quote:

ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake

Now..as to this question of the application of this "Deep Battle" concept to AE, I presume you are talking about the combined use of surface naval forces, carrier-based air forces and land-based air forces because the land battles are quite abstracted in AE.

Perhaps the carriers are the armor, the heavy surface forces more like motorized infantry and the land-based air a sort of long range artillery.

The scale and discontinuity (of island geography) are completely different but it is still necesary to secure a broad "breakthrough" if one is to push an offensive effort up through the Dutch East Indies for eg.

Let's say one wanted to take Luzon from Australia. One can't simply put a couple of divisions on transports and set sail without "pinning" Kendari and the bases in the Lesser Sundas. The enemy airbases are like the "shoulders" of an offensive salient. If they are held and the base of the salient is too narrow then artillery will impede resupply of the spearhead.

In the case of AE, the "salient" needs to be many hundreds of miles across.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

quote:

ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake

Now..as to this question of the application of this "Deep Battle" concept to AE, I presume you are talking about the combined use of surface naval forces, carrier-based air forces and land-based air forces because the land battles are quite abstracted in AE.

Perhaps the carriers are the armor, the heavy surface forces more like motorized infantry and the land-based air a sort of long range artillery.

The scale and discontinuity (of island geography) are completely different but it is still necesary to secure a broad "breakthrough" if one is to push an offensive effort up through the Dutch East Indies for eg.

Let's say one wanted to take Luzon from Australia. One can't simply put a couple of divisions on transports and set sail without "pinning" Kendari and the bases in the Lesser Sundas. The enemy airbases are like the "shoulders" of an offensive salient. If they are held and the base of the salient is too narrow then artillery will impede resupply of the spearhead.

In the case of AE, the "salient" needs to be many hundreds of miles across.

Cap Mandrake,

this is true, but what makes this a very interesting topic are the Soviet tenets for achieving a decisive victory (in a given operation), which they labelled "Deep Battle", were different than German, English and American concepts. They approached the initial operations very differently, using attacks across a broad front, followed by exploitation of local success versus a concentrated attack across a small fontage to achieve a breakthrough.

This has different implications for overall force ratios, recon, deception, and operations to fix and/or deplete enemy reserves.

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ORIGINAL: herwin

Blitzkrieg was a motorised version of Stosstruppen tactics from WWII. It began in the midst of the defended zone and kept evolving its way to the rear. Think light infantry tactics with motor vehicles. Deep Battle was a motorised version of Russian Civil War cavalry tactics. The units were released at the rear of the defended zone and kept going until they reached strategic goals deep in the enemy position. The mechanised corps was designed to hold key terrain (usually an urban logistics hub) until the RKKA infantry could catch up. The three tank corps were designed to overrun everything significant on the way to that goal.

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ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

Blitzkrieg was a motorised version of Stosstruppen tactics from WWII. It began in the midst of the defended zone and kept evolving its way to the rear. Think light infantry tactics with motor vehicles. Deep Battle was a motorised version of Russian Civil War cavalry tactics. The units were released at the rear of the defended zone and kept going until they reached strategic goals deep in the enemy position. The mechanised corps was designed to hold key terrain (usually an urban logistics hub) until the RKKA infantry could catch up. The three tank corps were designed to overrun everything significant on the way to that goal.

Harry, this is nicely put. I think the challenge is to step back and look at why the Soviets developed their deep battle doctrine the way they did and see if it offers any insite into different tactics, operational art and strategy in the Pacific.

As an example, why did the Soviets develop a very detailed concept of echeloned forces when developing deep battle doctrine?
Mike

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

The Red Army didn't use reserves, except for small anti-tank forces. Each echelon had a mission and was expected to burn itself out performing that mission.

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ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

The Red Army didn't use reserves, except for small anti-tank forces. Each echelon had a mission and was expected to burn itself out performing that mission.

Harry, we may be having a problem of definition. To my observation, the Soviets used operational and strategic level reserves on a very large scale, waiting for the opportunity to exploit success in the tactical zone of the enemy's defense.

However, the point I was trying to make about the echelon of forces in Soviet Doctrine, was the mathmatical basis behind the arrangement. They made a serious attempt to calculate the most efficient levels of force concentration in terms of effective rate of attack. To my knowledge, no other army made as detailed models of the limits on mass and mobility in mechanized warfare. US Amphibious doctrine developed very detailed echelons, but are there other ways a player might consider the echeloning of forces in order to maintain momentum in AE?

Mike