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Shiva the Destroyer -> RE: Any news from 1.07.14.? (1/25/2014 6:21:23 PM)
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Michael T
quote:
One really important change I would like to see but which I probably never will is a limitation in how many armies can attack at the same time
This is what I really like about Schwerpunkts advanced supply system. You can only put so many units in to attack supply. It limits the offensive capability for both sides. I works really well.
As for Sudden death it does not solve the problems of a Soviet run away in early 41. It needs a check in August/Sept to do that. I asked for it but it did not happen. The SD rules work to prevent a German run in winter 41 and for both sides from that point on. So other means are neccesary to prevent the Soviets running in summer 41. Hence the rail limit. That reduces the factory evac thus forcing the Soviets to fight further forward. Otherwise you could put a HR SD rule in for the Soviets in 41 and leave the rail alone.
A game rail capacity limit (if not a selectable OPTION) would be just as artificial as the 1v1=2v1 and would seriously impair the 'What if' exploration of game play.
The reason for the active forward (offensive) actions of the Red Army in the first few days was because of 3 disastrous Russian High Command Directives issued the first day
To wit:
quote:
First Directive: (ref: The Road to Stalingrad, The Sunday Blow: 22 June 1941 pg. 110)
To Military Soviets Leningrad MD, Baltic MD, Western MD, Kiev MD, Odessa MD.
Copy People's Commissar for the Navy
1. During the course of 22-23.6.41 a surprise attack by the Germans on the fronts of the Leningrad,
Baltic Special, Western Special, Kiev Special and Odessa Military Districts is possible.
2. The assignment of our forces – not to give way to provocative actions of any kind which might
produce major complications. At the same time troops of the Leningrad, Baltic Special, Western
Special, Kiev Special and Odessa Military Districts to be at full combat readiness, to meet a possible
surprise blow by the Germans and their allies.
3, I thereby order:
(a) during the night of 22.6.41 secretly to man the fire-points of the fortified districts (URS) on the
state frontiers;
(b) before dawn on 22.6.41 to disperse all aircraft including military planes among field aerodromes
and thoroughly camouflage the machines;
(c) all units to be brought to a state of readiness. Troops to be held in dispersed form and kept
camouflaged;
(d) air defence forces to be brought to combat readiness without drawing on reservists personnel.
Preparation of all measures to black out cities and installations;
(e) no other measures to be taken without special authorizations
Timoshenko Zhukov
(ref: The Road to Stalingrad, The Sunday Blow: 22 June 1941 pg. 124)
Directive No. 2
22 June 1941 at 04.00 hours in the morning German aircraft without any cause whatsoever carried out flights over aerodromes and towns along the length of the frontier and proceeded to bomb them. Simultaneously in a number of places German troops opened fire with artillery and penetrated the frontier,
In connection with the unprecedented attack by Germany on the Soviet Union, I issue these orders:
1. Troops in full strength and with all means at their disposal will attack the enemy and destroy him in
those places where he has violated the Soviet frontier.
In the absence of special authorization, ground troops will not cross the frontier line.
2. Reconnaissance and attack aircraft will locate the concentration areas of enemy aircraft and the
deployment of his ground forces. Bomber and ground-attack aircraft will destroy with powerful
blows the aircraft on enemy aerodromes and will bomb the main concentrations of his ground
forces. Aviation strikes will be mounted to a depth of 100-150 kilometres in German territory.
Konigsberg and Memel will be bombed.
No flights over Finland and Rumania to take place without special authorization.
(ref: The Road to Stalingrad, The Sunday Blow: 22 June 1941 pg. 132)
Of the nature and extent of this catastrophe 'the centre' seemed to know little or nothing. The Defense Commissariat and the General Staff were painstakenly trying to piece together some of the details. Nevertheless, towards the end of this ghastly day, at 21.15 hours on 22 June 1941 Timoshenko issued the last of the blundering directives,
Directive No. 3, which prescribed nothing less than all three Soviet Fronts taking the offensive. The object was to hurl the German Army back in one massive attack, ending it all with a single blow. The North-Western and Western Fronts, each employing their rifle divisions plus two mechanized corps, were to mount coordinated operations from Kaunas and Grodno, thus carrying the war on to enemy territory and by the evening of 24 June – having encircled and destroyed the enemy – would occupy the Suwalki area. Front operations would be supported by the long-range bomber force (ADD), The South-Western Front was ordered to use 5th and 6th Armies supported by 'several' mechanized corps to destroy with 'concentric blows' those enemy forces operating on the Vladimir-Volynsk/Krystonopol front and by the evening of 24 June the Soviet force would invest the area of Lublin, having also 'secured itself' from the direction of Cracow and simultaneously defending the state frontier with Hungary. On the flanks of the Soviet-German front Red Army troops were restricted to 'defensive assignments', covering the state frontier and preventing enemy penetrations.
What is really needed is OPTIONAL Command/Control movement limitations for those units originally attached to the Northern Front, Northwestern Front, Southern Front, and Southwestern Front commands. This might include NO rail move capability for those specifically attached units for the first turn or so.
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