURE Onnekotan-jima !!! Combat modifiers Attacker: leaders(+), leaders(-), disruption(-) Assaulting units: 161st Infantry Rgt /4 Hmm, I actually landed 1500 men. Only 400+ are ready to fight. That's the effect of winter in the north [8D]. It should really mess with Mike's counter-invasion when that comes.... Over the next little while I plan to bring additional troops into this base using Adak as a staging post, base a fighter squadron in order to prevent unescorted bomber raids from attriting my convoys and force him to get serious in retaking it. It'll be a nice diversion of effort from the DEI and an operation I can run on the cheap.

ny59giants -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/14/2010 7:45:54 PM)
Fionn, Mike needs to move an Air HQ to Ominato and then use transport planes to get it over to Hokkaido in order to get torpedoes. The Air HQs on Honshu are permanently restricted to "General Defense" command which extends from the top of the Hokkaido to Formosa.

modrow -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/14/2010 10:52:56 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Nemo121 I would urge everyone to read the Aussies vs Amis AAR http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=2200574 It is very obvious when professionals go to work and it shows a very balanced, strategic view of things with the tactical and operational suborned to the strategic as they should be. In addition they've obviously done a lot of good pilot management in addition to declining unnecessary exchanges. There's lots to learn there. Agreed. Actually, I printed the advice jrcar recently gave in the Shipwreck of hopes - Good guys AAR and re-read it after each replay and before each turn now [8D]. One of the difficulties of such high-quality type of play is that you really have to be able to plan ahead. I think many of the actions we observe in these forums are the outcome of impromptu actions (or reactions) that do not involve long-term planning (which is more than just defining where one wants to be at a given point of time, but involves also defining how this is to be achieved in some detail), but are frequently reactions to tactical opportunities. Maybe they involve bringing the assets into place for two or three weeks, springing the trap for a few turns and then executing in a series of turns - but this is not the planning I am thinking of and maybe even sort of interferes with it, because you may be tempted to use assets you need to achieve strategic, long-term goals to exploit tactical opportunities, which may provide you with a "victory" while actually delaying the important achievement that ensure victory. In other words, this type of play leads to lacking subordination of tactical and operational aspects to the strategic ones but tends to reverse that relation, and it is tempting to fall for it - at least for me, to go for the little bit of "perceived success" where it seems achievable rather than going ahead with the major plan. I also believe that the necessity for long-term planning has increased at least for the Allied player from WitP to AE (then again maybe I just stress it some more) anyway, because you have to prepare the tools for the job by training and because you have to manage the devices you receive more carefully to enable the units your plan involves to do their jobs. Maybe this will support/create a trend to lead us to more strategic play. After all, we are here on a forum place whose motto is not "what's your tactics" ? As always, just my 2cts Hartwig

pat.casey -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/14/2010 11:29:14 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Nemo121 Pat, Hmm, I'm not sure I'd agree. I would say that so long as the plan suits the ability and tenor of the player then the plan is likely to succeed. Most people will do better following conventional plans in a conventional manner and will do well when they do so. Some will do much better when they pursue the unconventional as that's the way their mind and temperament predispose them to operate. Very few people will do well when operating in diametric opposition to their predispositions. Perhaps its just my inherently conservative nature here, but my basic thinking is: The conventional wisdom is usually right. Most people are inherently conventional thinkers, although few want to admit that. Hence when in doubt, take the conventional approach. If you've got some major strategic insight, then by all means act on it, but don't delude yourself into thinking you're more insightful than you are :). Its all about knowing your limitations.

Nemo121 -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/15/2010 12:14:57 AM)
ny59, Aye, I know... I checked that before I sent BBs into Netty range... I think he may be rushing KB into the region as I haven't seen it for 3 days ( last spotted at Truk )... My forces in Fiji are ready to begin loading and I'm considering sending them in once I know KB is in the north OR shows up in the DEI - where he will soon be getting ready to invade Sumatra once Singers falls ( there's about 70 AV there so it should fall in about 3 or 4 days on the first attack ). To be clear the 70 AV there is perma-restricted and can't be flown or shipped out. In total in terms of non-restricted units I am going to lose 1 engineer vehicle and 11 guns from one of the Australian Bdes. Hartwig, I think you are correct... Too often people put together a string of off the cuff operations and call that a strategy. Taking advantage of opportunities is great - and something I'm all for - but thinking that's a strategy makes one far too reactive really. That's why I like the Aussies vs Amis AAR. You can see them calmly and cooly putting together a strategic plan and following it through - taking advantage of opportunities to be sure but still running their overall strategy and suborning operations to their strategy. That is something I bang on about all the time but I'm not sure if people realise it. Pat, Well it just goes to show you how people differ. In my view the conventional wisdom is an excellent way to abbrogate one's right to individual thought and end up thoughtlessly doing the same as everyone else. Most of the time people make relatively reasonable decisions but in crises people often make clearly life-ending decisions which, if one obeys the conventional wisdom of the crowd/herd , will end up with you dying alongside them. Back when I used to do a bit more research into PTSD and reactions to trauma/crisis I read a lot of reports of the actions people took when ferries went down or you got fires or stampedes in cinemas/nightclubs etc in various psychology and psychiatry journals. You can learn a lot about decision-making schema and the drive to conform in such situations. Invariably every report showed that there were one or two exits ( usually the doors the people had entered by ) which were packed full of bodies blocking the doors and trapping others inside where they died of smoke inhalation or drowning etc while other exits were either lightly used ( allowing an orderly evacuation with no crushing ) or utterly unused. You get the same thing in airplane crashes where people don't often check the exits or count the number of seats rows to their nearest exit and thus are condemned to try to make it to the front or rear entrances of the plane --- with the result that a lot of people who were in the middle of the plane near the overwing exit doors are often found dead near either the front or rear exits having made it much farther than they would have had to go to the middle exits - IOW these were potential successful escapers who died because of ignorance/following the crowd. Airplane crashes are particularly useful for this type of research because you can KNOW where people were when the plane went down thanks to assigned seat numbers etc... In one nightclub fire in which close to 100 people died there were 5 exits. 2 were blocked by people such that 50 or 60 people died of smoke inhalation trying to push through a barricade of corpses while 2 exits were used by a small group of people near the front of the hall to get out with no crushing and no injuries and the last exit was utterly unopened. This exit was within 30 feet of one of the doors at which the 50 or 60 people died trying to push through the corpses. That's a pretty extreme example but it is my experience that very few people actually think through their decisions in daily life ( If they did I'd have a lot less business ;-) ). Most just fall back on a quick mental schema or just go along with the crowd almost irrespective of any long-term consideration as to whether or not such crowd-following will lead them into a place they like being. For 99% of anyone's life that's more than good enough as very few crowds will, during the course of an average safe working day decide to do something so dumb they'll all die BUT that 1% of the time it'll get you killed. So, my view is pretty much that I'll always consider what I'm doing in isolation from what the crowd is doing. MY attitude is that if THEY happen to be doing something I want to do then I'll go along but if they're doing something else then I'll happily plough my own furrow. The key is that I'll do whatever my consideration points out as being best irrespective of what the crowd does. Sometimes the crowd conforms, sometimes it doesn't, either is fine by me. Personally though while I'm quite comfortable getting through life without achieving anything society would notice me for ( my goals are more personal and relationship-oriented ) I'm not comfortable suborning my decision-making processes to those of groups which studies show often act irrationally and in a self-destructive manner. Each to their own though. 99% of the time herd-following will get you through life just fine if your content to do so... The other 1% of the time OR if you're the type of person who just couldn't tolerate herd-following its better to think for yourself --- albeit not so obviously that society recognises that you are different and decides to single you out. We are, at heart, still cavemen who fear "the other, the different, the one who is not like US". Also, you can't forget that my training as a doctor values making decisions based on data and evidence and not on the basis of what society or I would like to happen. We use the phrase "evidence based medicine" for this but what it basically boils down to is being trained to think of all the options and prepare to do whatever will give your patients the best chance of survival/recovery no matter what happens. What I'd like to happen is utterly irrelevant, what others would do is irrelevant, what matters is doing what research says gives my patient the best chance... It also feeds into the rather cold calculation of chances and survival. I have patients I'm fond of but whom I know are going to do poorly and die irrespective of my best efforts. I know that my personal feelings have NO impact on patient outcome or anything else except the rate of my own burnout - which is also a reality and something which will happen no matter how tough I think I am unless I am appropriately careful of it and myself. It doesn't mean I won't make those efforts but it does give you a very healthy regard for the fact that things are as they are, not as I want them to be and that oftentimes my best won't be good enough. Death, eventually, will win every war I fight. I might win a few battles along the way and the better and more rationally I fight them ( and the less reliant I am on "Well, everyone else does this so I'm sure its good enough" style thinking ) the more battles I'll win but in the end I'll lose every war. Winning the battles gives people better quality of life and more time with their loved ones so the battles are worth winning but the war is only ever going to end one way. I often say that doctors are pragmatic optimists... I know I'll lose the war but every day I go in is another opportunity to win the battles on THIS DAY. String enough of those good days together and I help people and that's what I do it for. I don't think, however, that you can understand my approach to AARs and play and strategy without realising how that approach is shaped by the work I do and training I got. Last year's conventional wisdom is this year's "less than the best treatment" and, as such, conventional wisdom isn't a good guide to treating patients although much of what works IS common sense ( a bit of a dichotomy there but life is full of contradictions ). I think that between that and the fact that my job really reinforces that my own personal preferences have no bearing on outcome you have two important keystones to my approach to stuff.

pat.casey -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/15/2010 2:12:51 AM)
Nemo, I'm not advocating blindly following a conventional approach when there's evidence to the contrary. What I am advocating is, in the absence of evidence, the conventional approach is the best default option. If its impractical for you to go out an run conclusive research and/or logic your way to a correct response, and it is on a great many questions, then following the conventional wisdom is the wisest course. I think too often players feel compelled to do something "unusual" just to prove they're being different and original, and that, in turn, is really nothing more than a different kind of conformity; conforming with our societal bias towards rebelliousness/originality. If you've got reason to believe your 1945 invasion of San Francisco is going to work out and win the war for you, by all means, go for it, I'll bring the popcorn. But if you're just doing it because you want to prove that you're not one of those "conventional" IJN players who hunker down in the home islands in 1945, then you're doing your strategic goal (winning the war), a disservice.

bklooste -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/15/2010 5:27:15 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Nemo121 bklooste - that's precisely why it is so good. "I moved 10 planes here and set them at 2,000 feet, 4 were met by Zeroes, 2 were intercepted by Claudes, I incurred 3 damaged planes and 1 destroyed before they dived... At that point 3 more were damaged while 1 was destroyed. I scored a single bomb hit which hit x gun mount and then on the egress they were, again, intercepted by Claudes with the result that Captain Who Cares' plane was further damaged. I checked and it appears he went down 3 hexes from my own CVs. I am sending Lieutenant Wainthorpe's floatplane squadron out to search for him." Wow, lots of detail but not really much of any value for anyone trying to learn about the strategic level of the game and trying to improve their play. I hate those AARs esp combat report ones which is just waste of time but there is a huge range , i like yours so far. In particular things that are missing from Ausies are things like where the mines are , which fields are being maintained , multiple air fields vs a single big on , how they are dealing with the death star in China have they tried suround tactics ( some of that looks like its about to happen) .

bklooste -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/15/2010 5:28:45 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: pat.casey quote: ORIGINAL: bklooste Agree , its prob the best but they dont give the tactical detail only strategic a and tactical results. Most AAR IMHO use very sub standard strategy esp China. Nothing wrong with an example of a conventional plan done well. I like reading AARs about high risk/high reward operations, because they're fun to watch/read about, but I think a more conventional plan is more likely to win the war sooner as the allies over enough repetitions. The problem is they are following strategy for which a general in WWII would be sacked for eg challanging the Japanese in CHina with only 1:1 or 2:1 odds not trying to suround the death stakcs etc. Also a conventional plan must be flawed as the Japanese player expects

Nemo121 -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/15/2010 6:58:29 AM)
Pat, In the absence of lots of evidence there's absolutely no reason to believe that my own ( or your own ) assessment is likely to be more fallible than that of the herd - especially as most of the herd doesn't consist of people who've made a rational assessment but merely comprises people who are going "Hey, if he's heading that way so will I". Personally, even when there's little evidence around I'd trust my instincts and analysis more than I'd trust that of the herd. But, people differ and others make a different choice. I respect that. I don't, however, see any reason to believe that the herd is going to make better analyses and decisions than I. As to people doing something different to be different... Aye well that's pointless too. Do something different if your analysis leads you do that way, do something conventional if your analysis leads you do that. Playing to the gallery in either case is stupid. I'm not sure that Japans strategic goal is "winning the war". After all my national policy objective here isn't quite to "win the game". I'm playing for stress relief and to put together some skillful play. If I can do that and lose then I'll be happy. To be fair though good play usually puts one on the winning end of things but it isn't always necessarily so. Remember in reality Japan wasn't even trying to win vs the US. It was trying to get a "too bloody and long draw" and, in so doing, sap US national morale and get a negotiated peace which would allow it to hold most of what it had taken. This was essentially the north vietnamese strategy several decades later and, in that war, it pretty much won although the two crucial differences there were: a) a much greater emphasis on propaganda by the North Vietnamese and b) the lack of an attack on American soil - I won't be counting embassies in Vietnam as being American soil for these purposes. bklooste, Well the minefields and suchlike are mostly tactical issues IMO... The strength of that AAR lies in the strategic level of planning their airframe committment rates, how they put operations together and how they maintain subordination to the strategic goals. Precise accounts of what goes where you can get in many other places. No AAR can do everything...

modrow -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/15/2010 8:01:30 AM)
Interesting so see a "wisdom of the crowds" debate pop up here... I am never really sure about the position to take in such a discussion (usually the opposite one, but here both places are taken already). So maybe I just toss in a comment and see what the disputants make of it. Note that this comment may be totally wrong - if so, I'm interested in the real the facts. One aspect that may need some consideration is that I think the herd-following may be "in us". What I mean to say is that it is sort of an instinctive reaction we seem to fall back on when we are in an "exceptional" situation, for which we cannot fall back on expereince. Now, if you believe in evolution this may be indicative of the fact that this is a good strategy, otherwise the indiviualists would rule supreme (which just does not seem to be the case imho) or at least be more dominant. Looks like the alternative approach is/used to be way more risky. "Hey, I don't know this fruit but the others eat it, so chances are I can do the same" involves less risks than "Hey, there's a fruit I can potentially harvest as the only person, so I'll eat it", which admittedly may be very rewarding, but also quite punishing. Of course, such an approach may of course be what makes a great leader, specifically a great military leader. Doing a "schiefe Schlachtordnung" like Frederick II of Prussia in a time nobody does it can bring you great victories, repeating it 50 years later against a new great leader like Napoleon who does new things defines one's defeat. Managing to do what is considered impossible to do, thus challenging conventional wisdom (the Ardennes are totally unsuitable terrain to be crossed by tanks, everyone knows that) is a potential cornerstone of a great success. As always, just my 2cts Hartwig

pat.casey -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/15/2010 3:49:41 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: hartwig.modrow Interesting so see a "wisdom of the crowds" debate pop up here... I am never really sure about the position to take in such a discussion (usually the opposite one, but here both places are taken already). So maybe I just toss in a comment and see what the disputants make of it. Note that this comment may be totally wrong - if so, I'm interested in the real the facts. One aspect that may need some consideration is that I think the herd-following may be "in us". What I mean to say is that it is sort of an instinctive reaction we seem to fall back on when we are in an "exceptional" situation, for which we cannot fall back on expereince. Now, if you believe in evolution this may be indicative of the fact that this is a good strategy, otherwise the indiviualists would rule supreme (which just does not seem to be the case imho) or at least be more dominant. Looks like the alternative approach is/used to be way more risky. "Hey, I don't know this fruit but the others eat it, so chances are I can do the same" involves less risks than "Hey, there's a fruit I can potentially harvest as the only person, so I'll eat it", which admittedly may be very rewarding, but also quite punishing. Of course, such an approach may of course be what makes a great leader, specifically a great military leader. Doing a "schiefe Schlachtordnung" like Frederick II of Prussia in a time nobody does it can bring you great victories, repeating it 50 years later against a new great leader like Napoleon who does new things defines one's defeat. Managing to do what is considered impossible to do, thus challenging conventional wisdom (the Ardennes are totally unsuitable terrain to be crossed by tanks, everyone knows that) is a potential cornerstone of a great success. As always, just my 2cts Hartwig I more or less agree with you on this e.g. that "greatness", at least the way our society defines it, usually comes down to doing something new and extraordinary which redefines the conventional wisdom. The position I'm taking though is that few of us have greatness in us, but a lot of us think we do. As a consequence, people make bad decisions because they think they're smarter than they are. In the particular case of our society, there's a cofactor, which is that we to value individualism and originality highly, so there's social pressure, quite apart from a mistaken appreciation of our abilities, to do something different from our peers. Its all about knowing your limitations. To make an analogy appropriate to the board here, consider the eastern theatre of the American Civil War. For the first two years of the war, countless union generals got their hats handed to them by trying to do clever things to break the army of northern virginia e.g. I'll ship my army across the bay, I'll attack in winter, I'll split my army, etc. It took George Gordon Meade, a hugeley conventional general, to win at Gettysburg. Meade wasn't brilliant, and he didn't have any great strategic insights, but he made no mistakes by trying to out-clever his opponent. Fundamentally, of course, Meade wasn't a great general; he failed to follow up his victory, and he had no vision of how to win the war, as opposed to a battle. For that, the union had to wait for Grant, but the Union was far better served by having conventional Meade in charge at Gettysburg than they would have been by, say, Joe Hooker.

Nemo121 -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/15/2010 5:31:03 PM)
Hartwig, Interesting to see that our previous ( many months ago ) conversation on crowds arises here yet again... I think though that while it is vogueish to talk of the wisdom of crowds it is true that those crowds are self-selecting crowds in which many of the individuals are self-selecting for innovation etc. After all the whole idea is that the "crowd" generates a large number of possible solutions which are rationally assessed and that the crowd then tends towards the most practicable solution. There are problems with applying this theory to in-game herding around conventional wisdom on many levels: Essentially though this crowd may generate a large number of potential solutions but conventional wisdom is all about the generation of a very small number of solutions ( or one solution ) which the mass will slavishly follow. It is not a case of the wisdom of crowds so much as the ignorance of herds in which the herd follows whatever course of action is initiated by one or two members within the herd... those members not necessarily having been chosen for their quick-wittedness or analytical brilliance but rather self-selecting as the first members of the herd to move --- hardly the best criterion for determining the most thoroughly analysed and "best" reaction to any given situation. You can see this in the case of the fires... The first person who started moving ( let's call them the Alpha ) moved towards the doors they came in through. Others followed this person and as more and more began to copy this person's actions the psychology of crowds inexorably caused others to choose to conform as their capacity for analysis gave way to the simplistic mental schema of panic which shout "do what they're doing, they know the way out". ( In panic it appears that roughly 2/3rds of people stop rational assessment and go with the most simplistic of mental schema ( rules of thumb in plain words ) as that's all they can process through their panic. Levels of survival for this 2/3rds are significantly less than for the 1/3rd which rationally assesses the situation and options. ) The end result was that people made decisions on the basis of hope and ignorance and followed the ignorance of the herd into a deadly narrowing. quote: One aspect that may need some consideration is that I think the herd-following may be "in us". What I mean to say is that it is sort of an instinctive reaction we seem to fall back on when we are in an "exceptional" situation, for which we cannot fall back on expereince. Now, if you believe in evolution this may be indicative of the fact that this is a good strategy, otherwise the indiviualists would rule supreme (which just does not seem to be the case imho) or at least be more dominant. Looks like the alternative approach is/used to be way more risky. "Hey, I don't know this fruit but the others eat it, so chances are I can do the same" involves less risks than "Hey, there's a fruit I can potentially harvest as the only person, so I'll eat it", which admittedly may be very rewarding, but also quite punishing. What I would suggest to this is that while the urge to follow the herd is deeply ingrained in humans that doesn't mean that if one analyses a situation individually one is consigned to eating the berry no-one else has eaten. I would argue that if you're intelligent and assessing things for yourself you would actually think, "Hmm, here's a berry I can potentially harvest as the only person... Hmm, I don't know if it is poisonous. Well, looks like I'll stick with the safe berries until someone else eats it and I see if they live or die." Just because you assess things rationally and individually doesn't mean you HAVE to take the contrary view. It just means that when the herd makes the right decision you can go along with their decision but when your assessment leads you to think they have made the wrong decision you have the option of taking a different path. E.g. When the herd decides to camp out in the open because the caves look forbidding you can go... "Hmm, lots of tall grass here, perfect territory for a sabretooth attack. Methinks I'll go into one of those caves and spend the time and effort clearing it out in order to sleep in safety." quote: Of course, such an approach may of course be what makes a great leader, specifically a great military leader. Doing a "schiefe Schlachtordnung" like Frederick II of Prussia in a time nobody does it can bring you great victories, repeating it 50 years later against a new great leader like Napoleon who does new things defines one's defeat. Managing to do what is considered impossible to do, thus challenging conventional wisdom (the Ardennes are totally unsuitable terrain to be crossed by tanks, everyone knows that) is a potential cornerstone of a great success. Well in all of those situations the conventional wisdom was just plain wrong. It only took someone to try the thing to prove it was doable and when they did they garnered great victories because their opponents had failed to guard against it because THEY never bothered to challenge their own conventional wisdom. Is thinking for oneself a guarantee of success? Of course not but I think that to assess every situation on its merits is, if one is gifted with reasonable intelligence and judgement, a far superior way of living life and making plans than to follow the ignorance of herds--- herds which are given their impulse to move not by the most intelligent member of the herd but merely by he or she who moves first. I know plenty of idiots whom I wouldn't trust to find their way out of a room with a flashing neon exit sign who have fast reaction times. Being first to move isn't a guarantee of moving in the right direction. Lastly, I think that several parties to the discussion are making the mistake of assuming that "thinking for oneself" is synonymous with "being unconventional". That simply isn't so. Thinking for oneself and rejecting conventional wisdom holds the possibility of reach the same conclusion as the conventional wisdom. It also holds the possibility of reaching a different conclusion. It absolutely doesn't necessitate unconventionality. I think that having the assumption that thinking for oneself necessitates unconventionality is hampering the discussion. Also I'm talking about not accepting conventional wisdom. I think that's an entirely different thing than greatness. One can think for oneself without being great. My only contention is that thinking for oneself will lead most people to better outcomes than following the herd. It will lead a tiny number to "greatness" but even if all people thought for themselves only a tiny portion would ever do so and achieve greatness. Again I think this seeming assumption - that I'm equating thinking for oneself with greatness - is leading the discussion astray.

Rob Brennan UK -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/15/2010 5:48:18 PM)
Interesting discussion , and at the risk of hijacking the AAR , Nemo have you read Bad Science by Ben Goldacre ? his website is a must read for any 'rational' thinkers :- http://www.badscience.net/ thats my contribution to the group mentality discussion .. on with the war chaps !

Nemo121 -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/15/2010 6:11:10 PM)
Rob, absolutely... Great read. Some stuff by James Hogan ( about scientific orthodoxy ) is also very good. Again, just because someone disagrees with the conventional wisdom doesn't mean they're right BUT it doesn't mean they're wrong either ;-) ... In other news.... I thought I should give a little idea of what my latest moves in the DEI have been... Southern DEI - I've begun to pull PBY-5s out of Sumatra and into Kendari while the PBY-4s go to Ambon. These planes are pulling out the Cavite and Manilla USN Base Forces which have significant Naval Support elements and should help speed unloading at both Ambon and Kendari. I'm also looking at Saumlaki ( sic ) to form a defensive line running- Ambon, Kendari, Samlauki, Koepang, Darwin. I'm proposing to put 1 Infantry Division and 1 Armoured Regiment at Ambon and Kendari to begin with and then put additional Australian formations into the line as they straggle in. I fully expect Kendari and Ambon to fall but I expect to be able to pull most of the Australian troops out before they fall using my PBYs and transports and as I fall back I will concentrate these forces into fewer bases, making the defence stronger as it crumples.. Why Kendari and Ambon? Simple, a surface fleet can base out of Koepang or Darwin and hit any landings or Kendari and Ambon hard. Additionally any landing on Menado can be hit from Kendari or Ambon. I have tasked Force Z to this region and am just itching to send it or a CA-centred RN TF in against an IJN landing force in this region. This plan would cost me a few non-airtransportable guns but that's about it. It would also be a great situation into which to insert my CVs after they run the channel between Oz and PNG. It would also force him to conform to my plans as he can't really afford to leave Kendari or Ambon in my hands if he is trying to pull out OIL from Balikpapan etc. My airforce would butcher his TKs on that journey. Southern Sumatra - I'm seeing more and more signs that he may just come straight for Palembang. I have an additional Australian Division which is on its way from Aden. That division musters some 450 AV and will greatly help the defence of Palembang. In the meantime I have gathered an armoured reserve inland in strategic move mode and am going to move several Bdes from Oosthaven to Palembang. At present every base in Southern Sumatra has at least 100 AV to defend against parachute attack while Palembang has some 1200 AV, Oosthaven has some 1700 AV and I have a mobile reserve of about 400 AV. I have an additional 400 AV of Dutch troops to still pull out of Batavia which will go to defend Oosthaven. So, I'm pulling about 300 AV out of Oosthaven and sending them north to Palembang while my air transports pull yet more infantry out of Batavia. NorPac... Since the Japanese aren't doing much about NorPac and since I get 2 regiments of troops in CONUSA over the next couple of days I'm going to rush those troops to the Aleutians while I move the infantry regiment from Adak into Onnekotan Jima. That'll give me a regiment in Adak, another in Attu and another in Onnekotan Jima. I have base forces and engineers sufficient to build Level 6 forts in a short period of time and will concentrate on trying to use the force at Onnekotan to inspire the IJN into combat on terms favourable to my surface combat TFs. Once NorPac is reinforced all the other reinforcements will be routed to Fiji where I will decide to either reinforce the Marshalls ( if I go ahead and take them ) or can ship them on towards northern Oz to engage in the southern DEI. I quite like the look of the DEI as having potential for being turned into an IJN quagmire. Burma: Moulmein is being held by the 1st Burmese Division and about 600 AV of Chinese troops. The experience of all my units is poor but Forts are Level 3 and I'm hoping terrain and numbers make up for the rest. China: I suffered 2,400 casualties to artillery today... I need to hold a few more days until I can get a 1,000 AV stack into position to catch the enemy in the flank and then I think I'll have to pull out. KB: KB is missing. It was in Truk and I think it is heading north but I amn't sure. Nonetheless I think it is time to begin loading my troopships. I'll continue reconning aggressively and if I spot KB in the Marshalls I'll just sail the troopships west and towards the DEI. The forces they carry can do a lot of good there.

modrow -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/15/2010 8:13:24 PM)
Pat, quote: ORIGINAL: pat.casey The position I'm taking though is that few of us have greatness in us, but a lot of us think we do. As a consequence, people make bad decisions because they think they're smarter than they are. In the particular case of our society, there's a cofactor, which is that we to value individualism and originality highly, so there's social pressure, quite apart from a mistaken appreciation of our abilities, to do something different from our peers. It seems to be even worse... even though this seems to be another vogueish topic, at least it seems to be more popular in popular science than in the corresponding "hard science" - there is the Dunning-Kruger effect. The more incompetent one is in a given skill, the bigger is the positive bias influencing where one would place oneself in the skill distribution of said skill... Hartwig

Nemo121 -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/15/2010 8:28:30 PM)
And the reverse Dunning-Kurger effect which is that the more incompetent one is in a given skill set the greater prowess one attributes to anyone who can best you in that skill set ---- derived from the misdirected belief that one is actually brilliant at that skill set so the opponent must be even more brilliant to have bested you. By extolling the opponent's brilliance one, indirectly, cements how brilliant one is as it took a man of such genius to best you... Dunning-Kruger and its obverse are regularly observed in the AAR section... Very few people ascribe their victories to luck or their losses to their own incompetence[:D]

modrow -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/15/2010 8:37:04 PM)
Nemo, I assume you know what you are doing and took corresponding precautions (in terms of naval support, AE/AKE or whatever), so this is most likely only relevant info for the copycats in the herd rather than keeping you from tasting poisonous fruits: I think Koepang and Darwin without precautions as mentioned above will not be able to rearm those surface fleets. They start as level 3 ports - Koepang with 0 naval support, Darwin with 33 naval support. If you have only base plus naval support as of day one, I think you won't be able to reload 6in/53 guns or bigger. quote: ORIGINAL: Nemo121 I fully expect Kendari and Ambon to fall but I expect to be able to pull most of the Australian troops out before they fall using my PBYs and transports and as I fall back I will concentrate these forces into fewer bases, making the defence stronger as it crumples.. Why Kendari and Ambon? Simple, a surface fleet can base out of Koepang or Darwin and hit any landings or Kendari and Ambon hard. Additionally any landing on Menado can be hit from Kendari or Ambon. I have tasked Force Z to this region and am just itching to send it or a CA-centred RN TF in against an IJN landing force in this region. Hartwig

modrow -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/15/2010 8:42:05 PM)
Nemo, quote: Dunning-Kruger and its obverse are regularly observed in the AAR section... Very few people ascribe their victories to luck or their losses to their own incompetence[:D] You are wrong here. Most of us conquered Tokyo earlier and conducted PH attacks that were more successful compared to what our historical counterparts achieved. Even with the AI on very hard ! That must show beyond reasonable doubt that we all are made of the material great commanders are made of [:D]. Hartwig

Nemo121 -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/15/2010 11:19:50 PM)
Hartwig, I expect Darwin to be a level 6 port soon enough. As the action nears it it should manage to exceed 200 Naval Support Squads also so be big enough to manage anything that needs reloading. As to your disproving of my reverse Dunning-Kruger phenomenon - I stand, nay kneel, corrected [:D]

Nemo121 -> RE: Salutations and solicitations.... 1EyedJacks (J) vs Nemo (A) (2/21/2010 10:17:03 PM)
21st January... I think I've spotted KB south of the Phillipines. In either case I'm launching a small raid on Singkawang by Force Z to try to draw its attention back to the DEI... I have considerable surface reinforcements making for this region ( A CA, several more CLs ) and should have enough to create two solid cruiser-based SC TFs. The BBs will have to hit and then retreat to Colombo for replenishment. That's ok though as the Repulse needs to repair system damage anyways. In other news I've managed to pull out almost every ton of supplies and fuel from Java. I'm currently sucking Balikpapan dry whilst airlifting the 4th KNIL Regiment there from Batavia. PBY4s and PBY5s are evacuating two USN BFs from Manilla into Balipapan and Kendari respectively. Once the USN BFs are done I'll focus on pulling the Marine Regiment and one of the US Engineer Regiments out. In the meantime the loading of troops at Fiji begins... I am loading the first US Infantry Regiment onto APs and xAKs in order to test my knowledge of unit loading. If I've calculated things right I should load more than 250 points of unit per xAK and 600 points of unit per APs. If I can do that then the entire unit should unload in a single day and shock attack at full strength. Over 400 ships are committed to this attack so I'm hopeful I should have more than enough xAPs and xAKs to carry the necessary strike units. Once the strike units are appropriately loaded I'll carry whatever support units I can. The key though is just to get combat units on the ground. I won't be projecting air power from these bases anytime soon but I do want to attempt to draw enemy forces away from the schwerpunkt and that means defending the ground I've taken and threatening to take more. Now, to discuss what is in Sumatra... Medan: 172 AV behind Level 3 forts ( these guys are Dutch so have poor experience but by pulling them all into the same base they're a tougher nut to crack than leaving them all isolated and spread out. ) Benkoenen: 110 AV behind Level 2 forts ( increasing to level 3, I only got a decent number of engineers here recently ). Djambi: 72 AV behind Level 0 forts - The dutch have very few engineers in their Bn-sized units. Still, this is mainly an anti-parachutist defence so doesn't need to be ueber-strong. Praboemoelih: 66 AV behind Level 2 forts - This is an important base to hold as it lies directly behind Palembang and if/when Mike lands at Palembang I expect him to drop paras at Praboemoelih in order to try to impede the flow of my reserves. Palembang: 1114 AV behind Level 4 forts. I have 162 engineers, 7 engineer vehicles and 553 guns. Principal units are: 11th (347 AV ) & 9th (262 AV) Indian Divisions. The 9th is mainly short of about 50 Ind Inf Squads but those are in the pools just waiting for us to upgrade to the new patch which will allow my units which have upgraded a device to accept replacements. Without this bug I'd have another 500 AV on Sumatra. It is quite frustrating. 44th, 45th and 46th Indian Bdes. Between 102 and 110 AV each. SSVF Bde, FMSV Bde, 2 Punjab Bns, 1st Manchester Bn. Most of the units have poor leaders but I've been saving up PPs and am in the process of upgrading the leaders from guys with 30 Land Exp to guys with 60 or 70 Land Exp. That should make a huge difference. In addition to the infantry units there are 6 Heavy AAA and 4 Light AAA as well as the 22nd Indian Mountain Gun Regiment. Lahat: 341 AV - This nice semi-hidden base in wooded terrain is going to be my main airbase and centre for reserve units. I have 94 engineers and 16 engineering vehicles there, level 1 forts and a Level 1 airfield. My plan is to create a Level 4 airfield there and then base my fighters and bombers there to protect the landing beaches at Palembang or Oosthaven. I am betting that Mike won't recon effectively and spot Lahat until his first invasion convoys come in. At that point in time I might be able to teach him a harsh lesson. I expect him to simply bomb Palembang until no more fighter rise up to challenge him and then send his troops in. I'll show him what he expects but I'll have maintained the core of my bomber force and, hopefully, can hit the landing fleets hard. Units here Malaya Army HQ ( with Percival in command... This is attached to ABDA... I have a query about this unit.... Which units will have their combat rolls effected by Malaya Army HQ? Most of my units in Sumatra are either attached to ABDA directly, Burma Command or III Indian Corps... I am trying to figure out if I need to spend 150 PP replacing Percival as he sucks ). 254th Armored Bde ( again, a unit which won't accept replacements ) B sqdn 3rd Hussar Regt Mobielie Eenheid Bn Lijfwacht Cav Sqn 16th Light Cavalry Regt + a couple of Inf Bns for local defence vs paras. All of the armoured units are either resting to try and take replacements or in strategic move mode so they can counter an invasion fleet. Oosthaven: 1658 AV with 305 engineers and 11 engineering vehicles. KNIL Army Command, ABDA HQ, MLD HQ, ML KNIL HQ and Commandement Marine. I'm utterly confused with these. I can't, quite figure out which are the army ones. Obviously KNIL Army is an Army HQ and Commandement Marine is naval but what about ABDA? Is that an army HQ also? MLD and ML KNIL are Air HQs according to the game so does that mean that ABDA and KNIL Army are my only two army HQs there? 18th British Division ( 437 AV ), 8th Australian Division ( 365 AV - should be about 465 AV ), 63rd Indian and 48th Gurkha Bdes. KNIL 1st and 2nd Regiments, various Garrison and Landstorm Bns. I also have an AT Regiment ( many 2 pounder guns ) and 24 x 6 inch coastal defence guns there. 6th Australian Division and 2nd Royal Tank Regiment are also on the way from Aden... I plan to send 2nd Royal Tank Regiment into reserve ( bringing the reserve to about 400 AV of tough, armoured units ) and the 6th Australian to Palembang. I want to bring Palembang up to over 1500 AV. My main issues right now are as follows: 1. What the hell to do with Percival. He costs 150 PP to replace but if my guys at Palembang are going to use him as a combat modifier then I should replace him. 2. What to do with the 350 AV at Batavia? Currently I am sending 1 Regiment from there to Balikpapan to join up with the US Marines when I airlift them out and provide some 200 AV of defensive power there. I am hoping to trash Balikpapan and once they are forced to retreat into Samarinda I'll fly them out using PBYs. Minimal cost, maximum effect. What about the remaining 250 AV... Should they go to Balikpapan or Oosthaven? I currently think they should go to Oosthaven as Balikpapan is subsidiary. Also the more I put at Balikpapan the more I have to fly out of Samarinda and the more I'll lose if I can't fly them out. 3. CD guns. 24 x 6 inch guns is one hell of a Coastal Defence but the more I look at things the more I think Mike might just continue with his stolid approach and drop a shedload of troops at Palembang. If he does this he'll face pitiful CD defences as I thought he'd be more subtle and go for Oosthaven and concentrated there.... So far he hasn't shown much subtlety which makes me think he'll just charge right into Palembang... given that he can't deploy CAs or BBs into Palembang given the shallow nature of the port all I'll face will be DDs, CLs, PBs etc. 6 inch CD guns should chew right through them and get at the AKs and APs pretty handily. Throw in some torpedo-carrying raids the next day and a landing at Palembang is a highly dangerous proposition. I know that and added to the fact that Palembang is a swamp ( x 3 defensive bonus ) I wouldn't land there BUT will Mike have carried out a similar in-depth assessment? I don't think he's the sort to do that. He'll put together a good op but I don't think he'll assess in detail and then apply some laterality to it. I'm about 80% decided to move the CD guns to Palembang at this stage. Thoughts? As an aside... Since I've been considering this I've gotten a few minelayers in hiding off the Javan coast ready to dart into Oosthaven at the first sights of an invasion fleet to dump 300+ mines into the hex. That ought to cause some problems even if I move the CD guns.

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