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Cav Trooper -> RE: would someone total the Russian resources and post it here? (11/20/2004 6:05:54 PM)
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After reading the whole article, I came to a couple of conclusions:
1: As we all know, WITP land combat is really out of synch with actual operations, compared to this account. I further acknowledge that this is a very intensely debated subject and will not comment any further.
2: Russian Airpower in the article is a very effective force for the Japanese to contend with, although not a monster which can not be overcome, it is nonetheless a force mulitplier to contend with.
3: The Russian Army, at the time, was more of a factor to contend with, actually surpassing the Japanese Army capabilities in some respects.
4: Confirms the reluctance of the Japanese High Command to seriously consider a North First Option, which actually probably contributed to the PH attack decision in more ways than one. Therefore, I see the result of this basically forcing the Japanese hand to move south vs. north in no uncertain terms.
Now, for Hirohito's strategy:
1. Based upon this, admittingly upon one article without other references, it seems to me that the time needed to conclude his operations is very very generous, massively underestimated and totally skewed out of all proportions compared to actual conditions of the time. Factor in the "defense in depth", leadership on the Russian side, and overall lack of equal leadership on the Japanese side, I do not see the end state occuring as rapidly as Hirohito claims (in historical terms not game) with the lack of deterimental effects to the Japanese Army forces committed that he claims in his scenario. I believe the effect(s) on the Japanese forces would be atleast a 60% reduction in combat capability for atleast 6 months to a year, just to replace manpower, equpiment and unit cohesiveness.
2. The Russian supply is even more tenious than we assumed, and to some degree so is the Japanese. With this in mind I believe, IMHO, both sides ability to wage sustained high intensity broad front offensive combat operations would be extremely difficult if not impossible over the long term, for strategic gains. So, in game terms, a longer lead up and supply positioning time would be required before large scale operations commence for the Japanese, not the quick move and attack concept as proposed.
3. The Japanese would also have to move in a larger Air component than originally indicated, thereby, in my honest opinion, have a larger detrimental effect on future Air operations, post campaign than assumed. Plus I believe that it would severely tax the production ability of Japan to make up the losses to the degree that it would actually make Japan's Air assets weaker in the long run post 43 than assumed, thereby weakening the defence even more than it will be already.
So, in conclusion, Hirohito's strategy, while appearing to be sound in theory, I believe that it is a reciepe for disaster in the long run, and the return will be less than what was invested, thereby creating a deficit instead of a surplus.
comments???
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