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warspite1 -> RE: The question to ask about The Italians (9/1/2020 7:01:50 AM)
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The issue for the British after the fall of France was, without wishing to state the obvious, if the home country fell then the game was up anyway. Yes, the plan was that the British would fight on from the Dominions, but the bulk of the manufacturing capability, and the largest concentration of manpower would be under enemy occupation. Quite clearly defence of the UK therefore was paramount in the summer of 1940.
But, that does not mean that the British would simply refuse to defend elsewhere if it was needed – and if the threat to the UK was manageable. So despite, in real life, the Germans actually doing something about preparing for an invasion, Churchill didn’t bring home UK forces from Egypt and the Middle East, he didn’t reduce Malta and Gibraltar of defences. Yes he swapped six territorial battalions in the UK with six regular battalions from Egypt, and small elements of the ANZAC forces that were to have fought in France, were sent to the UK from the Middle East. The Canadians were in the UK too. What numbers could be expected to bolster the defences of Gibraltar would depend on the threat to the UK, but Gibraltar was too important to be simply given up.
But what is being proposed in this woefully undetailed ‘staff study’ is that the Germans effectively do nothing but plonk a few French barges in various ports while the Luftwaffe sit around and occasionally ‘demonstrate’. Apparently, this policy of letting British industry get on and recover, this policy of leaving Britain alone, while fighter command pilots train properly and bomber command builds up is supposed to be sufficient to make the British believe an invasion was imminent.
After September, when the weather would preclude an invasion, the British have far more flexibility to move units overseas. And so timing of course is also very important, and that is why Curtis Lemay is so desperate for his attack on Spain to start before the Germans would realistically have been in a position to do so.
He suggested July! for this reason. The Armistice with France was only signed on the 22 June 1940. Until around the 1 June, the Germans had no reason to believe that France would be defeated so quickly and there is no way plans would have been made for what happens next. We know Hitler still believed, especially after the armistice, that the British would refuse to fight on and continued to make peace feelers. There would necessarily be a time for the defeat of France to sink in and for the British to come to their senses, before Hitler realised the truth….
Having done so, and Catapult would have pretty much told him all he needed to know, he now, at the start of July, has to start thinking about the next steps. We know the route he chose, but this scenario has Hitler choosing a different path having listened to Raeder and a few others about the benefits of the Mediterranean.
Gibraltar would of course have been the first name on the list and this is perfect, after all, Franco would be sufficiently grateful for the help received in installing him as Claudillo, that he would jump at the chance to get Gibraltar back. Despite the total nonsense outlined (there is no detail) in this scenario, under no circumstances under any scenario, would Hitler simply plan to invade Spain. Counter-factuals can be fun to explore, but alternate scenarios need to be kept from flights of fantasy.
So, after Catapult gives Hitler his answer from the UK, Hitler will now set out to convince Spain of the need to join the Axis after the usual diplomatic manoeuvrings. Hitler is no doubt fully confident that Franco knows what he has to do. But, unlike Hitler, we know exactly what Franco will say and we know why he will say it. Hitler will ask Mussolini to speak to him as one ‘southern European’ to another, and we know too, what will come from this. Eventually (we assume Hitler is by this point sufficiently set on a Med strategy, and sufficiently angered by Franco) he gives the Spaniard an ultimatum. “Look, I’ve been nice, I’ve offered you what I can, but I really need you to make a decision or it’s no more Mr Nice Guy”. Logically this ultimatum coincides with plans to invade Spain instead.
An invasion of Spain is such a massive decision. I know it’s a favourite of strategic war gamers, but if we come out of the cardboard and pixel world we gamers all love to inhabit, and actually stay in the real world then we must acknowledge that, for so many reasons, and on so many levels, this is a huge decision. The letters between Hitler and Mussolini reflect how annoyed Hitler was at Franco’s stance but, at no point, does he remotely even suggest that there would be any offensive action taken against Spain in return. But, for the purposes of this scenario, we are going with it, but it is something that Hitler will do everything he can to avoid.
By the time the Germans have drawn up the plans and moved the forces required into southwest France and ready for the lead elements to cross the border, we are probably talking mid-August at the earliest? I think with Malta and Gibraltar intact and the Regia Marina yet to have the Littorios worked up, we can discount any naval assistance from the Italians. Besides, the RM is fully focussed on supplying Italian troops in North Africa that Mussolini is desperate to set against the British in Egypt.
Meanwhile, what has been happening in Northern France? This is the big unanswered question at this point. What exactly have the Germans been doing to make the British believe an invasion is being planned? Without understanding this then any British response to action against Spain simply can’t be considered.
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