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fcharton -> RE: Perfection, of a kind, spence (A) vs fcharton (J) (8/30/2014 1:47:33 PM)
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June 16th 1943
We’re still moving, but at a very slow rate, as work is a bit demanding on my side.
In New Guinea, Madang fell easily to the second deliberate attack. I had a reinforced regiment, behind forts, but a few weeks of air bombing had destroyed all their supplies, and one naval bombardment was all it took to send disruption in the high 50s, and doom the units.
Once Madang has fallen, and its level four airfield is rebuilt (a matter of days for allied engineers), Lae becomes almost impossible to protect, and my opponent has been landing troops there, uncontested, for over a week. He'll attack once he judges he has enough, and will take the base, and move on. And in the end, three division worth of troops, all behind prepared positions, will be lost.
A week ago, KB struck against the landings in Madang. We sank a CA Northampton and a Canadian corvette (the Dawson). CL Trenton was reported sunk a few days later, but I doubt it. This was a good strike, but it failed to hinder the landings.
In the Dutch Indies, KB disrupted the landings in Babo. We couldn’t prevent the base from falling, but sank at least three CLAA (Juneau, San Juan and San Diego), a light cruiser (Helena) and two destroyers, a troop ship (unfortunately empty) and a pair of cargoes.
Finally, a raid against a supply run in Port Blair sank CA Cornwall and CLAA Van Heemskerck, and possibly CA Frobisher. In Burma, my opponent in reinforcing his line, but the front, along the indian border, is stable.
The air war is becoming increasingly unbalanced. Over the first half of the month, I lost 680 planes to 320 allies, but when it comes to fighter losses, the ratio is much worse. With 130 Hellcats and 30 Corsairs produced every month since May, my opponent can afford to commit modern fighters most of the time, and it will only get worst next month, when he gets 50 P-38H and as many P47-D2. In terms of speed, all but the Hellcat are much faster than my fastest fighter (Tojo), and neither my Zeroes or Oscar can cope with them. This means I’m stuck with ever increasing exchange rates, at a time when Allied production is getting larger than mine (I’m producing 1500 planes a month, and so do the Allies).
Next month, I’m getting the Oscar IIIa and the Tojo IIc, I began producing the A6M5b in June. I’m not sure they will make a lot of difference, though.
Overall, the current situation seems pretty typical of the mid-game period, when Japan has to spend troops, and planes, and ships, to try and delay the juggernaut.
New Guinea and Burma are the two sides of the coin. In the former, sending lots of troops to Lae and the area allowed me the keep the Allies off the Bismarck Sea until now. And moving lots Chinese troops to Burma means the Allies are stuck on the Indian border, and will probably remain there until I choose to retreat. I believe this is a good thing, as once the allies begin moving forward, their advantage in supply capacity and building speed means they can build their forward bases (and the umbrella under which they advance) much faster than you can build your defenses. And the game is soon over once they get in range of your industry.
But then, manning your front position means losing those troops early in the game, since the game offers little options in term of evacuation and retreat. I believe this summarizes the midgame Japanese dilemma: how many troops are you ready to throw away, in order to delay Allied advance. If you are too conservative, Allies bombers will get into range of your factories much too early. If you are too lavish, you won’t have the reserves to hold the line, once the front is broken.
I believe this justifies the aggressive strategies, where Japan moves much farther than its historical perimeter, that seem to have become so popular among seasoned AE players. The best way to slow Allied advance, is to make it as long as possible.
Is this “history done right” (as wargaming should be)? I have my doubts about it. The idea that the correct way to play Japan is to capture all of China, just after declaring war upon the US, and then go for Manila instead of Hawaii, because you’d rather have the subs than the old BB, and then jump for Perth, or Bombay, or Noumea, or maybe even all of them, sounds a bit like “blitzkrieg gone mad” to me.
On the other hand, the idea that, in this game and many others that reached mid-43, Japan, not having lost KB at Midway, having better supplies because of scenario 2, and having managed a larger perimeter than historical, could be 100% on the defensive by 1943 seems a bit exaggerated. And the fact that many games where the Allies fared much worse than historical in 42 end up with resounding Allied victories in 44 adds to the suspicion.
The more I think about it, the more I’m convinced something is wrong in the grand scenario, which suggests something is rotten in the system itself. More precisely, I think the system favours offense and underplays defense. This is the reason why the Allies, once production and reinforcements set in, can raise from the dead and land in Korea in 44. This is also the reason why Japan can, and should, take China, no matter the home rules and stacking limits. And this explains why going for Karachi, Tahiti or Auckland are sound goals for June 1942…
Why is this so? I think the system downplays friction, in the most Clausewitzian sense of the word (Murphy, in modern parlance). In the game, like in reality, lots of things can go wrong, no doubt, and this is why AE is a great game, but if you push the correct buttons, everything will go right, much righter than it should. And the lack of friction favours offense over defence.
Why is this so? I believe this happens because AE was developed by a mixture of servicemen and scientists (some being both, you know who you are), who tend to trust their tools (formulae or doctrine) a bit more than they should. In my opinion (note that I’m saying that on my AAR, and wouldn’t venture to go as far on some other forum thread), you see this a lot on the forum, where the typical ‘rant’ thread, is always “why was this not successful?” and never “why didn’t this fail?”, and the typical response is “you forgot to push button X and Y, silly you (and please read thread nr XXX our google up question nr YYY)” and seldom “because never ever gets right”.
Where am I getting at? I think Clausewitz got it right, when he explains friction (or Murphy) is what explains why we don’t “get to the extremes” (ie why winner doesn’t take all, ie why it is not all about size). There is something asymmetric in war, which make offense unjustly hard, and defense unreasonably easy. And I think this is what AE fails to model accurately.
And the result, in the grand campaign of a very involving and time consuming game , is very unfortunate : it means lots of (allied) players will drop in 1942, as the all powerful Japanese get everything they want, all the time, and the rest (Japanese) will drop in 43, once they’ve lost the KB, and everything gets mad.
But there are counterexamples? Yeah,but look at them : counterexamples only happen when the match is terribly unbalanced. Nemo can defend in 42, yeah, but he’s Nemo. Rader can manage against an absolute newbie, but only until 43, since the newb happened to be Greyjoy.
Right, sorry, if I sound like I’m ranting, I didn’t mean to. I believe what I wanted to explain is that we either need shorter scenarios (but then we lose the production side of Japan, which is bad) or a serious reflection about GC balance. And if you're an AFB reading this, keep in mind that unless the AI becomes what it isn't now, and unless you're one of those types who delight reading the rules and not playing the games, you need happy JFB to play...
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