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mdiehl -> (8/29/2002 10:00:11 PM)
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[QUOTE]the Japanese won more night engagements then they lost[/QUOTE]
Nikademus: Prove it. Please specify standards by which one evaluates who "won." Typically I count tonnage in the quick and dirty, but a multiple-variable approach would also count total number of warships, damage (I think one could use casualties as a proxy for this, one could also use "days in the yard" or possibly even "reams of bureaucratic paperwork") and whether or not the deployed forces achieved their tactical objectives. (We can leave out the "strategic victory" conditions for puroposes of simplification).
You also overlooked or missed my point. The guys who knew torpedo doctrine tended to be the guys whose ships had torpedoes. One would expect a DD commodore operating alone to do better than a DD commodore subordinate to a CA Admiral in the USN in 1942. (This is basically the same point made by Sauercracker in his last post, and Drongo also, about what happened to USN DDs in 1942 when they're subordinate to some CA admirals).
Here's the Real Issue (IMO):
Since UV is a wargame with ahistorical flexibility (which is *fine*) one can easily imagine that the USN player might send a CL+DD TF for some of the various skirmishes in 1942 rather than a CA+CL+DD TF. (Just as the IJN player can choose which ships to send where and so forth). *In that event*, one would not as a feature of game design presume that the USN Desron or DD+CL TF would necessarily be any less likely to launch a torp doctrine attack than the IJN. That the DD desrons were trained in this is beyond dispute -- it was used in January 1942 at Balikpapan and USN DD skippers looked for oppotunities to fight in this manner from the start. The problem seems, to me anyhow, to have occurred when DD commodores were attached to CA admirals who would not let them do what they'd been trained to do.
So, if the Allied player decides, in his capacity as ubermind, to send a USN desron sans heavies up the slot, he risks running into much heavier opposition (IJN CAs) but he might accept that risk in return for a greater probability of launching a doctrinaire torpedo attack that *might* work out swimmingly for the USN. He'd ahve to do what real people do: evaluate the objective, commit forces accordingly.
Drongo:
[QUOTE]If that really was the case, I can't see how UV can be included in that group when discussing the capabilities of the 2 navies for night naval combat. [/QUOTE]
I'm not wacking UV on that one. I'm wacking the proposed solution. A systemic advantage to the IJN seems to me to gloss over the real causes of the IJN victories and their defeats as well in 1942. It may be that UV needs a "Tassafaronga" engine. I'm not sure what the solution would be. In 1942 you could, with decent anecdotal supporting evidence, argue for a greater likelihood of surprise when the two navies clash in and around uplift island chains -- the early radar was certainly hinky enough in the slot. I think the long term solution for games like WitP (which will allegedly use major parts of the UV combat code) is to get really complicated with the "radar exp" "night exp" "asw exp" "smoke exp," "starshell exp," "rotary bugsmasher observation floatplane exp," etc, or else to assume that at the ship level it all "comes out in the wash," and instead model it at the admiral level.
John Carney. I agree that the VG product is a great game. IIRC the initiative DRM is an optional rule. I prefer not to use it in large part because I don't know what the game design means by "initiative," and because what I usually think of as "initiative" should be determined by the players, not by a rule.
By the way. As the resident curmudgeon I'm sure I'll shock everyone when I say that the LL (or any other torpedo) ought to have a hit rate much closer to 12% in night combat when the target is surprised, rather than the 2-12% range seen in VG PacWar.
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