Kull -> RE: PDU = off. Does anyone play with this setting (5/13/2010 12:34:07 AM)
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ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk Other than "Agreed" I have to disagree with almost everything you said. The side that made the most mistakes irl gets more of an advantage from hindsight in a game. Imo Japan made far more mistakes than the Allies and, as a result, gets to correct/improve more issues. This occurs either from the game design itself (having production vs. not having production to no rl Ki61 design/production snafus) or player choice (concentrating on the best ac, having a coherent asw doctrine or pilot training program vs. what Japan used irl, being able to calculate exact invasion forces from known defences at start, etc.). Those Japanese advantages may seem tactical to you but they allow you to contemplate strategic choices unavailable to Japan irl because they were either impossible or that Midway had occurred. From the little that I've played (1 pbem, 3 ai games) the allies have neither the qualitative or quantitative advantage in 41-42. Kinda like what happened irl. In my pbem I don't have either advantage in early 43 but at least I have a theory on the cause (some mix between my ability and Japanese ac production/pilot training). I'm not sure what strategic pre-knowledge means other than to imagine that Japan has a similar capability to explore wiser strategic choices than they made during the war or to explore options unavailable to them. I've never played w/o pdu on, I'll have to try it off sometime. I'm obviously not talking about Allied capabilities in 41 and 42. Quantity and Quality advantages reside with Japan for the first year or so, and that allows them to dictate the strategic terms of engagement. Unfortunately for them, that doesn't leave much in the way of choice. They have to capture the resources necessary to keep the war machine running, and once that's been done, there's precious little time to do much else. And tactically speaking, what else IS there which could change the strategic dynamic? The Allies really do not need China, India, Australia, Burma or much of anything, really, other than the invulnerable American mainland (and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union). From there, the Allies simply have to march through the island chains (and only those) which lie between Hawaii and Japan. It's that simple. Because no matter what the Japanese do, beginning in '43, the advantage swings - PERMANENTLY - to the Allies. And there is absolutely NOTHING the Japanese can do to stop that. From that point forward the Allies dictate the terms of engagement, and they can do so without having to worry about appeasing British colonial interests, Chinese adventures, or Doug MacArthur's ego. So granting the Japanese a PDU advantage simply adds some degree of difficulty. It can delay the point at which the pendulum swings, and it can make the end game a lot tougher, but it won't don't anything to alter the Grand Strategic Equation.
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