|
xhoel -> RE: Update on the AAR. (6/5/2019 10:11:12 PM)
|
OKH report on the failure of the Donets offensive.
In retrospective of the failed offensive operation the OKH deemed it necessary to analyize the reasons for this failure and to get a lesson out of it so that we can avoid repeating our mistakes in the future.
First of all we need to look at the minor reasons for the failure. This can be quickly summarized in 3 points which affect each other. The first one was the inability of German local commanders at Corps level to push back the enemy forces (eg bad rolls). This can be seen in the failure of attacks and the halving of CV in more than one case. The other reason was the tenacity of Soviet forces in holding their ground (eg good enemy rolls as well as SU activation and air support). Soviet CV did increase due to good rolls as well as SU activation.
While these reasons did play a role in the failure of the offensive, they were not the main culprits.
The biggest problem with the operation was the small number of formations that were available for offensive operations as well as their positioning. While the infantry forces were enough to break through the first line of defense they lacked the MP and CV to punch through Soviet secondary lines, leaving the job to the Panzer Corps deployed to the north, which not only had to clear Soviet units deployed in the secondary and tertiary defensive lines but also make headway in the Soviet rear and secure the pocket, an impossible task, one could say. This lack of MP and of units translated in a poor security screening of the breakthrough forces, which should always be secured in such pincer operations.
Especially considering the fact that the attacks were conducted in unfavorable terrain (1 minor river crossing and 1 major river crossing), we should have had more units in the ready for both assault and screening of the breakthrough forces.
The position of the units was also not optimal. Most units were on the frontline and had to expand MP to be brought into their staging areas. This not only meant, that MP were spent on movement that could have been avoided but also that the fatigue of the units increased by quite a bit, which does affect combat efficiency. The armored forces were also positioned in unfavorable positions and had to cover a lot of ground or cross the river (like the motorized division shown below) to get to their staging areas. Such excessive movement not only eats up fuel and MP, but also builds fatigue and decreases TOE as AFVs breakdown thus lowering the combat power of said units. Most Panzer and Motorized formations had around 40 MP at the beginning of the operation, which is only 80% of their capacity.
[image]local://upfiles/57112/813B74F960EB4982B44AAFAD9B0E4333.jpg[/image]
In red, panzer/motorized divisions that took part in the northern thrust. In yellow, formations that took part in the southern thrust. Circled in black, units that were not on the frontline at the beginning of the offensive.
The 2 Panzer Corps model pincer which was used in the north this turn, failed to yield results in the south. Even if the breakthrough in both flanks would have been successful, the motorized/armored formations were inadequate in number to secure the pocket and would have been forced to expose themselves to powerful Soviet counterattacks from strong well rested units that the enemy had in the vicinity. This means that from now on, the OKH will conduct such big pincer movements with forces, the equivalent of a Panzer Army (3 Panzer Corps). This means that the Panzer Corps that is in Crimea right now (belonging to the 1st Panzer Army), will be ordered to move to the Rostov sector immediately so that they are in position for the upcoming summer offensive.
Another big problem was the lack of air support. While the IV Fliegerkorps was in the area and did do its best to support the operation, we simply did not have enough air groups in the area to dominate the skies and hit the enemy ground forces with impunity. Thus many attacks were launched without a preliminary air bombardment or without Air support.
Lessons pulled from this failure:
1) Have enough units ready and in position to be able to breakthrough the main line of defense and also to screen the pocket. The infantry should do most of the fighting in order to allow the exploiting force to secure the pocket. The infantry should do most of the fighting and allow the Panzer/Motorized divisions to save their MPs for exploitation.
2) Make sure you have enough armored/motorized formation for hitting the enemy rear and sealing the pocket. Make sure they are fell supplied and close to the breakthrough point.
3) Make sure there is enough air support to do ground bombing and to run ground support missions.
4) Plan large scale operations better, having more reserves at hand and do not underestimate the enemy.
This concludes the OKH report for the failure of the Donets offensive. Feel free to comment and give me your thoughts on the matter.
|
|
|
|
