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Von Rom -> RE: Who was better: Patton or Rommel (8/6/2004 3:54:52 AM)
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ORIGINAL: IronDuke
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ORIGINAL: Von Rom
Ironduke:
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As for Rommel versus Patton. Rommel was a more rounded Commander, and I think he possessed (usually) a purpose to his manouevre which Patton lacked.
Give me one example of Patton's lacking purpose in maneuvre.
Von Rom,
I am prepared to reply to this, but if my points are ignored, or rejected without evidence to the contrary, or buried beneath long passages of questionable relevance, I reserve the right to just talk to the others. I'm not getting into another Patton thread situation.
In addition to General McNair's comments after watching Patton's manouevres (in Louisiana if memory serves) in 1941 "This is no way to fight a war".; you could also cite the right turn with sizeable forces into Brittany after the breakout; indeed the entire attack into Brittany. On the 3rd August, Bradley (an Army Group Commander at this point) was at Middleton's HQ (A Corp Commander) concerned at the spread out dispositions of the troops, was ordering some of Patton's divisions about to cover the flanks. He was interfering in Patton's command because he felt the advance was everywhere at once and not tactically sound.
To quote Farago:
"...he (Patton) usually confined his piecemeal operations to skirmishes with stragglers, instead of interfering strategically with the enemy's communication zone. While he did succeed in places and in parts in preventing the enemy from forming a front, he did not destroy enough of his units to make more than a dent in his strength".
If you don't like Farago, try Weigley:
"He did not ruinously disrupt the enemy's communication's zone. His traps failed too often to close on the enemy's main forces. Principally, he occupied ground rather than destroying armies."
Ultimately, it lacked purpose because it was an advance for advancing's sake. Rommel manouevred in order to outflank, encircle and defeat all manner of defences. You can see the purpose of his manouevres through the desert campaign.
The final example would be Sicily. An offensive considered insane by his senior Corp Commander, and which was considered a glory drive by his senior Divisional Commander. Perhaps I am wrong to say it had no purpose, I should have said it had the wrong purpose.
Regards,
Ironduke
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I am prepared to reply to this, but if my points are ignored, or rejected without evidence to the contrary, or buried beneath long passages of questionable relevance, I reserve the right to just talk to the others. I'm not getting into another Patton thread situation.
Well, just be sure you don't ignore my points or call me disparaging names as you had hinted at on several ocassions in that "other" thread.
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In addition to General McNair's comments after watching Patton's manouevres (in Louisiana if memory serves) in 1941 "This is no way to fight a war".;
So, you use a pre-war trainig exercise as an indication of Patton's expertise in maneuvers? [8|]
BTW, how well did you spell in grade 8 compared to today?
Even so, let's look at McNair's training exercies in 1941:
It is very clear that McNair and a few others were out to try to discredit Patton and his armor theories:
"A conspiracy was developing in the War Department to take the wind out of the sails of the 'armor boys' and once and for all discredit the tank as a panecea. It was no longer a secret in the inner circles of the Army that the big maneuvres. . . were being deliberately rigged against armor" (Ladislas, Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., 1964), p. 158)
Further:
Patton was winning in the maneuveres when "McNair ordered the umpires to cut Patton down to size. After that, every decision went against him. But so devastating were his tactics that in the end McNair was forced to call off the exercises 12 hours ahead of their allotted period because Patton had wrapped them up and left nothing more to do" (Ladislas, Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., 1964), p. 161)
So much for McNair.
Even though the maneuveres were rigged against him, Patton's expert blitz of his forces ended the maneuveres 12 hours early. . .
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you could also cite the right turn with sizeable forces into Brittany after the breakout; indeed the entire attack into Brittany. On the 3rd August, Bradley (an Army Group Commander at this point) was at Middleton's HQ (A Corp Commander) concerned at the spread out dispositions of the troops, was ordering some of Patton's divisions about to cover the flanks. He was interfering in Patton's command because he felt the advance was everywhere at once and not tactically sound.
Not sure where you are getting your information, but that is all incorrect.
Patton was ORDERED to seize Brittany:
"Patton's latest directive - to secure Brittany - had been issued to him by General Montgomery on July 27th. It was repeated verbally on August 1st, the written confirmation of the verbal order, now coming from Bradley, the new Army Group Commnader, reaching Patton four days later" (Ladislas, Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., 1964), p. 480).
As to Patton's flanks, Third Army XIX TAC flew 12,000 sorties in August alone to cover his flanks. This coordination between Third Army and its air wing has been considered one of the most brilliant air/land combinations of the war.
“By the summer of 1944, Allied forces had four fighter-bomber tactical air commands supporting the designated field armies in Europe; in the fall they added a fifth. Of these, the team of Third Army, commanded by Lt Gen George S. Patton, and XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC), led by Brig Gen Otto P. Weyland, deserves special attention as the most spectacular Allied air-ground team of the Second World War.
"The Patton-Weyland relationship arguably proved the most satisfying of all such partnerships between air and ground commanders during the conflict. It remains today a model for air-ground cooperation.” p. 147 “...The problems and frustrations encountered in North Africa led to important improvements in command, control and operations. By the time of the Normandy buildup in 1944, many of the participants involved had lived through North Africa and Sicily. They had tested doctrine under combat conditions, worked out problems, and created bonds that they brought to the northwest European campaign.” p. 148"
http://www.belisarius.com/modern_business_strategy/moore/mie_29.htm
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"...he (Patton) usually confined his piecemeal operations to skirmishes with stragglers, instead of interfering strategically with the enemy's communication zone. While he did succeed in places and in parts in preventing the enemy from forming a front, he did not destroy enough of his units to make more than a dent in his strength".
If you don't like Farago, try Weigley:
"He did not ruinously disrupt the enemy's communication's zone. His traps failed too often to close on the enemy's main forces. Principally, he occupied ground rather than destroying armies."
Ultimately, it lacked purpose because it was an advance for advancing's sake. Rommel manouevred in order to outflank, encircle and defeat all manner of defences. You can see the purpose of his manouevres through the desert campaign.
The final example would be Sicily. An offensive considered insane by his senior Corp Commander, and which was considered a glory drive by his senior Divisional Commander. Perhaps I am wrong to say it had no purpose, I should have said it had the wrong purpose.
Many of these comments are purely vacuuous and contain NO EVIDENCE.
Most of these are just general comments and really carry NO WEIGHT.
Patton bypassed opposition so he could ENCIRCLE HIS ENEMY, such as in Falaise.
This is exactly what the Germans did in France - which you spoke so highly about.
That is the goal of most brilliant commanders: to out-flank, encircle and trap the enemy.
This is exactly what Patton did.
As for Sicily:
Alexander kept Third Army INACTIVE FOR two weeks. Fed up, Patton got permission from Alexander to seize Palermo, then conducted three amphibious operations, and then he took Messina.
Even with a two week delay, Patton still beat Monty to Messina, who was engaged in tough frontal fighting against entrenched axis forces in mountainous terrain.
Had Patton been allowed to drive for Messina TWO WEEKS EARLIER, he could have bagged all the Axis forces on Sicily.
You keep harping on Bradley's comments. Yet it is well known that Bradley disliked Patton.
However, BOTH Alexander and Monty agreed that Patton's drive was the CORRECT ONE.
Decisively defeating an enemy force requires dominant maneuver throughout the depth of the battle space. Dominance requires seeing activity in the battle space, moving rapidly through its depth and directing firepower to dominate the maneuver relationship. Final dominance comes through simultaneously applying firepower and controlling terrain.
Relational maneuver creates a decisive impact on a campaign by securing operational advantages before battle or exploiting tactical success. By avoiding enemy strengths, relational maneuver attempts to incapacitate through systematic disruption rather than physical destruction. The potential advantages are disproportionate to the effort and resources involved. Facilitating maneuver with firepower can yield astounding results such as Operation Neptune to establish the Normandy lodgment or Operation Cobra to break out of the lodgment.
In contrast to those sources you cited, here are the comments by three leading German authorities who knew all about Patton's abilities:
Percy Ernst Schramm, the distinquished historian who was one of the keepers of the German High Command's war diary, stated: "'The breakout paved the way for a new situation. The struggle that hitherto resembled 1918, with two more or less static fronts, now developed into a war of movement whose speed surpassed, if possible, that of the [German] campaign of 1940'" (Ladislas, Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., 1964), p. 505).
General Siegfried Westphal, who was von Rundstedt's Chief of Staff in the west, wrote: "'As far as General Patton was concerned, I was of the opinion even then that he was by far the outstanding commander in the [enemy] camp. Above all else, Patton was remarkable for his determined and bold actions" (Ladislas, Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., 1964), p. 505).
General Blumentritt wrote: "'We regarded General Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive Panzer-General of the Allies, a man of incredible initiative and lightning-like action. He resembled our own Panzer-General Guderian. His operations impressed us enormously, probably because he came closest to our concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon's basic tenet-activitee, vitesse-vitesse" (Ladislas, Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., 1964), p. 505).
"It was Marshall's firm belief that Patton was the Army's greatest human asset in the field to score decisive victories over the fast-moving Germans. He came to regard him as absolutely indispensable for the triumph of American arms in the Second World War. . . . Patton was to General Marshall the ideal of an American officer - organizer, trainer, combat leader. Marshall knew only too well that there were not many officers like that in the United States or, for that matter, in any man's army anywhere in the world" (Ladislas, Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Astor-Honor, Inc., 1964), pp. 131-32).
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