RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (Full Version)

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mmarquo -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (8/29/2013 12:19:03 PM)

I see plenty of deleted, morale-depleted shells...



Schmart -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (8/29/2013 5:36:18 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Marquo

I see plenty of deleted, morale-depleted shells...


Many (most?) scheduled reinforcement divisions and brigades arrive as such, but not the auto rebuilt divisions.



Gabriel B. -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (8/29/2013 5:38:19 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

The whole situation makes it increasingly plain that we have underestimated the Russian colossus...At the outset of war, we reckoned with about 200 enemy divisions. Now we have already counted 360. But there they are, and if we smash a dozen of them, the Russians simply put up another dozen.”
From the diary of General Franz Halder, August 11, 1941

I don't think the game conveys that well.



They were realy only about 200 infantry / mountain infantry divisions at the start , the german asumed the soviet tank forces were still organised as moto mechanised brigades not divisions.
It is no demeaning term, because a light tank brigade had around 255 tanks before the war.
some mechanised corps of the western front did not even have a brigade worth of light tanks.


as for the new divisios , if memory serves : 120 new rifle divisions in 3 months plus the rebuilt ones.



Gabriel B. -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (8/29/2013 5:47:55 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Walloc
If ppl stay in the "I need to capture troops mindset" in these cases they giving them selfs an disadvanatge.



I am rather new here myself, but I have read several ARR where axis players manage to lose the high operational tempo just to bag a few more divisions.



Aurelian -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (8/29/2013 7:04:26 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Gabriel B.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

The whole situation makes it increasingly plain that we have underestimated the Russian colossus...At the outset of war, we reckoned with about 200 enemy divisions. Now we have already counted 360. But there they are, and if we smash a dozen of them, the Russians simply put up another dozen.”
From the diary of General Franz Halder, August 11, 1941

I don't think the game conveys that well.



They were realy only about 200 infantry / mountain infantry divisions at the start , the german asumed the soviet tank forces were still organised as moto mechanised brigades not divisions.
It is no demeaning term, because a light tank brigade had around 255 tanks before the war.
some mechanised corps of the western front did not even have a brigade worth of light tanks.


as for the new divisios , if memory serves : 120 new rifle divisions in 3 months plus the rebuilt ones.



But that entry was made less than two months after the start :)



Gabriel B. -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (8/29/2013 8:44:49 PM)

Acording to soviet designations they had 303 divisions at the start (90+ being tank/ moto )__Halder math is besides the point however this is what red army had in august :


North front : 27 rifle + 7 people militia divisions, 2 tank ,1 moto .

Nord west : 13 rifle +1 people militia divisions, 1 cavalry , 6 tank, 3 moto

West : 36 rifle + 2 cavalry , 11 tank +2 moto

Reserve : 23 rifle + 12 people militia divisions, 2 cavalry , 4 tank+2 moto

Central: 19 rifle +5 cavalry ,3 Tank, 1 moto .

South West: 30 rifle, 3 cavalry, 12 tank, 2 moto.

South: 39 rifle, 7 cavalry, 8 tank , 5 moto .


This is more or less what the germans had in front of them (it adds up to 290 divisions ) , than there were 81 rifle, 24 cav, 5 tank, 2 moto in the military districts and inactive fronts (total 402 ).

Basicly they rebuilt all divisions lost and added another 99 , losses in armor which the germans underextimated took far longer.

As for the game, the AI is alowed to build units for no AP if it drops below 300 .






Aurelian -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (8/29/2013 10:21:15 PM)

But, by the end of 1941, they raised the equivalent of 825 divisions. They had a mobilization pool of 10,000,000.

http://sti.clemson.edu/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=189&Itemid=310

Thus Halder's comment. Sure, the next dozen were not as well trained or equipped. or the next dozen after that. But they showed up, they fought. They bled. But they bled the Germans too. And despite how Pelton claims the Germans were winning the attrition war, they could not.

As Flav pointed out above:
quote:

... the Soviet replacement system doesn't really support a strong forward defense in 1941, as it considerably understates the Soviet ability to take a hit in the chin.


And it doesn't. They lost more territory than the US has east of the Mississippi. They lost more troops in 41 than the West did from 1939-45. They saw the fruits of their more than 20 years labor, forced or otherwise, either taken by the enemy or destroyed at their hand. And they didn't roll over. They mobilized millions from beyond the Urals. They kept coming. Oh nuts, I'm rambling :)



SigUp -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (8/29/2013 10:33:32 PM)

The numbers in the paper you posted present another problem. Not only does German OOB numbers rise to an epic ahistorical proportion, the Red Army likewise does. Furthermore, the Soviet player will never have to deal with forces depleted from their (successful) assaults against German positions. Even if the replacement system delivers the correct number of men to the Red Army, its losses won't reach the 6-7 million in 1943-44 due to the combat system favouring the winning side. Just like the Germans suffer too few casualties in 1941, the Soviets suffer too few from 1942 onwards, on an even bigger scale.



fbs -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (8/30/2013 6:09:06 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: SigUp

... its losses won't reach the 6-7 million in 1943-44 due to the combat system favouring the winning side. Just like the Germans suffer too few casualties in 1941, the Soviets suffer too few from 1942 onwards, on an even bigger scale.



That's a very important point.

I've gone in message detail 4, shot by shot, over several battles, and it's incredible that several divisions attacking 3 divisions will get like 200 casualties in one side and 100 casualties on the other side after shooting some 2000 times, and then when the shooting finishes and the resulting CVs are compared, the losing side runs and then they get 20,000 casualties.

I think that separating shooting vs. running casualties is pretty cool, but the shooting casualties seem way too low for both sides.



SigUp -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (8/30/2013 6:44:49 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: fbs


quote:

ORIGINAL: SigUp

... its losses won't reach the 6-7 million in 1943-44 due to the combat system favouring the winning side. Just like the Germans suffer too few casualties in 1941, the Soviets suffer too few from 1942 onwards, on an even bigger scale.



That's a very important point.

I've gone in message detail 4, shot by shot, over several battles, and it's incredible that several divisions attacking 3 divisions will get like 200 casualties in one side and 100 casualties on the other side after shooting some 2000 times, and then when the shooting finishes and the resulting CVs are compared, the losing side runs and then they get 20,000 casualties.

I think that separating shooting vs. running casualties is pretty cool, but the shooting casualties seem way too low for both sides.


The overemphasis on retreat losses is what leads to such incredible results happening like 0-100 losses for the Germans, while the Soviet loses 2000. Similarly the standard result of a successful Red Army attack on a German division seems to be the Germans losing 1000+ out of 10.000, while the Soviets lose 1000 out of 100.000.



Gabriel B. -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (8/30/2013 9:01:39 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

Oh nuts, I'm rambling :)


You are [:D]

The wording in that survey is a bit misleading , "raised" should not apply to divisions that existed prewar .

303 prewar
266 brigades equivalent to 133 divisions
385 rebuild or newly formed



The Guru -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (8/31/2013 10:40:54 PM)

(first I apologize for my poor English I'm not a native speaker)

If I may contribute my 2 cents to the critical debate of what alternate historical decisions should or shouldn't be allowed, I think the key is a certain measure of plausibility

The "I'm in command I can do what I want" argument has its limits. If you want to be a Hitler that looks favourably upon surrendering huge portions of newly conquered territory because he's aware that he is facing a very long and difficult war and wants to perserve its manpower in order to bar the way to Berlin, if you want a denazified Luftwaffe completely subordinated to the logistical imperatives of the Heer and highly trained in en-route air resupply of mobile formations, if you want a non-feudal, streamlined and rational German production system in order to ultra-maximize production of the most efficient items ... well, then it's not Hitler, it's not the Luftwaffe, it's not Nazi Germany, and so there wouldn't even have been a WWII and the game would make no sense.

The same goes, in my opinion, with the Soviet runaway strategy. The Red Army was permeated, from the top brass to the lowest echelons of command, with a sectarian belief in the virtues of offensive. The structure of the army was offensive-oriented, the training was offensive-oriented. Retreat was not considered part of the arsenal of military maneuvers, it was an admission of failure and cowardice. Retreat exposed the responsible officers to being shot. Doctrinal rigidity prevailed everywhere. It took the Soviets a full year of bloodbaths to start considering retreat as a valid option. And even then, the first full-scale retreat towards the Caucasus in 1942 wasn't even planned, it started as a rout; Stalin just declined to give the "no retreat" order and allowed the retreat to continue.
Offensive was in-built in the hardware of the 1941 Red ARMY. This is why I don't consider the runaway tactic as plausible and it shouldn't therefore be allowed, at least that easily, in an historical game.
The same is true for the Wehrmacht fleeing back to Poland for Xmas 1941, btw.

This being a military game, alternate courses should be explored through alternate military decisions - basically where and when to employ the forces available. Retreats such as the ones discussed are political, and, even worse, ideological, issues.
Now, I'm not saying a little flexibility, for fun's sake, kills the historical game, but I seriously believe that the political and ideological fundamentals of the belligerents should be respected.
Alternate political situations deriving from alternate military situations should be possible, of course: Finland, or the other minors, could sue for peace earlier or later than historically, if the military situation if accordingly worse or better. National Morale can also be higher or worse than historical based on the military situation. Etc...




Flaviusx -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (8/31/2013 10:51:44 PM)

The Guru, you are overstating the Soviet unwillingness to retreat; so far as Kiev was concerned, calls to do just that came from Zhukov, Budenny, Kirponos, the SW Front Chief of staff, among others. This in summer of 1941, mind you. These calls came as early as July and kept right on coming until the disaster in September which everybody could see a mile away.

The sticking point was Stalin. I agree this needs to be accounted for, but it's not a question of doctrine. It's a matter of politics.



The Guru -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (8/31/2013 11:20:25 PM)

Well, obviously, some soviet leaders right in the eye of the cyclone have indeed called for retreat, if anything at least for self-preservation ( if I'm not mistaken Kirponos died in the encirclement), even though I still believe that in terms of doctrine the Red Army was not well-prepared for organized retreat, to say the least

Yet, I don't disagree with you, the key is Stalin, and it doesn't disprove my point. It was unthinkable to initiate such a redeployment without Stalin's approval. In the same way, most German officers during the 1941 winter where in favour of retreat. Hitler was not. He had it his way.

The Barbarossa campaign as an historical event is inseparable from the Hitler/Stalin dynamic. Imagining these characters with such insightful, flexible and reasonable frames of mind is straying too far from reality, and removes the historical background for Barbarossa even happening



Michael T -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (8/31/2013 11:52:40 PM)

quote:

The Barbarossa campaign as an historical event is inseparable from the Hitler/Stalin dynamic. Imagining these characters with such insightful, flexible and reasonable frames of mind is straying too far from reality, and removes the historical background for Barbarossa even happening


Agree entirely.




mmarquo -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (9/1/2013 3:37:27 AM)

So why play if alea jacta est?



Michael T -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (9/1/2013 3:54:43 AM)

When I play WITE I take on the role of the East Front commander, not Hitler. Others obviously see themselves as Hitler's or Stalin's replacement. Its a fundamental difference. I think, the SD rules in an abstract kind of way enforce a 'no retreat' political reality on to the players. I absolutely refuse from now on to play WITE without severe penalties for wholesale retreats. Its just my preference and how I like to play. I just won't be playing people who want to run anymore.

Some withdrawals are perfectly acceptable. I am talking about retreats back to Poland in the blizzard or Reds running to Moscow and Rostov by T12, that kind of thing.



The Guru -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (9/1/2013 8:20:25 AM)

quote:

So why play if alea jacta est?


It's not, far from that.
I just think we have to accept a certain number of given constraints if we want to remain in the realm of a military simulation.
We start at the historical date, with the historical number of troops and we should start with the historical political/ideological context and the historical characters that generated this particular historical situation.

If, as Hitler, there is no limit to your decision spectrum, then why not, indeed, streamline production immediately, levy the Volksturm in 1941, issue adequate winter supplies to the Army, recall the Einsatzgruppen and implement friendly politics in the conquered territories to increase Hiwi flow and reduce partisan activity, etc.

What the game should be about (again, if we want to keep it a simulation), I agree with MT, is conducting military operations from the OKH point of view.
And I would go even further, I think therecould even be some mecanism simulating Stalin's early appetite for counterattacks. It is not uncommon to see a 1941 with the Red Army conducting not a single significant counterattack throughout the whole year. To me, it just makes no sense.







swkuh -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (9/1/2013 1:46:09 PM)

Agree w/Guru. Papa Joe and der Fuhrer set the policy and often the strategy and even tactic of the conflict throughout the war. These issues had consequences and should be the basis for WitE modeling. Now, one could create variables that would allow modifications to the policies, etc. but that wouldn't be this game! After some experience playing vs. AI I've accepted the hard coded production plans and other controls that give the game a chance of working.

Now, there could be a market for a game that looked at these issues, but maybe the details would be curtailed.



mmarquo -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (9/1/2013 4:02:25 PM)

"What the game should be about (again, if we want to keep it a simulation), I agree with MT, is conducting military operations from the OKH point of view. And I would go even further, I think there could even be some mecanism simulating Stalin's early appetite for counterattacks. It is not uncommon to see a 1941 with the Red Army conducting not a single significant counterattack throughout the whole year. To me, it just makes no sense."

So as the OKH commander you can do what ever you want without a buffoon's meddling, but as STAVKA the player is subject to the vagaries of Uncle Joe??? Either it swings both ways or not at all.



fbs -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (9/1/2013 5:33:58 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: The Guru
If, as Hitler, there is no limit to your decision spectrum, then why not, indeed, streamline production immediately, levy the Volksturm in 1941, issue adequate winter supplies to the Army, recall the Einsatzgruppen and implement friendly politics in the conquered territories to increase Hiwi flow and reduce partisan activity, etc.


Exactly the point. Some of these make a convincing case (at least for me), like going to war production in 1941. That, I think, is within the reality of what could have been possible with better planning. Other actions, like treating the occupied territories friendly, seem quite improbable with Hitler being the homicidal maniac he was.

On the Soviet side, the question is whether it could have been possible (or not) that Stalin could have authorized retreat, at about 2-3 weeks into the war. The point for retreat is that Russia did exactly that against Napoleon, that the USSR did very poorly in the Winter War, and Stalin authorized the retreat to Stalingrad in 1942. So, if Stalin got in that mindset in 1942, why couldn't he have reached the same mindset in 1941?

On the other hand, there is one guy that does (serious) gaming of political thinking, and he says he can predict most government's actions with great accuracy by focusing on what the government leaders should do in order to keep themselves in power. If that's true for Stalin, then perhaps the main argument for not retreating is not that Stalin was an idiot, but that he probably thought he would not survive that retreat. The argument for this point of view is that in 1942 he was politically stronger, while in late Jun-1941 he at one point thought he would be shot by his party (that's documented).



The Guru -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (9/1/2013 6:04:37 PM)

quote:

So as the OKH commander you can do what ever you want without a buffoon's meddling, but as STAVKA the player is subject to the vagaries of Uncle Joe???


Not at all. As I said previously:
quote:

This is why I don't consider the runaway tactic as plausible and it shouldn't therefore be allowed, at least that easily, in an historical game.
The same is true for the Wehrmacht fleeing back to Poland for Xmas 1941, btw.


For the exact same reasons I think it is essential to compute Hitler into the equation too.
This is why I am all in favour of SD conditions that go both ways. In my opinion, the Germans must attempt to maintain their encroachment in Russia as deep as possible as far as mid-1944 at least, because Hitler still expected to pull some magic trick and win the war.
The problem with the conventional campaign VC - I have mentioned this many times before (I'm not much of a "name" on this forum so there was little or no reaction) is that for the German they are expressed negatively, that is, lose the war as late as possible. Yet, for Hitler and the Germans, it was never a question of trying to make the agony as long as possible. It was victory or death, and they would have been no particular feeling of "better performance" if they had collapsed in June rather than May. So while it is stupid for the german WitE player to gamble his army in a high risk offensive strategy, it made perfect sense from the historical point of view. (interestingly, it is precisely this kind of "wargamer" point of view that leads many people to say that Citadel or the Battle of the Bulge were a waste of resources. It was not, it was the right thing to try, even with 1% chance of success.)

The German player in WitE, depending on the situation, might prepare for the long defensive war as early as the first snows of 1941. Why the hell would he burn his forces in a desperate and overstretched attempt to reach the capital? Why would he ever want to head for the Caucasian oilfields?

This is why I think the campaign VC should be kinda modelled on the scenario ones, with high Victory points for distant locations, hexes near Moscow, etc, to give an incentive for "grabbing that extra city", and a penalty for being too pusillanimous.




SigUp -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (9/1/2013 6:10:21 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: fbs

On the Soviet side, the question is whether it could have been possible (or not) that Stalin could have authorized retreat, at about 2-3 weeks into the war. The point for retreat is that Russia did exactly that against Napoleon, that the USSR did very poorly in the Winter War, and Stalin authorized the retreat to Stalingrad in 1942. So, if Stalin got in that mindset in 1942, why couldn't he have reached the same mindset in 1941?

*sigh* Once again, Stalin did not authorize a retreat to Stalingrad. He ordered the Red Army to fight where they stood. But after the Germans trashed the Soviet formations in front of Voronezh, parts of the Red Army lost discipline and flooded backwards. Why else do you think did Stalin think it was necessary to issue Order No. 227 and order the troops to create units shooting people fleeing? You are trying to justify the Red Army running East with a historical inaccuracy.



The Guru -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (9/1/2013 6:42:00 PM)

quote:

Stalin did not authorize a retreat to Stalingrad

I concur. As I mentioned in my earlier post, that "retreat" started as a rout

quote:

So, if Stalin got in that mindset in 1942, why couldn't he have reached the same mindset in 1941

So he actually did not get into that mindset. He only reached some limited acceptance of the idea of retreat during the Caucasus episode. And only after one year of one after the other abysmal failures at mandated counterattacks. So no, no way he could have got into that mindset in 1941.



Easo79 -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (9/1/2013 7:31:20 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: SigUp

quote:

ORIGINAL: fbs

On the Soviet side, the question is whether it could have been possible (or not) that Stalin could have authorized retreat, at about 2-3 weeks into the war. The point for retreat is that Russia did exactly that against Napoleon, that the USSR did very poorly in the Winter War, and Stalin authorized the retreat to Stalingrad in 1942. So, if Stalin got in that mindset in 1942, why couldn't he have reached the same mindset in 1941?

*sigh* Once again, Stalin did not authorize a retreat to Stalingrad. He ordered the Red Army to fight where they stood. But after the Germans trashed the Soviet formations in front of Voronezh, parts of the Red Army lost discipline and flooded backwards. Why else do you think did Stalin think it was necessary to issue Order No. 227 and order the troops to create units shooting people fleeing? You are trying to justify the Red Army running East with a historical inaccuracy.


It seems to me that both of you are partially correct.

"More significantly, the German advance (in 1942) failed to duplicate the massive prisoner hauls of the previous year. Stalin and Timoshenko had learned from their mistakes, and on 6 July , the Stavka wisely directed the Southwestern and Southern Fronts to conduct a strategic retreat, rather than to stand and fight" (Glantz, When Titans clashed).

Order 227 was issued 3 weeks after that instruction (which did not allowed a retreat all the way to Stalingrad).

It seems that there was a change in mindset after all, but that this was prompted by the previous failures. How many failures were necessary to accept than running East was sometimes the best thing to do can only be speculated over.



Walloc -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (9/1/2013 7:43:35 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: The Guru

This is why I think the campaign VC should be kinda modelled on the scenario ones, with high Victory points for distant locations, hexes near Moscow, etc, to give an incentive for "grabbing that extra city", and a penalty for being too pusillanimous.


I understand and agree that, that might happen depending on players psyche. On the other hand it doesnt only give that incetives. U might as well forster a i grab all up to a line. Then i fortify this line with intend to hold on for longer. Ala Pelton or Stef defensive strategies. If ur able to hold that line longer going WWI than what u would be able to grab and hold by being offensive. Then the VP system forster a defensive game where possibly again depending om player psyche u would for go a 42 offensive amd a 43 counter attack. If u have achieved a line in 41 that give enough VP to give u victory if ur able to hold on.

The just grab the next city might work on some ppl possibly ending in a Stalingrad. The problem is that it just doesnt only give that incentive. It also gives the incentive to avoid a Stalingrad and the losses of such if by going defensive once reached a certain line where VP is enough to if u just hold on to that for X longer.

VP isnt necesarrily a magic cure. The longer a scenario/campaign becomes the more variables plays in. In a short scn where teh attacker/defender normally is more made up by pre hand conditions pre its much easier to make such work with out having ways of gaming the system.

VP in the campaigns are clearly a voiced opinion of many. Just saying this can just as well become a system that is being gamed too. Unless u have a stringent set of take city X by then and also city Y by then and changing yearly, which what u could do but u then also reduce teh player ability to create his own campaigns. If u hafta in eseence through gaining enough VP in 41 to hafta as german to go for both Leningrad, Kharkov and Rhzev. Then u reduce the player ability to say ill go for a Leningrad option this time around rather than a AGC advance and u forced to take city X Y and Z else u dont gain enough VP. U get all the more predicteble campaigns. If u make a option of VP is spread out all over the map and its up too players to get which ones they want. U Possibly end up in the above stated case where u dont necesarrily foster a offensive german campaign in 42+ but hey ill just sit on these cities with the manpower boosts given by the game going for the WWI solution. VP for cities doesnt only give the incentive u just get 1 more it as said also depending on player psyches givs the incitives to hold them and more so than gaining new ones.

In short incentivces when going a turn based VP system isnt always as clear as ppl might think and it becomes yet another system that can possibly be gamed.

Kind regards,

Rasmus



loki100 -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (9/1/2013 7:54:00 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: SigUp
*sigh* Once again, Stalin did not authorize a retreat to Stalingrad. He ordered the Red Army to fight where they stood. But after the Germans trashed the Soviet formations in front of Voronezh, parts of the Red Army lost discipline and flooded backwards. Why else do you think did Stalin think it was necessary to issue Order No. 227 and order the troops to create units shooting people fleeing? You are trying to justify the Red Army running East with a historical inaccuracy.


to be honest in the period May-July 1942 Stalin veered all over the place around this idea. Mekhlis' grand screw up in the Crimea fed into his opinion that the Red Army had to attack as it lacked the discipline to defend (hence the decision to push on with the Kharkov offensive). At the start of Blau on the Voronezh axis, he switched from defend at all costs to allowing a flexible retreat. At Rostov, the NKVD formations held the west bank till the bulk of the Soviet formations had crossed safely and then held it till the bridges were properly blown.

By accident, the Soviets managed a flexible defense along the lower Don but a lot of Soviet memoires note just how demolarised those units were as they fell back to Stalingrad.

I think Order 227 has to be seen as a realistic (if needlessly cruel) statement that as at Moscow in November 1941 there simply was no more room to retreat?



fbs -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (9/1/2013 8:37:43 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: SigUp
*sigh* Once again, Stalin did not authorize a retreat to Stalingrad. He ordered the Red Army to fight where they stood. But after the Germans trashed the Soviet formations in front of Voronezh, parts of the Red Army lost discipline and flooded backwards. Why else do you think did Stalin think it was necessary to issue Order No. 227 and order the troops to create units shooting people fleeing? You are trying to justify the Red Army running East with a historical inaccuracy.



John Keegan, in "The Second World War": "July 1942... At the Stavka, A. M. Vasilevsky had succeeded in persuading Stalin that "stand fast" orders [I reckon he means #227] issued for their own sake were undesirable, since they served the Ostheer's ends, and in extracting permission for threatened Russian formations to slip away out of danger."

History Place: "Hitler's offensive, which he named Operation Blue... it was almost too easy. On closer look, German field commanders realized that Russian battle tactics had changed. Instead of stubbornly standing their ground and inviting encirclement, the Red Army had adopted a new strategy, the fighting retreat, to minimize losses and draw the Germans ever deeper into Russia, thereby stretching already-overtaxed supply lines to the breaking point."

I reckon I can find a few more references that Stalin indeed authorized retreats in 1942 - those two took some 10 minutes only.

But I give you part of the point - there is a distinction between a "fighting retreat" that would appease Stalin, and shamelessly "running away" like peeps do in games here. Perhaps the "running like a gazelle" strategy is indeed not realistic, but the fighting retreat was.



fbs -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (9/1/2013 8:42:59 PM)

Btw, one way that could simulate Stalin's interference and his liking for stand-and-die postures may be to add a random chance to freeze Soviet units for a turn in 1941 whenever they move East more than x hexes...

That certainly would be stand and die in 1941.



SigUp -> RE: Why is it non-historical that the Soviets could have run? (9/1/2013 8:45:48 PM)

I don't have my source, that quotes from orders to the Soviet formations, here. When I find it, I'll post it here.



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