The Role of India?

The Role of India? (Full Version)

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IChristie -> The Role of India? (7/19/2002 12:30:48 AM)
I'm just reading the book "Turn of the Tide" which is kind of biograpy of Lord Alanbrooke (British Chief of the Imperial General Staff during most of WWII). I had not realized until now that the British were petrified in 1942 that the Japanese were going to seize India or at least control of the Indian ocean thereby putting their supply line to the Mid East in jeopardy. Or, worse yet, striking north and linking up with German drive south from Russia. This appears, at the time, to have been a much greater concern than the invasion of Australia. I also wasn't aware that Colombo was attacked by Nagumo's carriers (in April '42) and may even have been targeted for invasion if resistance had been light (which it wasn't - thank you Admiral Layton "saviour of Ceylon"). So my question is: should this strategic importance of India be modelled in the game somehow. I think the British fear is quite credible. If Japan had concentrated on acting in concert with Germany - there is a very real chance that the Allied position could have been seriously compromised - Mid East and Africa fall, Russia defense compromised - etc. My sense is (not substantiated by any experience with PacWar) that the China-Burma-India theatre is usually a bit of side show in most Pacific war games. Should there be some strategic benefit to the Japanese player for concentrating on it? What do you guys think?

Fred98 -> (7/19/2002 7:00:46 AM)
After the initial wave of victories from December 1941 till early 1942 the Japanese were in 2 minds as to what to do next. This was partly because their army and nave were in disagreement on most subjects. When the Japanese task force (I think there was a carrier involved because the Japanese had aircraft available) attacked and defeated a British task force near Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) this happened because the Japans Navy was on a roll and didn’t want to stop. But they did stop otherwise they would have been over extended. Should they attack south and stop the US fleets refuelling in Australia, or should they instead concentrate on India/Burma, thereby finishing the British influence in the region. And then using India/Burma as a jumping off point to finish the war in China? If a player is forced to choose between these 2 it makes the game more interesting. -

Jeremy Pritchard -> (7/19/2002 8:37:02 AM)
The Japanese were actually very disappointed in the actions in the Indian Ocean, which resulted in the loss of 1 Light Carrier, 2 Heavy Cruisers, 2 Destroyers, some Corvettes, Armed Merchant Cruisers, and many cargo vessels. The damage inflicted on British bases was generally minimal, with aircraft losses being about equal. However, the Japanese lost many aircraft not due to air-air combat, but due to missing their rondevu with IJN carriers. Many of the good pilots, and their bombadiers (in the case of torpedo and dive bombers) were lost in this indesisive incident, and the paranoia of 'where are the carriers' felt during this operation (they didn't know where the main British Fleet was during the entire engagement) remained during Midway. Actions in the Indian Ocean greatly effected those in the rest of the Pacific. I would like to see the theatre spread even further then India, possibly reaching bases as far as Madagascar (which was invaded by the British because of fears of Japanese doing to it what they did to French Indo-China). With weather limitations, the creation of an accurate and important South East Asia is critical to the Pacific War. It should be a tempting decoy, much like China is, to draw attention from the Japanese away from their main enemy in the United States. For years the Japanese had a policy of containment against the British, which worked very well (they had about 4 Divisions hold up the entire Indian Army). They attacked in 1944 because they needed a decisive victory, and thought that the Indians would, much like Russia, crumble once the door was kicked in. Also, another thing I would like to see is the implementation of the Indian National Army. I created this force in Pacific War, but they just act like regular Japanese units. For this to really work effectively, there would be some sort of calculation to determine how to create INA formations and reserve troop pools. Most of the INA troops came from formations captured in Malaya, where the bulk of the POW's decided to join up instead of languish in prison camps, plus many agreed with the politics. It might be interesting that for every unit of Indian troops captured, a certain percentage will join the INA pool, eventually allowing the player to create formations of INA troops. This pool could only grow if Indian troops are captured, which could be an incentive to march further into India (as not only would your enemy lose men, you would gain men). The 1st INA Division had a very good reputation, but was destroyed in the offensive in 1944. The 2nd INA Division was deployed in Siam when the war ended, but were of poorer quality. India should be very important for both the Allies and the Japanese. In reality, the Japanese had little chance in occupying India, but could have sparked revolution that would have taken England out of the war in the Pacific.

HMSWarspite -> (7/20/2002 2:11:27 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard [B]The Japanese were actually very disappointed in the actions in the Indian Ocean, which resulted in the loss of 1 Light Carrier, 2 Heavy Cruisers, 2 Destroyers, some Corvettes, Armed Merchant Cruisers, and many cargo vessels. The damage inflicted on British bases was generally minimal, with aircraft losses being about equal. However, the Japanese lost many aircraft not due to air-air combat, but due to missing their rondevu with IJN carriers. Many of the good pilots, and their bombadiers (in the case of torpedo and dive bombers) were lost in this indesisive incident, and the paranoia of 'where are the carriers' felt during this operation (they didn't know where the main British Fleet was during the entire engagement) remained during Midway. Actions in the Indian Ocean greatly effected those in the rest of the Pacific. [/B][/QUOTE] One of the main reasons why the raid was a failure was that the British picked up advanced warning via a cracked JN25 (IJN code) message of an attack on 'D', with an air raid on 'DG' planned for 2nd April 1942. The Japanese operators were having trouble with some of the codes, and one obligingly spelt out the target in phonetic Japanese characters - 'KO-RO-N-BO'. Somerville questioned the code breakers to check they were sure, then legged it to the Maldives. The raid didn't turn up, and the code breakers thought they might have blown their credibility, but a RAF Catalina spotted Nagumo's force on 4th April. It was shot down, but got off a message. Nagumo had delayed his attack til Easter Sunday in the hope of the target being off guard. Unfortunately, Somerville had already decided the code breakers were wrong, and Cornwall, Dorsetshire (CAs), Hermes (CVL) and Vampire (DD) were heading back to Ceylon to resume routine tasks. These ships, plus Tenedos (DD), Hector (AMC), and the odds and ends in port suffered. Nearly one of the first successful code breaks in the Indian Ocean. Saved the bulk of the Eastern Fleet though. Details from 'The Emperor's Codes, by Michael Smith'. IIRC Nagumo then raided the coast of India before returning to Singapore. Don't know why it wasn't tried again.

CynicAl -> (7/20/2002 7:41:43 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by HMSWarspite [B] ... Nagumo then raided the coast of India before returning to Singapore. Don't know why it wasn't tried again. [/B][/QUOTE] Immediately after Kido Butai returned from the IO, CarDiv5 split off to cover Operation MO, while CarDivs 1 and 2 began working up for Operation MI. CarDiv5 returned from the Coral Sea in bad shape, and of course CarDivs 1 and 2 were wiped out at Midway. By the time CarDiv5 got back to operational status, attention was focused on the new Allied offensive in the Solomons.

Q-Ball -> (8/3/2002 4:19:44 AM)
[QUOTE]So my question is: should this strategic importance of India be modelled in the game somehow[/QUOTE] Good question. To answer this, I wonder a) could the Japanese have logistically sustained the number of troops necessary to invade India? Invading India would have required a very large ground force, and as it was they were having difficulty keeping their 4 divisions in Burma supplied (hence the Burma Railway). They could have supplied a larger effort only by diverting large amounts of shipping from other theatres. In game terms, I would think India would be worth alot of VP's, but would not contribute alot of material to the Japanese war effort, at least not much fuel, which is what they needed most. b) I may be biased, but as a UV player I like planes and ships, and am not as interested in large land forces grinding it out. I guess we have to have that in Malaya and the Phillipines, but I hope to be too busy finding CV's to have to deal with 12 IJA divisions attacking India. So, I would probably be against some extra changes to make India more strategically important. Yes, it probably was to the Brits, but I can't see how the IJA would really interdict Mideast supply routes. Also, if the Japanese did invade India, you can bet the British would have sent alot more ships, planes, and troops than they did historically, so how do you account for that?

mdiehl -> (8/3/2002 4:51:36 AM)
Changes vis a vis what? GG Pacific War? I do not think there need to be any more strategic incentives than there were in Pacific War. Namely: (1) Conquest VP (2) Kill VP, (3) It basically eliminates all combat on one flank of the Empire, (4) The UK no longer contributes units to the battle (although I think it should be be permissible for UK units to stage to the Pacific via the US or Australia), and (5) if you control India you've completely out-flanked China, so they're gonna go too.

IChristie -> (8/3/2002 11:53:26 AM)
I guess my original question stemmed from the fact that I have always sort of regarded the pacific and Atlantic as separate theatres which were pretty much unrelated to one another except at a very high level in terms of logistics. In reading Alan Brooke's memoirs I realized that for the British they were not as unrelated (at least early on). The British had a very deep seated fear that the Germans and Japanese would try to link up by Japan invading India and Germany pushing south through Southern Russia and Iran. I they had done so, the British defense of Egypt might well have collapsed and the Axis would have secured Caucasian and Middle East Oil fields. Also, the Japanese and Germans would have been able to supply and reinforce each other. Obviously, this kind of concerted behaviour was not the priority for either Japan or Germany. But it does make me wonder whether such a strategy might actually have held out more hope for the Japanese than the "expand and wait for the US tidal wave" approach. I was just musing out loud about whether players should be given a large enough incentive to think about pursuing and alternative to the standard Japanese strategy of concentrating on the US in the Pacific

mdiehl -> (8/5/2002 9:55:56 PM)
I think I undertsood yoru question. My answer is that IMO no more incentives are necessary. If the UK is cut out of the equation and China falls, you free up a whole bunch more divisions, land based air, supplies, fuel etc. Basically it lets the Japanese focus all of the resources and economy on defending the Pacific edge against the US. More than enough time to run out the clock and do so in a swimmingly victorious fashion. Personally, I don't think the Japanese could have invaded India successfully. They could not even supply their troops in Burma. There were no suitable logistical facilities for them until in India or Columbo, and then the local populace would mostly have been intolerant of the Japanese way of occupying nations. India would have been like China, only the resistance forces would have been better armed and better organized.

John Carney -> (8/5/2002 10:40:14 PM)
I am an avid player of VG Pacific War. Looking forward to a great computer game. I have delayed my attack on China in two Campaign games, in order to mount a large offensive on India, after the fall of Singapore. In the game that India fell I was able to quickly isolate and cause China's capitulation. Allowing the divertion of troops to further garrison the Pacific Islands, thus preventing the Bombing of Japan mainland by B-29's in 1945. This enabled me to meet Japan's Victory Conditions in the game. The fall of India would have precipitated the inability of British units to operate in the Pacific, due to their need to protect the southern entrance to the Suez and supply routes to Egypt. Simulated in VG Pacific War by the removal of all British Air, Sea, and Land replacments for the remainder of the game. Units already in the theater of operation my supply from US and Austrialian bases and continue to fight.

mdiehl -> (8/6/2002 3:26:02 AM)
One of the reasons why VG Pacific War is a flawed system. There actually aren't any good ones. But WW2:PTO has the best logistical model available, and in that game invading India is nigh impossible. Had Japan landed a substantial army in India historically it would have been a great Tar Baby. Worse than the USSR was for Germany. With the added burden of Japan's logistical train stretched out from Japan to India, and no shipping to support operations anywhere else in the Pacific/Indonesia theater. So IMO if you actually did invade India you'd not be able to invade any of Indonesia, Burma, the PI, or other defensive perimiter holdings. And you'd still have a tiger by the tail.

Jeremy Pritchard -> (8/6/2002 5:31:06 AM)
One thing that everyone is forgetting is the comparatively small, but still not insignificant Indian National Army. Although I am not sure of the actual dates of activiation, I do know that the 1st Indian National Army Division joined the IJA operation at Imphal and made a fairly good showing of itself. The 2nd Indian National Army Division was in the process of being formed at the end of the war. A very high proportion of Indian POW's joined the INA, possibly either due to the fact that they would get out of the POW camps, and due to the fact that they would be 'liberating' their nation. Had the Japanese entered India, say in late 1942, they might have sped up the process of developing the INA. With the added Indian POW's that were bound to be captured in an invasion of India, plus gaining untapped civilian population, maybe the requirement for IJA Divisions would be much less if they left much of the operation to INA Divisions? This would really lesson the need for IJA garrison forces, as INA formations could take over. There indeed was a lot of support for the Japanese, or anyone who would get rid of the British, in India (Indian formations even served in the German army). The INA is one of the little oddities in WWII. Although it was late in getting going, it did solve some of the manpower problems in Burma in 1944-45 (there were significant forces still in the field in 1945 preparing to devend Malaya and Siam). It was one of the only effective military organizations made from captured POW's (there were some good French formations in the German army in Russia, but these never reached the numbers in the INA). So, using the INA, at least a partial invasion of India is possible, as the British were strapped for fighting formations in the region about as much as the Japanese. If the Japanese would have found it tough to secure their lines of communication in India, so too would the British (especially if they knew that an army of liberation was invading the country).

John Carney -> (8/6/2002 6:32:26 AM)
The way to break India with out delay in Malaya Operations, is to Bypass Ragoon initially. Secure Imphal with 55th and 33rd Div of 15th Army. Divert Southern China Divisions of the 22nd & 23rd Army to Attack weak and under trained Indian divisions in North India. This requires suspending South China Operations From 1941 to 1943. Delay attack on Ragoon until after May 1942, after Carrier and Bombbardment raides by Ozawa Malayan Fleet (2 CVL's and five old BB), utilizing Guard Div from Sigapore. Utilize the Invasion Fleet of the 56th & 18th Div of 15th Army, which landed at Rangoon in March, and land at Ducca India. Sieze the Port and Railroad head at Calcutta and complete the line from Mandalay to Chittagong. In 1941 India posses Five under strength Div and two British second line Div. With suspended South China Operations it is Possible to Succed with capture of northeast India. This will isolate supplies to China and allow the withering of any air cover over China and reduce military supplies to Chiang Kai-Shek. The rail and land routes to Burma could be opened. Ozawa raided and sunk 23 Merchants mid 42 at Vizagapatam, Cocanada, and Masulipatam India, while Nagumo's in effective raid only sunk 2 Cruisers 4 DE/SC and 5 merchants. Japan also operated two Div of fleet submarines in the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian sea during 42 and 43. This is no garuntee of victory as I said of two attempts only once was it successful. VG Pacific War is not perfect as no game can be. However Somerville almost lost the eastern fleet to Nagumo at Ceylon. Wavell constantly pleaded for troops from Australia ( flying to meet Churchill twice early in 42. And General Stillwill writes of the pure luck that Burma was the Dam that held Japan back in the west. You would think operation Shoestring had a glutten of supplies. This is what makes the "what if" of India very Important to the game. Do not forget the glutten of oil in Palembang Sumatra that Somerville was not willing to commit his Fleet too. As it would have been cut to ribbons by Ozawa and the IJN air squadrons based in Malaya. The South HQ at Saigon was strong enough to hold back the tide till 45. The interdication of merchants by US submarines in the South China Sea was the down fall of South HQ. If Japan institutes Convoys and diverts DD's to Convoy duty can the South be held back through 1943. This is another important aspect of the war that I hope will be a factor in WITP. You seem to be able to effect the supply of Uncommon Valor. Only wish I had more time.

showboat1 -> (8/6/2002 11:14:09 AM)
I think John and Jeremy both make great points on the possibilities of an alternate strategy take out India, BUT wouldn't that divert form the true nature of the game, WAR IN THE PACIFIC. It's not War In The Indian Ocean (though that would be a cool add on game). Maybe its time to refocus for now and then develop the what-ifs after the initial game comes out as add-ons.

John Carney -> (8/6/2002 6:36:42 PM)
India, Burma, and Malaya are very Important in that they are the reason Britian drains Army supplies and troops from the Pacific. If the 17th Army is commited in Burma it will not be present in the Solomons. It would be like ignoring China, which was a major drain on Army ground & air units, and a great training ground for IJN air wings early in the war (39-42). The presence of Australia and New Zeland in whole also opens up the possible shifting of strategy to take those countries. How about raids on the West Coast. This game needs to include all possible Theaters for Japan to operate in. It is going to take a long time to master this master piece.

mdiehl -> (8/6/2002 10:11:43 PM)
I did not see any significant INA contribution to the Japanese effort in the Burma campaign. I'll have to double check. I'm pretty sure that the most that Japan could ever have hoped for from the INA was small acts of sabotage. If they'd ever fielded a division in India the RIA would have eaten them (and any accompanying Japanese division) entire. You'd have Britain with superior armor and numerical and qualitative a/c superiority fighting on a short logistical line with interior lines and good terrain. In contrast to a badly supplied Japanese army, largely on foot, trying to take the offensive and fight a battle in terrain that favors mechanized/mobile units. Japan wasting divisions in India proper is the best thing that could happen to the Allies. And there remains the problem that supplying troops in India means that you have no sealift capacity to support ops in New Guinea, Phillippines, Indonesia, Borneo etc. (or you can have some sealift capacity for these areas and have no industrial production at home).

Sabre21 -> (8/10/2002 9:06:31 AM)
The Japanese never really seriously considered a full scale invasion of India, they knew they were at the end of their logistical capability in Burma. But the British paranoia about a possible Axis link up was real....it was mentioned earlier how the Brits occupied Madagascar to prevent the Japs from doing so to at least protect the supply lines going to Egypt. For the British, the CBI theater (primarily the Indian ocean part) was crucial in their overall war effort. The US on the other hand was more interested in keeping China in the war so as to tie up as many Jap army units as possible. So yes...the CBI had a tremendous impact on the overall Pacific War. Lets look at a pretty valid "what if". The independence movement in India led by Ghandi was gaining momentum...what if the Japanese took the attitude that they were liberators rather than conquerors (many an asian country had that attitude early in the war) and used that to neutralize the Brits. India could have had a revolution and tied up badly needed British assets..I think if this had occured that the Brits what have been forced out of India, in which case India could very well have become a Japanese ally. This in turn would have cut off all lend lease to China and very probably forced Chiang Kai-shek to capitulate or at least seek an armistice. Ol' Chiang was using a lot of the American lend lease to bribe the various warlords to keep the focus against his buddy Mao and the Japanese. If these bribes dried up...so would most of Chiangs support. Then the Japanese could have moved many of their experienced divisions out to reinforce the pacific rim which in turn would have made the US effort much more difficult than it was. Not to mention the fact that if the Brits got pushed out of the Indian ocean area, a greater amount of US supplies and reinforcements would have been necessary to keep the European theatre from getting worse...draining resources that would have been available in the Pacific. So yes..India had a very important role to play..or at least could have. Andy

Ranger-75 -> (8/10/2002 9:31:57 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl [B]I did not see any significant INA contribution to the Japanese effort in the Burma campaign. I'll have to double check. I'm pretty sure that the most that Japan could ever have hoped for from the INA was small acts of sabotage. If they'd ever fielded a division in India the RIA would have eaten them (and any accompanying Japanese division) entire. You'd have Britain with superior armor and numerical and qualitative a/c superiority fighting on a short logistical line with interior lines and good terrain. In contrast to a badly supplied Japanese army, largely on foot, trying to take the offensive and fight a battle in terrain that favors mechanized/mobile units. Japan wasting divisions in India proper is the best thing that could happen to the Allies. And there remains the problem that supplying troops in India means that you have no sealift capacity to support ops in New Guinea, Phillippines, Indonesia, Borneo etc. (or you can have some sealift capacity for these areas and have no industrial production at home). [/B][/QUOTE] The Japanese actually tried this in 1944. They were getting tired of the air raids and wanted to close the link to China (still thinking that "solving" the China "incident" would resolve all their problems). The resulting Japanese offensive broke the back of the Japanese army in Burma and made it easier for the Britsh / Indian army to completely kick the Japanese out of Burma over the next six months.

mdiehl -> (8/12/2002 9:43:03 PM)
MMmmm. I'm gonna do something rarely seen on a listserv discussion board. I'm gonna retract a deterministically held belief, that Japan did not consider an amphibious assault in India, in the face of better information. I've been reading Barrier and the Javelin by Wilmott. It seems that invading India may have been one of the better options for Japan in the immediate post-Singapore, post-Indonesia campaigns, in lieu of the New Guinea, Solomons, and Midway campaigns. I'm not saying it would work. I still think the Indian littoral is a lousy place for Japanese troops and a great place for British armor, and I still think Japan's logistical train would have been overtaxed, but it seems that the Japanese considered it prior to dismissing the idea (maybe for the reasons I mentioned).

IChristie -> A Scenario Possibility (8/12/2002 11:26:14 PM)
Sounds like it might make an interesting scenario at least. See if the Japanese could capture India. Or at least make significant enough gains to dramatically threaten British interests and thus divert even more US resources to Europe.

mdiehl -> (8/12/2002 11:55:58 PM)
Were I the US, in the event of a Japanese assault on India, I would not take the heat of the UK by sending resources to Europe. With Combined fleet and Kido Butai strike force 1 tied up in India, and the entire supply train there as well (which is a realistic estimate of what it would take, and why the Japanese Army opposed the endeavor), I'd divert US resources to the PTO and strike immediately for the CenPac. The readiness of Japanese CenPac bases would be low, they'd be low on supplies, men, fuel and munitions. The US might easily walk straight through to Saipan and Guam (the defenses in early 1942 would have been minimal, with few if any fortifications). Then I'd load up the B17s and start pounding the snot out of Japan. Japanese fighters in 1942 are perhaps the one plane in which unescorted strategic bombing by B17s and B24s might have a prayer of success without enduring horrendous losses to the heavy bomber groups. That'd bring the IJN running but they'd be fighting in waters controlled by the USN and under a substantial American land-based air umbrella. The attrition on the IJN would be somewhere between crippling and outrageously fantastic.

Jeremy Pritchard -> (8/13/2002 1:43:49 AM)
Any attack in India would primarily be an Imperial Japanese Army zone of operations, which would realistically mean that operations in New Guinea would suffer, but those in the Central and South Pacific would remain the same. The Japanese would have not advanced their defensive perimeter as far, nor would have been quite as wreckless with their carrier fleet with an attack on Midway primarily because this war tactic calls for a defensive war in the East and an offensive war in the West. The IJA had its own supply fleet (about 1/3 of all Japanese merchant shipping) and even a few ships (some very bad CVE's). They probably could have supplied their own forces without drawing on the IJN for supply and support. When the IJA needed more troops from 1937-39 during their war against China they sent formations from quiet areas (homeland) and raised new units to replace them. The 4 Divisions on duty in the Home Islands would probably have been shipped to make up for units sent to India, with new ones raised for home garrison duty. The Royal Navy would probably not cause much of a fuss, due to comitments in the vital Medeterranean (the British could lose the Bay of Bengal, but not the Medeterranean) and the Atlantic. British Infantry and Armour would probably be diverted as well as more Indian Forces being raised. The Indians did have an Armoured Division in India until 1944 when it was converted into an Airborne Division. Only token IJN forces had to exist in the Bay of Bengal to keep the small forces of the RN out and guard IJA convoys, leaving the rest to react to American moves. Realistically the USN probably could not have done much until late 1942 or early 1943, due to limitations of aircraft, sufficient forward bases and the amphibous fleet they had in 1944 but not in 1942. The US was not in a position for a lighting war in 1942. The IJNAF still had a lot of quality in it, and the bases in the Central Pacific were still sufficiently defended by air and ground forces. The USN Carrier TF's could not put up enough cover to counter the strong forces in the Marshall Islands (which would have to be taken before invading the Marianas). Until the IJN Carriers were neutralized and the IJNAF was attritioned the US could not have reached Saipan. This move might have been historically better for the Japanese, since it separates the two feuding military arms to either end of the Pacific, resulting in less reduntant supply routes (the IJN and IJA had different convoys going to the same region which resulted in easy pickings and a waste of transport). The IJN woud probably have had to raise more Land forces, and might have fielded something comparable to the USMC Divisions, or at least Brigades. The IJN showed a real lack of interest in the Indian Ocean, and would not have spent much of their resources in it when their enemy was in the other end of the Pacific. The Imperial Army would be fighting in their terrain as well, which is similar to that of China instead of New Guinea and the Solomans. They could not have been neutralized as they were in the Pacific through island hopping and would have had to be defeated in the field, which probably was not possible until late in the war. What would Japan gain? Probably knocking China out of the war as an effective opponent since all heavy supplies would have been cut off (even air supply would not reach them). The Threat of the Chinese army would dwindle, and the USAAC could not use Chinese bases for operation, which would have eliminated the need for late war operations and as many high quality Land units, which could be replaced by Garrison troops.

mdiehl -> (8/13/2002 2:17:27 AM)
Wilmott has discussed this in Barrier and the Javelin. There's no way a campaign occurs by the IJA in India if it is not substantially supported by the IJN with respect to CV and BB covering forces, and a lengthy and highly vulnerable waterborne supply train. Taking India requires every ship and army division that Japan can devote to the task. Probably why the Japanese did not try. The IJA merchant suplpy system was adequate for China because they only had to traverse the Sea of Japan and a wee part of the S. China Sea. About 1/10 as far as they'd have had to go to support a campaign in India. The IJA logistical system failed miserably at supporting a campaign in Burma, even with the presence of a good port (Rangoon) and an adequate number of airfields to cover it. It would have been an incredible gamble and it would likely have failed. But, Wilmott suggests, it might have been a better use than attriting the Japanese naval air fleet and the surface forces in the New Guinea, Midway, and Solomons campaigns. One way or the other it would have been decisive. "and the bases in the Central Pacific were still sufficiently defended by air and ground forces. The USN Carrier TF's could not put up enough cover to counter the strong forces in the Marshall Islands (which would have to be taken before invading the Marianas). Until the IJN Carriers were neutralized and the IJNAF was attritioned the US could not have reached Saipan." That is largely incorrect. I apologize for being so blunt, but in March 1942 (which is when the IJN and IJA would have to start an amphibious campaign against India to have a prayer of success), Guam, Saipan, Wake, and Rabaul were minor backwaters with few troops and fewer naval air units. In February the best that Rabaul could muster against a Lexington air raid was a counterstrike by 17 Betties... of which 11 were shot down by F4Fs and 6 that never came close to the CV. Substantial naval air presence at Truk was only increased as a result of the early-war USN CV raids. Since an invasion of India presupposes the use of Kido Butai in the Bay of Bengal, there's no IJN CV counterforce that could threaten a US TF. Sorry that's just the way it is. Japanese LBA could scarcely reach Rangoon. In theory, unprotected Betties could reach the northeast coast plain in India, unescorted, with a very small bomb load. Even a small contingent of lend-lease P40s would have wrecked, in a few days any long range air campaign against India. The only way Japan projects sufficient airpower to even covering the invasion is to send all of Kido Butai to teh Bay of Bengal. Even then it would be hell on the IJN. IIRC, (Wlmott again), Japanese naval air lost 315 a/c prior to April 1942 in their various attempts to cover land campaigns and interdict Allied ship movement, against opposition that was for the most part outnumbered, isolated, and undersupplied. The Japanese would not have had anything approaching favorable numbers or conditions in India.

brisd -> 3 gambles (8/13/2002 3:42:16 AM)
Using my Pacific War experiences, the Japanese player has several offensive options (Hawaii/Australia/India), two of which can be combined. Once the East Indies have fallen, the Allies are split and it is almost impossible to reinforce the Indian Ocean from the Pacific. Thus a brief opportunity exists for the conquest of Ceylon and thus isolation of India. I do not know the rail network of India in 1942, but is it safe to assume if Ceylon was captured by IJN/IJA, then the British in Calcutta and Burma would be isolated? If so, as in PacWar, then the IJA can invade with support from land based air in Rangoon and Ceylon and old BB's to provide naval support. Once British are conquered, China is also isolated and their conquest is assured. Once those divisions are freed up, Australia becomes a target assuming the Japanese have captured New Caledonia and surrounding islands. This all must be accomplished by end of '43 of course. PacWar does not realistically consider the occupation forces required to hold such a vast area of populous land of course. Other considerations: 1. A national liberation (Pro-Axis) India Army that might have rose up given the chance? 2. Axis concentration in Mediterranean, possible conquest of Med/Eqypt/Arabian oil fields would have made a strategic difference in Allies defense options in Indian/Pacific oceans. 3. Possible Auto-victory conditions reflecting India or Commonwealth suing for peace, to include Australia/New Zealand? There are many strategic possibilities if the designer give us the maps and OOB we will make the scenarios. :)

Jeremy Pritchard -> (8/13/2002 5:14:31 AM)
Well, the Japanese may have not have been able to defend these islands, but the United States was also not in a place to take them, and defend them. In order for the US to have suceeded in the Central Pacific the IJN CV TF must be neutralized, or they face a very strontg counterattack. The Marshall Islands were attacked in 1944 because this was the earliest time they could be attacked and secured. In 1942 the Americans did not have the men or the means in which to take and secure the Central Pacific in 1942 without leaving themselves open to disaster. The IJA actually used significantly small numbers of men and material in the Solomans and New Guinea Theatre in 1942. There were some IMB's, the 2nd and 38th Infantry Divisions along with some other detachments. These Infantry formations would not have been needed in the attack on India, as sufficient forces could be brought in from other theatres. The IJA was not heavily involved in the Central and South Pacific until late 1942 The key to this debate has nothing to do with the United States and their ability to exploit what was open to them, but wether or not an attack in India would succeed. By the time the US could really have done anything (early 1943) the Japanese would either have won or have been defeated in India. Along with the 4 Divisions in Burma (18th, 33rd, 55th and 56th) the formations garrisoning the Home Islands (52nd, 53rd and 54th) that eventually served (except for the 52nd that went to Truk) in Burma could have been sent to the Indian front (there were sufficient Depot Divisions and men to raise new formations for Home Defence). The Use of the 2nd Guard and 5th Divisions could have been possible because their defensive positions would have become redundant had an offensive in the Indian Ocean have taken place. So, here you have 9 possible Divisions which the Japanese could have used to invade India that was very lightly defended in both men, equipment and morale. After being kicked out of Burma, the defence of India was pretty pitiful. Ceylon was defended by the 34th Indian Division that was forming up, the Burma-India border was defended primarily by the 23rd Infantry Division, with the 17th Division, 1st Burma Division and 7th Armoured Brigade short on men, equipment and morale. The 14th, 25th and 26th Divisions were in the Process of forming, and the 70th British Division, fresh from its stay at Tobruk and Operation Crusader, was being sent. Any ground that the British lost in 1942 could not have been won back for at least 2 years. It was feared that Ceylon would be invaded, and would only have taken one Japanese Division to do so. The entire country was garrisoned by batallions whose duty was primarily to keep the population in order, much like the KNIL. It would not have taken the entire IJN to defend the Bay of Bengal as well. The Royal Navy was streched thin all over the world. The Germans still had 3 Battleship/Battlecruisers ready to break out which still required the use of modern British Battleships and Battle Cruisers to escort Convoys. There really would not have been much of a threat to Japanese shipping as you propose, as the British could not afford to lose valuable military shipping on commerce raiding. So, the Japanese had a force that would not only outnumber their opponents, but also had better quality and quantity of equipment (most Indian Armoured formations would not have their tanks for another 6 months). The Indian formations also had a very low morale, after being critically defeated in Burma, with heavy losses, and also not particularly liking the defending power. The Royal Navy was kicked out of the region and did not have sufficient forces and logistic support in which to maintain a strong presence in the area (it was withdrawn to East Africa in May 1942, as this was seen as to be the only safe port for the Eastern Fleet).

mdiehl -> (8/13/2002 9:51:58 PM)
Jeremy, I think you and I covered most of this in the production thread. IMO a summary: 1. The first military problem is the provision of adequate air cover. To suppress the UK air bases in India requires all of the available fleet carriers, and probably all lighter carriers in the effort to keep teh fleet boys supplied. Even then, it's very dicey. [Also, you'd have to talk the navy into this plan. By April 1942 they'd lost 315 naval a/c, including land based air flotilla stuff, in combat, and about another 500 operationally. This campaign would probably completely eliminate the IJN CVs as an effective fighting force for at least two years, owing to want of pilots an airplanes.] 2. The second military problem is waging mobile war on the Indian littoral. Even a weak UK armored battalian of Infantry and Cruiser tanks would have been a huge threat to Japanese ops in India. 3. Removing the 4 divisions in Burma (canceling the Burma campaign: let's say for the sake of argument the Japanese keep Rangoon and a division there, because you don't want to leave an open flank in Rangoon) means that the UK is able to deploy in India all of the armor that they abandoned in Burma, plus a couple of fresh divisions not used in Burma. 4. By March 1942 the US had 16 divisions mobilized and ready to go if desperately needed. Three of these could have taken the Japanese CenPac holdings in March-June 1942, because the Japanese just did not have the defenses in place. The US had the shipping avilable, but in 1942 it was primarily tied up in moving aforementioned divisions to the UK, and later in op Torch. I submit that if India were seriously threatened, the US would have sent troops to India, invaded the CenPac, or both. 5. The threat to the Japanese logistical line is submarines. Even with crummy torpedoes, USN submarines achieved some success in 1942. Since an India operation requires all of Japan's sealift capacity to support, even modest damage to the Japanese line of supply would have serious consequences to troops in the field in India. I do not think as the US/UK that surface raiders would be the best way to attack this supply chain. 6. IN sum: India is a big tar baby. Probably not conquerable even allowing for great initial luck and pervasive savoir faire. Once the attack gets bogged down, as it will, there's no way to retreat. Along the way, the IJN ability to project naval air gets decimated, leaving no effective force to implement the planned campaign of attrition against a resurgent USN in the Pacific.

Adnan Meshuggi -> (8/13/2002 11:04:26 PM)
Well well, the indian problem... my 2 cent (euros) 1.) India disliked to be a colony of uk (really strongly) 2.) the indian troops, after loosing many men in burma, had no interest to doe for british "scum", well the brits, like all the time before, saved their own people if possible... and that is allways bad, if you loose. 3.) An japanese attack dosen´t need a full "liberation" from british influence, it is enough if the british bases are elliminated, india is in a civil war (or a liberation war, killing as much brits as possible) and no support station for china anymore. Also, if the brits want india back, they need a lot of troops (like the japanese, if they want to conquer, err, liberate, err conquer it....) For the japanese, only some more luck in april and the british fleet is gone (like the hermes), so the support of the IJN is quite small, mostly convois with supplies for a "short" period. Sure, they will suffer, but at last less as if they try midway.... so in 20/20 it had been the best thing that japan could have done If they are succsessfull, they elliminate their china-"problem", at last they minimize it, they kill the danger for their oil for a lot time... the support for allied attacks in indonesia is nil, so the allieds need a lot more manpower to do something here, the germans have lesser problems in africa (because the brits need at last ONE open supply channel for stalin, and if the timing is bad, the pq17-desaster close exactly in time the northern route so the brits must hold open the persian way to russia) The operation torch could be cancelled, because the low trained (at last with no battle knowledge) us troops will be thrown to ... india, to stabilize this revolution, because the brits couldn´t hold it and this means that the allieds have a lot lesser ships, troops, ammunition and weapons to attack in the solomons... Sure, if it fail, war is over one year earlier, but, it had been an interesting variation, and for the game, for the japanese gamers, it would be a very interesting opportunity.... so bring it in, but make it difficulty, if the japanese player want to try it, he should risk a lot....

mdiehl -> (8/14/2002 12:08:11 AM)
"1.) India disliked to be a colony of uk (really strongly) 2.) the indian troops, after loosing many men in burma, had no interest to doe for british "scum", well the brits, like all the time before, saved their own people if possible... and that is allways bad, if you loose. 3.) An japanese attack dosen´t need a full "liberation" from british influence, it is enough if the british bases are elliminated, india is in a civil war (or a liberation war, killing as much brits as possible) and no support station for china anymore. Also, if the brits want india back, they need a lot of troops (like the japanese, if they want to conquer, err, liberate, err conquer it....)" In order: 1) Claim number (1) above is flawed by the premise that "India," as such, had any feelings on the matter at all. The castes had different perspectives, in general, and the ones who were most influential in the matter were either divided (the Brahmins) or pro-British (the military castes). 2) Claim number two is absurd. If you're talking about raiding the Indian Ocean to run down the remnants of Eastern Fleet you have a doable objective that will further deplete (but not to such a degree) Kido Butai. If you're talking about an Invasion of India, you need air cover. That means Japaense carriers, because the parts of India you want to conquer are far outside of effectiveescort range of Japanese fighters, and well within the easy interception range of RIAF and RAF land-based air. Then there's the problems of logistics and supply that you wish would not exist. In this regard, you seem very suited to be a Japanese operational planner. 3) Is a rant. Something about a huge inept American garrison in India. Neither required nor needed. The divisions committed to Torch were inexperienced. Amazing how quickly the US went from a decisive defeat (at Kasserine) to handing the Afrika Korps its head on a platter. IIRC Rommel made the same observation. The divisions (a marine division, and elements of a division formed by some top notch US National Guard regiments) committed to the G'canal campaign were better trained and better equipped than their IJA counterparts, and it showed. "If it fail, war is over one year earlier..." If it fail, Japan bombed out by end of 1943. Japanese navy hiding in Sea of Japan. Japanese Army and Navy in state of open civil war to deflect blame for India Disaster on the other service.

IChristie -> (8/14/2002 12:13:01 AM)
This has been a very interesting discussion. It has certainly convinced me that the strategic importance of India should be emphasized in the game. The arguments against concentrating on India revolve around whether the strategy could have worked - rather than on the benefits of the strategy if successful. I'm hoping that WITP will give us a simulation to put some of these theories to the test. Looks like Mr Pritchard and Mr. Mdiehl are just going to have to settle this one mano a mano once the game is ready. ;) I'm looking forward the after action reports :)

mdiehl -> (8/14/2002 12:43:25 AM)
Pritchard and I aren't disagreeing about the results of a Japanese victory in India. If India goes, that's Really Bad News. Pritchard and I are disagreeing (slightly) about the effort that would have been required, historically, had the Japanese tried. (We weren't debating its "doability" in the game). I think Jeremy has agreed that you need much of Combined fleet and all of Kido Butai to do the job. Adnan Whoever seems to think you need a Japanese CV, a few Kampetai, and an infantry brigade. The problem with settling it mano a mano is that it requires that Matrix make an accurate assessment of the resources available to both sides, and the effort required to do the job. In GGPW it was routinely possible to take all of India. I advocated the same to a friend of mine, and accomplished it several times. It also rarely had an adverse effect on Combined Fleet's combat strength (although, hehe, against a human opponent I did once hand Kondo his head on a Royal Navy 15" pike when a fellow attempted to invade the Andaman Islands). And there was almost no Japanese pilot combat attrition, and no operational attrition, and the effort did not much tax my effort to supply the operation, when I played it as the Japanese. Because of these considerations, I concluded that GGPW was critically flawed and I stopped playing it against human opponents. So, unless WitP gets the model right from the get go, nothing about our points of disagreement will be solved. And I will not purchase a game unless its playable against people. I've yet to see a satisfying AI, and won't play a game where the Ai corrects for a blunder by arbitarily deciding that all 40 of my SBDs diving on Shokaku missed.

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