Re: Re: To MDIEHL

Re: Re: To MDIEHL (Full Version)

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Tanaka -> Re: Re: To MDIEHL (4/9/2003 4:42:54 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by TIMJOT [B][QUOTE]Originally posted by Mike Scholl ------------------------------------------------- In truth, about the only place in the Pacific Basin that Kido Butai COULD have sailed un-noticed in December 1941 was the North Central Pacific. Anywhere else would have been noticed by civilian shipping if not by military reccon -------------------------------------------------- Not entirely true. I believe Kondo's Southern Covering Force; 2BBs, 7 CAs and dozen or so DDs2 managed to sail south undetected. Part of the transport force was spotted, but even with that, heading and intent could not be determined. So its plausible that Kido Butai could sail south undetected. It also could very easily sailed to the Mandates ( No civ. shipping allowed) via the Bonin's and lie in wait under the protection of the many anchorages and airfields to ambush a sorte of the Pac Fleet. Not a bad plan if you consider Kimmels op plan called for the Pac Fleet to conduct a sweeping raid through the Mandates at the start of hostilities. There are a myriad of other possibities that I wont get into. but the point is, it isnt as PH is a slam dunk. Many in the IJN and IJA were against it including key commanders like Kondo and Nagumo. It was an incredible gamble concieved by a degenerate gambler. In the end it almost completely failed achieve any of its stated goals. Rainbow 5 had much more to do with restraining the USN than the tactically insignificant losses a PH. (quote)Mike Scholl ----------------------------------------------- Taking the Carriers south to the Philippines or Malaya would help those campaigns---but it would be virtually impossible to achieve the suprise of Pearl Harbor. Which should trigger some possibility of Western reaction. ----------------------------------------------- Yes and No. If you mean they couldnt have achieved strategic surprise, then I agree. The allies expected them to attack Malaya and the Philipines, but they certainly could and did achieve tactical surprise. [/B][/QUOTE] Very well put!!!

mdiehl -> (4/9/2003 5:08:58 AM)
[QUOTE]Yes and No. If you mean they couldnt have achieved strategic surprise, then I agree. The allies expected them to attack Malaya and the Philipines, but they certainly could and did achieve tactical surprise.[/QUOTE] In the PI, the achievment of "tactical surprise" was an accident that had nothing to do with Japanese operational planning beyond putting the a/c in the air.

TIMJOT -> (4/9/2003 11:55:09 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl [B]In the PI, the achievment of "tactical surprise" was an accident that had nothing to do with Japanese operational planning beyond putting the a/c in the air. [/B][/QUOTE] The question was not HOW but WOULD they achieve tactical surprise. That being said. I would say it was endemic more than accident. I know very well the chain of events that lead to the FEAF being caught on the ground at Clark. The false alarms, the poor comunications, undecipline comand and control, even plain bad luck. That doesnt change the FACT that the Japanese achieved complete TACTICAL SURPRISE over both Clark and Iba fields. That there had been no warning of their immediate approach and, the first wave was almost at the release line when they were sighted. Is by definition acheiving tactical surprise.

mdiehl -> Timjot (4/9/2003 9:58:32 PM)
Look, I know you're pretty well informed. I think the point where we differ is the nature of the "endemic" part. The Clark/Nichols raid was the first of many "tactical surprise" airstrikes delivered by both sides in the PTO. The Allies were not particularly more vulnerable to this sort of thing than the Japanese. As Allied radar sets became more common, the Allies became particularly less vulnerable.

panda124c -> (4/10/2003 9:10:23 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl [B] Incorrect. Assuming even that the Japanese hit the fuel facilities (which they can do with or withut PacFleet there and which history shows them unable or unwilling to fathom since they did not do so), you're looking at an immediate limitation on the number of ships that can be fueled from PH based on the number of auxiliary tankers that can be brought to service in the area. Fuel tanks are, of themselves, notoriously difficult to set alight; it'd require extensive use of both HE and incendiaries, so any Jpns strike aimed at the fuel tanks loses all anti-ship capability against armored vessels. Even then, all that has been accomplished is essentially to destroy some gigantic fuel drums. Fuel storage tanks could have been completely replaced and refilled withing three months. There were no other strategically vulnerable assets at PH. About the only way that Japan could have shut down PH for a significant period of time would have been to scuttle Yamato and Musashi at the harbor entrance.[/B][/QUOTE] Except for repair facilities (limited yes but much closer than the West Coast), command and control, air bases (used as a staging area for long range AC), training facilities and sub bases. [QUOTE] Incorrect. For Japan to contest the HI (which was heavily garrisoned) they'd need to cancel all ops against the PI and Malaya in order to have sufficient transports and supply train to sustain such an operation. Even then, that does not guarantee a successful conquest of Honolulu, never mind any of the other islands in the HI island chain. If the Jpns get a foothold in the HI, what they then have is an isolated outpost of Japanese units that have to rely on having 6 Jpn carriers permanently stationed en location in order to provide air cover. In these circumstances the US merely has to ramp up other airbases in the region (a matter of a few weeks tops), move in US air units, and let the attrition begin. It'd be the worst sort of tar baby the Japanese could possibly stick their hands or feet into. It'd be like Guadalcanal, except that there would be forty "Henderson Fields" rather than just one, and no Japanese land based air would be able to operate in the area. In these circumstances, none of the 6 PH strike carriers would likely live past February 1942. [/B][/QUOTE] Any changes in the disposition of major US fleet elements would require Japan to re-think their initial moves. [QUOTE] Japan had no idea of where the US CVs were and had no guarantee that the rest of PacFleet would be, for example, in harbor on 7 December rather than smashing into their flank. Frankly, most of the people who fantasize about what more Japan might have accomplished near the HI during the first week of the war seem to lack any real grasp of the extreme risk that Japan assumed. [/B][/QUOTE] Japan was well aware of the location of the US Fleet units. Their traing facalites for the PH attack were almost 100% correct in name and location. They missed the CV because they moved just before the attack.

mdiehl -> pbear (4/10/2003 10:14:22 PM)
[QUOTE]Except for repair facilities (limited yes but much closer than the West Coast), command and control, air bases (used as a staging area for long range AC), training facilities and sub bases.[/QUOTE] That is true, but all of these facilities are, if anything, even less vulnerable to air attack than the oil storage tanks. "Command and control" amounts to personnel and electronics and office equipment. Unless Japan invades the island, they're not going to be effective in eliminating or substantially reducing these assets. "Air bases" are buildings, fuel facilities and ground equipment: all easily replaced in a fortnight. With respect to air bases Japan historically hit the most vulnerable target and the most difficult one to replace: aircraft. Runway damage is the sort of thing that US can fix in a few hours or less. US submarine "bases" were tenders and machine shops. The tenders could have been attacked but these were, again, easily replaced. The most effective thing that Japan could have done to the submarines would have been to determine, if they could, where the torpedoes were stored and blow those up. Kido Butai would have been much less likely to achieve this than a well planned saboteur effort. Machine shops, and the other "repair facilities" that you mention are also easily replaced and in any case not vulnerable to the, frankly, low intensity raid that Kido Butai could muster on its best day. For an understanding of how difficult it is to knock out a machine shop or repair facility for a long time, consider the effort that USAAF 8th AF devoted to assaulting the Me and ball bearing facilities. More tonnage dropped squarely on some of these factories by B17s in single raids than all the planes in Kido Butai could drop if they exhausted all the stores on their CVs. The US in 1941 did not maintain substantial training facilities in PH, and of those in and around Oahu, even if all had been shut down and never reopened it would not have affected US training schedules in the slightest. [QUOTE]Any changes in the disposition of major US fleet elements would require Japan to re-think their initial moves.[/QUOTE] Assuming that they knew about such changes, quite so. Similarly, any changes in Japanese disposition of forces preparatory to different (ahistorical) initial moves might be countered by different deployments of US assets, fleet-wise and otherwise. [QUOTE]Japan was well aware of the location of the US Fleet units. [/QUOTE] Japan was not well aware of the locations of US fleet units. They assumed they knew where the US CVs were, and they were wrong. Considering that the CVs were the highest priority target, despite all the success against parked battleships, the raid achieved much less than Jpns op planners had hoped. Japan was well aware of the layout of PH. It's easy to be correct about which berth will be occupied by, for ex, USS California, because that berth was California's permanent station. Japan could not know, [I]a priori[/I], that California would be in that berth on 7 Dec, because the possibility existed that CA would be at sea at the time of the strike, just as the US CVs were. [QUOTE]They missed the CV because they moved just before the attack.[/QUOTE] Japan missed three CVs that were not in harbor where Jpn expected them to be. They did not know where these CVs were, and did not know where they were going. This observation is one of the reasons why I think folks who play monday morning quarterback to Nagumo, arguing that Nagumo should have launched a third wave of strikes, really don't have any knowledge of carrier warfare or of strategic logistics. A third wave could have achieved no significant additional strategic damage at PH, and would have left Kido Butai vulnerable to a potential flanking attack from up to three US CVs. There is an old AH game, [I]Victory in the Pacific.[/I] It has varied starting positions for the US CVs. The game appeals to Axis fanboys because often the US CVs are more vulnerable than they historically were. Sometimes, however, it happens that the two or three US CVs are together and location unknown. Then the Axis fanboys whine and simper because, whilst they pound PacFleet in PH, 2-3US CVs worth of aircraft sink four or five Jpns carriers. A disaster from the outset. This, however, is a highly realistic version of alt history, and its possibility gives more credibility to Nagumo's decision to leave than to any other course of action. A surprise attack from even one US CV might well sink three Japanese CVs. The US would probably then lose the 1 CV to a counter strike, but those sorts of trades are trades that the US can afford to make.

Yamamoto -> Re: pbear (4/10/2003 11:28:09 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl [B]Japan was not well aware of the locations of US fleet units. They assumed they knew where the US CVs were. [/B][/QUOTE] The Japanese assumed that the CVs would be in port on Sunday because they had been in port all other SUndays for MONTHS. The fact that they were ordered to remain at sea that weekend only leands more eveidence to support the belief that the president knw about the attack before it happened. [QUOTE][B] A surprise attack from even one US CV might well sink three Japanese CVs. The US would probably then lose the 1 CV to a counter strike, but those sorts of trades are trades that the US can afford to make. [/B][/QUOTE] An attack by 1 CV against 6 CVs would probably result in every attacking plane getting shot down and the attacking CV sunk. We've all seen it happen enough in UV. Any CV vs CV battle in December of 1941 would have been a disaster for teh US, barring some divine intervention ala Midway. Yamamoto

mdiehl -> (4/10/2003 11:41:46 PM)
[QUOTE]The Japanese assumed that the CVs would be in port on Sunday because they had been in port all other SUndays for MONTHS.[/QUOTE] Incorrect. I recommend you visit records of US CV troms. IN any case it illustrates my point exactly. Japan could not be certain where at any given time any American ship could be. Just like every other combatant, they could only operate on the basis of their most current intel and their best guess as to how the situation might conceivably differ from their intel. Frankly, Japan's capability for tracking US ship movements was woefully underdeveloped, and almost completely dependent on visual observation. Their true talent for overlooking the obvious was only made plain at Midway (where the US telegraphed the move in so many ways that the failure of the submarine based aerial recon missions was just the last failure in a string of intel failures). [QUOTE]An attack by 1 CV against 6 CVs would probably result in every attacking plane getting shot down and the attacking CV sunk. We've all seen it happen enough in UV. Any CV vs CV battle in December of 1941 would have been a disaster for teh US, barring some divine intervention ala Midway.[/QUOTE] I was talking about historically realistic outcomes. A surprise attack by even 1 US CV while Kido Butai is involved in launching or recovering a/c from the PH strikes would likely (this is my conservative guess) have sunk two Japanese CVs. Japanese CAP-CAC was crude and ineffective. The degree of success of a 1 US CV strike would depend entirely on the circumstances of the strike's arrival. Given that Kido Butai had no scouting missions out and a minimal CAP during the PH operation, I'd say the odds highly favor an effective US surprise attack, had any American CV been in the area to launch one. As to UV, I agree that probably the game would probably not give much chance of US success even with a 1 CV raid achieving total surprise. The game is highly flawed, and UV has carried this particular flaw (Jpns multi CV TF omnipotence) down from PW.

mdiehl -> (4/10/2003 11:51:21 PM)
[QUOTE]Any CV vs CV battle in December of 1941 would have been a disaster for teh US, barring some divine intervention ala Midway.[/QUOTE] Divinity had no part of the US success at Midway. Outstanding US intel was no accident. Putting the US Cvs en location was no accident. Having Yorktown operational in 24 hours was no accident. Having extra search assets at Midway was no accident. That Japan multitasked their CVs to simultaneously attempt to accomplish three missions at once was no accident. It was standard bad operational planning for Japan once all the set piece battles had been won in the first three months of the war. Japan failing to grasp the implications of enhanced US search assets all along the string of islands that link the Hawaiian Islands to Midway was no accident. Japan failing to grasp the odd coincidence that American surface vessels just happened to be in their strategic recon lagoon at the right moment, along with all the other obviously wierd s__t going on in the CenPac was no accident. The latter two were the result of poor pre-war Japanese commitment to intel and their inability to commit resources to (indicative of their contempt for) strategic intelligence. Midway happened because the Jpns were lax, poorly informed, and poorly prepared, and because the USN was well prepared, well informed, and ready to seize the easy meat that was stupidly handed out by Japan. The only "miracle" at Midway was that the Japanese did not lose much more than they actually lost when all the shooting stopped.

TIMJOT -> Re: Timjot (4/11/2003 1:21:04 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl [B]Look, I know you're pretty well informed. I think the point where we differ is the nature of the "endemic" part. The Clark/Nichols raid was the first of many "tactical surprise" airstrikes delivered by both sides in the PTO. The Allies were not particularly more vulnerable to this sort of thing than the Japanese. As Allied radar sets became more common, the Allies became particularly less vulnerable. [/B][/QUOTE] Endemic in the historical context of USAFFE in 1941. Which had, A wholy inadequate early warning system; a primitive, non-redundant, non-compatible commincation system; and a convoluted, inefficient command and control structure. Everyday after Dec 8th would have seen the situation improve. By April 1942, USAFFE would have been very tough nut. Look we are talking specifically about attacking the Philipines and Malaya in 1941. IMO the Allies were more vulnerable because The Japanese had the very considerable advantage of the initiative and 2. they had the advantage of an active 5th column providing significant assistance in both locations. Hypothetically though had USAFFE the luxury of the initiative, and an active 5th column, then I agree the Japanese were every bit if not more vulnerable to a first strike "tactical surprise". Not nit picking, but I believe you ment Clark/Iba raids. Nichols wasnt attacked until Dec 10.

TIMJOT -> (4/11/2003 2:15:27 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl [B] I was talking about historically realistic outcomes. A surprise attack by even 1 US CV while Kido Butai is involved in launching or recovering a/c from the PH strikes would likely (this is my conservative guess) have sunk two Japanese CVs. Japanese CAP-CAC was crude and ineffective. The degree of success of a 1 US CV strike would depend entirely on the circumstances of the strike's arrival. Given that Kido Butai had no scouting missions out and a minimal CAP during the PH operation, I'd say the odds highly favor an effective US surprise attack, had any American CV been in the area to launch one. [/B][/QUOTE] I dont want to come off defending a 3rd strike because I think PH was a bad idea regardless of the number of strikes. But.. I think you are being a little too optimistic. Genda's 3 strike purposal called for 2 CVs to be kept back in reserve, loaded and ready to launch a strike should the US CVs appear. The sending out of the BBs and CAs scout plans to search and locate enemy TFs. And finally the putting up of additional CAP at the expense of a large escort, This was deemed acceptable in lew of reports of the destruction US airfields and minimal resistance encountered in the air. Additionally, if you take into consideration that the 4 CV vs CV battles fought in 1942, all were fought basically at 1:1 odds, but only 1 achieved better than 1:1 loss ratio. I dont see how you can extrapulate those statistics and come up with a hypothetical CV vs CV battle fought at 1:6 odds with a resulting 1:2 favorable loss ratio.

mdiehl -> (4/11/2003 2:23:12 AM)
On CV loss ratios, Midway shows that roughly 24 SBDs (2/3 of a CV worth in US terms) can handily sink 4 Japanese carriers. It toook two launches, however, which is why I think that a US CV could reasonably be assumed to sink 2 Japanese CVs in a surprise strike. Furthermore, Yorktown survived the battle and would have escaped but for a Japanese submarine. Kido Butai's potential loss of face (a shut-out) was only narrowly avoided by circumstances beyond their control for reasons only partially attributable to Japanse aviation.

wpurdom -> US readiness (4/11/2003 2:27:52 AM)
Given the fact that the US had a very detailed understanding of the entire Japanese naval forces and a close understanding of how imminent that assaults on the Philippines and points south and still had the enormous disaster at Clark Field hours after the raid on Pearl Harbor, the likelihood of increased Allied readiness from Japanese alterations of plans is most remote. The prospect that the controversial East Wind Rain message would have changed matters at Pearl or any of the other bases is practically non-existent. As it was, the US was already aware that war was imminent and when they decoded the Japanese diplomatic note in advance of the note they understood that "this means war" just as FDR said when he read it. The real dangers to the attack on Pearl were the discovery of the sub in the Harbor several hours before the attack and the possibility that the radar reading might not have been discounted, but even those would likely have only had a marginal impact.

mdiehl -> (4/11/2003 2:58:24 AM)
[QUOTE]Given the fact that the US had a very detailed understanding of the entire Japanese naval forces and a close understanding of how imminent that assaults on the Philippines and points south and still had the enormous disaster at Clark Field hours after the raid on Pearl Harbor, the likelihood of increased Allied readiness from Japanese alterations of plans is most remote.[/QUOTE] The problem with this assertion is the assumption that the occurrence of tactical surprise at Clark or PH had anything to do with systemic Allied readiness. As I said before, each of these was unique in its own way. Japan did all it could in putting the assets in range to strike. That USAAFFE did not hit them first on Formosa was fortunate, and a consequence of (as Timjot alludes) a lack of decisiveness at USAFFE HQ. The fact that Clark was ambushed is a total accident. The CAP had landed moments before, after responding to a false air raid alarm. False air raid alarms continued to happen to all combatants throughout the war, although the increasing US use of radar rapidly cut down on the problem on the Allied side. [QUOTE]The prospect that the controversial East Wind Rain message would have changed matters at Pearl or any of the other bases is practically non-existent.[/QUOTE] Well, you have no basis for quantifying this so your "practically non-existent" amounts to the same thing as "highly likely." What [I]is[/I] known about East Wind Rain is that its transmission on 6 December set Allied cdrs into a whirlwind of useful motion. True, it revealed nothing about the locations of IJN CVDiv1 and CVDiv2, and at PH, Short and Kimmel had already cancelled all leaves and ordered all personnel to report ready by Monday AM (which was as fast as anyone could get the job done since the order went out on a weekend). BUT, if East Wind Rain is sent as historically on the 6th and for whatever reason KB does not show up at PH early on the 7th, then on 8 December, Japan finds highly stepped up recon, active CAPs over Oahu, fully operational radar on Diamond Head, vessels in PH steam ready and prepared to go to general quarters instantly, and 2 US CVs moving to position to ambush KB by, say the 11/12th. Might even be able to bag some of KB on their return trip home, although that's not so likely if they got out via the northcenpac teh way they came in. If KB strikes as historically, it is reasonable, IMO, to conclude that even duplicating the historical move, the strike is much less successful because it is reasonable to imagine, without stretching credulity in the slightest, that surprise is not achieved at Oahu. Ditto for Clark. [QUOTE]The real dangers to the attack on Pearl were the discovery of the sub in the Harbor several hours before the attack and the possibility that the radar reading might not have been discounted, but even those would likely have only had a marginal impact.[/QUOTE] Incorrect. Had the diamond head report been taken at face value, KB's strike force would have found all ships at general quarters. That means hatches dogged and less likely to sink, and all gun positions manned. Some ships, like USS Ca, might be clear of the target area entirely. The PBY installation in the harbor would have been void of planes, since these would all have been out searching. The B17 contingent coming in from the West Coast would probaby not had many options, but at least there'd have been alot more runway space at Hickam and the other airbases A significant amount of the USAAF pursuit force (say, 30 a/c) would have been airborne and in advantageus position to intercept. Many more a/c would not be in position to intercept, but they'd be clear of the runway and action area, so the losses in US aircraft would have been considerably lower.

Snigbert -> (4/11/2003 3:51:25 AM)
[B]As to UV, I agree that probably the game would probably not give much chance of US success even with a 1 CV raid achieving total surprise. The game is highly flawed, and UV has carried this particular flaw (Jpns multi CV TF omnipotence) down from PW.[/B] All this statement demonstrates is that you have never played the game. There is no such thing as Japanese multi CV TF ominpotence in UV. Japanese carriers are, ship for ship, inferior to American carriers in UV and anyone who has had a carrier battle in UV can attest to that fact. The only time the Japanese player has a chance to come out victorious in a carrier duel is A. Very early on, like May or June 42 when the American carrier air crews are less experienced, flying the earlier aircraft, etc or B. When Japan has a minimum of 2:1 odds in numbers of carriers. Even at 2:1 odds Japan is going to most likely receive a lot worse than it gives. I cant help thinking someone who criticizes a game they havent played is like someone criticizing a book they havent read, or an album they havent heard.

mdiehl -> (4/11/2003 4:22:10 AM)
[QUOTE]Very early on, like May or June 42 when the American carrier air crews are less experienced, flying the earlier aircraft, etc or B.[/QUOTE] This is precisely the phenomenon and window of time to which I was referring. American aircrews flying, F4Fs and SBDs were better in toto (better training in better tactics, although less airtime) than their Japanese counterparts in Zekes and Vals. The only capacity in which Japanese had the edge was in torpedo bombers. US CAP-CAC was superior, a little, and US search doctrine was more intensive and US searches were more effective. I can't help but think that a guy who doesn't understand that a product may be judged by the results that it delivers [I]before[/I] he shells out his money must have been highly enamored of the Chevrolet [I]Monza.[/I] You must be pretty helpless whenever you have to make a decision to purchase anything.

Snigbert -> (4/11/2003 4:33:36 AM)
And if you had played the game you would know I was talking about F3Fs, not F4Fs which replace all of the F3Fs after the first couple of months of play. Yes, the SBD is a little better than the Val, but the Allies are also still using the TBD Devastator... So clearly, based on your imagined 'Myth of Japanese CV TF omnipotence' (which this is the first time I have ever heard of in UV), I see that you really can tell lots about a game without playing it.

mdiehl -> (4/11/2003 4:40:06 AM)
[QUOTE] And if you had played the game you would know I was talking about F3Fs, not F4Fs which replace all of the F3Fs after the first couple of months of play.[/QUOTE] If you knew any history you'd know that F4F3s, F4F4s throughout the first six months of 1942 USN pilots ran up an almost 2:1 favorable kill ratio when F4Fs of any kind confronted A6Ms. You'd also know that pilots preferred some aspects of the F4F3 owing to its lighter weight (two fewer machine guns -- with 4 remaining -- more than enough to handily destroy any Jpns airplane), and correspondingly more active control sensitivity and longer gun-time. (I'm going to assume that you meant F4F3 not the F3F, since the USN did not fly the latter from any CV after the 3rd quarter 1941. Of the 164 F3Fs built, all of the remaining 140 were in service as training aircraft when the U.S. entered the war.) Apparently, I know alot more without playing it than you do after playing it, well, however long you've been at it.

herbieh -> Mdiel, AVOID (4/11/2003 8:57:56 AM)
Never , EVER, get into a conversation with MDIEHL about naval matters. Apparently he knows it all and the only reason this forum exists is so that he can LORD it over us with his superior knowledge. For us who play UV, support the tremendous effort the game designers put in, and who enjoy the game, I suggest we just ignore the endless attempts Medhed spends on how wrong we are and get back to what WE are on about, playing the game and having a good time We who play know what WE are on about Those who design the game know what they are about. Me, Ill be spending the week end trying to sink wobbly with what ever the game gives me, and ultimately it will be MY SKill, verses his, using what ever assets the GAME gives me. And Ill have a lot more fun than spending hours trying to prove arcane , who gives a ****, points on the forum Buy the game, play the game, see if you are any good, because UV really lets you find out if YOU Really could have done better. Have a beer boys, and write something amusing for a change. :D

Snigbert -> (4/11/2003 10:33:08 AM)
[B]If you knew any history you'd know that F4F3s, F4F4s throughout the first six months of 1942 USN pilots ran up an almost 2:1 favorable kill ratio when F4Fs of any kind confronted A6Ms. You'd also know that pilots preferred some aspects of the F4F3 owing to its lighter weight (two fewer machine guns -- with 4 remaining -- more than enough to handily destroy any Jpns airplane), and correspondingly more active control sensitivity and longer gun-time. (I'm going to assume that you meant F4F3 not the F3F, since the USN did not fly the latter from any CV after the 3rd quarter 1941. Of the 164 F3Fs built, all of the remaining 140 were in service as training aircraft when the U.S. entered the war.)[/B] Yes, clearly my typo indicates that I know nothing about history. I'll have to return my Masters Degree to Georgetown and explain to them that despite all of their efforts to teach me I dont know any history. I was simply pointing out that your mythical Jap CV TF omnipotence (which you havent been able to support in games terms in any way so far) doesnt exist. Maybe I wasnt clear enough in the first place, but I was agreeing with you that the US carriers are superior at almost every point in the game. At the beginning, ie May, June of 42, the Japanese have more even odds but from that point forward they require 2:1 or 3:1 odds for any success. For example, the game I am playing now as Japan, I had the Shoho sunk, Shokaku damaged badly enough to send her back to Japan and Zuikaku slightly damaged, vs the Yorktown being sunk and the Lexington taking 1 bomb hit. Compared to the actual battle fo the Coral Sea, I would say that is fairly close to what really happened. So, can you give me any examples of Japanese carrier invulnerabilty in the game? Knowing how many F4Fs were in service in 1942, or how well they did against Zeros, demonstrates absolutely no knowledge of UV game play, it only demonstrates that you know your history. Which is admirable, but doesnt give you any ground to stand on when it comes to criticizing a game you've never tried. Can you point out all the flaws in WitP as well? I really enjoy how some people only look for the slightest flaws to criticize rather than looking at how many things are right about the game. Then again, judging by how Mdiehl resorts to insults when having trouble making his points and can't afford to risk $50 on a game, we might just want to wait until he graduates from High School to talk to him further.

Snigbert -> (4/11/2003 10:39:11 AM)
[B]Never , EVER, get into a conversation with MDIEHL about naval matters. Apparently he knows it all and the only reason this forum exists is so that he can LORD it over us with his superior knowledge.[/B] I agree, I'm done responding to him.

Aussie -> (4/11/2003 11:12:54 AM)
So basically, some people here need to do some serious naval gazing...

Mike Scholl -> WONDERFULL..... (4/11/2003 2:55:07 PM)
.....The ignorant have declared themselves to be in a state of bliss. Please don't spoil their "high" with a bunch of ugly facts. Seriously, Gentlemen, if all you want is a "great game" you should try chess. It's about as perfect a "strategy" game as there is, and a true test of your skills. But if you want to play "Historical Simulation Games", you really can't just accept the "facts" you like and ignore the rest. MDIEHL raises valid points, and they deserve valid discussion and argument. UV is a great "simulation game", but not without flaws and problems. What's so horrible about wanting WITP to be an even better "simulation game"? With as many of UV's problems fixed as possible? And wanting as much "reality" as can be quantified included?

Snigbert -> (4/11/2003 9:45:54 PM)
Mike Scholl, Did I ever say UV was a perfect game? Did I say it didnt need any work? I was only defending it against an accusation of a flaw that I havent seen any evidence of existing from someone who has never played the game. I wouldn't have become as irritated (and I apologize for that) if he didn't have such a derogatory attitude to anyone who disagrees with him. Most people learn around the third grade that you dont just toss insults at anyone who has a differing opinion and luckily these boards are mostly populated with people who are more respectful to one another. I know UV still has some issues, although not very many in my opinion. WitP will have issues too, and hopefully the Matrix staff will be as dedicated to working those issues out over time as it has been with UV. There is no such thing as a perfect computer game, in my book.

mdiehl -> (4/11/2003 9:51:45 PM)
[QUOTE]I wouldn't have become as irritated (and I apologize for that) if he didn't have such a derogatory attitude to anyone who disagrees with him. Most people learn around the third grade that you dont just toss insults at anyone who has a differing opinion and luckily these boards are mostly populated with people who are more respectful to one another.[/QUOTE] Do you [I]deliberately[/I] mock yourself or is the irony manifest in [B]you[/B] complaining about someone else copping an "attitude" completely lost on you? What, exactly, in your opinion, makes the F4F3 demonstrably inferior to the F4F4, such that CV ag equipped with the latter should fare substantially better than the former?

TIMJOT -> Re: WONDERFULL..... (4/11/2003 10:22:49 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Mike Scholl [B].....The ignorant have declared themselves to be in a state of bliss. Please don't spoil their "high" with a bunch of ugly facts. Seriously, Gentlemen, if all you want is a "great game" you should try chess. It's about as perfect a "strategy" game as there is, and a true test of your skills. But if you want to play "Historical Simulation Games", you really can't just accept the "facts" you like and ignore the rest. MDIEHL raises valid points, and they deserve valid discussion and argument. UV is a great "simulation game", but not without flaws and problems. What's so horrible about wanting WITP to be an even better "simulation game"? With as many of UV's problems fixed as possible? And wanting as much "reality" as can be quantified included? [/B][/QUOTE] Yes, discussion is valid. A little decorum and impartiallity would be helpful though. A Chorus of "ALLIED UBER ALLES" is no more valid than cheering "NIPPON ICHI-BAN" IMHO.

LTCMTS -> Comments (4/11/2003 10:28:07 PM)
First, the Battle Line on 7 Dec 41, did not have 5"/38's, VT fuzes or Mk.37 FC. Of the BBs, only West Virginia had an operational CXAM-1. There were no other operational radars, EW or FC, mounted on the other BBs. Even in Mar 42, the surviving BBs had only CXAM, CXAM-1 and SC for EW and Mk.3 for surface FC. They did not have Mk.4's until late '42. All the BB's in Pearl Harbor had Mk.19 DP FCD, w/15' coincidence RF and the Mk.IV RK. This was the USN's first generation DP FCD, way before the Mk.28, Mk.33 and Mk.37. They also had only two each, ether fore and aft or sided. That means the 8 DP/AA guns on each ship would have been limited to two targets each under controlled fire. No VT fuzes until mid-43 and all the BBs in Pearl Harbor had 5"/25 Mk.11 guns with only "follow the pointer" direction from the Mk.19. Also only one BB, the Maryland, I think, had her 1.1" Mk.1 quads. All the others substituted 3"/50 Mk.10 or 3"/23 Mk.9 in local control till the 1.1" became available. The BBs did indeed have excellent SPS against the size warheads the Type 91 17.7" aerial torpedoes carried. However, a BB sunk at sea would be a total loss, and without air cover (or at this point in the war, even with it), the IJN would have committed all the 152 VTBs aboard the Kido Butai to torpedo attacks, with sufficient torpedoes for at least two attacks. Even if only 10% hit, thats over 30 hits on the eight available (nine if you get Pennsylvannia out of the dry dock in time) BBs in the battleline. Also, on that crack about the carriers not being in Pearl proving that FDR Knew the Japanese were coming. The conspiracy theorists are, plain and simple, idiots. The carriers were not ordered out of Pearl on a moments notice. One carrier, the Saratoga, was on the West Coast being refitted. This refit was directed by the CNO in Jan 41. The Enterprise and Yorktown were delivering Marine air squadrons to Midway and Wake. These reinforcements had been planned by Kimmel as part of his PacFleet OPLAN since Sep 41. The Marine air was being positioned at Midway and Wake to defend these offensive/defensive outposts to Hawaii. Unless one wants to grant prescience to FDR a year ahead of the attack, this accusation falls in with the one which has the British attacking Pearl Harbor from secret bases on another island. How the hell was an attack by Japan supposed to get us into a European war! FDR saw Germany as the greatest threat to the US. US warplanners had decided as early as 1938, that in a war between the US on one hand and Germany and Japan on the other, that Germany would come first. FDR had, in fact, with his positioning of the USN in a shooting, undeclared war with the German U-boats over the Neutrality Patrol, and his allout aid to the British Empire (and the USSR) with lend-lease, at a point of legal belligerence with Nazi Germany, that Hitler, to busy with the USSR and Britain, was willing to ignore. FDR (and the War and Navy Departments) did not want a war in the Pacific that would distract from the main strategic threat to the US. BLUF: An attack by Japan on the US did not make us automatically aliies with the British Empire against the Nazis. The Japanese felt no obligation to attack the USSR in Jun 41 and there was no proof that the Germans wouldn't do the same in Dec 41. In fact, it was Hitler, for God and Satan knows only why, who declared war on the US on 10 Dec 41, that solved FDR's problem of a distracting war in the Pacific versus the war he wanted against Germany.

Snigbert -> (4/11/2003 10:35:06 PM)
Alright, the F4F-3 was less armed (4 .50 cal vs 6 .50 cal), Slower Climb rate (2050 vs 2890), Lower Ceiling (by 3000 ft), and Less range (by only 76 miles). None of these make the F4F-3 Greatly inferior, but in combination with less training, experience, worse TBs, etc at the beginning of the war and the Japanese air crews being at their highest level (and thenceforth degrading) it does something to even up the odds at the beginning of the game. Now that I've answered your question, will you answer mine? Demonstrate for me how the Japanese enjoy Carrier TF Omnipotence in UV, if you would.

mdiehl -> (4/11/2003 11:10:10 PM)
I'll bite. We've had this discussion before and it has been raised dozens of times (not by me) in the UV threads that the Allies 'do not dare' to confront a comparable number of Japanese CVs. It has been so long since I've poked around the UV threads that many of the threads have been archived. But there are many concrete examples, such as advice like this from Frag to any Allied player in the Allied Opening Moves thread: [QUOTE]Hide until turn 75 when your troops show up to protect Noumea. Turn 85 is the next batch in Brisbane. Until then, your ONLY care in the world is protecting Brisbane & Noumea.[/QUOTE] Further along in the thread he talks about the need to keep US CVs out of view until the time comes for a counterattack. From the gist of all the AARs and threads it is clear that the Allied player would not be advised to duplicate the US tactic for thwarting the historical attempt to invade Port Moresby. To wit, sending carriers into harm's way. If this is, as you suggest in your posts, a consequence of low EXP in Allied pilots, then there is absolutely no doubt that UV has duplicated an error made by PW: the dominance of Japanese naval aviation through either overestimating the proper amount of Jpns EXP, understimating the proper amount of USN EXP, or overfactoring of EXP in the combat model, or failure to account for poor Jpns air combat tactics and CAC. [And no, I'm not gonna duplicate the discussion that has been had many many times in which I prove, once again, that despite the claims by some that Japanese pilots were better on account of greater experience, and despite the fact that they allegedly had better planes, USN pilots outperformed Jpns pilots in kills by a ratio of roughly 1.5:1 to 2:1 through May 1942. If UV does not routinely lead to that expectation, then it still has the same flawed air combat model that originated with PW. Different game mechanics but same highly flawed results.] Quite apart from these things, I still see in UV CVTFS with 80 aircraft flying around on CAP. No one in WW2 could have managed an 80 plane CAP until mid-late 1943 when the US had, after much experience, devised superior CAC. Since the only player with enough ships to post 80 a/c on defense through May while retaining enough other a/c to launch an escorted strike is the Jpns, it pretty much follows that the Jpns CVTFs have a really ahistorical edge. But don't take my word for it. Ask how many players in UV would pit 2 Allied CVs against Sho and Zui in March 1942 in a ship a ship duel with no backup assets from land based air to do search or launch strikes. If the most likely result in such an encounter is anything other than a dead-on draw (in ships lost, with roughly 2:1 Allied favor in bomber losses and 1.5:1 Allied favor in fighter losses), and 6 months ago the most likely result was a crushing Jpns victory, then the game is just plain broken with respect to simulation quality. It might be [I]fun[/I], but there are plenty of fun PTO games out there already that appeal to fantasy.

LTCMTS -> Reclama (4/11/2003 11:20:43 PM)
Ooops. It was Lexington delivering Marine SB2Us to Midway. The Enterprise was delivering F4F-3As to Wake. The Yorktown was in the Atlantic. Also, maybe I missed something. My available references say that the F4F-3 had superior speed at height, initial climb rate and range on the F4F-4 because of the F4F-4's added weight, the result of additional guns, armor and fuel. David Brown makes this point clearly describing his experiences with the Martlet I and the Wildcat IV. Also remember that, if I recollect rightly, the Lexington still had F2A-3s, not F4Fs. And that the US carriers only had 18 VFs each until Mar/Apr 1942. As far as the TBDs go, they were certainly successful under the conditions seen at Coral Sea, where a coordinated attack with overwhelming force sank Shoho. We cannot be sure what the impact of a coordinated attack on the Kido Butai would have had. Also, it took launching 98 SBDs to get those 24 SBDs in poisition to damage and destroy the Akagi, Kaga and Soryu. Finally, the force structures, industrial bases and political-military situation in the Pacific in 1941 were the result of national defense (or offense) strategies based on decades of decisions and outcomes impacted by external and internal political, military and economic input on the policies of the major powers involved. Why and where Allied and Japanese forces were and their readiness conditions and operational plans flowed from these strategies. To say that players should have the option to "freestyle" strategies, force structures, force deployments and industrial output and planning without restraint is pointless. Ahistorical scenarios must be based in historical or historically supportable alternatives. At the level we are dealing with, the available strategic options are few and have been dictated by history going back to 1895. Something as simple as Philippine Army force structure was dictated by historical events and decisions that lock the Philippine Army of 1941 into its historical condition. Any changes require changes to historical events and decisions that impact other event streams in the game, and so must be leiminated or tightly controlled. The only other alternative is to provide a game in which every part of the game's database and mechanics would be open to modification by the user in order to cater to every possible ahistorical or even fictional (and there is a difference) such as the Nimitz showing up off Hawaii. (by the way Carriers at War actually had that scenario)

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