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Drongo -> (4/16/2003 11:57:57 AM)
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Posted by Madflava13
[QUOTE] Although a USMC counter-attack might have killed off the Japanese eventually, if they had made it to Henderson (which is historically a possibilty), I can only imagine the damage the Japanese could have inflicted.. Scratch the Cactus air force and all the support mechanisms that were in place. Coupled with Japanese dominance of the waters in the area (at least at the beginning of the campaign) and you've got a lot of dead Marines because no reinforcements were coming any time soon...[/QUOTE]
I agree it had the potential to be a disaster but....
I don't have any detailed sources on hand but from memory, Kawaguchi's 3 battalion attack on Bloody Ridge in mid-September was the one that came closest to breaking through. Ichiki's earlier attack in August was just suicide and Maruyama's later attack in October was effectively stopped dead by a well organised US defence.
If you assume that Kawaguchi's attack did succeed in clearing the Marines off Bloody Ridge and then pushed on toward the airfield, what would have happened next? There are a lot of factors to consider.
Unless the marine defence line had collapsed very early, the Japanese advance onto the coastal plain would have been in daylight.
Would the Marine Raiders have been destroyed in the attack or would they still be a viable force that could aid in the defence of the airfield with the marine HQ units and any other 2nd line troops (like the Artillery/AA batteries, aircraft mechanics, etc)?
The Japanese still had to take and hold a fairly large, open area and probably in daylight. While this was going on, what would be happening in the rest of the US line. The US would now know for sure the main attack had occured and had effectively 2 Marine Regiments unengaged to the East and West. These were only faced by about 2 Japanese battalions which proved incapable of tieing the marines down by direct pressure. Detachments from these regiments would certainly have been sent had the Japanese attack broke through. IIRC, there were also at least 6 US light tanks available to move that had been historically placed on the eastern flank. I would expect these to have certainly been sent in to engage the Japanese. How quickly these forces could arrive and whether the Japanese could definitely secure the airfield is unknown (to me, anyway).
The other factor to consider is what was Kawaguchi's intent? From memory, his attack was intended to capture the airfield then drive the rest of the marines from their positions. This was not a "raid" to knock out Henderson so as to cover a major Japanese landing. From earlier accounts I read, the intention was to capture and hold the airbase for future Japanese use. I don't recall any mention in his plan to methodically destroy all equipment, supplies, aircraft, etc on immeadiate occupation of the airfield. Rendering the actual runway more than temporarily inoperable was also beyond his capabilities, regardless of his intent.
If Kawaguchi's attack succeeded, if he then took Henderson, if he realised that he had no hope of further success, if he then had the time and freedom to destroy the airfield facilities/aircraft and if the Japanese Airforce and Navy were sitting ready to make full use of the opportunity, it could have been a decisive result.
Without being part of a concerted Japanese operation, the knocking out of Henderson would have only been an (admittedly big) temporary inconvenience to the defenders. The USN had shown that they could get supplies through using quick supply runs (Henderson being operational or not) and the airstrip itself would most likely still be useable for air supply. Also, discussions in the US high command indicated that they were prepared to seriously consider risking the beaching individual transports if ever the need became that desperate. I would also think that a convoy carrying replacement equipment, covered by available USN CVs, would have been considered as a one off.
In my opinion, had Maruyama's October attack (which was part of a major Japanese op) had the same chance of initial success as Kawaguchi's unsupported one in September, the Guadalcanal Campaign could well have ended differently.
It's been a while since I studied the campaign, maybe someone who has a reference handy might comment.
Posted by Snigbert
[QUOTE]They could have pissed in the marine's coffee and not told them, for example[/QUOTE]
It would have been a payback for the time that the marines pissed on the Japanese supplies after they captured a supply camp. Quid quo pro.
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