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bklooste -> RE: Fast late war Zeros (2/1/2011 2:27:43 AM)
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1. That why if you want to hinder Japan early you need things that dont benefit the allies in 44. The brigade in Palembang i would not see as a cheat its more to balance the historical knowledge the Japanese player has.. re the Fuso i kind of agree on the brit response but i dont see the Japanese breaking up their battle line pre PH for any reason. They would just have baby KB with cruiser support.
2. I said give them more obsolete planes .. ie much worse than the warhawk or even unarmed trainers.
There are a few stock AAR but the allies do have the freedom eg train and commit durring an offensive. Many AARs i have seen have the Japanese force an attrition on the allies but then consolidate. Agree to the allies elite forces at key points and this is very historical in terms of where the B17s were used. Also note in the Ausies vs Amis AAR what happens when there is low attrition .. ie Japanese planes facing significantly larger quanitties of experienced allied pilots in great air craft where the allied player chooses from mid 42..
3. Not so keen on the warhawks as it is a change that benefits the Allies in the long term ( esp higher pilot survivability due to better results) , prefer things like restricted brigades , dutch troops etc . I dont think an early DEI is needed but i dont mind if the Japanese are punished if they rush it. It just makes the game more interesting. An early Palembang while SIngapore hasnt been taken is IMHO very gamey ( though i am one of the few who actually support a Mersing landing due to continuing on the same night and landing there at dawn - no idea how to supply a major landing there though !)
Do you regret not getting the A6M4 , as its a specific counter vs B17s/B25 ?
Curious , in what way do the gun club benefit ? Is it the Aganos ?
Ben
quote:
ORIGINAL: FatR
Oh dang. The forum ate my extra-detailed response. So I'll answer relatively concisely:
1)Bklooste's proposals about Allied extras = game lost by Japan by early 1944 at the latest unless the Allied player really doesn't know what is good for him or restricts himself deliberately; or the Japanese player goes for extra-gamey moves to circumvent new and improved Allied defense. Ask Michael how his game against me went, or read my first AAR to see why. Without fast capture of DEI with moderate damage at most, Japan will collapse under Allied assault really fast, because it won't be able to afford both active operations of the Combined Fleet and massive air production, but really needs both to slow Allies down. A brigade in Palemang particularly feels almost like a cheat to me, but other additions can combine to produce a similar effect.
The thought about replacing Nagatos with a pair of older battleships as the cover for Malayan invasion, and placing the rest of the battleline at Home Islands rings true, though. I don't think that British would have reacted to Fusos down there much differently than to Congos, particularly considering their historical lack of knowledge (and/or appreciation of the knowledge they had) about the enemy's capabilities.
2)About giving more planes to Allies in 1942. You know how many first-line fighters Allies will get through reinforcements alone in as early as September of 1942, already? 298. Maybe more if I missed something. Considering that you are probably lucky to exchange fighters 1:1 while assaulting a strategic schwerpunkt, because that's where Lightnings and Hurricanes and massed 4Es will be, unless you have outplayed your opponent, can you afford to lose 300 planes in a month - and, more importantly, about 200 pilots - just to saw through reinforcements alone and actually starting attriting the opposing force? No, not under usual circumstances. Assertion that Japanese can outattrit Allied aviation to the point of achieving greater operational freedom through this is very unlikely to end up true against a competent opponent. At least after the point Allies can field even relatively small number of superior airframes to cement their air defences. Even if they can still outproduce Allies in planes, uneven exchange of pilots is likely to make Japanese airforce collapse sooner rather than later. In fact, I don't remember any AAR where Allies actually ran out of planes in summer of 1942 or later. After checking the numbers, I now regret betting on an attritional air campaign in my current game.
3)About ##1-2 as a whole - giving Allies more extras until really late in the war, in 1944 and later, defeats the purpose of this mod, which is supposed to be easier on Japan than Scen 1, and makes it rather hard to balance (for example, do you realize, that the gun club benefits more from the changes in the current version of the mod, than any other part of the Japanese Navy, comparative to the enemy's capabilities?). I'm against this. The Allies side already got bonuses that allows it to overcome some of its worst weaknesses and give some options at the beginning. The most I can accept is Allies retaining three above-mentioned patrol squadrons. And then again, with now-reduced service rating on patrol planes (the change I still see as pointless, considering I never had problems with ops losses), this might be rather excessive.
And do note, that I already proposed to improve Warhawks, as a compensation to Allies for nerfing Hurricanes. This is quite beneficial to them overall, as Warhawk versions comprise about a much greater part of their total reinforcements. Together with reduction in IJN pilot experience, this already moderates main factors that can make early air war very onesided and create false perception that Allies cannot contest the air early in the war.
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