BletchleyGeek -> RE: The core problem with WitE+ (1/8/2014 10:44:40 PM)
|
quote:
ORIGINAL: Red Lancer This game has been balanced to produce historic outcomes to the conflict. WitE is described a simulation. In a game this complex it is easy to miss the wood for the trees. Much of the frustration on the forums is based on the perception that in achieving historic outcomes too much influence has been placed on changes to the logistics/production system and the blizzard and not enough on the game engine. I have considerable sympathy with that point of view. Where I have less sympathy is in the use of strategic statistics to argue tactical shortcomings. IMO there are too many other variables in play; most of which you have highlighted. I think that I am allowed to say that the issue at the heart of this discussion has now moved to the WitW Testers Forum and the opening round of comments are already raising good food for thought. I do really expect 2by3 will deliver something really good with WitW, and I also hope that you guys will be bouncing back quick enough to return to the Eastern Front. Don't take the statements below as a destructive criticism: it's just a frank - and subjective, indeed - assessment of what actually lies at the core. The thing is that WITE faces two dilemmas which I don't think can be solved in a way that you can satisfy everyone concerned. The first dilemma lies in the trade-off between playability and fidelity when representing time, terrain, weather and forces. In order to make a playable operational simulation, and lacking any meaningful friendly AI to assist the player, the game had to parcel into packets each of the former into weekly turns, 10 km hexes, all or nothing weather conditions for areas in excess of 100 square kilometers, and Divisions/Brigade/Regiments as maneuver forces. Each of these choices have, in turn, required to introduce a quite extensive and complex set of rules to account for events and processes which cannot be accounted for given the choices made to model time, terrain, weather and forces. Such rules can be more or less inspired, but in general, as with the blizzard effects, they have just become a very complicated affair with plenty of loopholes and problems from both a simulation/what-if or re-enacment/historicity perspective. I know some of these choices are under review - or have been outright changed - in WitW (like weather). But I reckon you'll have to review further the other choices as well (especially time). Here follows an example of a feature of the 1941 campaign which WitE just can't handle, that I find critical to get right in order to portray with a certain degree of accuracy how the German Army eventually petered out at the gates of major strategic objectives during the Winter of 1941: quote:
2. Tactics. The operations in connection with the establishment and defense of bridgeheads were among the most important tasks of the Eastern campaign, and these duties were assigned quite frequently, particularly to the mobile troops. During the course of the campaign I, myself, together with the troops subordinated to me, have fought in various sectors and more than sixty bridgeheads, not even two which were alike in character. [...] Not one of these bridgeheads even remotely resembled the one at the Luga River, which even my subordinate commanders at first considered to be untenable. The units which arrived subsequently regarded the setup of this bridgehead as absurd, and were quite astonished that it had been possible to hold it under such difficult circumstances. [...] The person writing this was Erhard Raus, CO of 6th Panzer Division, reflecting on one the "case-studies" covered in "Panzers on the Eastern Front: General Erhard Raus and His Panzer Divisions in Russia 1941-1945". Note the remark "more than sixty bridgeheads". That's a lot of battles where elements of a Panzer Division had to fight against massive odds - and come on top due to superior training, command and control. In this case, Raus commanded a KG formed by one panzer battalion, a panzer-grenadier battalion, an artillery battalion, a 50mm AT Gun battery, plus a 88mm battery and a 20mm battery. Against them, Northern Front pitted three militia divisions - probably over 10,000 bayonet strength - hastily recruited and formed in Leningrad, along with elements of a Tank Division. The fight covered the best part of four days. The Soviets forces in all likelihood suffered close to 50% casualties and the Germans about 20% (hence the 15:1 ratio Raus mentions in passing). Indeed, this is just one an example - and far too many operational wargames introduce rules which fit one single example, taking the part as the whole - but I think it's quite instructive. Every bridgehead was different - in terrain, forces involved and outcome (here Raus discusses a successful bridgehead battle, I wonder how many of those 'more than sixty' ended with a German withdrawal). But look at the casualty rates: even if the Luga bridgehead was probably "special" with respect to the perceived "hopelessness" of the endeavour, that's a lot of battles, always conveying significant amounts of tear and wear (in materiel, personnel and psychologically). No wonder the German Army just petered out: their mobile divisions were just hollow hulks by November 1941 after so much fighting and too little rest, refit and resupply. I've yet to see a German Army ragged as the German Army was in any WitE game. Using the Panzer Divisions in the way the Germans did, and given the logistics in the theater, probably that outcome couldn't be avoided (and this is a hint about how poorly was Barbarossa planned from an strategic and operational viewpoint). I'd argue that the same is true for Soviet formations in WitE: the abstractions in time and forces, lead to "battles" which cause in general much less disruption and casualties that they should. How supposedly WitE accounts for the above? By introducing a rule that causes attrition for movement, proportional to the number of hexes traversed by a unit. Let's say it's less than a 1% of the force, and modified by Leader Admin rolls. Is this rule "good enough"? I think it isn't, as one can imagine several ways how players, having perfect knowledge of the rule and the engine, can find a way to reduce its effects to the minimum. The combat engine, the logistics/production system, the terrain (map), the weather and the time granularity are all interconnected - operating on one component to get it "right" will probably require major changes on other parts. This should be accepted as it is, something I think 2by3 has been reluctant to admit. The second dilemma in WitE involves also that of being an 'attrition-theory' game or a 'maneuver-theory' game. WitE is a game of attrition, pure and simple. We move in order to fight, and only rarely - the Germans in 1941 and 1942, or the Soviets in 1943 - one actually fights in order to move. It's all about fighting, fighting and fighting, battle after battle. Sides don't really have any 'critical vulnerability' (either material or moral) which can be attacked and bring a decision at the strategic level (or operational, indeed mass isolation brings about an operational decision, but encirclements in WitE are also magical, since the players have to jump through hoops in order to have a decent chance to break out, and the encircler doesn't really need to divide his forces into an inner and outer ring). VP's are mere window-dressing in campaign games (not in scenarios, which are probably the best WitE has to offer), inconsequential until the very last turn of the game. And fights in WitE are always protrayed to be 'fair' and 'square'. But taking this 'fair & square' approach to its logical consequences would mean that you'll never get to see the German Army accomplishing much, and probably the Third Reich would have been overrun by 1943 in most games. So one introduces rules that give 'magic powers' to the 'most proficient' side. The problem with this 'magic powers' is that they're, by definition, purely magical, not grounded in anything physical and detached from the thing WitE attempts to model. And they get out hand, very much as Mickey Mouse found out in "Fantasia". So we have 'surprise turns', '1:1 -> 2:1' and magical protections conveyed by high levels of experience when units are retreating or being fired upon. How many issues are or have been related to these rules? Especially the latter becomes rather decisive in the later parts of the game: Pelton rightly says Morale is King, and he's right, since Morale is the cap for the magical Experience protection spell. In any case, all the best wishes guys, and I'm hoping to see WitW hit the shelves sooner than later [:)]
|
|
|
|