ComradeP -> RE: What PBEM House Rules do you suggest? (12/13/2010 3:36:14 PM)
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I would be less happy with starting a PBEM game without some house rules or at least appeals to common sense, as there are a number of things that can be exploited. 1) You can't place more than a certain number of squadrons, as agreed to by the players, in the national reserve for more than 1 turn. You can essentially remove your air force from the map, so some measures should be taken to prevent gamey abuse of that. 2) No farming of AP's through placing a unit on static, having the enemy bump it out of a hex, and placing it on static again. The rule would be along the lines that units can only be placed on static in actual quiet sectors or areas where you're constructing forts. 3) You can't place more than a certain number of units, as agreed to by the players, on refit. How anyone can claim placing the entire Soviet army on refit is not gamey is still beyond me. One other problem with the game is that leaders can't increase their skills past 6, so that the best leaders have their skills set to them at the start of the game. This means that Axis and Soviet leaders that started the campaign with (extremely) limited experience but turned out to be great leaders will be significantly overrated at the start of the campaign. The Axis have a whole bunch of great leaders, not all of whom actually did something that would warrant such high figures at the start of Barbarossa. Likewise, the Soviets have great mechanized leaders for their future Tank armies, even though the majority of them had at best theoretical experience with modern mobile warfare, considering the limited amount of large scale mobile operations the Soviets participated in prior to Barbarossa (essentially only the battles against the Japanese, Poles, and the Finns, and some experience from the Spanish civil war, and none of those with commands on the scale of the later Tank armies). A debate about Soviet leader quality on the tester forum ended with me being told I was reading the wrong books and the impression that a number of Soviet mechanized leaders are underrated, rather than overrated, so that kind of killed the debate.
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