RE: Why was Patton so great? (Full Version)

All Forums >> [General] >> General Discussion



Message

Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 7:00:22 AM)

Please find below the details surrounding three major operations during WW2 in Europe. These operations turned out to be mistakes.

Of the leading high ranking officers at that time, historians have named Ike, Montgomery and Bradley has having made crucial errors that not only delayed the war and allowed thousands of the enemy to escape, but also led to even more Allied soldiers being killed.

The one leading officer who shines during this period is General Patton.

All of the information is based on widely known facts, and most historians acknowledge the circumstances in all cases.


Taken from the book:


The Unknown Patton


by


Charles M. Province


CHAPTER SIX


SHAEF'S THREE MAJOR ERRORS


I - The Falaise Pocket

On June 6th, 1944, the Allied Forces launched "Overlord". The invasion of Normandy. This force, consisting of the First Army (American) and the Second Army (British) was commanded by General Montgomery.

On August 1st, 1944, D-Day+55, Patton's Third Army became officially operational.

Between July 5th, when Third Army had actually landed on French soil, and July 31, Third Army had advanced inland to the town of Avranches. The advance was a total of about 50 miles in 26 days.

In a comparison, Montgomery and his Second British Army had, since D-Day, advanced to the town of Caen, about 10 miles inland. A total of ten miles in 55 days. Montgomery's explanation for his slowness was that he was "re-grouping" in order to pivot at Caen and attack the Germans in force. . . .

By August 11, D-Day+66, Patton and his Third Army had broken completely out of the Cherbourg peninsula. He had advanced south, west, east, and north. Third Army had ripped a hole through the German Seventh Army and had roared "hell for leather" through the towns of Avranches, Mortain, Fougeres, Vitre, Mayenne, and Laval. They had made a sharp 90 degree turn at Le Mans and attacked north to the town of Alecon. They had gone a total of 200 miles in 10 days. . . .

By August 15th, D-Day+70, Third Army units (the Second French Armored Division and the 90th American Infantry Division) had reached Argentan, a town about 12 miles from Falaise. Canadian troops under Montgomery had reached the outskirts of Falaise. August 17th, D-Day+72, saw Patton's 90th Division and Second French Division joined by the 80th Infantry Division at Argentan. Montgomery's Second Army was still about 10 miles from Falaise.

At this point, there was a gap of 12 miles between Falaise to Argentan through which the German Seventh Army was escaping. Patton and his Third Army had moved 250 miles in 17 days. They had completely encircled the German Seventh Army, and were now ready to advance directly to Falaise. Blocking their escape and destroying them would be like shooting fish in a barrel. . . .

Third Army was poised and ready for one of the swiftest, greatest victories in all of history. Closing the gap between the two towns was a matter of hours. The 15th Corps had the tanks and troops necessary to put up a solid wall of men and armor. The Germans were completely confused and running for their lives. Then, the order arrived from SHAEF. HALT!

Patton and his Third Army were ordered NOT to seize Falaise.

What the Germans were powerless to do, SHAEF did for them.

There were later two explanations given for the order to stop Patton. First, SHAEF claimed that the British had "heavily sewn the Falaise area with time bombs." Secondly, Bradley claimed that he not only feared a head on collision of the British and Americans, he also was worried that the fleeing Germans might "trample" the Third Army in it's rush to escape.

The first claim was an outright lie to cover political chicanery.

The second claim by Bradley made no sense at all. They were noises made by a subordinate to obfuscate and condone an error by his superiors. Had the proper order been issued, the British could have held their position and there would have been no possibility of a "collision" of British and American forces.

Regarding Bradley's anxiety about Third Army being "trampled", it is incredible and difficult to imagine two Infantry Divisions and an Armored Division being "trampled" by a thoroughly routed enemy. Evidently, the thought never occurred to Bradley that the enemy might consider surrendering.

The real reason behind the halting of Third Army was Montgomery. He insisted, or rather, demanded that he be allowed to close the gap. He did not want Patton to spring the trap that Third Army had set. Monty wanted the glory and the credit for the "ripe plum" situation which was created by Patton's brilliant leadership and Third Army's speed and daring execution. He received neither. He did not close the gap in time, and he allowed a great number of Germans to live to fight another day.

Montgomery failed to reach Falaise until the 19th of August, D-Day+74. During that time, with Patton halted at Argentan, the great bulk of the German Army managed to escape through the 12 mile gap. What would have been one of the great and memorable victories of all time was lost due to one of SHAEF's oleaginous political schemes.

After this major blunder had been accomplished and became part of history, Patton wrote in his diary, "The 15th Corps could have easily entered the town of Falaise and completely closed the gap to Argentan. This halt was a great mistake as I was certain that we could have entered Falaise and I was not certain that the British would. As a matter of fact, we had reconnaissance parties near the town when we were ordered to pull back." Patton was correct, yet his advice went unheeded.


II - Market-Garden and Out of Gas

What was probably the greatest error made in WWII by Eisenhower and the SHAEF planners was actually two directly related occurrences, one which greatly affected the other.

To quote General Patton, "The 29th of August, 1944 was, in my opinion, one of the critical days of the war. Hereafter pages will be written on it, or rather on the events which produced it. It was evident that then there was no real threat against us as long as we did not stop ourselves or allow ourselves to be stopped by imaginary enemies. Everything seemed rosy when suddenly it was reported to me that the 140,000 gallons of gasoline which we were supposed to get for that day did not arrive. I presented my case for a rapid advance to the east for the purpose of cutting the Siegfried Line before it could be manned. It was my opinion that this was the momentous error of the war."

Patton thought that German resistance had collapsed and that nothing could stop the Third Army and the Allies if they proceeded with speed. What did stop him was once again the high command. Now, 35 years later, there is massive evidence to prove conclusively that Patton was correct. Eisenhower and SHAEF were wrong, again. One of Eisenhower's problems was that his SHAEF headquarters was located at Granville, near Cherbourg, a distance of 400 miles from the battle front.

The reason for Patton's halt was explained away as "lack of supplies". Another great lie. There was no lack of supplies. There was, however, a "diversion of supplies".

One thorn in Patton's side was the person of General John C.H. Lee, the commander of COMZ. COMZ was the supply command. With Patton in dire need of gasoline and other imperative supplies, Lee decided that the end of August was the perfect time to move his non-combatant headquarters to greener pastures. What proved to be "just the ticket" was a move to newly liberated Paris. This, of course, meant newly liberated wine, newly liberated women, and newly liberated song. During the move, Lee used hundreds of trucks, tons of supplies, and thousands of gallons of gasoline that were desperately needed by the Third Army's thirsty tanks. Eisenhower, of course and as usual, remained silent. Bradley quietly remarked, "No one can compute the cost of that move in lost truck tonnage on the front."

It is interesting to consult a map of the European Theater of Operations during the end of August, 1944. In northern France, from Dieppe to Mantes (north to south) were Crerar and the Canadian Army; Dempsey and the British Second Army; and Hodges and the First American Army. These three Armies constituting Montgomery's 21st Army Group occupied a front of about 150 linear miles. Contiguous to them on the south was Patton and Third Army. First Army received ample supplies. The boundary between First and Third Armies apparently was an insurmountable obstacle making utterly impossible any transportation of any supplies, especially gasoline.

It was evident to all commanders that what was actually needed was to discontinue Eisenhower's "Broad front" strategy (which he continually and pontifically quoted from Clauswitz). Reassessment of the situation demanded a "single thrust" strategy. There were monumental reasons why this thrust should have been headed by Patton. He, above all others, was capable of the direct, simple, and ruthless drive which would be required to accomplish the task. He was also the most adept at exploiting success.

Actually, Patton could have been supplied more easily than might be imagined. Had 21st Army group been halted instead of Third Army, supplies could have been sent directly behind and through 21st Army Group territory. When Third Army had advanced to the forefront, 21st Army Group could have then followed up Third Army's advancing rear to the south. They could then pivot to the north when Third Army had taken the northern position previously held by 21st Army Group. In other words, they could have switched places by means of a "pinwheel" maneuver.

The great need therefore was for Patton to orchestrate a single concentrated thrust so deep into Germany's heart that the enemy would have no chance of recovery. The timing was perfect, the day of August 29 was the day. It should have been ordered by SHAEF. Instead, Bradley, reluctantly following orders from above, cut Patton's gasoline supply from 400,000 gallons a day to almost nothing.

Fate had given Eisenhower the greatest Cavalry leader and as great an Army as his nation had ever produced. He failed at the decisive moment to use them. Why? The reason was not the supply situation. The reason was Field-Marshal Montgomery.

Eisenhower once again sided with Montgomery and the British so that Montgomery could attempt the "single thrust" attack, but not into Germany. The attack was to be in Holland. Montgomery used the term "dagger-like" thrust. Bradley remarked that it probably would be more like a "butter-knife" thrust.

Patton had often claimed that Eisenhower was more British than American and that he (Eisenhower) allowed the British to influence him too extensively. This is certainly true. One cannot fault the British nor even Montgomery for this. People and nations have since the dawn of time striven for themselves and this is understandable. The British were not at fault. Montgomery was not at fault. The entire blame lies squarely and solely upon Eisenhower. He was a straw man who had never experienced the necessary command of troops. He utterly lacked "command presence" and personal confidence in his own decisions. According to General Patton, Eisenhower was always attempting to be popular, always wanting to be "one of the boys". He was, for his entire Army career, a staff officer. As General MacArthur had once said of him, "He was the best clerk I ever had." Had he been a better, more capable commander; had he some combat experience and more backbone, he might have been able to stand his ground and make the correct and necessary decision. Instead, he replaced pragmatism with politics. One of the influences that effected him greatly was his romantic involvement with a British woman; his driver, Kay Summersby.

Eisenhower had decided to go along with Montgomery and his plan code-named, "Operation Market-Garden". Montgomery demanded, and got, absolute priority for ETO supplies. He was assured by Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, that not only would he receive a thousand tons of supplies per day plus transport, he was additionally promised that Patton's drive to the Saar would be completely halted. Montgomery was elated.

Shortly after 10 a.m. on Sunday, September 17, 1944, from airfields all over southern England the greatest armada of troop-carrying aircraft ever assembled for a single operation took to the air. MARKET, which was the airborne phase of the operation, was monumental; it involved almost 5,000 fighters, bombers, transports and more than 2500 gliders. That Sunday afternoon, at 1:30 p.m. an entire Allied airborne army, complete with vehicles and equipment, began dropping behind the German lines. The target for this historic and tragic invasion from the sky was Nazi occupied Holland.

On the ground, ready along the Dutch-Belgian border, were the GARDEN forces, massed tank columns of the British Second Army. At 2:35 p.m., preceded by artillery and led by swarms of rocket firing fighters, the tanks began their dash into Holland along a strategic route that the paratroopers were already fighting to capture and hold open.

It staggers the imagination when considering what Patton could have accomplished with this massive force and number one priority.

On September 24, 1944, Operation Market-Garden was officially over. Here is what had happened:

Allied forces suffered more casualties in Market-Garden than in the mammoth invasion of Normandy. Most historians agree that in the twenty-four hour period of D-Day, total Allied losses reached an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 men. In the nine days of Market-Garden, combined losses amounted to MORE THAN 17,000 men.

British casualties were the highest; a total of 13,226. General Urquhart's entire division was almost destroyed to a man. In the 10,005 Arnhem force, which included a Polish division and glider pilots, casualties totaled 7,578. In addition to this figure RAF pilot and crew losses came to another 294, making a total of 7,872. General Horrocks 30th Corps lost 1,480 and the British 8th and 12th Corps another 3,874.

American losses, including glider pilots and the 9th Troop Carrier Command, are put at 3,974. General Gavin's 82nd Airborne Division had suffered a loss of 1,432. General Taylor's 101st Airborne lost 2,118. Air crew losses were 424.

Complete German figures are unknown. In Arnhem and Oosterbeek admitted casualties came to 3,300 including 1,300 dead. After interviewing German commanders a conservative estimate was that Army Group B lost at least 7,500 to 10,000 men of which perhaps a quarter were killed. A total of 12,000 to 15,000 men. Less than the Allies.

What about Dutch civilian casualties? No one can say. Deaths in Arnhem and Oosterbeek are said to have been low, less than 500, but no one knows with any certainty. there have been casualty figures given as high as 10,000 in the entire Operation Market-Garden campaign and as a result of the forcible evacuation of the Arnhem sector together with deprivation and starvation in the terrible winter that followed the attack.

Had it been worth it? NO. Operation Market-Garden was a prime example of a "Pyrrhic" victory.

After Market-Garden was over, Montgomery said, "In my prejudiced view, if the operation had been properly backed from it's inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job - it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd and SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain Market-Garden's unrepentant advocate."

It seems incredible that with Patton stopped, with absolute priority in supplies and weapons, and with over 30,000 troops, Montgomery still claims that his plan was "improperly backed". What more could he have asked for and gotten. . . .?

Had Patton been given this type of support, supplies, and equipment. . . .

Perhaps Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands summed it up most succinctly when he stated, "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success."


III - Ardennes Offensive / Battle of the Bulge

The "Battle of the Bulge" at Bastogne, Belgium was not initiated completely by the Germans. They had a healthy assist from their enemy, the Allies. It is another case of one thing affecting another. There were two occurrences which helped the Germans to launch their offensive on December 16, 1944.

The first was recorded by General Patton in his diary, "The 1st Army is making a terrible mistake in leaving the 8th Corps area static, as it is probable that the Germans are building up to the east of them."

What prompted Patton to this judgement were reports from his G-2 (Intelligence) officer, Colonel Oscar Koch. Ignoring daily intelligence reports from SHAEF, which was hundreds of miles behind the front lines, and who claimed that everything was fine and dandy, Koch had his own intelligence teams at work. One of these was nicknamed "Patton's Household Cavalry".

As early as December 12, 1944, Koch had begun preparing and transmitting reports to SHAEF regarding what he considered to be a dangerous buildup of Germans east of the 1st Army's 8th Corps. Eisenhower was very busy, occupied with major decisions such as who should be the head nurse of SHAEF. Therefore, he ignored the warnings from those two upstarts, Koch and Patton. He mistakenly allowed Bradley to turn the 8th Corps area into a "rest station", thereby reducing both their discipline and fighting spirit.

The second occurrence was Bradley's breaking of a promise that he had made to Patton. Patton explains, "Bradley called up at 1710 hours and, in my opinion, crawfished quite blatantly, in his forbidding me to use the 83rd Division. I believe that he had been "overtalked" by either Middleton or Hodges, or by both. I was very sore at the time and I still regard it as a great mistake. If I had been able to use the two combat teams of the 83rd to attack Saarburg, that town would have fallen on the 12th or 13th and we probably would have captured the city of Trier. With Trier in our hands, Von Rundstedt's breakthrough could not have occurred. This is probably a case of, "because of a nail, a shoe was lost, etc..."

In other words, had Patton been allowed to use the 83rd Division, as he had been promised, the Germans would not have had the ability to stage their offensive, let alone break through to Bastogne. Knowing Patton's perceptiveness, his intuitiveness, and above all, his track record, it is next to impossible not to believe him. Yet, he was once again ignored and put in his place by his "superiors", to use the word in a military sense only.

Patton being the commander he was, envisioned what could and might happen if the Germans did decide to attack. He called his staff together for a meeting. By the time that Patton was called to attend the Allied meeting at Verdun, to discuss the "Bulge" situation, Patton was already prepared with two completely separate and distinct plans of action. All that was needed was for him to phone his Chief of Staff, utter one of two code words, and within a matter of minutes Third Army would be headed north toward Bastogne to, "... rip out their living guts and grease the treads of our tanks with them."

This was the type of planning that Patton and his staff did so well. This same staff that Bradley had termed "mediocre". Truthfully, it was the best and most loyal staff in the entire European Theater of Operations.

At one point, Patton proposed that the Germans be allowed to advance even further. Then he could attack their rear, cut off the salient at the base, and annihilate them. He was turned down.

Within less than 48 hours after that meeting, Third Army had 2 divisions attacking toward Bastogne, hitting them in the flank and abruptly stopping their offensive. Within a week he had moved the bulk of his Army, a quarter of a million strong, and including 133,000 tanks and trucks, between 50 and 70 miles to the north in the worst possible weather conditions over icy roads. It is little wonder that the Germans had such a healthy respect for and a powerful fear of Patton. It is a wonder, though, how SHAEF could continually ignore him and his ideas.

By January 23, the Ardennes Offensive was Kaput. The German had lost not only the battle, but also the war. The Germans knew it and Patton knew it. The only ones who did not know it were the masterminds at SHAEF.

After Patton had been called in to save the day, he was put back in his place. Though he had saved the Bastogne operations, he was informed that the major push would now be north of the Ruhr, meaning Montgomery.

In the aftermath of Bastogne, Patton continued to follow orders and to fight Germans. Montgomery made some noisy statements about how he had come to the rescue and saved the day for the unfortunate Americans. During his speech, one would almost get the impression that he could use the term "colonists" in lieu of "Americans". This was too much even for some of the British. Winston Churchill, speaking before the House of Commons, publicly repudiated Montgomery and his statements. It might be mentioned that had Patton acted and spoken the way Montgomery did, he would have been immediately relieved of duty by Eisenhower, castigated (or castrated) by the press, and sent home in shame. Churchill not only repudiated Montgomery, he reminded him and the British population that during the Bulge, that for every British soldier in the line, there were 35 to 40 Americans; for every British casualty, there were 55 to 60 American casualties. . . .

These, then, are the three MAJOR errors made by Eisenhower and SHAEF during WWII in the European Theater of Operations. There were others, but none which had such a wide spread effect on the possible end of the war itself. Had Patton's advice and counsel been heeded, it is very probable that the war would have been concluded by the end of 1944, instead of in 1945.

http://www.pattonhq.com/unknown/chap06.html



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 7:07:31 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

You just can't stay away can you[;)]


I was going to stay away.

But then I made the mistake of reading some of the posts in this thread.

Some of it is complete and utter nonsense. . .

So I am taking the time to post more information and views on Patton and Third Army for the more thoughtful reader.



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 7:56:55 AM)

Based on information from: "Patton: A Genius for War" by Carlos D'Este, pp. 504-520; and The History Net http://www.historynet.com/ah/blpattontomessina/


Patton in Sicily

When Patton and Monty landed in Sicily, Alexander assigned Monty the role of driving north to Messina in the east, while Patton was assigned the role of "watching" Monty's flank in the west.

For two weeks Patton and his Seventh Army sat idle, while Monty's British and Canadian soldiers became bogged down in tough mountain fighting against heavily entrenched German and Italian troops.

Finally, Patton had had enough.

Taking matters into his own hands, Patton flew to meet with Alexander, and persuaded him to allow Seventh Army to drive towards Palermo. In a second meeting with Monty present, Monty also agreed that Patton should drive west and then east.

Montgomery surprised Patton by suggesting that Seventh Army capture Messina. While Keyes and Bradley had raced across Sicily, Montgomery's Eighth Army had become completely bogged down in the east. Dug-in German troops continued to hold Montgomery at Catania, while his circling movement west around Etna proceeded slowly. With Seventh Army now poised, cat-like, ready to strike east, Montgomery realized that Patton was best positioned to take the city. Besides, by attacking east Patton would relieve the pressure on Eighth Army and allow him to finally punch past Catania.

On July 22 Truscott's Division entered Palermo after covering an astonishing 100 miles in just 72 hours in mountainous and winding roads.

When Patton captured Palermo, he not only acquired a forward port to receive supplies, but he also isolated and trapped 57,000 Italian soldiers in the west, who would be unable to join the fighting.

Then Patton unleashed his armour to drive east to Messina.

As the final phase of the Sicily Campaign heated up, Patton drove his officers to push as hard as they could. Troina fell on August 6. To the south, British forces captured Adrano and--finally--Catania. Fighting a brilliant rearguard action, German army units crept back from their narrowing front toward the beaches of the Straits of Messina. There, German and Italian ships waited to ferry troops and equipment across the two-mile passage to the Italian mainland.

In an effort to by-pass enemy positions and speed up his advance, Patton authorized two amphibious landings along the north coast. On the night of August 7-8 Americans swept ashore virtually unopposed behind German lines at St. Agata. At the same time, troops from Truscott's 3rd Division launched an attack on the high ridges inland and took 1,500 prisoners, bringing Seventh Army 12 miles closer to Messina. The second landing nearly proved a disaster. Truscott felt he would not have time to get his infantry up in time to support it, and wanted to postpone the attack for one day. Bradley agreed. But Patton was having none of it. Messina lay around the corner, and this wasn't the time to slow down. Early on August 11 elements of Truscott's 30th Infantry regiment went ashore at Brolo, 12 miles behind a German front. The Americans were quickly pinned down on a hill just above town. Nearly 30 hours passed before the balance of Truscott's troops could relieve them. Progress had again been made, but at a high price.

On August 13 American troops captured Randazzo. To the south, British and Canadian troops forced the Germans from the slopes of Mt. Etna. Axis forces flooded toward Messina. On the night of August 15-16 Montgomery tried an amphibious landing of his own, putting elements of his commando and armored units ashore at Scaletta, just eight miles from Messina.

Patton ordered a third "leap-frog" operation for that same night, but by then American troops were moving so fast that they had already passed the scheduled landing site by the time the ship borne force arrived. Around 10:00 p.m. on August 16 elements of Truscott's 3rd Division entered bomb-scarred Messina. Patton immediately notified Eisenhower and Alexander, and called Bradley to tell him "we would enter Messina in the morning at 1000 hours."

Patton's victorious, hell-for-leather drive on Messina restored some luster to an otherwise badly managed campaign. Rather than firmly coordinating the moves of Seventh and Eighth Armies, Alexander had vacillated, first backing down to Montgomery and then allowing, almost forcing, Patton to set his own course. Poor decisions, such as the reassignment of Highway 124 to Montgomery (and poor air cover over the Messina Straits), ultimately cost time, and allowed Axis ships and ferries to evacuate roughly 60,000 Italian soldiers, 40,000 Germans, 10,000 vehicles, and 17,000 tons of equipment from the island--all of which would soon be used against the Allies in Italy.

The race had significant, if less tangible, repercussions for Patton and American fighting men. The fast-moving Seventh Army had proved itself the equal of Eighth Army and set a new standard in mobile warfare. The Americans, Montgomery admitted after the war, had "proved themselves to be first-class troops. It took time; but they did it more quickly than we did."

Significance

Patton's drive to Palermo and then to Messina was an operation he planned and initiated. His successful drive helped to save both Alexander's and Monty's reputations. Alexander had allowed Patton's Seventh Army to sit idle for TWO weeks. Monty's army was bogged down in the mountainous terrain in the east against stiff Axis resistance.

Patton showed the correctness of his decision because both Alexander AND Monty clearly saw the need for it, and agreed to it.

Had Patton been able to drive west when he first landed, in all likelihood, he could have bagged ALL of the Axis forces on Sicily. Even starting two weeks late, Patton still got to Messina before Monty.

Unfortunately, this delay allowed over 100,000 Axis troops and 10,000 vehicles to escape across the Straits of Messina, and would later be in position to fight Allied troops in Italy.

"Both the Tunisian and Sicily campaigns highlighted Patton’s skill at rapidly moving his forces and logistics to sustain them in order to engage and defeat the enemy. In his book Crusade in Europe, Eisenhower praises Patton’s mobility: "Speed requires training, fitness, confidence, morale, suitable transport, and skillful leadership. Patton employed these tactics relentlessly, and thus not only minimized casualties but shook the whole Italian Government so forcibly that Mussolini toppled from his position in late July."35 Also in a letter to Marshall, Eisenhower praised Patton’s "native shrewdness about logistics…and as a truly aggressive commander with brains."36 Patton’s combat and logistics units plus his staff elements constantly improved their abilities to fight and sustain their formations in the tactical environment. Now with the invasion of Europe quickly approaching, the logistics lessons learned from the Tunisian and Sicilian operations would be put to good use—as well as Patton and his Third Army."

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/decker.html



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 8:32:03 AM)

Mention has been made that Patton left no writing. This is untrue.

We know more about Patton's thoughts and plans than most other high officers. Why?

Because General Patton kept a day-to-day diary of his thoughts, plans and feelings throughout the war.

His diaries were published as "The Patton Papers 1940-1945"

Here are some reviews:

http://www.historyofmilitary.com/The_Patton_Papers_19401945_0306807173.html



Patton also wrote a book "War as I knew it", which was published in 1947.


War As I Knew It

- Book Review, by George S. Patton, Rick Atkinson (Introduction)

Book Description

Adored by many, loathed by some, General George S. Patton, Jr., was one of the most brilliant military strategists in history. War As I Knew It is the personal and candid account of his celebrated, relentless crusade across western Europe during World War II. First published in 1947, this absorbing narrative draws on Patton's vivid memories of battle and his detailed diaries, from the moment the Third Army exploded onto the Brittany Peninsula to the final Allied casualty report. The result is not only a grueling, human account of daily combat and heroic feats - including a riveting look at the Battle of the Bulge - but a valuable chronicle of the strategies and fiery personality of a legendary warrior. Patton's letters from earlier military campaigns in North Africa and Sicily, complemented by a powerful retrospective of his guiding philosophies, further reveal a man of uncompromising will and uncommon character, which made "Georgie" a household name in mid-century America. With a new introduction.

[image]local://upfiles/279/Tr511689740.jpg[/image]



freeboy -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 10:55:21 AM)

It is difficult for myself in hindsight to find any reasonableness to those criticle of Patton's military prowess, the arguments given seem lumped into two catagories.. the " he was arogent and full of himself" and the "what third army did wasn't so great... "
These arguments are like saying water tastes better when filtered... so what? He didn't like Monty, too similar in arogance perhaps.. and he did get passed over in favor of Bradley... Omar Bradley.. come on now that was a huge mistake!!!
And the thought that the Germans didn't regard him as the allies Ace is ludicrous... read what they actually said. sorry no references handy. Why do you think the Panzers where waiting at Calies? For Monty ggcb(good grief charlie Brown)
Looking at the French 44 45 area in ww2 one wonders at all the errors we see in hindsight.
Troops left in Norway and the Channel Islands.. toxic nerve agent not used on dday against the beaches.. but the crucial air control of the skies was lost well prior to Normandy, and the Eastern Front had bleed Germany badly. I wopuld argue that we look at the performances of this theater in light of the overall ww2 effort. Patton troops outperformed all others in the task at hand. More area taken, troops captured etc.
Would he have done well on the retreat, we'll never know, but he was a take charge and lead by example leader.. never far from his troops. Men, from this period, who I admire did not always like or agree with him. I am scratching my head on this one.. not trying to offend just really do not agree based on considerable study of the period.



Ludovic Coval -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 12:27:18 PM)

von Rom

quote:

Contrary to what was shown in the movie, when Patton was forced to apologize to Third Army (for the slapping incident), all his soldiers cheered loudly, so that Patton could not utter his apology. They (the soldiers of Third Army) felt that the General did not have to apologize to them. This act brought tears to Patton's eyes.


I may be wrong but if memory serve, the movie place the slap incident in Italy, by this time Patton was in charge of 7th Army. He then lost its command only to be given 3rd with Bradley help. Also, always if memory serve, Bradley and Patton were close friends.

Finally, Falaise pocket was result of Cobra, operation mainly planned by Bradley not Patton. After 3rd Army had broke German lines at Avranches (most Germans tanks were around Caen, making Brits lives miserable), she found herself without flanks with a narrow corridor to rest of 12 Army Group. (Actually Germans tried to cut-off her with their attack on Mortain).

LC



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 4:27:14 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ludovic Coval

von Rom

quote:

Contrary to what was shown in the movie, when Patton was forced to apologize to Third Army (for the slapping incident), all his soldiers cheered loudly, so that Patton could not utter his apology. They (the soldiers of Third Army) felt that the General did not have to apologize to them. This act brought tears to Patton's eyes.


I may be wrong but if memory serve, the movie place the slap incident in Italy, by this time Patton was in charge of 7th Army. He then lost its command only to be given 3rd with Bradley help. Also, always if memory serve, Bradley and Patton were close friends.

Finally, Falaise pocket was result of Cobra, operation mainly planned by Bradley not Patton. After 3rd Army had broke German lines at Avranches (most Germans tanks were around Caen, making Brits lives miserable), she found herself without flanks with a narrow corridor to rest of 12 Army Group. (Actually Germans tried to cut-off her with their attack on Mortain).

LC


Hi Ludovic Coval:

There were a number of factual errors in the movie Patton. The slapping incidents actually took place on Sicily.

Bradley and Patton were close friends. But Bradley slowly turned against Patton over time. They were both very different characters in personality, etc. However, while Bradley did not care for the way Patton talked sometimes, he could not fault Patton on both his fighting and tactical abilities.

Operation Cobra:

Actually, Operation Cobra, while credited to Bradley, was originally devised by Patton and his brilliant staff.

In the months to come, after North Africa, Patton was never "officially" asked about plans for any Allied operation. In private, though, it was a very different story. Very often, others would come to him to ask his views and ideas concerning future plans. Bradley, especially, would come to Patton to ask his opinion about impending operations. Often he would not only ask Patton's opinion, he would also "borrow" his thoughts. They would later turn up miraculously as Bradley's ideas. This situation became so bad that, eventually, Patton became fed up with Bradley receiving all of the credit for his ideas. As Patton put it, "I do not want any more of my ideas used without credit to me, as happens when I give them orally."

On the surface, this might seem to some people a selfish attitude, but a deeper study and thorough consideration of the situation will offer a better understanding. At Patton's expense, other General Officers were building their careers and gaining undue praise. Patton, himself, was being kept under wraps and he was being virtually ignored. Others of lesser ability were being promoted over him. In reality, he was pushing them up the ladder and they were taking the credit that was honestly due Patton.

Initially Patton did not mind Bradley stealing his ideas because as a soldier he realized that it would help the war effort. As time passed it became evident that the Allies would, indeed, win the war. Patton felt that he had been pushed far enough and that he had been taken advantage of too much. When Patton personally proffered his plans he was ignored. When Bradley put forth Patton's plans, as his own, they were most readily accepted for consideration.

Operation COBRA, the breakout in Normandy by Patton's armored divisions, was actually a slightly altered version of one of Patton's plans, but it was fully credited to Bradley. Actually, it was the first in a series of bold and brilliant plans devised by Patton during 1944.

The third Army staff never doubted that Bradley was making good in France by expropriating their boss's ideas. Patton's aide, Colonel Charles Codman, wrote to his wife, "As of August 1st, General Bradley has adopted practically all of General Patton's plans."

On august 14, 1944, Patton wrote in his diary regarding the St. Lo breakthrough, "It is really a great plan, wholly my own, and I made Bradley think that he thought of it."

Patton eventually became disgusted with the hypocrisy of the higher command. He stopped telling any of his plans to Bradley.

In reality, Patton was probably the best planner in the European Theater of Operations. Indeed, his knowledge of strategy and tactics were to say the least, equal if not superior to any of the high command such as Eisenhower, Bradley, Devers, Clark, and the British. Without exception, his intuitiveness and perceptiveness was never equaled by any of the "masterminds" at SHAEF.

Patton had worked long and hard over the years to become the competent soldier that he was. His years of dedicated study and application were not in vain. He had attended all of the Army's "command level" service schools. He not only graduated from them, but did so with honors.

******

Col. Brenton G. Wallace, a staff officer under Patton, has written a book called "Patton and His Third Army" in which he claims that Patton was chiefly responsible both for the planning and execution of the famous St. Lo breakthrough, which swept on past Avranches and eventually hurled all the German armies out of France.

Battle plan credit, up until now, had gone uncontested to General Omar N. Bradley, who later commanded the 12th Army Group and many experts have laid the brilliant execution of the plan at the door of Lt. Gen. Joseph L. (Lightning Joe) Collins, a corps commander in the First Army.

But Wallace, who served as assistant chief of staff in G-3 (liaison) for the Third Army writes: "The First Army was given credit, whereas Gen. Patton planned it and executed it and used not only First Army troops but also a number of his own Third Army units."



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 4:43:57 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: freeboy

It is difficult for myself in hindsight to find any reasonableness to those criticle of Patton's military prowess, the arguments given seem lumped into two catagories.. the " he was arogent and full of himself" and the "what third army did wasn't so great... "
These arguments are like saying water tastes better when filtered... so what? He didn't like Monty, too similar in arogance perhaps.. and he did get passed over in favor of Bradley... Omar Bradley.. come on now that was a huge mistake!!!
And the thought that the Germans didn't regard him as the allies Ace is ludicrous... read what they actually said. sorry no references handy. Why do you think the Panzers where waiting at Calies? For Monty ggcb(good grief charlie Brown)
Looking at the French 44 45 area in ww2 one wonders at all the errors we see in hindsight.
Troops left in Norway and the Channel Islands.. toxic nerve agent not used on dday against the beaches.. but the crucial air control of the skies was lost well prior to Normandy, and the Eastern Front had bleed Germany badly. I wopuld argue that we look at the performances of this theater in light of the overall ww2 effort. Patton troops outperformed all others in the task at hand. More area taken, troops captured etc.
Would he have done well on the retreat, we'll never know, but he was a take charge and lead by example leader.. never far from his troops. Men, from this period, who I admire did not always like or agree with him. I am scratching my head on this one.. not trying to offend just really do not agree based on considerable study of the period.


freeboy:

I certainly understand your situation. It can be confusing - heheh

What few people, especially writers who write about Patton, fail to understand is: Patton was the consumate actor. They often confuse the "image" that Patton projected, with the military man and the fighter.

Patton believed strongly that a leader should present a very strong prescence to his troops; troops who would be facing death in battle. Patton often practised for hours in front of a mirror, perfecting his "war face". All the clothes he wore - the helmet, pistols, riding crop, etc - were designed to give the soldiers an easily identifiable image of their leader. Even the words and actions he used were done purposefully, to project the image of a tough leader.

In private, however, Patton was a cultured, highly educated man, who not only spoke French and graduated with honours from all of America's top military schools, but he also read widely on almost every subject, especially history.

Patton wrote numerous, well researched papers, and even published a two volume work of poetry.

But at heart, Patton was a warrior, with a warrior's frame of mind. Having never been defeated in battle, Patton believed in formulating plans that maximized enemy casualties while minimizing his own. Defeat, stalemate and appeasement were all repugnant to him.

Brian Horrocks wrote about George Patton in his autobiography A Full Life (1960):

"My first visit to Tripoli came on 15th February when Montgomery laid on a series of lectures, demonstrations and discussions so that the successful battle technique developed by the 8th Army, and particularly our system for joint Army/R.A.F. control, could be passed on to everyone. This was a great get-together for all of us, but my chief memory is of meeting for the first time that remarkable character, General George Patton of the U.S. Army. I found myself walking back to our hotel with Patton after Monty's initial address on " How to make war," so I asked him what he thought of it. He replied in a southern drawl, with a twinkle in his eye: " I may be old, I may be slow, I may be stupid, but it just don't mean nothing to me!"

"It was soon quite obvious that he was neither slow nor stupid. One of the remarkable things about him was the way in which, seemingly at will, he could put on two entirely different acts. Either the fine old southern gentleman and cavalry officer with his polo ponies, or the real tough guy with a steel helmet and two revolvers stuck in his belt. He was unquestionably a very strong personality and had terrific drive. His pet phrase, however sticky the battle might be, was "keep them rolling forward.""


If you want to learn more about the man, I would strongly suggest reading Carlos D'Este's "Patton: A Genius for War". At over 800 pages, it is a very balanced book, that examines Patton as a multi-dimensional man. Reviewers have called it the definitive biography of Patton. It treats its subject with respect, but it does not shy away from the faults Patton had. Highly recommended.



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 7:23:07 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

This is something I 'snipped' from a much longer piece on quite a nice site. It's dealing with part of Pattons drive to relieve Bastogne.

http://www.thetroubleshooters.com/br122.html

quote:

The 352nd Volks Grenadier Division (General Schmidt) on the morning was advancing along the Diekirch-Ettelbruck-Merzig highway in front of, but at a right angle to the American advance from the south. Schmidt was under the impression that his division had broken through the American line and was now marching through undefended, unoccupied country. The 914th Regiment had just entered Ettelbruck when the 318th Infantry appeared. It was the artillery regiment of the 352nd, bringing up the tail of the division east of the town, which ran afoul of the Americans. Quite obviously the Germans did not expect an attack from this direction. The 914th faced left and deployed hurriedly, using the town as a base, but in the process lost its heavy metal, for the German batteries were in no position to engage in an artillery duel, and fell back to Diekirch.


The reason I quote this is to show that the 3rd Army was not driving through 'battle-hardened veterans' in December 1944. The Volksgrenadier divisions were little more than 'Home Guard' units comprised of men previously classed too old or too unfit for combat service.



heheh

With all due respect, but if you are seeking to destroy Third Army's accomplishments, at least be fair-minded about it.

You take this one minor situation and unit, and then project it to cover ALL of Third Army's operations during the entire Bulge operation.

That German unit being where it was indicates:

1) The Germans were not expecting an attack on that flank (and so Patton's attack was a surprise). Any military leader worth his salt knows that you attack the enemy's flank, where he is the weakest.

2) Many other units of Third Army were fighting elsewhere, and not just against this one German unit.

3) Patton firmly believed in hitting the enemy where he was weakest and least expected it. He achieved that in the Bulge.

Many German units that fought in the Battle of the Bulge included some of the very best troops Germany had to offer.

Over 250,000 German troops, well supported by armor and artillery, poured into the Ardennes region. Green American troops, unprepared and vastly outnumbered, were pushed back and a massive pocket was formed in the Allied lines.

These German troops included: the 1st SS Panzer Korps, the 47th Panzer Korps, Kampfrguppe Peiper, the German 7th Armee, the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies, Panzer Lehr and the 5th Parachute divisions, among others.

[image]local://upfiles/279/Qo415243512.jpg[/image]



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 7:45:33 PM)

Further to the above.

The German 352nd VolksGrenadier Division was NOT made up of old men. It was in fact comprised of veteran infantry soldiers who were drawn from a variety of other infantry divisons.

Here is the battle history of this unit:


The 352nd VGD was created at first under various names in December, 1940.

Originally known as the 352 Infantry Division, it suffered heavy losses in Russia, and was reorganized in November, 1943 at St Lô by including the 321st , 389th and 356th Infantry Divisions into it.

This newly reorganized division was again strongly reduced further during D-Day and more specifically during the battles of July, 1944.

In September, it was recreated in Germany by incorporating into it the survivors of the 581st Infantry Division.

It then became known as the 352nd VGD. But it comprised veteran infantry soldiers from various other infantry units.

After a training period on the western front, it participated in the Battle of the Bulge under Erich Otto Schmidt's command, fighting along side of the German veteran 5th Parachute Division.



EricGuitarJames -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 7:47:09 PM)

Von Rom, I'm not using Porch as a 'referee', all I'm doing is pointing out that Patton is controversial figure who invokes passionate debate. If you don't want to read/see/hear opinions which question Patton's reputation as a 'great' general that is entirely your right but it doesn't make for reasoned debate.



EricGuitarJames -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 8:03:09 PM)

quote:

Many German units that fought in the Battle of the Bulge included some of the very best troops Germany had to offer.


Don't try and patronise me sonny, I'm well aware of what troops fought in Wacht Am Rhein. The 6th SS Panzerarmee, which was made up of the best troops with the best equipment, fought in the north. Manteuffels 5th Panzerarmee took the south. 7th Army were intended to secure the southern shoulder which was where Patton attacked. 7th army had only four divisions and were badly stretched in attempting to perform the task expected of them even without Pattons strike towards Bastogne. The 3rd Army did not encounter the best of the Wehrmacht here as they didn't throughout the campaign in Western Europe. Patton's reputation is largely built on his accomplishments in fighting second-rate Italian or German formations. He was never tested against the best and neither was he ever placed in a position whereby he had to stage a 'fighting retreat', the true test of a commander.



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 8:06:56 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

Von Rom, I'm not using Porch as a 'referee', all I'm doing is pointing out that Patton is controversial figure who invokes passionate debate. If you don't want to read/see/hear opinions which question Patton's reputation as a 'great' general that is entirely your right but it doesn't make for reasoned debate.


The last thing I want to read when finding out about someone, is to read a book that only throws praise on that person. On the other hand, if I dislike a person, I also don't want to read a book that obviously throws vindictive on the person. In other words, I search for fairly balanced books that detail not only the good and bad about a person or an event, but is fair-minded about it. I am looking for even-handed treatment that presents all the evidence.

Here is more of Porch's "insightful" understanding of Patton:

"Despite his World War II reputation as the U.S. Army's primary practitioner of armored warfare à la Rommel, Patton was in fact an eleventh-hour convert to tanks, preaching right up to the 1939 fall of Poland the virtues of the horse and the benefits of arming cavalrymen with a straight saber of his own design."

Not only is Porch in gross error in these statements, but even if Porch had done even a light reading into Patton's background, he would have clearly seen that Patton formed the US's first Tank Corps, commanded it, and wrote all the tactical and training manuals for it long before WW2.

His erroneous comments above indicate to me that he not only has failed to even do the slightest background study into Patton, but his writing contains all of the misconceptions that people, who have not read about Patton, contain.

I have read a lot about Patton. And after reading some of Porch's work on that webiste, I realize, reading him is a complete waste of time. It is a waste of time not only because his writing contains numerous errors, but he has also indicated very blatantly his crude approach to dealing with Patton.



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 8:17:27 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

quote:

Many German units that fought in the Battle of the Bulge included some of the very best troops Germany had to offer.


Don't try and patronise me sonny, I'm well aware of what troops fought in Wacht Am Rhein. The 6th SS Panzerarmee, which was made up of the best troops with the best equipment, fought in the north. Manteuffels 5th Panzerarmee took the south. 7th Army were intended to secure the southern shoulder which was where Patton attacked. 7th army had only four divisions and were badly stretched in attempting to perform the task expected of them even without Pattons strike towards Bastogne. The 3rd Army did not encounter the best of the Wehrmacht here as they didn't throughout the campaign in Western Europe. Patton's reputation is largely built on his accomplishments in fighting second-rate Italian or German formations. He was never tested against the best and neither was he ever placed in a position whereby he had to stage a 'fighting retreat', the true test of a commander.


You calling me sonny?

That truly is a compliment. . .

Heheh

Here again, is the battle history of the 352nd VolksGrenadier Division:

Contrary to your assertion, the German 352nd VolksGrenadier Division was NOT made up of old men or poor elements of the "Home Guard". It was in fact comprised of veteran infantry soldiers who were drawn from a variety of other infantry divisons.

Here is the battle history of this unit:

The 352nd VGD was first created in December, 1940 as the 352nd Infantry Division.

Originally known as the 352 Infantry Division, it suffered heavy losses in Russia, and was reorganized in November, 1943 at St Lô by including the 321st , 389th and 356th Infantry Divisions into it.

This newly reorganized division was again strongly reduced further during D-Day and more specifically during the battles of July, 1944.

In September, it was recreated in Germany by incorporating into it the survivors of the 581st Infantry Division.

It then became known as the 352nd VGD. But it comprised veteran infantry soldiers from various other infantry units.

After a training period on the western front, it participated in the Battle of the Bulge under Erich Otto Schmidt's command, fighting along side of the German veteran 5th Parachute Division.


I am always amazed how Patton's accomplishments rankle some people to no end. . .

Heheh

He is attacked on the basis of his character and/or because he supposedly faced poor opposition. . .

Heheh

No matter how much Patton is maligned; no matter how much the facts are distorted and twisted; no matter how much he is wrongly attacked; his critics simply can't undo what he accomplished. . .

heheh

Have a nice day [:)]



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 8:50:51 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames
He was never tested against the best and neither was he ever placed in a position whereby he had to stage a 'fighting retreat', the true test of a commander.


Heheh

Patton didn't believe in retreating; only attacking.

The true test of a commander is in winning battles - not retreating - something Patton did in spades. He never lost a campaign.

Are you suggesting that German surprise attacks upon poor Poland, neutral Belgium, little Norway, France, and the poorly-led rabble of Soviet troops during the opening phase of Barbarossa, was facing the Allies' best? It is interesting that once the Allies re-covered their balance, Germany was then on the defense and retreating . . .

Note how the appearance of the veteran Soviet Siberian troops pushed the Germans back before the gates of Moscow in late 1941/early 1942.

Cheers!



IronDuke_slith -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 10:38:01 PM)

Von Rom,
I think your strategy is to post as much as you can in order to prevent people from arguing back [;)], I haven't got the time to take each post apart, however, I'll have to challenge some of it because I think you are way off. I should have more time rtomorrow [:)]. I'd like to respond as I was annoyed by the quote

quote:

Some of it is complete and utter nonsense. . .

So I am taking the time to post more information and views on Patton and Third Army for the more thoughtful reader.


You never seem to challenge anything I say or debate any of the issues I raise, merely post more details on the same thing. You're yet to tell me where my description of PAtton's actions are wrong, we just get more Pro-Patton opinions given as if they are some even handed and balanced opinion.

What disappointed me were your criticisms of Porch as unbalanced., only days after quoting extensively from the George S Patton fansite. With respect, I think you are guilty as we are of everything you criticise us for. We all seek works to justify our arguments, you included.

I also think some of your research is very faulty (with respect). Your remarks about the 352nd VG in particular seem to be trying to suggest it was a good combat formation.

quote:

The 352nd VGD was created at first under various names in December, 1940.

Originally known as the 352 Infantry Division, it suffered heavy losses in Russia, and was reorganized in November, 1943 at St Lô by including the 321st , 389th and 356th Infantry Divisions into it.

This newly reorganized division was again strongly reduced further during D-Day and more specifically during the battles of July, 1944.

In September, it was recreated in Germany by incorporating into it the survivors of the 581st Infantry Division.


A few problems here. The 352 that fought in Normandy was so badly mauled it's survivors were absorbed by the 2nd Panzer in august. The division was essentially destroyed. The rebuilt 352 was actually the renumbered 581 (as you mention) but there would have been few if any of the 352 Combat veterans from Normandy in the ranks. You call the 581 an infantry division, but it was in fact a Volksgrenadier division of the 32nd wave. Therefore, the 352nd was a Volksgrenadier division like any other, and not anything above that mediocre standard. Your comment:

quote:

It then became known as the 352nd VGD. But it comprised veteran infantry soldiers from various other infantry units.


is nonsense. Not only were the division's personnel largely drawn from the forming Volksgrenadiers of 581, but a large number of surplus naval and luftwaffe personnel were drafted in to make it up to the eventual strength of 13000. This division was the complete opposite of the one you describe.

quote:

After a training period on the western front,


Which would have been very short since the division did not begin to form until 21 September, and fought in the Eiffel before getting involved in the Bulge.

The best account of the Bulge probably remains MacDonald's account (he is a US Army historian). In his OOB at the end of the book he describes the 352 as "Poorly trained and lacked experienced officers."

This division was made up of ex sailors and airplane ground crew together with the usual VG fare of men previously considered too old or unfit for combat together with teenagers. It had few combat veterans, and when formed would have had only a few weeks to train and prepare for what was to come. To suggest Patton met combat veterans when he ran into them is nonsense.

Regards,
IronDuke



IronDuke_slith -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/11/2004 11:00:48 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

'Duke, were you getting tired when you wrote this or was it me not being clear[&:]. Either way, we agree[:)]

Top generals, like top politicians, are rarely blessed with the gift of humility. The 'drive' required to get to the top of the greasy pole tends to negate such qualities. Rather thsn admit to errors they prefer to blame others (Sosabowski at Arnhem) or retrospectively twist facts (Caen, as you mention above) - I only choose these examples as Montgomery is immediate in my mind. Wellington is one of the few in history who made it to the top of both greasy poles yet emerged with his dignity and reputation relatively untarnished by unnecessary self-mythologysing (can you say that? did I spell it correctly? [:D]). One of the reasons I like Slim is that his account of the campaign in India and Burma (Defeat Into Victory - a fine book!) is refreshingly honest with him being candid regarding his own shortcomings and the mistakes he made.


I was tired, It's a war of attrition against a thousand dodgy websites, and I need all the Allies I can get, so my apologies [:)]. Interesting remarks about Slim, I have his autobiography but haven't got around to reading it, yet. I will bear your recommendation in mind.
Regards,
IronDuke



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/12/2004 12:03:17 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Von Rom,
I think your strategy is to post as much as you can in order to prevent people from arguing back [;)], I haven't got the time to take each post apart, however, I'll have to challenge some of it because I think you are way off. I should have more time rtomorrow [:)].

Regards,
IronDuke


My strategy??? [&:]

With all due respect, that is a blatantly false accusation.

There is so much misinformation and basically incorrect information in this thread, that I balanced it out with info about Patton and Third Army. This information is for the interested reader.

As I stated at the beginning of my post, I have posted information that roughly corresponds to the known facts surrounding many incidents about Patton. Many historians agree with these assessments.

I have used the information from "The Unknown Patton" because based on my extensive reading about Patton, most of the info is essentially correct. This just saves me a great deal of typing.

As to the 352 VGD:

GuitarJames made it appear that this division was made up of old men and home guard units.

I have clearly shown that when it fought in the Bulge, it was made of veteran soldiers from several other disbanded infantry divisions. It was then given time to train together as a unit.

It also fought beside the veteran German 5th Parachute Division.

These were only two of several units Third Army engaged.

I have no doubt that when it surrendered it was a beaten and demoralized unit, as most fighting units would be, which had fought in the freezing cold and then had to surrender.

How is any of this incorrect?? [8|][&:]



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/12/2004 12:42:03 AM)

Besides, no one (not the Germans or Allies) expected Patton to be able to attack from the south, since Third Army was heavily engaged fighting the German First Army.

Any army is vulnerable on its flanks. The Germans were at the Bulge, just as the Allies were in France in 1940, and Soviet troops were in 1941 Russia.

The miracle is the Patton was able to disengage Third Army from fighting, and while he had to protect himself from the German First Army, he turned Third Army 90 degrees north in freezing winter weather, and attacked the Germans in the flanks, surprising them.

Everyone, including all Allied Commanders, and most historians, as well as many top German officers, considered what Patton did was brilliant.

General Omar N. Bradley, who had no love for Patton, called his actions in the Bulge "one of the most astonishing feats of generalship of our campaign in the west".

It appears that only you, IronDuke, consider what Patton did was not very good. I guess you must be privy to information and insight that no other high level Allied or German officer or reputable historian has had access to. [&:]

Besides, the American troops that the Germans attacked in the Ardennes were themselves green and resting. So by your estimation, of what value was the German victory over them? Plus, many troops in Patton's Third Army were themselves relatively inexperienced when they attacked north into the German flanks.

Frankly, I just can't see what it is you are trying to argue or prove. . .[&:]



EricGuitarJames -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/12/2004 2:53:03 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Besides, no one (not the Germans or Allies) expected Patton to be able to attack from the south, since Third Army was heavily engaged fighting the German First Army.

The miracle is the Patton was able to disengage Third Army from fighting, and while he had to protect himself from the German First Army, he turned Third Army 90 degrees north in freezing winter weather, and attacked the Germans in the flanks, surprising them.



'Heavily engaged' doing what exactly? Since the First Army was not on the offensive then we must assume that it was the US Third Army which was itself attacking. Therefore Patton switched his axis of offensive through ninety degrees, a clever move but not in itself dangerous to his position.



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/12/2004 3:05:27 AM)

More Praises for General Patton:

1) HASSO VON MANTEUFFEL (1897 - 1978) - von Manteuffel became the Commander-in-Chief of 5th Panzer Army and received the rank of General of the Panzer Troops. In December of 1944, Hasso Von Manteuffel was the commander of 5th Panzer Army, which was ordered to drive across the Meuse to Brussels and Antwerp, protecting the flank of 6th Panzer Army. During the Battle of the Bulge, 5th Panzer Army won tremendous victories and almost succeeded in breaking the Allied lines of defence. On December 16, 1970 Manteuffel praised his old adversary, Gen. George S. Patton. In part: "...General Patton was a master of lightning warfare and the best commander in this reference. Evidence of his excellent command and control of an army are the campaign in Sicily, the break-out in Brittany 1944 and during the Battle of the Bulge Dec. 1944..."

2) In his book Crusade in Europe, Eisenhower praises Patton’s mobility in Sicily: "Speed requires training, fitness, confidence, morale, suitable transport, and skillful leadership. Patton employed these tactics relentlessly, and thus not only minimized casualties but shook the whole Italian Government so forcibly that Mussolini toppled from his position in late July."

3) Also in a letter to Marshall, Eisenhower praised Patton’s "native shrewdness about logistics…and as a truly aggressive commander with brains."



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/12/2004 3:09:49 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Besides, no one (not the Germans or Allies) expected Patton to be able to attack from the south, since Third Army was heavily engaged fighting the German First Army.

The miracle is the Patton was able to disengage Third Army from fighting, and while he had to protect himself from the German First Army, he turned Third Army 90 degrees north in freezing winter weather, and attacked the Germans in the flanks, surprising them.



'Heavily engaged' doing what exactly? Since the First Army was not on the offensive then we must assume that it was the US Third Army which was itself attacking. Therefore Patton switched his axis of offensive through ninety degrees, a clever move but not in itself dangerous to his position.


Not dangerous to Third Army's position?? [&:]

Please consult any reputable historian, Allied Leader or German General for the answer to this highly questionable statement.

It seems you are truly grasping at straws. . . Still trying to find a hole in the dike?[8|]

[



EricGuitarJames -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/12/2004 3:14:31 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames
He was never tested against the best and neither was he ever placed in a position whereby he had to stage a 'fighting retreat', the true test of a commander.


Heheh

Patton didn't believe in retreating; only attacking.

The true test of a commander is in winning battles - not retreating - something Patton did in spades. He never lost a campaign.

Cheers!


It's a reflection of Patton's one dimensional view of warfare and something that was shared by Hitler incidentally. The true master commander knows when to retreat (the old doggeral 'he who fights and runs away lives to fight another day'[:)]), to conserve his forces. He/She sees the battle being fought as part of a greater strategic whole and is aware that 'retreat' does not necessarily equal 'defeat'. The British retreated from Dunkirk in 1940 and returned to France in 1944 to defeat Nazi Germany in concert with their Allies. Thankfully they didn't have a 'Patton' commanding the BEF, otherwise they'd all have been speaking German [:-]



IronDuke_slith -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/12/2004 3:17:52 AM)

I'm really beginning to despair. Your unquestioning acceptance of material favourable to your cause makes debate difficult. This piece is so strewn with historical errors large and small (not just in interpretation but in fact) that it would require hours to put right. Are you saying this was actually written by a historian? How can you say most historians accept this nonsense?

quote:

On June 6th, 1944, the Allied Forces launched "Overlord". The invasion of Normandy. This force, consisting of the First Army (American) and the Second Army (British) was commanded by General Montgomery.

On August 1st, 1944, D-Day+55, Patton's Third Army became officially operational.

Between July 5th, when Third Army had actually landed on French soil, and July 31, Third Army had advanced inland to the town of Avranches. The advance was a total of about 50 miles in 26 days.

In a comparison, Montgomery and his Second British Army had, since D-Day, advanced to the town of Caen, about 10 miles inland. A total of ten miles in 55 days. Montgomery's explanation for his slowness was that he was "re-grouping" in order to pivot at Caen and attack the Germans in force. . .


This is the sort of stuff which gives history a bad name. Montgomery launched several separate Corp sized offensives to take Caen (Charnwood, Epsom, Goodwood) etc. They had also launched these offensives into the teeth of just about every Panzer Division deployed by the Germans into Normandy, including the SS formations that were generally perceived to be the best they had.

To compare the drive on and eventually past Caen to the attacks by Patton's third army is nonsense. One was against the best the Germans had, the other was through a hole made by 1st US Army into an area largely only defended now by German MPs and the kitchen units. How can you compare these offensives without seeing the context? Raw statisticss mean nothing unless understood and assessed in context.

quote:

By August 11, D-Day+66, Patton and his Third Army had broken completely out of the Cherbourg peninsula. He had advanced south, west, east, and north. Third Army had ripped a hole through the German Seventh Army and had roared "hell for leather" through the towns of Avranches, Mortain, Fougeres, Vitre, Mayenne, and Laval. They had made a sharp 90 degree turn at Le Mans and attacked north to the town of Alecon. They had gone a total of 200 miles in 10 days. . . .


This is palpably untrue. 3rd Army did not rip a hole in German 7th Army, the hole was already there. This makes it sound as if Patton fought some sort of breakout battle. Also look at the map. Once through the german front line Patton turned west into Brittany in the complete opposite direction to where the Falaise pocket and the German Field Army in Normandy was. How can you hold this up as some sort of Strategic brilliance????? You also seem obsessed (both in Sicily and Normandy and France) with how many miles Patton covered. It seems to escape you that if there is no one standing in front of you, only the maximum speed of your vehicles and the size of your petrol tanks limits how far you can advance and how quickly. I appeal to you, tell me where in any of these advances, Patton did any serious fighting? Name any battles fought along the way that we can discuss, please don't keep on quoting Patton fanboys who make their points by lifting his actions out of context. Lets talk specifics.

quote:

By August 15th, D-Day+70, Third Army units (the Second French Armored Division and the 90th American Infantry Division) had reached Argentan, a town about 12 miles from Falaise. Canadian troops under Montgomery had reached the outskirts of Falaise. August 17th, D-Day+72, saw Patton's 90th Division and Second French Division joined by the 80th Infantry Division at Argentan. Montgomery's Second Army was still about 10 miles from Falaise.

At this point, there was a gap of 12 miles between Falaise to Argentan through which the German Seventh Army was escaping. Patton and his Third Army had moved 250 miles in 17 days. They had completely encircled the German Seventh Army, and were now ready to advance directly to Falaise. Blocking their escape and destroying them would be like shooting fish in a barrel. . . .

Third Army was poised and ready for one of the swiftest, greatest victories in all of history. Closing the gap between the two towns was a matter of hours. The 15th Corps had the tanks and troops necessary to put up a solid wall of men and armor. The Germans were completely confused and running for their lives. Then, the order arrived from SHAEF. HALT!


Who on earth writes this? Firstly, we've already seen the quotes in this thread from Bradley's autobiography stating that he rang Patton and told him to stop. Bradley did not belong to SHAEF. SHAEF was Eisenhower's HQ. Tactical command of the ground units in Normandy rested with 21st Army Group (commanded by Montgomery) although in practice, since Bradley had activated 3rd Army, handed over command to Hodges of 1st Army, and assumed command of US 12th Army Group, he was largely free to do what he liked as Montgomery at this stage did not feel able to control the US forces that now matched his own in size. Bradley was not independent, but he was no longer Monty's strict subordinate. It was 12th Army Group that gave Patton's third army the order. A proper historian should know this, so why such the basic error???

Secondly, 90th Infantry division had number of problems during the Normandy campaign. It was not one of the better performing divisions, certainly at that stage. It is not true to say it would have been like shooting fish in a barrel. Bradley realised that the units would have been attacked persistently by German forces looking to break through. The list of units who would have attempted it reads like a who's who of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS in 1944. Bradley knew the units in and around Falaise were being bombarded by artillery and from the air. Most German casualties were not caused by Allied ground units, but by air and artillery. They were already fish in the barrel, and Bradley felt (rightly or wrongly) giving them Americans to shoot back at was not wise in the circumstances.

quote:

Patton and his Third Army were ordered NOT to seize Falaise.

What the Germans were powerless to do, SHAEF did for them.


More of this SHAEF business. What does this say about this researcher's abilities?

quote:

There were later two explanations given for the order to stop Patton. First, SHAEF claimed that the British had "heavily sewn the Falaise area with time bombs." Secondly, Bradley claimed that he not only feared a head on collision of the British and Americans, he also was worried that the fleeing Germans might "trample" the Third Army in it's rush to escape.

The first claim was an outright lie to cover political chicanery.

The second claim by Bradley made no sense at all. They were noises made by a subordinate to obfuscate and condone an error by his superiors. Had the proper order been issued, the British could have held their position and there would have been no possibility of a "collision" of British and American forces.

Regarding Bradley's anxiety about Third Army being "trampled", it is incredible and difficult to imagine two Infantry Divisions and an Armored Division being "trampled" by a thoroughly routed enemy. Evidently, the thought never occurred to Bradley that the enemy might consider surrendering.

The real reason behind the halting of Third Army was Montgomery. He insisted, or rather, demanded that he be allowed to close the gap. He did not want Patton to spring the trap that Third Army had set. Monty wanted the glory and the credit for the "ripe plum" situation which was created by Patton's brilliant leadership and Third Army's speed and daring execution. He received neither. He did not close the gap in time, and he allowed a great number of Germans to live to fight another day.


This is paranoid fantasy. The author has at least now decided that Bradley played a part in this, not just SHAEF. The evidence overwhelmingly shows (as Hastings in "Overlord" and D'Este in "Decision in Normandy" clearly demonstrate to all but those who refuse to see) that Bradley alone decided that Haislip's Corp should halt at Argentan and not close the gap. Bradley himself stated this, that the decision to halt was his and his alone. As I have stated, the 90th Infantry was not the best formation in the US OOB, and the Germans in the pocket were thought to number tens of thousands. Some American units had already fought fierce breakout batles with the Germans, and Bradley feared the division would be mauled. Eisenhower concurred with the decision. Once ordered to halt, Patton actually requested permission to send one of his Corps off towards the Seine (the so called long hook) in an attempt to seize bridgeheads, and cut off further German forces. PAtton (and his fans) may have seen the gap as an attempt for glory, but Bradley was more concerned with lives. The German army was being destroyed as it stumbled out of the gap. Why put American lives on the line when Artillery and air strikes were already doing the job.


quote:

Montgomery failed to reach Falaise until the 19th of August, D-Day+74. During that time, with Patton halted at Argentan, the great bulk of the German Army managed to escape through the 12 mile gap. What would have been one of the great and memorable victories of all time was lost due to one of SHAEF's oleaginous political schemes.

After this major blunder had been accomplished and became part of history, Patton wrote in his diary, "The 15th Corps could have easily entered the town of Falaise and completely closed the gap to Argentan. This halt was a great mistake as I was certain that we could have entered Falaise and I was not certain that the British would. As a matter of fact, we had reconnaissance parties near the town when we were ordered to pull back." Patton was correct, yet his advice went unheeded.


If the great bulk of the German Army were trapped in the pocket, how could one average American Corp have held it up? D'Este and Hastings both thought that on the basis of the information available, Bradley was right to give the halt order. Only those ignorant of military reality (and upset that George wasn't allowed to win the war on his own) would assume that having gotten there (which was never the issue), Patton would have been able to stay there. As it was, out of 6 panzer divisions, less than a hundred tanks escaped. The germans were all but destroyed. A great victory was won.

I'm presuming this stuff comes from Rohmer's Patton's Gap? D'Este had this to say about the book.

"He used an extract from de Pogue's notes of the Williams interview, which, by his own admission, he obtained over the telephone, as a basis for drawing a sweeping and highly innaccurate conclusion that Montgomery bore sole responsibility for failing to close the Falaise gap."

Hmmmm.....?

Furthermore, it seems Rohmer was largely driven by a dislike for Montgomery and that coupled with poor research created this fantasy which no other serious historian (contrary to your own sweeping statements) takes seriously.

Regards,
IronDuke



EricGuitarJames -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/12/2004 3:22:15 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Besides, no one (not the Germans or Allies) expected Patton to be able to attack from the south, since Third Army was heavily engaged fighting the German First Army.

The miracle is the Patton was able to disengage Third Army from fighting, and while he had to protect himself from the German First Army, he turned Third Army 90 degrees north in freezing winter weather, and attacked the Germans in the flanks, surprising them.



'Heavily engaged' doing what exactly? Since the First Army was not on the offensive then we must assume that it was the US Third Army which was itself attacking. Therefore Patton switched his axis of offensive through ninety degrees, a clever move but not in itself dangerous to his position.


Not dangerous to Third Army's position?? [&:]

Please consult any reputable historian, Allied Leader or German General for the answer to this highly questionable statement.

It seems you are truly grasping at straws. . . [8|]


Nope, you've already said that the best of the German troops were engaged in the 'Bulge' offensive. In any case, Patton didn't attack with his whole army, he merely 'refused' the front facing east, switching the rest of his army to attack northwards.



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/12/2004 3:23:24 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames
He was never tested against the best and neither was he ever placed in a position whereby he had to stage a 'fighting retreat', the true test of a commander.


Heheh

Patton didn't believe in retreating; only attacking.

The true test of a commander is in winning battles - not retreating - something Patton did in spades. He never lost a campaign.

Cheers!


It's a reflection of Patton's one dimensional view of warfare and something that was shared by Hitler incidentally. The true master commander knows when to retreat (the old doggeral 'he who fights and runs away lives to fight another day'[:)]), to conserve his forces. He/She sees the battle being fought as part of a greater strategic whole and is aware that 'retreat' does not necessarily equal 'defeat'. The British retreated from Dunkirk in 1940 and returned to France in 1944 to defeat Nazi Germany in concert with their Allies. Thankfully they didn't have a 'Patton' commanding the BEF, otherwise they'd all have been speaking German [:-]



Heheh

Patton would never have been caught as the Allies were in 1940 - now that is a brilliant commander.

He anticipated many of the German moves BEFORE they happened, especially in the Bugle. . .



IronDuke_slith -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/12/2004 3:29:19 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

quote:

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Von Rom,
I think your strategy is to post as much as you can in order to prevent people from arguing back [;)], I haven't got the time to take each post apart, however, I'll have to challenge some of it because I think you are way off. I should have more time rtomorrow [:)].

Regards,
IronDuke


My strategy??? [&:]

With all due respect, that is a blatantly false accusation.

There is so much misinformation and basically incorrect information in this thread, that I balanced it out with info about Patton and Third Army. This information is for the interested reader.

As I stated at the beginning of my post, I have posted information that roughly corresponds to the known facts surrounding many incidents about Patton. Many historians agree with these assessments.

I have used the information from "The Unknown Patton" because based on my extensive reading about Patton, most of the info is essentially correct. This just saves me a great deal of typing.

As to the 352 VGD:

GuitarJames made it appear that this division was made up of old men and home guard units.

I have clearly shown that when it fought in the Bulge, it was made of veteran soldiers from several other disbanded infantry divisions. It was then given time to train together as a unit.

It also fought beside the veteran German 5th Parachute Division.

These were only two of several units Third Army engaged.

I have no doubt that when it surrendered it was a beaten and demoralized unit, as most fighting units would be, which had fought in the freezing cold and then had to surrender.

How is any of this incorrect?? [8|][&:]


Do you actually read anything that I write? You say time and time again that "most historians" agree with you. I then quote historians who don't. Which historians agree with you? Don't just say "they" agree, quote their conclusions that match yours. Just because you say something time and again, doesn't make it true. You have to prove it, something you seem unwilling to do. So far, you've cited the George S Patton website (really unbiased source) and possibly Rohmer, who D'este (a historian you've praised) severly criticised for poor method and innaccurate conclusions in "Patton's gap". How can you credit these sources? Don't tell us historians agree with you, name them so we can assess their credentials. Read my posts, I cram them with quotes and references from historians, please do the same.

Also,

quote:

I have clearly shown that when it fought in the Bulge, it was made of veteran soldiers from several other disbanded infantry divisions. It was then given time to train together as a unit.


This is the most astonishing statement. You didn't demonstrate it, please requote (to make me look stupid) where you proved it. You merely stated it. and have again repeated it. At no point have you proved it. Saying something is so doesn't make it true. My description of the 352 was based on works by Nafziger, Mitcham and MacDonald, all recognised historians with good reputations. PLEASE, PLEASE, PLEASE tell us where you got this information from that was not available to these men? Their works will require updating.

Regards,
IronDuke



EricGuitarJames -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/12/2004 3:30:01 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Heheh

Patton would never have been caught as the Allies were in 1940 - now that is a brilliant commander.

He anticipated many of the German moves BEFORE they happened, especially in the Bugle. . .


Oh I give up! I had hoped that this would be a discussion based on facts, instead I'm faced with this subjective nonsense. Bye, bye Matrix.



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/12/2004 3:35:40 AM)

IronDuke:

Your way of writing and arguing is very frustrating.

What you are arguing is inconsequential.

You simply cannot see the forest for the trees [8|]

I used that site for an overview of facts related to the Falaise Gap.

What is IMPORTANT is the failure to close the Falaise Gap. Can't you SEE that?

Patton was ORDERED NOT to close the Gap. Can't you grasp this bit of information?

Slight errors in who reported to who, or if a few dates are off, really doesn't matter. Can't you grasp the BIGGER picture?

Patton was ordered to stop and NOT close the Falasie Gap. By not closing the Gap, 75,000 German soldiers escaped.

Patton, in his own diaries, written at the time, also says so, as well as many historians.

Again, you write a great deal, but you do not deal with central issues!

It's like wanting to use bricks to build a house, but instead you focus on hammering a few nails into a board.. . .

YOU say Patton could not have closed the Gap.

But patton and others felt otherwise.


As to the 352 VGD:

Who cares?

What is the point of going on and on about the 352nd GVD?

Many troops in Patton's Third Army were inexperienced. So what?

He caught the German's napping and hit them in an exposed flank.

Can't you see the bigger picture of what EVERYONE ELSE can see in what Patton accomplished at the Bulge??



Von Rom -> RE: Why was Patton so great? (7/12/2004 3:37:29 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames

quote:

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Heheh

Patton would never have been caught as the Allies were in 1940 - now that is a brilliant commander.

He anticipated many of the German moves BEFORE they happened, especially in the Bugle. . .


Oh I give up! I had hoped that this would be a discussion based on facts, instead I'm faced with this subjective nonsense. Bye, bye Matrix.


Heheh

Facts?

That is all I have provided in this thread.

Sorry to see you go. . .



Page: <<   < prev  2 3 [4] 5 6   next >   >>

Valid CSS!




Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI
0.9375