Operation SF Scenario (Full Version)

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Symon -> Operation SF Scenario (8/19/2014 5:29:53 PM)

Very grainy, Bn/Rgt sized scenario taken from the actual operational orders. This scenario (as will the others) has specific HRs and Victory conditions, as set forth in the Scen Instructions; there's no penalty for ignoring them except the knowledge that one had to cheat to get her done.

Premise of the Scen is Yamamoto was talked into letting the op go forward in advance of his desired Midway strategy. If the US fleet could be lured to destruction in the SEPac region, so much the better. If Japan got, at least, a foothold in these regions, then a thrust at Midway would be viewed more seriously and would certainly bring out the "rump" of the US Fleet to be appropriately crushed. Ok, this requires some abstract thinking on the part of the actual prticipants, but it's not too far outside the box. So ... without further adoo, here's the actual IJ Op Orders for SF.

**Army–Navy central agreement concerning operations in New Caledonia, Fijian islands, and Samoan islands areas
No. 1 Operational objective
Invade key locations in the area of New Caledonia and the islands of Fiji and Samoa. In addition to strengthening the blockade between the United States and Australia, the operation will smash enemy plans to counter-attack from that region.
No 2 Operational policy
1. The invasion of key locations in the area of New Caledonia and the islands of Fiji and Samoa will be executed by the army and navy in cooperation.
2. Maintain mastery over the enemy fleet and air strength. First, undertake a surprise attack at New Caledonia. Then undertake surprise landings on the islands of Fiji and Samoa by invading key locations such as Noumea, Suva, and Pago Pago.
3. Mopping-up operations will be conducted within the islands after such key locations as Noumea, Suva, and Pago Pago have been invaded, then the surrounding islands will be subjugated at an appropriate juncture.
4. The army and navy will cooperate to secure key locations after the invasion of New Caledonia and Fiji. The navy will then proceed with the establishment of an operational base. After the invasion of key areas of Samoa, either destroy various military installations and withdraw, or secure the area.
No. 3 Command and unit deployment
Army
Command: 17th Army headquarters
Strength: main force of 17th Army
Navy
Command: 2nd Fleet headquarters
Strength: force based on 1st Air Fleet of the 2nd Fleet
No. 4 Operational preparations
1. The main strength of naval units will assemble at Truk.
2. After the majority strength of army units have assembled at Davao, they proceed to the staging point by way of Palau.
3. Elements of army units at Rabaul will assemble and stand to and undertake preparations for the operation.
No. 5 Staging point
New Caledonia (Operation NK) offensive units will assemble at Rabaul.
Fiji (Operation FI) offensive units will assemble at Truk.
Samoa (Operation SA) offensive units will assemble at Truk.
No. 6 Operational commencement
At an appropriate time according to the situation of the Combined Fleet operations.

**Army–Navy central agreement concerning the Port Moresby Operation
No. 1 Operational objective
Invade Port Moresby, destroy enemy offensive positions in eastern New Guinea, and bring the Coral Sea under control.
No. 2 Operational policy
At an appropriate opportunity during the operations against New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa, the army and navy will cooperate to land near Port Moresby and invade and secure the surrounding area.
No. 3 Command and unit deployment
Army
Command: 17th Army Headquarters
Strength: elements of the 17th Army
Navy
Command: 4th Fleet Headquarters
Strength: force based on 4th Fleet : elements of the 11th Air Fleet will participate in this operation.
No. 4 Operational preparations
1. Army units will assemble in Davao, then proceed to the operation staging point.
2. The navy will use an appropriate force (including units not assigned to the actual operation) to protect the transport of the army units to the staging point.
No. 5 Staging point
Port Moresby (Operation MO) offensive units will assemble at Rabaul.
No. 6 Operational commencement
The operation will begin at an appropriate time after the start of the New Caledonia operation and prior to the start of the Fiji and Samoa operations.



Big B -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/20/2014 2:13:40 PM)

Sounds fascinating John [8D]



derhexer -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/20/2014 6:50:46 PM)

I'm excited just reading about this fascinating scenario. [X(] Go for it and thanks!![:D]



Symon -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/20/2014 7:33:58 PM)

Well, much of this came from Bergeron and Parshall & Tully. Their thoughts and takes on the strategic decisions and mistakes made during this period got me thinking. Then looking at the Japanese plans (Army and Navy) got me itching. Then reading the diaries of the participants got me motivated. Did this as a quick-and-dirty for the PA group, but it got out to TX and CA and they wanted more. Who am I to complain. Here’s the historical background.

IJ is expanding, they recognized the importance of controlling the Coral Sea and just went for it; on-the-jump, as it were. They got whacked at Coral Sea, which became as defining a moment as the Doolittle Raid. Strategically, SF much more to recommend it: the Army was on board, it furthered Japan’s war aims of forcing an Allied disengagement, it protected Japan’s initial conquests, and it could be cheap in the great scheme of things.

[Bergeron’s Opinion] It would certainly have postponed or perhaps even prevented the formation/build-up/offensive posture, of the SoPac and SWPac Theaters.

Everything was running in favor of SF. Adm Inouye Shigeyoshi was strongly in favor of SF over Midway. He considered Midway a dead end, with no strategic value beyond the (desired, hoped for, wished for, assumed) destruction of the US Fleet. Other than that, Midway was worthless as an objective.

[JWE’s Opinion] Inouye was one Japan’s best and brightest strategic minds. He was a protégé and confidant of Yamamoto. His diaries read like a fast-forward prediction of what actually happened, along with extensive entries about how some of the worst disasters could have been prevented. Required reading in the Naval Academies. Recommended reading for wargamers.

The arguments between SF and Midway were long and often violent. According to Japanese records, the Army was gaining the best of the argument, until Yamamoto made his famous implication to resign unless Midway went off. Here’s where my alt-history departs, and the seminal point/man is Inouye Shigeyoshi.

He’d heard enough and saw things were getting out of hand and that people were getting backed up against a wall that they really didn’t want to get to. So he took leave, went to Tokyo, grabbed his buddy, and snagged Chiyoko Kawai, and a few of her friends, and retired to a geisha house in the highlands (I forget if it was in Gunma or Tochigi) for a period of relaxation, entertainment, sport, and discussion.

He finally talked Yamamoto into considering Op SF as something that would pull the US carriers into a theater that was ripe for a major Operaton. Something that would do the same thing that Midway was designed to do, but would do it with a certain degree of Army support, and with Navy support in the margins.

Perhaps tomorrow, the Midway Operation can go forward, but with serious reductions of the US Fleet, from SF Operations, the “rump’ of the US Fleet in PH, cannot but offer itself up as a ‘sacrifice’ to the Imperial Fleet. Everyone gets what they want and Yamamoto doesn’t have to resign if he doesn’t want to. Yammy bought in, and the rest is history.

[8D][8D] JWE



DanSez -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/20/2014 9:06:54 PM)

Great news.
I have been playing a number of the short scenarios and would greatly appreciate new and interesting additions.

(reference to Parshall & Tully)
I am about 2/3rd way thru Shattered Sword and agree it opens up an interesting what-if concerning internal politics and decision process going into Midway. Everyone who plays this game (WitPAE) should read it.

forgive my ignorance -- to what book/reference are you referring to by: Bergeron's Opinion

I am always looking for good reading material and if it is on the level of Shattered Sword, I want to get a copy.
Thanks in advance...







Barb -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/21/2014 7:06:44 AM)

Would be great scenario... :)
What time frame it should be ? May - December 1942?



Symon -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/21/2014 12:29:59 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: DanSez
forgive my ignorance -- to what book/reference are you referring to by: Bergeron's Opinion

My bad, get dyslexic at times [8D]. That should be Bergerud, as in:
Bergerud, Eric, Fire in the Sky, Ch.1, Defining the Battlefield, pp 42, 43, Westview Press, Boulder CO, 2001
Some good stuff in there.



Don Bowen -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/21/2014 12:37:12 PM)

Looking forward to this one John.

There's also some very interesting discussion in John B. Lundstrom's The First South Pacific Campaign. An older book, recently re-released.



Symon -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/21/2014 12:39:17 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Barb
Would be great scenario... :)
What time frame it should be ? May - December 1942?

12 months or so, May 15, 1942 to May 15 1943.



Symon -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/21/2014 3:49:31 PM)

Ok, we had to tweak the IJ OOB to make this work, so we used the paradigm of the DEI conquest. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Base Forces became the 1x, 2x, 3x, Special BFs. So what to do with the Op SF BFs. Well, we worked out a schema where a partial set would come from 6th BF (4th Fleet) in Kwajalein, and result in 61, 62, and 63 "Special" BFs for purpose of the Ops in SW Pac. Then, Ops in SWPac against New Cal, would come under 8th Fleet and the designated BFs would be 8x Special.

We try our best to make things as real as they could have been. Japanese historians are welcome, and encouraged, to comment.



ny59giants -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/21/2014 4:27:03 PM)

Where can the SCEN files be found?? I didn't see them on DBB website.



spence -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/21/2014 10:24:38 PM)

Since a REAL base at Truk was something of an IJN "Pipe Dream" will the IJN be given lots of supply to run this whole affair on? IRL keeping the divsion(-) in New Guineau and the divison(+) on Guadalcanal proved to be way too heavy a burden for the base at Rabaul it would seem that the IJN needs to be given something to justify Allied fears of what they might do.



derhexer -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/22/2014 4:28:41 PM)

This could be exciting. The Japanese will have a long supply line that will be vulnerable to sub attacks. Eventually the bases at Noumea Suva and Pago Pago may become isolated and starving. The Japanese could allocate a large part of their resources to ASW operations.

If you build this on one of the may 1942 campaign games then the Allies could distract Japanese efforts by attacking in China or invading Burma.



Symon -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/24/2014 7:01:35 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: spence
Since a REAL base at Truk was something of an IJN "Pipe Dream" will the IJN be given lots of supply to run this whole affair on?

Speaking of "Pipe Dreams", here's what was at Truk in March '42. The "Pearl Harbor of the Pacific" had darn near as many total Naval troops as the Main Navy Bldg on Oahu the morning of PH. An entire Japanese base, that was smaller than the comtemporary US PacFleet HQ establishment, frightened the crap out of our military planners. Going forward to 1945, the "Field Survey of Truk's Defenses" Geiger, Marshall, Peterson, USA/N/MC, by direction; has pretty much the same organization, but there was some Navy reinforcement and a ton of Army units that all came in, in the late '44, '45 time frame.

So the "real" Truk base in March of 1942, was as follows: The numbers are Officers : Warrants : Ranks ; Civilians -- unit total

41st Naval Gd Unit – 61 : 29 : 1680 : 155 civ -- 1925
4th Port & Dock Unit – 11 : 1 : 200 : 158 civ – 370
4th Nav Transp Unit – 11 : 2 : 74 : 612 civ – 699
4th Construction Unit – 24 : 5 : 474 : 31 civ – 534
4th NavCivEng Dept – 20 : 15 : 70 : 9293 civ – 9398**
104th Nav Air Depot – 6 : 1 : 20 : 547 civ – 574
17th Ku’tai Av Support – 9 : 2 : 224 : 5 civ – 240
85th Sub Base Unit – 6 : 2 : 71 : 36 civ – 115

148 Off, 56 WO, 2813 OR, 10837 Civilians
Civilians are not called out in Japanese records. They are listed simply as non-Military personnel, and include everything from Civil Engineers, civilian airframe and motor mechanics, barge operators and harbor facility stevedores/maintenance/repair technicians, to Korean, Chinese and Native laborers.
** this number went up and down because it was the source of various Naval Construction Units that were sent hither and yon. The NCUs sent to Guadalcanal came from this pool. For example, the designations of 10th and 13th Construction Units, was for convenience of intendance, and had little basis in OOB organizational structure.

The 85th Sub Base was just like the one on Kwajalein. It wasn’t a Sub Base in the US sense. It was nothing more than an R&R facility for sub crews, with a minimal facility for rearming torpedoes from minimal stocks in caves above the single pier. The “real” sub base was whatever AS happened to be in town at the moment. 85th had some civilian welders that could do some pipefitting and some surface arc welding, but had no capability whatsoever for deep welds.

At Truk, the Harbor Dept (Nav Transp and Ports & Docks Unit) was formed by taking over the facilities and personnel of the South Seas Company, wholesale. There were minimal repair facilities at Truk in the beginning, and they remained minimal throughout the entire war period. At it’s best, Truk could fix up topside damage on a destroyer. But didn’t have the repair facilities to do a complete job. From the beginning of the war, to the end, all she could do was fix ‘em up good enough to get home to Japan.

[ed] Oh jeez, you guys want sources, so :
Senshi Sosho, IJM, Vol. 4, Kato, 14 Part, Coox A.D., San Diego
Field Survey - Japanese Defenses, Truk, CINCPAC - CINCPOA, Mar 15, 1946.
Japanese Monographs, vol 116, Chf Mil Hist, Dept of Army



PaxMondo -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/25/2014 3:52:51 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Symon

The “real” sub base was whatever AS happened to be in town at the moment.
...

At it’s best, ... all she could do was fix ‘em up good enough to get home to Japan.


Which pretty much sums up all IJ bases outside of Japan, and gets back to shortage of skilled labor in all categories ... they had shortages in the HI ... they definitely couldn't afford to ship any out to the field.


As you allude, the US feared Truk far more than they needed to, but only because they knew it was the major IJN base in the SoPAC so they assumed it had to have everything that an equivalent US base would have. Of course, it didn't have any where near that ....

I have to admit, this was prolly one of the most difficult balancing tasks that you devs faced: how do keep the IJ competitive as it actually was when everything is known with 20/20 hindsight? You guys at Henderson and Gary's original team did a great job with that ...

[&o][&o][&o]



oldman45 -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/25/2014 4:28:25 PM)

This is also what makes studying history as much fun as it is. All my life and everything I read I thought Truk to be a major base. Now I found out it was just a pier with buildings..... This right up there when I found out that all the books I had that were written by Charles Oman needed to be used as a starting point and not gospel.



derhexer -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/25/2014 5:08:20 PM)

quote:

I have to admit, this was prolly one of the most difficult balancing tasks that you devs faced: how do keep the IJ competitive as it actually was when everything is known with
20/20 hindsight? You guys at Henderson and Gary's original team did a great job with that ...


Playing wargames is much like reading fiction - you have to suspend your disbelief to enjoy it. As you are moving your troops and fighting your battles you know that you
are not Patton or Yamamoto. But, a good designer can give you an idea of the problems that they faced as they fought their campaigns.
A poor designer slaps you in the face with something that is so unhistorical and unrealistic that you walk away berating yourself for having
bought that piece of whatever.

I'm not Nimitz, but I can feel his problems as he plans invasions - gathering ships, troops and supplies, deciding what forces to use, etc.

Go with your scenario design. I'll play it because I want to see how Nimitz deals with this problem, and how Yamamoto deals with his supply an shipping issues.



Symon -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/25/2014 8:39:39 PM)

Well, then, we finally got a handle on the make-up of IJN forces in the period of interest. Got a full reading on the OOBs of the various fleets and base forces. Yes, the image is missing the 3rd and 5th BFs, but we have them; it was getting a bit long and they weren’t all that relevant to the SF operation. The OOBs come from primary Japanese sources and include detail such as individual commissioned Naval vessels and designation of auxiliary divisions of gunboats, sub-chasers, mine-sweepers. These last are usually in groups of 2 or 3 and can be abstracted very easily. The commissioned sub-chasers and gunboats are listed by name. Good stuff.

Going through the sources, I found some interesting things. 8th Base Force (8th Fleet) didn’t come into being in July of ’42. Rather, it began life as 8th Special Base Force, under command of 4th Fleet, on Feb 1, ’42 for the New Britain (Rabaul) operations. This SpBF included much of the nucleus of the 8th BF, and was formally redesignated upon establishment of 8th Fleet in July; but it was operationally in place for a time before that.

The whole business of SNLFs vs NGUs would take a book. Suffice to say they were fungible in many respects and one became the other in increasing frequency. One may come to their own conclusions, of course [;)][;)]
[image]local://upfiles/43462/DBBAE1BA793743EAA5F347285E70C4DB.jpg[/image]



Symon -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/31/2014 5:47:20 PM)

Well, we’re getting darn close. I have Aus, NZ, and the US set up according to the actual placement of units as of June 1, 1942. There’s a couple US divisions (and regiments) floating around, but beware !! they are callow, untrained, and inexperienced. Throw these regiments into the fight too early, and they will get their heads handed to them by smaller, highly experienced, and well led Japanese units. If you simply count battalions, you will get your winkie whacked.

I’ve seen US units judiciously used as sacrificial forlorn hopes, to slow the Japanese advance at the expense of a counter-punch capability (spoiler hint). Even the 1st MarDiv units arrive with Springfields and way less experience than in the campaign scenarios. It’s basically a back-alley, lights-out, free for all. And there’s a good opportunity for a Midway type engagement for both sides.

As with the land forces, the Naval forces are reduced in scope. There’s no 900lb KB gorilla stomping around. Carriers are in CarDivs (J) or TFs (US). And there’s reinforcement from here and there and whenever, so a Midway result, by either side, won’t end the scenario; as always we believe in equal opportunity [8D]

Ciao, JWE



drw61 -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/31/2014 8:08:24 PM)

John, thanks for doing this one. It sounds like a real challenge

Daryl



Don Bowen -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (8/31/2014 11:32:01 PM)


If I recall my Lundstrom, the original Japanese plan was to use only Kaga and Shoho. Is that in line with what you have?



Symon -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (9/1/2014 2:00:58 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Don Bowen
If I recall my Lundstrom, the original Japanese plan was to use only Kaga and Shoho. Is that in line with what you have?

Hi Don. Not quite [8D]

The revised plan has some of the same features and operational assumptions as the Midway Op, including a very high degree of complexity. It too functions as a lure for the “remnants” of the US Fleet. So Nagumo’s Striking Force is in play. However, the objectives are spread out along a line of almost 2400 nautical miles. CarDiv 5 is out of action for a while. Shokaku needs major repairs, Zuikaku needs planes and aircrews after Coral Sea. However, one can’t be complaisant.

The obvious Japanese solution is to hit everything, linked together with exquisite timing [;)].

New Cal (NK) goes off first, with 1st Striking Fleet (CarDiv 1) providing area air support. Since Shoho was sunk at Coral Sea, Zuiho is with 1st Covering Fleet, providing direct air to the invasion units. This operational arm then moves directly against Port Moresby (MO), before redeploying to support the FI and SA phases, and ambush the US Fleet.

Samoa (SA) and Fiji (FI) jump off at the other end of the line, while NK/MO is wrapping up but still running. 2nd Striking Fleet (CarDiv 2) provides area air support and Ryujo is with 2nd Covering Fleet, providing direct air to the invasion units.

It’s a hammer and anvil. Smash and grab New Cal and MO to get everybody’s attention and pin the Australian based ships. Then set up the anvil on the SA/FI line, with 2nd Striking Fleet, while 1st Striking Fleet plays hammer. The unsuspecting American Fleet will sail into the open jaws of the tiger and be instantly annihilated [;)].

At least, that’s the plan. Beauty isn’t it?



Don Bowen -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (9/1/2014 2:08:30 PM)


Beauty indeed John, and I'm really looking forward to it.

Went back to the books and re-read the plans. The Kaga/Shoho combination was for the original Solomons invasion, scheduled for around June 1st until the Midway operation had not been approved.

Memory, they say, is the second thing to go.




Symon -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (9/1/2014 2:24:56 PM)

Had to do it this way because there’s just too many US carriers available. There’s Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown kinda good to go at Pearl. Saratoga arrives June 6 (maybe). TF-37 with Wasp, North Carolina, Quincy, San Juan, etc.. arrives late June, early July (maybe).

That’s 5 fleet carriers vs 4 fleet and 2 light carriers with the possibility of a 5th (Zuikaku) getting in on the action at some time. All spread apart in both space and time. Seemed like a good way to balance things out.



Don Bowen -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (9/1/2014 3:26:06 PM)

John, I think you are absolutely right.

Lundstrom emphasizes the problems with US intelligence detecting the berthing assignments for major Japanese fleet units at Truk just before Midway. The berthing assignments were for AFTER the battle of Midway, of course, but in late May, 1942 they confused US Intelligence. Central Pacific Intelligence read the Midway portents correctly but King's boys in Washington read them as indications of a major thrust into the South Pacific INSTEAD of Central Pacific.

If Midway has gone as planned for the Japanese, it would be Kaga, Agaki, Hiryu, Soryu, and supporting ships back in the South Pacific. With, as you say, maybe Zuikaku.



Symon -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (9/1/2014 4:31:49 PM)

That’s what makes this one so much fun. In this scenario, Midway is scheduled as a mop-up after SF, so the portents and entrails will look very different. Assuming Joe Rochefort stirs the entrails right and sacrifices enough chickens, there’s an opportunity or two for Nimitz in this one.

If CinCPac has a good indication as to the Japanese operational axis maybe Nimitz can spring some traps his own self. Maybe re-redeploy a carrier TF or two into the Coral Sea area in anticipation; say Enterprise and Hornet? That would be 2 on 2 ½ and under the principles of calculated risk, this doesn’t sound too bad. If based Westerly, on OZ, it would tactically pin the IJ carriers to the western end of their op area (instead of the other way round as the Japanese plan assumes). Sort of a Coral Sea reprise.

And then still bust the hump getting Lady Lex ready. Soon as Sara shows up there’s another couple carrier TFs to do another 2 on 2 ½ at the other end of the op line. So the left Japanese jaw is engaged and pinned (and maybe hurt some) while the right jaw is engaged (and maybe hurt some) all by its own self. Unless some bad things happen.

Strangely enough, the timing seems to be a mirror image of the IJ O-Plan. Imagine that !! [:D] That is, if everything goes according to plan. But I hear that Adm Murphy is off the sick list and will be taking a personal interest in these operations.

Ciao. JWE



Symon -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (9/1/2014 7:17:29 PM)

Couple friends are out visiting from Malaysia with their wives and are asking about this Labor Day thing. Now they are not muslim, but pork and beef just doesn’t float their boat, if ya know what I mean. So I went totally eclectic.

Hors d’oeuvres are So American empenadas with an Asian filling. Then Hunan style orange chicken on Basmati rice, with grilled broccoli and peaches. For some salsa, we got Greek tatziki, with seeded cucumber, seeded tomato, green onion and daikon radish, in a traditional tatziki sauce, but with rice wine vinegar; and yeah, only greek style yogurt.

Desert is an Afghan style Gajar Ka Halwa with very black Turkish coffee, medium sweet.

Ciao. JWE



Don Bowen -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (9/2/2014 11:11:39 PM)


Some really good Chilean wine and a puruse of Lundstorm's The First South Pacific Campaign.

He makes the point that both the US and Japan had three separate planning groups and each group "planned" similarly to it's counterpart.

US Pacific Fleet and Combined Fleet were both concentrated on the Central Pacific.
Pacific Fleet recognized the importance of the Hawaiian Islands and were prepared to commit major resources to defend it.
Combined Fleet recognized the importance of the Hawaiian Islands to the US and calculated that a thrust into Hawaiian waters would precipitate the major fleet action that was so desired.

Japanese Naval Staff and the US CNO recognized the importance of the South Pacific and particularly the sea routes between the US and Australia.
The Japanese wanted to cut those sea routes to knock Australia out of the war and prevent an allied counter attack from there.
The US needed to protect access to Australia and intended to generate a counter attack back up the New Guinea/Philippines route.

Both the US and Japanese armies basically had their heads up their asses.
The US was obsessed with a cross channel invasion of Europe in 1942 and were willing to starve the Pacific to accomplish it.
The Japanese were obsessed with Russia and reserved it's major strength for future combat in Mongolia and Siberia.

The Japanese general staff caved to Yamamoto's resignation threat and commit to the disastrous Midway operation.
The US used message intercepts to prepare for the Japanese thrust and got a bit lucky in so completely defeating it.

There after the South Pacific came to the forefront until Japan was fully on the defensive.

Both armies continued to watch their ileocecal valves function until 1944.



oldman45 -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (9/3/2014 12:45:10 AM)

You made me look up ileocecal valve, wish I hadn't know. It's amazing what you can learn on this website. [;)]

John, that looked like one hell of a menu. Got me hungry reading it.



Symon -> RE: Operation SF Scenario (9/4/2014 7:30:48 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Don Bowen
Some really good Chilean wine and a puruse of Lundstorm's The First South Pacific Campaign.

Only way to go my friend.
quote:

Both armies continued to watch their ileocecal valves function until 1944.

Ain't that just the truth.

@Oldman45, I didn't look up ileocecal valve function because, knowing Don, I figured it was going to be something wet, blurpy, and stinky. I'm pretty old myself and the last thing I need is some other body part to worry about [:D]

I was re-reading, in Matloff & Snells, "Strategic Planning, 1941-42", some of the colloquy between Marshall, King, Arnold, Mac, Nimitz, Curtin, Churchill, and the San Diego Zoo, about the Jan-May 1942 time frame and the allocations finally made to the Pacific. My Gosh, how quickly actual events displace the best [sic] made plans. It looks as if things are going to be a bit thinner in the OZ/South/SWPac area than they are in the Guadalcanal Scen.

41st ID was in place in OZ, and was 'fairly' well trained. 32nd ID arrived in April/May, but didn't have a clue, and they were still swapping out their War-I weapons and had never even seen half the stuff they were 'equipped' with. And lots of the reinforcement plans would have to go by the boards. For example, 37th ID (-) was on ships for Fiji at the end of May, but whoops ... Just gonna have to trust me on this one [:D]

This one is hard. Japan had a bit more available than the planned 9 Bns, while Allied forces on the ground at the objectives were nowhere near sufficient (except perhaps New Cal) in the narrow window of opportunity. Reinforcement comes both from the US and Japan. Reinforcement schedules are in line with actuals, but dates and availability locations will vary.

Ciao. JWE [8D]



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