RE: determined outcome (Full Version)

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Ridgeway -> RE: determined outcome (4/19/2011 4:51:03 PM)

Are the people complaining about predetermined outcomes playing AI or PBEM? Has anyone checked if AI manpower production is different than for a live Russian?



PeeDeeAitch -> RE: determined outcome (4/19/2011 5:19:14 PM)

Part of my problem with winter quarters for the Germans is that, while an option as pointed out (and some discussed it), it did not fit the logistic capabilities at the time, nor the preparedness.

It is all well and good to suggest winter quarters november 1st, but that does not mean enough clothing is ready (and there is precious little documentation of real winter clothing for defensive use against a ready enemy), it does not suppose proper lubricants, shelters for aircraft, and last - just being ready for subzero temperatures in a functioning way. If anything, supply is too good in this game by winter.

By the time some began to call for winter quarters, the German Army was in too deep. In order to properly attack and destroy both enemy formations and conquer economic regions, they had to in effect do all or nothing.



LiquidSky -> RE: determined outcome (4/19/2011 5:28:36 PM)



The Germans themselves had no 'victory' plan for Russia. During the planning for Barbarossa they would talk in grandiose terms like smashing their armies. Hitler said: "Wiping out the very power to exist of Russia! That is the goal!" Operation Barbarossa says this about victory: "The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England." The rest of the directive deals in considerable detail about how to attack.

The Germans where wrong about how many divisions the Russians had in the field, wrong about how many they could call up (and how fast). They were wrong about the political will of the government to fight, and the will of the common Russian soldier to fight. They were wrong about how long it would take for the Russians to 'cry uncle' and give up the way France and so many other countries did. It amazes me that anyone now can come up with 'victory' plans for them, when the Germans themselves were incapable of it.

Of course, as the war raged, different idea's for victory popped up in the Germans heads. If only we take Moscow, they will surrender. If we take the oil in the Baku region, they will surrender. The reality is, the Russian would have never surrendered, (but would have used an armistace to build up troops for the next offensive, ala Napoleon against Alexander).

Which brings us to the game. Victory cannot be stated in 'historical' terms because the idea of victory either didnt exist, or was a myth. What we can use victory for in the game is to encourage proper 'historical like' behaviour and to reward good play. Benchmarks need to be placed during the games, and victory measured and assigned. At the end, they can be totaled.

For example: The Germans have to take certain cities by the end of the summer. Score points. The Russians have to push the line back so many hexes during the winter. Or cause casualties, or take cities..... Score points. The games victory becomes the sum total of all these benchmarks, which encourages play throught the entire war. So you didnt make it to Moscow as the Germans? Maybe you will do better at the next stage...

The end justifying the means victory condition of the game is too weak, and causes people to come up with there own victory in their minds. And many games ending because of poor player morale, when they fail to achieve it.



Rasputitsa -> RE: determined outcome (4/19/2011 6:47:13 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: LiquidSky
The Germans themselves had no 'victory' plan for Russia. During the planning for Barbarossa they would talk in grandiose terms like smashing their armies. Hitler said: "Wiping out the very power to exist of Russia! That is the goal!" Operation Barbarossa says this about victory: "The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England." The rest of the directive deals in considerable detail about how to attack.


Hitler is quoted as saying - "We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."

Barbarossa was a plan to kick in the door, in the expectation that there would be little resistence to futher advances. A more realistic plan may have concentrated the German Armee Groups into obtaining certain objectives, rather than expecting to spread out and easily occupy all of European Russia, after winning the frontier battles. What objectives, if lost, would have caused the Soviet Union to collapse, we will never know, because it never happened. But, it's a game and a game could be given various reasonable victory conditions, so that either side has something to aim for and a chance to win, why else would we play the game ?

It cannot be that 1941/42/43 just become scenario builders for an eventual Soviet victory in 1944/45, with the decision based only on the month the Russians get to Berlin. There is room for settings and scenarios, which would give a chance for other outcomes, still based around the historical capabilities of the actual forces. There is plenty of opportunity for historically based 'what-ifs' without losing the basic game, which must remain as an historical benchmark, on which to attach the alternatives. [:)]



marty_01 -> RE: determined outcome (4/19/2011 8:07:57 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa

quote:

ORIGINAL: LiquidSky
The Germans themselves had no 'victory' plan for Russia. During the planning for Barbarossa they would talk in grandiose terms like smashing their armies. Hitler said: "Wiping out the very power to exist of Russia! That is the goal!" Operation Barbarossa says this about victory: "The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England." The rest of the directive deals in considerable detail about how to attack.


Hitler is quoted as saying - "We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."

Barbarossa was a plan to kick in the door, in the expectation that there would be little resistence to futher advances. A more realistic plan may have concentrated the German Armee Groups into obtaining certain objectives, rather than expecting to spread out and easily occupy all of European Russia, after winning the frontier battles. What objectives, if lost, would have caused the Soviet Union to collapse, we will never know, because it never happened. But, it's a game and a game could be given various reasonable victory conditions, so that either side has something to aim for and a chance to win, why else would we play the game ?

It cannot be that 1941/42/43 just become scenario builders for an eventual Soviet victory in 1944/45, with the decision based only on the month the Russians get to Berlin. There is room for settings and scenarios, which would give a chance for other outcomes, still based around the historical capabilities of the actual forces. There is plenty of opportunity for historically based 'what-ifs' without losing the basic game, which must remain as an historical benchmark, on which to attach the alternatives. [:)]


+1

The German obviously had and an objective in-mind with Barbarossa – what they perceived would bring about victory with the Operation. This can be found by flipping through a few pages of Glantz or Erikson –Destruction of the Red Army. And in the planning of Barbarossa destruction of the Red Army in the minds of Germans meant destruction of the Frontier Armies. It was anticipated that destruction of the Red Army would bring about a quick political resolution – Russian Surrender. Not an unprecedented nor unreasonable objective in terms of European History and how wars were won back in those days. Kick in the door (destroy the Red Army) the whole rotten structure will come crashing down (Russia Surrenders).

The Germans didn’t anticipate the size nor the rapidity with which the Russian mobilized second and third echelon reserve armies after Barbarossa. When destruction of the Red Army (destruction of the frontier armies) didn’t result in “victory”, the Germans – or maybe I should say Hitler -- began to looking about for other means and methods that might bring about “victory”. Capture of Moscow and Leningrad?

Neither were captured in the actual event. We are therefore left to speculate what would have happened had the Germans actually captured Leningrad and Moscow. Those here of the mind set that loss of Moscow and Leningrad would have resulted in “Victory” for the Germans and “Defeat” for the Russians are no more wrong or right than those stating so assuredly that the like would never have resulted in a Soviet defeat and a German Victory. And the current automatic victory conditions in terms of Soviet defeat as designed by 2by3 isn’t right or wrong either. All we know is that in the real event the Germans lost after X, Y and Z occurred. Great. So we know how the Russian can win the war based upon studying the history of the actual event. The flip side of the coin is pure speculation. Given the wildly varying opinions on what would constitute a German victory, and because the like never actually occurred, it seems almost by default that the solution would be variable victory condition settings that trigger Automatic German victory\Russian Defeat. Give the players two or three speculative vicotry conditions for the German side of the coin. Players decide amongst themselves what victory condition settings to use before commencing with their PBEM.




Skanvak -> RE: determined outcome (4/19/2011 10:45:03 PM)

On this one, I have to go with Liquid Sky. Germany didn't have any plan for victory (As in political victory according to Clauswicz definition). Victory, for Hitler, would be achieved when the ability for the Russian to fight would be anihilated. Because otherwise, the Axis would have won by early Autumn 41, Stalin was ready to surrender. Stalin had great plan for Axis Victory, fortunatly, Hitler had none which compel Russia to fight to the end. One should understand that no peace was possible in the conflict because one side (Germany) refuse for ideological question to sign one.

So you have to fight until you break the will to fight of your opponnent, if he stop fighting, well you have won as axis, otherwise, I don't see why the game could not continue. Even with a political crumble, the Urals would have represent an hostile fontier permanently at war, with revolt using up the limited manpower of Germany.

That why I advocate on a coorect representation of what Moscow is worth in the war effort and as a rail hub, production center, administrative center and so on to make it a historically good economic target.

Though again I go with liquid about the VP to reward player that did better than historically.

the only concession that could be made if that we need more randomness to get rid of hindsight when something important happen (I have in mind the Finnish behaviour and soviet Fareast reserve).



DTurtle -> RE: determined outcome (4/20/2011 10:48:40 AM)

Well, the game does provide a system through which tracking successes, gound gained, losses incurred, etc. to be tracked. It is used in the various scenarios, but not in the Grand campaign. I'm guessing that this is the case, because it is very difficult to come up with values that would fit the whole campaign. But if someone wants to try, there is nothing that hinders a player from assigning VPs to certain cities that are given to the Axis/Soviet player each turn they control them, and so on.

You can even edit the factories, railyards, etc. So you could simulate the loss of Moscow as a transit hub by placing half the Soviet railyards in Moscow, for example.



marty_01 -> RE: determined outcome (4/20/2011 3:08:06 PM)

This is what Glantz says about the objective of Case Barbarossa in "Barbarossa Derailed". It's partly the basis of my above post. I say partly the basis as very similar language is used by a number of noted historians when they disscuss the objectives of Case Barbarossa (for example see also Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink…et al “Germany and the Second World War: Volume IV: The Attack on the Soviet Union”. It’s just that Glantz says in two pages what Boog, Förster et al require 100 odd pages to articulate. An aside -- but I purchased several Volumes of this Official German History of WWII right after they were translated into English. They went for about $120.00/per volume. This was over 10-years ago. Now Vol IV of the Series can't be touched for less than $400. I always tell the wife this sort of thing if and when she complains about me spending to much cash on books. I tell her its an investment and that she can sell off all this "junk" after I kick the bucket. Calms her down when she sees a potential profit)

http://img687.imageshack.us/g/glantzobjectivesofbarba.jpg/




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