RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (Full Version)

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Lokasenna -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 6:10:49 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: pontiouspilot I have played 1 PBEM where my opponent opted to use Kaga, or maybe it was Akagi...a big gal anyway.... in support of 1st turn theatrics in PI. The lack of 1 CV at Pearl was hardly noticeable but the 1 extra CV in Philippines caused a lot of trouble. Many subs were damaged badly although surprisingly few sunk. Air supremacy was much enhanced. All the refugee vessels fleeing the area took much worse casualties. The temptation for me to dick around interdicting any invasions in area was gone....it was just run like hell. As I recall he dispatched Houston and Boise which is always a drag. This is a fairly common alternate opening, I think, precisely because it can be so effective.

crsutton -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 8:29:46 PM)
I would opt for taking our as much at Pearl as I could. The Allied BBs are useful late in the war but as said. just as important is the destruction of Allied search and recon aircraft. From my experience, this hurts the Allies very much in the first six months. The idea of taking out the Allied sub force in Manila does not make sense in my eyes. With an 80% dud rate in the first year of the war Allies subs are not much of a threat and they will have plenty of subs when they do get decent torpedoes. Neither is going to win the war for Japan but I lean towards wrecking things as much as I can at Pearl.

Gandalf -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 8:47:18 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: HansBolter quote: ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget Must...not...reply. Opinions shouldn't be solicited if one isn't prepared to hear and accept them. [8D] I do have to admire your restraint LST. [;)] No restraint here... LOL Not a matter of cake and eat it too. What's so difficult about that expectation? I guess the Japanese understood that Pearl Harbor was the only legitimate surprise piece of cake in the whole pacific theatre. NOT! According to the Infamy Speech. quote: Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, members of the Senate and the House of Representatives: Yesterday, December 7th, 1941 - a date which will live in infamy - the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan. The United States was at peace with that nation, and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in the American island of Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to our Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. And, while this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or of armed attack. It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace. The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. I regret to tell you that very many American lives have been lost. In addition, American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu. Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya. Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong. Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam. Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands. Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island. And this morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island. Japan has therefore undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday and today speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our nation. As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense, that always will our whole nation remember the character of the onslaught against us. No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people, in their righteous might, will win through to absolute victory. I believe that I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us. Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory and our interests are in grave danger. With confidence in our armed forces, with the unbounding determination of our people, we will gain the inevitable triumph. So help us God. I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7th, 1941, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire. President Franklin D. Roosevelt - December 8, 1941 It appears that there was a whole lot of historical cake eating going on by the Japanese! [:D]

Anthropoid -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 9:03:14 PM)
So let me get this straight . . . if a TF has that "1st Turn Move" tick box selected, it gets to move up to 75 hexes on turn one!? Oh my goodness, this has "interesting What-If Scenarios" written all over it. [:'(] ADDIT: having read through the whole thread . . . re: real history, I increasingly have the sense that Japan had its back to the wall. Moreover, the decision-making in the top echelons of Japanese national and military policy seem to have been fraught with factionalism even to the point of assassinations(?). Japan's decisions were not rational, they were shaped by arrogance and cultural bias as far as I can tell. The rational course of action would have been a compromise which kept them (the decision makers and their way of life) in power while minimizing shame, resources lost and the like. Instead, their aspirations were to achieved dominance over a group of nations whose combined might far outstripped both their level at the time they decided to embark on that path and reasonable projections for the following decade. The Japanese Empire might well have survived to this day had they agreed to withdraw from China, and become a member of the allies rather than aspiring to repeat their smashing successes against Russia in the preceding decades and become the regions greatest power.

AW1Steve -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 11:11:33 PM)
For me I fear the Pearl Harbor strike more than the PI gambit. The BB's represent a lot of Victory points , and along with the PBY's, there are a lot of air frames that you can't afford to lose. I even begrudge losing P-26's , which make excellent training fighters (and allow me to switch to P-38's for combat that would normally be tied up). I've always agreed with Richardson and Hart that the smartest thing the Americans could have done was to evacuate the PI before the war. Consequently I regard anything there as lost. I do regret giving up the 4-piper DD's and the "Bird class AM's" as these can be converted to APD's and AVD's and AVP's. But I'd rather he hit the PI or Singapore than PH. And God forbid that he do an extended strike on PH and screw up the repair facility.

AW1Steve -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (9/30/2016 11:17:28 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget quote: ORIGINAL: szmike Imho Japanese players just explore possibilities. In the end of the day surprise doesn't make much of a difference for Allies, but it helps Japanese to keep those pilots a day longer at the least. Yes, in the end, no real or perceived advantage given to the JFBs in a "historic" scenario (not talking what-if mods here) will alter the ultimate outcome of the US industrial might steamrollering Japan. But it appears that some AFBs are unwilling to accept even the smallest additional challenge (OTOH they have no problem accepting the unhistorical advantages given to the Allied players). Let's face it, it is a game, it has necessarily some limitations and both sides get their share of "unhistorical" advantages and disadvantages. The war might as well have started with a surprise carrier raid against Manila instead of PH - enough empty ocean to the East and not enough US patrol planes to cover it to allow for a sudden appearance of KB. However, a surprise strike against Singers would be less likely, much smaller water surface with too much civilian traffic to gibe KB much chance to remain unnoticed. So while not entirely impossible, the details and limits of an unhistorical first turn with surprise should be discussed between opponents. Those who play the AI do not need to bother, obviously. I might be willing to accept the changes you site , with one stipulation. You give me a "plausible premise why". Any minor personnel change or condition could have completely changed the set up . For instance , had Roosevelt NOT fired Richardson , there would have been Navy PBY's on patrol (as there were before he was fired) as well as some wildcats on CAP). Set me a possible scenario to explain the set up change and I might agree. Don't just say "because I feel like it".

LargeSlowTarget -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/1/2016 7:14:13 AM)
Well, a Manila strike instead of Pearl Harbor could be explained by Yamamoto not being successful in forcing his PH idea and - being a good solider - following orders from IJN HQ to hit the PI. I agree with others here that the best opening remains a PH strike, trying to kill some BBs, with Akagi split off and sent to beef-up the Mini-KB in the DEI. The Manila subs are toothless tigers up into 1943 and in range of LBA (if HRs allow more than one port strike on day 1). Singers only makes sense with a Mersing gambit. I myself actually prefer the "afternoon of Dec 7" with no surprise start - a Dec 8 scenario set to start on Dec 7. The historical damage is done but the Japanese player can make changes, for example to the destination of invasion forces. This requires the HR that KB and the Japanese LBA remain grounded for the first day.

Grfin Zeppelin -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/1/2016 11:24:31 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget Well, a Manila strike instead of Pearl Harbor could be explained by Yamamoto not being successful in forcing his PH idea and - being a good solider - following orders from IJN HQ to hit the PI. I agree with others here that the best opening remains a PH strike, trying to kill some BBs, with Akagi split off and sent to beef-up the Mini-KB in the DEI. The Manila subs are toothless tigers up into 1943 and in range of LBA (if HRs allow more than one port strike on day 1). Singers only makes sense with a Mersing gambit. I myself actually prefer the "afternoon of Dec 7" with no surprise start - a Dec 8 scenario set to start on Dec 7. The historical damage is done but the Japanese player can make changes, for example to the destination of invasion forces. This requires the HR that KB and the Japanese LBA remain grounded for the first day. Kaga, she is the slowest.

zuluhour -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/1/2016 12:29:05 PM)
"The manual is not a rule book. There are no rules whatever, anywhere in the manual. The manual is simply a �how to�. It was never intended as a rule book. One may do as one wishes. But sometimes, rules are nice. " Matt Never thought of it that way,................

LargeSlowTarget -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/1/2016 2:28:55 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Gr�fin Zeppelin Kaga, she is the slowest. Excellent, at least one is paying attention to my rantings. Kaga it is. [:o] Danke, werte Gr�fin, ich verwechsele die beiden leider ab und zu...

geofflambert -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/1/2016 9:22:40 PM)
I'd say you'd have to scratch an early Phillipines invasion and/or call off the Malaya invasion. Oahu is too far away from support bases of any significance. I wouldn't advise it. Sorry about that, I was responding to this earlier post: [image]local://upfiles/37002/C396E2B2C2AB4159ABF7D4EB41B73F69.jpg[/image]

paradigmblue -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/1/2016 10:08:15 PM)
As an allied player, I would much rather have my opponent use the KB to strike Pearl rather than Manilla. A Manilla strike can completely wipe out the subs stationed there, leaving the USN without its "eyes" for the early part of the war. Moreover, it allows the KB to then quickly split to interdict the exits from the DEI and/or support landings there. With US carriers still in the Pacific, the KB can operate very aggressively in the first week, racking up ungodly numbers of ship kills in the theater before moving to support action around Port Morseby. The battleships lost at Pearl are not important in 1942. The loss of my eyes, however, is devastating.

MakeeLearn -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/1/2016 10:34:09 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: geofflambert I'd say you'd have to scratch an early Phillipines invasion and/or call off the Malaya invasion. Oahu is too far away from support bases of any significance. I wouldn't advise it. Sorry about that, I was responding to this earlier post: [image]local://upfiles/37002/C396E2B2C2AB4159ABF7D4EB41B73F69.jpg[/image] 90% of my reading and studying of WW2 has been on the ETO. WitPAE has whetted my appetite for the PTO. True, changes would have to made elsewhere - PI left to be dealt with later, etc., in order to take Midway and the Hawaiian Islands. However, was this not the ultimate goal, set in motion by the Midway attack? The biggest benefit to Japan in taking HI would have been in the political and military hurt it would have caused America. It may have resulted in what the Japanese were trying to achieve in the Pearl strike.

BBfanboy -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/2/2016 4:08:07 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn quote: ORIGINAL: geofflambert I'd say you'd have to scratch an early Phillipines invasion and/or call off the Malaya invasion. Oahu is too far away from support bases of any significance. I wouldn't advise it. Sorry about that, I was responding to this earlier post: [image]local://upfiles/37002/C396E2B2C2AB4159ABF7D4EB41B73F69.jpg[/image] 90% of my reading and studying of WW2 has been on the ETO. WitPAE has whetted my appetite for the PTO. True, changes would have to made elsewhere - PI left to be dealt with later, etc., in order to take Midway and the Hawaiian Islands. However, was this not the ultimate goal, set in motion by the Midway attack? The biggest benefit to Japan in taking HI would have been in the political and military hurt it would have caused America. It may have resulted in what the Japanese were trying to achieve in the Pearl strike. The original strike on PH was just to keep the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japan's conquest of the Southern Resource Area (DEI) and Burma. At the time most of the IJN was battleship-centric (just as most Western Naval officers were) so knocking out the battleships at PH was seen as essential. They also hoped to catch the two CVs there but didn't. The Midway operation was not in the original expansion plans but "Victory Disease" from the early conquests and the Doolittle raid on Japan led the Japanese government to believe that they could capture Midway easily and that they needed it to close a gap in their air search (that let the Doolittle raid approach the home islands). I have not seen anything to suggest the Japanese planned to take the Hawaiian Islands at any time, IRL.

ny59giants -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/2/2016 1:15:04 PM)
I have broken off Kaga, only CV below 30 knots, into a TF that gets the bonus and have her end up just past CRB to support a Mersing Gambit a few days later (add extra Zeros and pull off either Vals or Kates on 8th). Then, have TF with CVL Ryujo at Babeldoab end up at CRB to quickly join Kaga. A rapid move to divide the Malaysian peninsula in two is very difficult to defend as Allies. This resulting TF can control the Java Sea area easily. Allowing the other 5 CVs to hit Pearl and destroy too many PBYs and other aircraft is not good. Vals go all in for AF while the Kates go after the BBs. As mainly Allied player, its not the lost BBs that hurt, but heavily damaged CA/CLs my few CV TFs in early '42 will be short of. Most of the Allied shipping can be destroyed by roving SC TF in the Phillipines, so only the subs may survive. Not worth sending KB to hit Manila for me. Pearl is the worse option for Allied player. Damaged BBs are OK, the lose of CA/CL and aircraft are the real story here. Going all in for Manila is a long term blessing for Allies, IMO.

MakeeLearn -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/2/2016 1:46:42 PM)
quote: The original strike on PH was just to keep the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japan's conquest of the Southern Resource Area (DEI) and Burma. At the time most of the IJN was battleship-centric (just as most Western Naval officers were) so knocking out the battleships at PH was seen as essential. They also hoped to catch the two CVs there but didn't. The Midway operation was not in the original expansion plans but "Victory Disease" from the early conquests and the Doolittle raid on Japan led the Japanese government to believe that they could capture Midway easily and that they needed it to close a gap in their air search (that let the Doolittle raid approach the home islands). I have not seen anything to suggest the Japanese planned to take the Hawaiian Islands at any time, IRL. I'am reading "Titans of the Seas" (Belote). In January '42 Yamamoto asked his staff to propose what to do next. His chief of staff, Rear Admiral Ugaki favored an invasion of Hawaii. Having carrier superiority and an overwhelming advantage in battleships would make an occupation feasible. He proposed seizing Midway, Johnston,and Palmyra islands in June, followed by a invasion of the Hawaiian islands. This was determined by the Japanese "Think Tanks" to be too ambitious. Surprise was gone, it would be difficult to dominate the skys over Hawaii having to deal with both US land and carrier aircraft. Next he proposed seizing Ceylon and invading India. The Japanese Army No-Go that. Admiral Nagano's Naval General Staff pushed for a invasion of Australia - again No-Go from the Japanese Army Yamamoto recognized that the Doolittle raid was a stunt, but it reminded him forcefully of America's enormous potential. Ugaki then devised a less ambitious plan of his original Hawaiian plan. He proposed a near simultaneous capture of the outer Aleutian Islands and Midway Island. This would enable them to keep American sorties from Pearl surveilled and blunted. Then Johnston,and Palmyra islands would be taken. To Admiral Yamamoto this plan had a supreme advantage: It should force the inferior American carrier fleet into decisive battle. If the American carrier force was destroyed, then invading Hawaii might be practicable. Game wise, in a opening move(s) of trying to take Pearl, the battle(s) itself may prove more beneficial to the Japanese than actually taking the land.

Anthropoid -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/2/2016 2:13:51 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn quote: The original strike on PH was just to keep the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japan's conquest of the Southern Resource Area (DEI) and Burma. At the time most of the IJN was battleship-centric (just as most Western Naval officers were) so knocking out the battleships at PH was seen as essential. They also hoped to catch the two CVs there but didn't. The Midway operation was not in the original expansion plans but "Victory Disease" from the early conquests and the Doolittle raid on Japan led the Japanese government to believe that they could capture Midway easily and that they needed it to close a gap in their air search (that let the Doolittle raid approach the home islands). I have not seen anything to suggest the Japanese planned to take the Hawaiian Islands at any time, IRL. I'am reading "Titans of the Seas" (Belote). In January '42 Yamamoto asked his staff to propose what to do next. His chief of staff, Rear Admiral Ugaki favored an invasion of Hawaii. Having carrier superiority and an overwhelming advantage in battleships would make an occupation feasible. He proposed seizing Midway, Johnston,and Palmyra islands in June, followed by a invasion of the Hawaiian islands. This was determined by the Japanese "Think Tanks" to be too ambitious. Surprise was gone, it would be difficult to dominate the skys over Hawaii having to deal with both US land and carrier aircraft. Next he proposed seizing Ceylon and invading India. The Japanese Army No-Go that. Admiral Nagano's Naval General Staff pushed for a invasion of Australia - again No-Go from the Japanese Army Yamamoto recognized that the Doolittle raid was a stunt, but it reminded him forcefully of America's enormous potential. Ugaki then devised a less ambitious plan of his original Hawaiian plan. He proposed a near simultaneous capture of the outer Aleutian Islands and Midway Island. This would enable them to keep American sorties from Pearl surveilled and blunted. Then Johnston,and Palmyra islands would be taken. To Admiral Yamamoto this plan had a supreme advantage: It should force the inferior American carrier fleet into decisive battle. If the American carrier force was destroyed, then invading Hawaii might be practicable. Game wise, in a opening move of trying to take Pearl, the battle itself may prove more beneficial to the Japanese than actually taking the land. So basically, the Japanese "High Command" were not particularly good "JFB Players," is what I'm reading. I mean, did they not read Sun Tzu!? [:D] "Okay guys, we uh, did that whole Tora, Tora, Tora Pearl Harbor thing, and it worked great! Are we naval flyboys badass or what!? <entire room full of middle-aged and elderly Japanese staff officers and their younger attaches bolt to their feet, thrusts arms into sky and shouts BANZAI!! . . . followed by peels of fiendish laughter> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7edeOEuXdMU Yamato finally gets the room to quiet down and resume their seats" . . . I know, I know, so awesome he says wiping a tear from the corner of his eye* So now, the Yanks are REALLY pissed off! So!? NOW WHAT!? In other news . . . invasions southward are going pretty well . . . I guess we should be able to get enough oil, iron scrap to keep the war machine going for a year or so . . .

MakeeLearn -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/2/2016 2:17:46 PM)
quote: So basically, the Japanese "High Command" were not particularly good "JFB Players," is what I'm reading Well... Yamamoto was a Harvard man. [;)]EDIT : This statement is a joke, it means cut him some slack look what he has been through. Yamamoto said, to paraphrase, "I will run wild for the first year of the war, after that I cannot promise anything". After which he probably asked... "Has anyone seen my manual?"

Anthropoid -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/2/2016 2:18:58 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn quote: So basically, the Japanese "High Command" were not particularly good "JFB Players," is what I'm reading Well... Yamamoto was a Harvard man. Which proves absolutely . . . nothing [:D] Bill Gates, and that Facebook dude were Harbard DROPOUTS!

Anachro -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/2/2016 3:09:20 PM)
Yamamoto also got a D on his class paper and almost failed the courses he took there. I know; I saw the paper while doing research in the Harvard archives. [:D]

MakeeLearn -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/2/2016 3:12:20 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Anachro Yamamoto also got a D on his class paper and almost failed the courses he took there. I know; I saw the paper while doing research in the Harvard archives. [:D] Yeeeeeeeeeeah!!! a correct decoding of my post, that was previously misread.[&o]

Oberst_Klink -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/2/2016 4:46:41 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Anachro Yamamoto also got a D on his class paper and almost failed the courses he took there. I know; I saw the paper while doing research in the Harvard archives. [:D] Well... one could relate to all the West Pointers between the US-Mexican and the Civil War... McClellan was top of his class... now how did that turn out ;) Klink, Oberst

zuluhour -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/2/2016 5:05:13 PM)
I believe Patton finished last in his class

zuluhour -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/2/2016 5:05:52 PM)
......or was that me???

Anthropoid -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/2/2016 6:38:24 PM)
Pretty sure Genghis Khan, one of the greatest conquerors and strategists of human history (and also disproportional contributor of "seed" to the modern human population) never even got accepted to college.

MakeeLearn -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/2/2016 7:45:45 PM)
Keeping on the subject of Harvard... and smart moves... This was told to me by a veteran of Palau. A Alabama country boy was accepted into Harvard, the first in his family to go to college. His first day there he walked up to a group of frat boys and with a big warm smile on his face he said "Howdy y'all! I'am new here, could you please tell me where the library is at?" Laughter arose from the group of frat boys. Then one of the group responded: "From your dress and your speech it is evident that you are new to anywhere except a barnyard. What has become of these hallowed halls, that someone has been admitted that is too ignorant to know that you don't end a sentence with a preposition." The Alabama boy thought for a moment then with a even bigger warm smile on his face "Howdy y'all! I'am new here, could you please tell me where the library is at.. a##hole?"

Anachro -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/2/2016 8:01:06 PM)
Well...any frat boy at Harvard is just someone that got rejected from a finals club.

wneumann -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/2/2016 9:00:58 PM)
quote: But it appears that some AFBs are unwilling to accept even the smallest additional challenge (OTOH they have no problem accepting the unhistorical advantages given to the Allied players). Let's face it, it is a game, it has necessarily some limitations and both sides get their share of "unhistorical" advantages and disadvantages. Playing a scenario with a considerable quantity of additional challenge. I'll reserve comment until end of campaign in 1946.

Alfred -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/3/2016 2:57:12 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: BBfanboy quote: ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn quote: ORIGINAL: geofflambert I'd say you'd have to scratch an early Phillipines invasion and/or call off the Malaya invasion. Oahu is too far away from support bases of any significance. I wouldn't advise it. Sorry about that, I was responding to this earlier post: [image]local://upfiles/37002/C396E2B2C2AB4159ABF7D4EB41B73F69.jpg[/image] 90% of my reading and studying of WW2 has been on the ETO. WitPAE has whetted my appetite for the PTO. True, changes would have to made elsewhere - PI left to be dealt with later, etc., in order to take Midway and the Hawaiian Islands. However, was this not the ultimate goal, set in motion by the Midway attack? The biggest benefit to Japan in taking HI would have been in the political and military hurt it would have caused America. It may have resulted in what the Japanese were trying to achieve in the Pearl strike. The original strike on PH was just to keep the Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japan's conquest of the Southern Resource Area (DEI) and Burma. At the time most of the IJN was battleship-centric (just as most Western Naval officers were) so knocking out the battleships at PH was seen as essential. They also hoped to catch the two CVs there but didn't. The Midway operation was not in the original expansion plans but "Victory Disease" from the early conquests and the Doolittle raid on Japan led the Japanese government to believe that they could capture Midway easily and that they needed it to close a gap in their air search (that let the Doolittle raid approach the home islands). I have not seen anything to suggest the Japanese planned to take the Hawaiian Islands at any time, IRL. This line is repeated ad nauseum by armchair admirals. It subtly misinterprets the Japanese operational planning. As all successful long term successful professional militaries, Japan's was a follower of Clauswitzian theory. The opening moves of the war were a classical implementation of the Clauswitzian maxim of seeking combat with and destroying the main enemy force. There were three main enemy strengths: (a) the USN Pacific fleet, located at Pearly Harbor (b) the USA airforce located on Luzon bases (protected by the army) (c) the British combined forces located in Malaya Consequently the main thrust on 7/8 December 1941 was simultaneously directed against these three force concentrations using the maximum available Japanese forces deemed necessary to achieve victory. Everything else received only secondary forces using units which could not otherwise be deployed against the main Allied dispositions. The Midway operation was not victory disease either. Again that is just armchair strategists and lazy authors using a snazzy term. It was once again classic Clauswitzian of seeking to destroy the main enemy force. Alfred

Anachro -> RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings (10/3/2016 3:08:24 AM)
Yes, but the well-documented cavalier attitude taken towards the operational planning for Midway can be seen as a symptom of "victory disease." I agree with you on your characterization of the operation and its origin in military thinking, however.

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