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Hortlund -> (7/10/2001 4:43:00 PM)
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First, I have seen some low blows when it comes to US-bashing, but this one is really unfair. There were cowards and heroes on both sides. Let me give you some counterexamples.
In March 1945 two Jagdtigers (yes, you heard right…Jagdtigers) supported by a company of infantry moved into position to ambush an American advance column. It was in the early morning hours, no snow, but the weather was very cold and brisk. The two Tigers took positions along a crestline, and waited for the advancing Americans while the infantry set up their positions in the vicinity of the two tanks. About 30 minutes later the Americans showed up. The two Tigers opened up, and the battle started. The Americans had no chance whatsoever to do any damage to the two tigers with their tanks (M4a3's if I remember correctly), so they called in arty and an airstrike. The tigers took several hits from rockets, but were not KO:ed. In the meantime, American infantry were working their way towards the Tigers, so the Tigers decided to pull out. When they returned to the command post they found the German infantry company there. So what had happened? When the two tigers opened up with their massive guns (128's) in that brisk cold morning the cannons created a big cloud of fumes, or smoke (eh, perhaps that is not the right word, but you know what I mean, right…when you fire a gun, it smokes). So anyway, the German infantry heard the thunderous detonations (when the guns went off) and saw the smoke from the tanks and figured that the Tigers had been knocked out and promptly retreated. Now what does that tell us about courageous German soldiers?
Or this:
JOHNSON, OSCAR G.
Rank and organization: Sergeant, U.S. Army, Company B, 363d Infantry, 91st Infantry Division. Place and date: Near Scarperia, Italy, 1618 September 1944. Entered service at: Foster City, Mich. Birth: Foster City, Mich. G.O. No.: 58, 19 July 1945. Citation: (then Pfc.)
He practically single-handed protected the left flank of his company's position in the offensive to break the German's gothic line. Company B was the extreme left assault unit of the corps. The advance was stopped by heavy fire from Monticelli Ridge, and the company took cover behind an embankment. Sgt. Johnson, a mortar gunner, having expended his ammunition, assumed the duties of a rifleman. As leader of a squad of 7 men he was ordered to establish a combat post 50 yards to the left of the company to cover its exposed flank. Repeated enemy counterattacks, supported by artillery, mortar, and machinegun fire from the high ground to his front, had by the afternoon of 16 September killed or wounded all his men. Collecting weapons and ammunition from his fallen comrades, in the face of hostile fire, he held his exposed position and inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy, who several times came close enough to throw hand grenades. On the night of 1617 September, the enemy launched his heaviest attack on Company B, putting his greatest pressure against the lone defender of the left flank. In spite of mortar fire which crashed about him and machinegun bullets which whipped the crest of his shallow trench, Sgt. Johnson stood erect and repulsed the attack with grenades and small arms fire. He remained awake and on the alert throughout the night, frustrating all attempts at infiltration. On 17 September, 25 German soldiers surrendered to him. Two men, sent to reinforce him that afternoon, were caught in a devastating mortar and artillery barrage. With no thought of his own safety, Sgt. Johnson rushed to the shell hole where they lay half buried and seriously wounded, covered their position by his fire, and assisted a Medical Corpsman in rendering aid. That night he secured their removal to the rear and remained on watch until his company was relieved. Five companies of a German paratroop regiment had been repeatedly committed to the attack on Company B without success. Twenty dead Germans were found in front of his position. By his heroic stand and utter disregard for personal safety, Sgt. Johnson was in a large measure responsible for defeating the enemy's attempts to turn the exposed left flank.
I suggest you take a look at this page and learn something: http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/moh1.htm
Second, someone wrote about the dolchstoss theory from wwi. There might be more truth to it than you think. Basically in 1918 the German army was in really bad shape. Germany was under a very tight naval blockade, and the general food situation was bad all over Germany. The war so far had been a very bloody and pointless one, with hundreds of thousands of men slaughtered in the trenches for no gain whatsoever. Every attack followed the same pattern, 3-5 days of artillery bombardment, followed by a mad rush across no-mans land. And they all ended in the same results. The defenders sat in their shelters during the 3-5 days of arty bombardment, and when the shelling stopped the defenders emerged with their machineguns and slaughtered all the running men trying to cross no-mans land. Not even the tanks back then were of any use. Too slow, too heavy, no doctrine. All they did was drive around in no-mans land until they bogged down or were knocked out. Some penetrated the lines, but without infantry support they could do little but return to their own lines. Then the Germans came up with a new tactic. The stosstruppen tactics. In short this new tactic put focus on the squad as the main fighting unit, instead of the company as it had been before. The men were equipped with satchel charges, hand grenades, and automatic or semiautomatic weapons. These squads were designed to be highly maneuverable and flexible. The artillery doctrine was changed too. Instead of massive 5 day bombardments before the attack, that served little more than to alert the defenders, and make no-mans land into an impassable wilderness the artillery would be used in other ways. The arty would fire intense fire missions during 10-15 minutes max, lots of smoke would be used, the fire missions would be targeted not only at the frontlines, but also in depth, targeting the lines of communication, and other rear areas.
The basic attack plan would be this: one or two days before the attack the stormtroops would infiltrate into no-mans land, and go as deep as they could. The units would even infiltrate beyond the first and second lines of defence. When the attack started, the arty shot massive smoke missions, combined with concentrated fire missions on targets all along the enemy's depth. After the artillery strikes, the stormtroops would all attack at the same time, effectively attacking the enemy's defensive lines from all sides, even from behind. While this was taking place, regular infantry units would attack in the "normal" fashion across no-mans land.
When this new tactic was first used in 1918 (cant remember the exact date or location, I'll check it up if you want). The allied lines were shattered. The Germans advanced 20km's the first two days of the offensive. The offensive continued, and the allies did not have any effective countermeasure against these new tactics. The situation could be described as an infantry type blitzkrieg. Things were looking very bleak for the allies and there was a real chance for Germany to win the war at this point. The offensive was halted however, not from allied resistance, but from lack of supplies. The Germans had run out of food and ammo, and they were forced to halt the offensive after something like a week (again, I can check up on the details if you want). At the same time there was a big strike in Germany where thousands of factory workers and transport workers had laid down their work. The strike was organized by the communist movement, and it had been going on for something like a month. No production, and only very limited transports via rail.
Now, the supporters of the dochstoss theory, or myth, or whatever, claim that if these workers had not been on strike 1) the German army would have had more supplies 2) if the German army had had more supplies it would have been able to continue the advance, possibly (and even probably) being able to reach a negotiated peace 3) after the offensive halted the allies were able to launch their own offensive with the new US troops brought in, this offensive ended the war. Therefore it could be argued that the last German offensive was the last chance for Germany to secure some kind of "other-than-total-surrender-peace", and this offensive failed due to lack of supplies, the lack of supplies had a lot to do with the strike in Germany, which was organized by communists.
On a sidenote. One of the young lieutenants in the new stosstruppen units was Felix Steiner, and he was so impressed with this new tactic that he decided to model his units after it. After the war Steiner was appointed regimental commander of the Waffen SS regiment Deutschland. He equipped his soldiers with camouflage uniforms, focused on small units with high firepower, and trained his men to be highly flexible. Rgt Deutschland were later a part of Das Reich, the divison with the highest number of decorations in the war. So those stosstruppen tactics lived on in wwii, and they are still around today.
Steve
[ July 10, 2001: Message edited by: Panzerjaeger Hortlund ]
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